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Abstract 
  
This dissertation examines the influence of the US Army experience in military 
government and occupation missions on occupations conducted during and immediately after 
World War II.  The study concludes that army occupation experiences between the end of the 
Civil War and World War II positively influenced the occupations that occurred during and after 
World War II.  The study specifically examines occupation and government operations in the 
post-Civil War American South, Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico, post-World War I Germany, and 
the major occupations associated with World War II in Italy, Germany, and Japan.  Though 
historians have examined individual occupations, none has studied the entirety of the American 
army‘s experience with these operations.  This dissertation finds that significant elements of 
continuity exist between the occupations, so much so that by the World War II period it discerns 
a unique American way of conducting occupation operations.  Army doctrine was one of the 
major facilitators of continuity.  An additional and perhaps more important factor affecting the 
continuity between occupations was the army‘s institutional culture, which accepted occupation 
missions as both important and necessary.  An institutional understanding of occupation 
operations developed over time as the army repeatedly performed the mission or similar 
nontraditional military tasks.  Institutional culture ensured an understanding of the occupation 
mission passed informally from generation to generation of army officers through a complex 
network of formal and informal, professional and personal relationships.  That network of 
relationships was so complete that the World War II generation of leaders including Generals 
Marshall, Eisenhower, Clay and MacArthur, and Secretary of War Stimson, all had direct 
personal ties to individuals who served in key positions in previous occupations in the 
Philippines, Cuba, Mexico, or the Rhineland.  Doctrine and the cultural understanding of the 
occupation mission influenced the army to devote major resources and command attention to 
occupation operations during and after World War II.  Robust resourcing and the focus of leaders 
were key to overcoming the inevitable shortfalls in policy and planning that occurred during the 
war.  These efforts contributed significantly to the success of the military occupations of Japan 
and Germany after World War II. 
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CHAPTER 1 - US Army Occupation Operations, 1865–1952 
A much-researched aspect of the history of World War II is the two major military 
occupations that occurred because of the war:  the occupations of Germany and Japan.  Hosts of 
specialists in Japanese and German history have examined these operations.  Cold War historians 
have also looked at the operations.  However, except for Earl Ziemke‘s official history of the 
first years of the occupation of Germany, military historians have tended to avoid the tedious and 
nontraditional area of World War II military government and occupation.
1
  Occupations are, 
however, critical to both the history of the US Army and to a complete understanding of war.  
For example, the generally accepted decisive victory of the Union over Confederate forces in the 
American Civil War is much less clear when viewed through the prism of the failure of 
Reconstruction. Similarly, General William T. Sherman‘s place in army history must also 
consider his staunch opposition to employing army troops in defense of the rights of freed slaves 
and Republican state governments during Reconstruction.   The army was an important part of 
the history of Reconstruction, and the army‘s actions during Reconstruction are an important part 
of the army‘s history.  Other army occupation missions, including Cuba and the Philippines after 
the Spanish-American War and the Rhineland after World War I, are also important to 
understanding and analyzing those conflicts.  Post-conflict military operations are a critical and 
often ignored aspect of military history, particularly American military history.  
No history has comprehensively examined the record of the US Army in occupation 
operations.  This dissertation examines the US Army experience conducting post-conflict 
operations from 1865 to 1949.  It argues that linkage exists between the success of the post-
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 Earl Ziemke, The US Army Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946 (Washington D.C.:  Center of Military 
History, 1975). 
 2 
World War II operations and the eighty years of US Army experience with military government 
and occupation prior to that success.  Historians have examined the individual army efforts in 
occupation operations but most have failed to identify the continuity between those operations 
and the other important occupations in the army‘s history. No history has comprehensively 
examined US Army occupation operations (and only one has tried) across this period.  This work 
looks at the history of the US Army occupations, beginning with Reconstruction and identifies 
several lines of continuity among the operations.  The continuity is sufficiently explicit that it 
constitutes an American Way of Occupation.  The American Way of Occupation focuses on 
forming democratic government, accepts civilian-led political policy, appreciates indigenous 
culture, supports public education, stresses law and order, and emphasizes the health and welfare 
of the population. Also characteristic of American occupations, but in a negative way, were the 
consistent lack of strategic political guidance and the lack of appreciation of the importance of 
economic development to political stabilization. This continuity in American occupation 
operations played an important role in the success of the World War II occupation in Germany 
and Japan.  Among many other things, the early experiences focused the World War II military 
leadership on the issue and ensured adequate planning and robust resourcing of occupation 
operations. 
How the army internalized the occupation experience as a part of its institutional culture 
is another important aspect of the history of occupations from 1865 to 1952.  Military 
institutional culture, and its historical impacts are another subject that has not received the 
attention it deserves from military historians.  The US Army entered World War II with an 
institutional culture that recognized the strategic importance of occupation operations based on 
the army‘s historical experience.  The army‘s doctrine and military education system helped pass 
 3 
the culture to the World War II generation of leaders.  More importantly, previous generations of 
army leaders who were the veterans of occupations during Reconstruction, on the frontier, and 
after the Spanish-American War, passed their knowledge to the next generation of army leaders 
through a complex network of personal relationships.  Those veterans, Generals Arthur 
MacArthur and John Pershing among them, mentored and coached the leaders of World War II, 
sharing their experiences, and therefore their understanding of the links between occupation 
operations and strategic success.  
Only one author attempts to address the American experience with occupation operations 
and military government comprehensively and that is Stanley Sandler in Glad to See them Come 
and Sorry to See them Go:  A History of US Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 
1775-1991.
2
 His is the only attempt to describe the broad history of army civil affairs and 
military government.  However, Sandler differs from the present work in two important respects.  
First, as the title indicates, Sandler focuses on tactical civil affairs and military government.  
Thus, his work does not approach the subject at the strategic and operational level nor does it 
consistently address key aspects such as doctrine, planning, training, organization and execution 
of occupation operations.  Because the focus is tactical, the continuity of the American army‘s 
institutional approach to occupation operations remains unexplored.  In addition, Sandler covers 
a much broader time period than this project.  Sandler begins with an examination of civil-
military operations during the 1775 American invasion of Canada and ends with operations in 
the early 1990s. Such a broad survey limits the depth in Sandler, causes him to cover the 
incidental operations as well as the strategically critical occupations, and thus fails to highlight 
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the critical operations from 1865 to 1949.  Still, Sandler ably makes the point that civil-military 
operations are an important part of the US military experience.   
During the post-Civil War Reconstruction, the US Army executed its first large-scale 
post-conflict occupation.  Reconstruction established the basic pattern of operations and 
identified many of its salient challenges linking the American experience over several decades.  
During Reconstruction, the army occupied all of the former Confederate states.  One of the 
strategic goals was permanent and important political and social transformation.  The experience 
of army leaders in the process became part of the army tradition that informed and guided army 
officers who conducted subsequent occupation operations.  The United States Army and 
Reconstruction, by James E. Sefton, is the only look at army operations in support of the 
Reconstruction in all of the Southern states.
3
  Sefton argues that despite the army‘s presence 
throughout the South form more than a decade, the failure of Reconstruction was inevitable.  His 
view is that President Johnson‘s Presidential Reconstruction policy, which essentially turned 
over control of the South to former Confederates, was the only realistic solution to the chaos in 
the postwar South.  The title of Sefton‘s final chapter, ―The Only Possible Ending,‖ represents 
how closed he is to any possibility of Reconstruction success. Unfortunately, Sefton‘s analysis is 
both shallow and wrong.  To Sefton, politically moderate Union Generals George Meade, 
William Sherman, and John Schofield were wise army officers who recognized the hopelessness 
of using the military to enforce the unrealistic radical policies of Reconstruction.  His analysis is 
very incomplete:  he does not examine the impact that Johnson‘s major change in national policy 
had on the army‘s ability to be effective, he does not address the issues of moral right or wrong 
during Reconstruction, and he does not link Reconstruction to the Union war aims.  Sefton also 
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makes no issue of the completely different approaches toward Reconstruction of the two 
Commanding Generals of that period, Ulysses Grant and William Sherman.  Those differences, 
arguably, had a significant impact on the manner and effectiveness of the army in 
Reconstruction.  Sefton concludes that Reconstruction was a hopeless task without which the 
army was better off without.  Sefton misses much that is essential regarding the army‘s role in 
Reconstruction, most importantly, that the US Army, if properly guided by policy and leaders 
dedicated to the mission, was much more capable transforming the former Confederate states 
than it was in practice. 
The biggest shortcoming of Sefton‘s work is the explicit contention that there is no 
connection between the army‘s experience during Reconstruction and subsequent army history.  
This is not only not true, but also not possible.  It is true that the occupation of the South was an 
unpleasant duty for many officers, and that the General Sherman did not think occupation 
operations were the appropriate role for the army.  Still, a large portion of the army served in the 
South and the mission lasted twelve years.  The intensity of the mission and the length of the 
army occupation presence had to have effects.  The use of General Order 100 to control violence 
in the South after the war, and its publication and use by the army in the Philippines thirty-five 
years later is only one of the many links between the army in Civil War Reconstruction and later 
events in army history.
4
   
 The army‘s history on the frontier is important for several reasons.  It was the formative 
period for many officers such as Generals Arthur MacArthur, Elwell Otis, Hugh Scott, J. 
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 6 
Franklin Bell, Leonard Wood, and John Pershing —important leaders of military government 
operations and the men who led the army into the twentieth century.  It was also an important 
period because the army performed numerous missions on the frontier that did not involve 
fighting.  The major aspect of the army‘s frontier history that military historians have focused on 
is the army‘s guerrilla war with the Indians.  However, the amount of fighting that actually 
occurred in the twenty-five years after the Civil War was very small and involved only a small 
portion of the army.  Much more important is the influence that performing other tasks on the 
frontier had on the army self-image and culture.  
 Robert Utley‘s Frontier Regulars:  the United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891 
makes the case that for all of its interesting campaigns, the frontier experience retarded the 
professional development of the US Army.
5
  Utley‘s analysis however, is flawed.  Utley 
concludes that the frontier caused the army to devolve into something akin to a large 
constabulary force.  He explains that the frontier mission caused the army to ignore the writings 
of Emory Upton and to fall behind its contemporaries in Europe.  Utley‘s analysis is accurate as 
far as it goes, but it ignores two points.  First, the frontier experience prepared the army perfectly 
for the complex operations required of the army in Cuba, the Philippines, and on the Mexican 
border.  The frontier created in the army the governance and infrastructure building capability 
that the nation needed as the United States took over Spain‘s island possessions.  Second, Utley 
entirely misses the point that the frontier missions created a culture in the army not focused 
exclusively on the army as the nation‘s war-fighting tool.  Rather, it created an army culture and 
self-image in which the army was a multi-faceted tool of national policy; capable of performing 
a variety of diverse missions in the support of the national interest.  Political scientist Samuel P. 
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 Robert Utley, Frontier Regulars:  the United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891 (New York:  
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973). 
 7 
Huntington‘s classic The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military 
Relations captures the point that Utley misses.
6
  Huntington contends that the great legacy of the 
frontier army was the army‘s role as a tool of the national interest beyond war fighting.  
Huntington identifies the critical influence of the frontier as the point in the army‘s history when, 
combined with the increased professionalization and the experience of Civil War, including 
Reconstruction, the army officer corps developed a Clausewitzian view of war, i.e., an 
understanding of war as a function of politics rather than of battle.  In other words, Huntington 
properly identifies the American army‘s recognition that its proper role was to achieve the 
political purpose of the government.
7
   
Unlike the frontier, where most of the written history focuses on the fighting army, top-
notch histories exist on the American military occupation of Cuba after the Spanish-American 
War.  The first is the very thorough history of the American occupation of Cuba under General 
Leonard Wood, David F. Healy‘s The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902:  Generals, Politicians, 
and the Search for Policy.
8
  Healy argues that the major characteristic of the first occupation of 
Cuba, 1898–1902, was the internal political battles between various US Army generals and 
various factions of the Congress over Cuban policy.  He maintains that once Secretary of War 
Elihu Root and Military Governor General Leonard Wood settled most of those issues, the army 
quickly prepared Cuba for independence.  Healy is particularly effective describing the complex 
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 David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902:  Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy 
(Madison:  University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). 
 8 
arguments between the military governors as they wrestled with Cuban economic and social 
problems.  Healy‘s analysis is incomplete however, because the legacy of the 1898–1902 
occupation was the American return to Cuba in 1906.  Allan Millett covers the weaknesses of  
Healy in The Politics of Intervention:  The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909,9  and ably 
describes how the short-comings of Wood‘s occupation policies, though small, inevitably led to 
the break-down of indigenous government in Cuba and thus the second US occupation.  Millett 
focuses on the intervention as a product of US domestic policy, describing how politics set its 
boundaries and limitations.  Millett also makes the point that the short-cuts that the 1906 
occupation took, particularly the decision to form a Cuban army without ensuring that it was 
raised and trained as a professional, apolitical force, ultimately led to continued instability and 
future American interventions.  The combined Millett and Healy efforts provide a complete 
history of the two most important American interventions in Cuba.  They are unique in that they 
represent a political-military history of US Army operations and not a history of conventional 
military topics.  Thus, they accurately represent the complex issues that were central to the US 
Army‘s operations prior to World War I, but unfortunately Healy and Millet leave their studies 
unconnected to the greater history of the US Army in occupation operations, including the 
simultaneous operations in the Philippines. 
Many histories of the American military experience in the Philippines make the point that 
American operations in the Philippines were bungling and poorly conceived.
10
  John M. Gates‘ 
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines takes a different view.
11
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Gates argues that American success against the Philippine insurgency was the result of a well-
conceived combined strategy that included military operations and a campaign to bring effective 
governance to the islands.  As the title suggests, education was a major portion of the civil-
military campaign.  Gates describes how the campaign also included democratic local 
governance, infrastructure building, a professional police force, and a fair and effective legal 
system.  Gates persuasively argues that such aspects of US military operations in the Philippines 
were critical to the destruction of the Filipino insurgents because they provided the population a 
clear and more positive alternative to the insurgents.  Yet like similar treatments of civil-military 
operations, Gates makes no connection to the army history in similar missions.  In addition, 
Gates only examines the policy during the period 1898–1902, while active military operations 
were ongoing against the Philippine insurgents.  He misses the role the army continued to play in 
the Philippines after major hostilities were over, especially governing the Moro tribes of the 
southern islands.  Gates‘ conclusion that the American army in the Philippines was actually a 
very effective force, is reinforced in the recent  important history of the Philippine War, Brian 
Linn‘s comprehensive The Philippine War, 1899–1902.  However, like Gates, The Philippine 
War ends with President Theodore Roosevelt‘s declaration of the end of operations in July 
1902.
12
  It also pays scant attention to American political policy in the islands.  Though civilian 
governors led that policy, the governance of the Philippines remained a War Department 
responsibility, and governance of the large Moro province remained the responsibility of an army 
commander until 1911.  Thus, the Philippine War histories ending in 1902 are insufficient to 
understand the story of the army governance experience in the Philippines.  Robert A. Fulton 
captures the rest of the story in the Philippines in his excellent Moroland:  The History of Uncle 
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Sam and the Moros, 1899–1920 (Bend Oregon: Tomalo Creek Press, 2009).13  Fulton completely 
covers the period to 1911 when administration of Moro Province was the responsibility of 
military governors General Leonard Wood, General Tasker Bliss, and General John Pershing. 
None of the histories of the Philippine histories attempt to make connections to the 
broader army experience in governance.  Some, including Linn and Gates, correctly link army 
Philippine tactics and policy to the frontier experience, but none makes a broader connection or 
analysis of civil-military affairs operations.  Because of this, the efforts of key officers such 
Colonel Enoch Crowder, member of the Philippine Supreme Court and military secretary to 
General Arthur MacArthur, remain unconnected to Colonel Crowder‘s later contributions to 
governance in Cuba and American diplomatic history in the 1920s.  Likewise, no historian links 
the efforts of Major Henry Allen, commander of the Philippines Constabulary, to Allen‘s 
experience on the frontier, as an attaché in Europe, or his later achievements in the occupied 
Rhineland.  
The American army experiences with governance and civil-military operations in Cuba 
and the Philippines continued to influence US military operations for many years.  The 
immediate influence was on US occupation operations in Mexico and in Germany‘s Rhineland 
provinces.  In general, historians neglect the military operations that occurred along the volatile 
Mexican and American border during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century.  Almost 
everything written about army operations on the border focuses on John Pershing‘s punitive 
expedition in 1916.
14
  The most important civil-military operation of the period was General 
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Frederick Funston‘s nine-month occupation of the Mexican city of Vera Cruz.  The only study of 
the occupation of Vera Cruz is Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor:  Woodrow Wilson and the 
Occupation of Veracruz .
15
  As the title implies, Quirk focuses on how the operation fit within 
Woodrow Wilson‘s overall policy toward Mexico.  Quirk provides an adequate, if short, 
description of army operations in the city.  Quirk only mentions in passing the participation of 
Captain Douglas MacArthur, a member of Funston‘s staff.  He also does not examine in any 
detail, the experience of army troops or officers.  This omission is of some importance given that 
a number of junior officers of the 19
th
 Infantry Regiment in Vera Cruz would later serve in key 
army leadership positions during and after World War II.
16
 
Historians have also neglected the post-World War I Rhineland occupation.  The 
Rhineland occupation greatly influenced the army‘s understanding of occupation operations 
during the interwar years and the early years of World War II.  The only recent treatment of the 
Rhineland occupation was Keith L. Nelson‘s Victors Divided:  America and the Allies in 
Germany, 1918–1923, published in 1975.17  Nelson focuses primary on the policy role of the 
Rhineland Commission and the influence of the occupation as a brake on French designs on the 
Rhineland and the Ruhr.  In the thirty-five years since Nelson published, the army history in the 
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Rhineland has not been the focus of any other historian.  This omission exists despite the four-
year occupation‘s important influence on World War II civil affairs policy and doctrine.   
Only Peter Schifferle‘s history of the staff college at Fort Leavenworth, America's School 
for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II, addresses the 
influence of professional military education on operations in World War II.
18
  However, 
Sheferlee does not specifically look at occupation operations nor does he cover the Army War 
College experience in any detail.  The official institutional history of the Army War College, 
George S. Pappas‘s Prudens Futuri:  The US Army War College 1901–1967 discusses the 
committee system method of instruction but does not describe the detailed occupation operations 
studies conducted by the G-1 Staff committees in the 1920s and 1930s.
 19
  Henry G. Gole‘s The 
Road to Rainbow:  Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 mentions the importance of the 
War College committees in general to army planning.
 20
  The official army histories, Civil 
Affairs:  Soldiers Become Governors, by Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, and Earl 
Ziemke‘s The US Army Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946, both briefly mention the 
importance of the War College to developing not just plans but also the doctrine for occupation 
operations and military government in World War II.
21
   Like the interwar years, historians have 
largely ignored the early occupation operations of World War II in North Africa and Italy.  Only 
two official histories address the occupation of Italy.  The American army official history is 
Coles and Weinberg‘s Civil Affairs, mentioned above; an excellent compilation of over 800 
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pages of primary sources gleaned mostly from the army Civil Affairs Division records, but it is 
not a narrative and includes little analysis.  The other official history relevant to Italy is the 
British Army official history by C.R.S. Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943–
1945.
22
  Harris focuses on the British efforts in Italy but includes American participation in 
operations.  What it does not cover, however, is the relationship of the occupation in Italy to the 
US War Department, or the Italian experience‘s considerable influence on operations in 
Germany and Japan. 
Germany became the focus of historical study beginning in the 1950s as the United States 
and Soviet Union confronted each other in the Cold War.  Three examples of the early work on 
Germany are Harold Zink‘s The United States in Germany, 1944–1955, Alistair Horne‘s Return 
to Power:  A Report on the New, and Eugene Davidson‘s The Death and Life of Germany.23  All 
three are relatively straightforward discussions of German history beginning with the end of 
World War II.  They all focus on Germany‘s successful economic rebuilding and attribute it 
largely to enlightened democratic and economic action on the part of the United States and its 
allies. All three broadly view the rehabilitation of Germany through the perspective of the Cold 
War. The two most important academic books on the military occupation of Germany are John 
Gimbel‘s The American Occupation of Germany:  Politics and the Military, 1945–1949, and 
Edward N. Peterson‘s The American Occupation of Germany:  Retreat to Victory.24  Both are 
critical of the army‘s role in post-World War II Germany.  Of the two, Gimbel‘s is the more 
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complex and nuanced, focused primarily on the political policy development and execution.  
Gimbel, like earlier historians of the occupation, views policy as largely influenced by the Cold 
War.    Edward Peterson‘s view of the occupation, Retreat to Victory, makes the case that the 
primary agent in the American occupation of Germany was the Germans themselves.  Peterson 
argues that American occupation forces did not contribute to the post-war recovery and may 
have actually hindered it.  Hence, Peterson‘s title, which embodies the thesis that success in 
Germany, was proportionate to the disengagement of the American occupation forces.  Neither 
Peterson nor Gimble see the US Army as an important agent in occupation policy.  Peterson does 
not recognize that quick disengagement from direct government was the clearly articulated 
policy of not just the American occupation of Germany, but also of all American occupation 
operations.  The ―retreat to victory,‖ was actually the army‘s master plan.25  These histories fail 
to recognize the policy linkage between the army‘s history, personified by the experiences of 
American Secretary of War Henry Stimson and codified in army military government and legal 
doctrine, as well as in the curriculum at the School of Military Government, and the operations in 
post-World War II Europe.  The linkage to army history was as important to occupation policy 
and practice as any other factor. 
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Numerous historians have thoroughly examined the history of the occupation of Japan.  
There were several major differences between the histories of the occupation of Japan and 
Germany.  Many of the histories of the occupation of Japan focus on leaders:  General Douglas 
MacArthur, the leader of the American occupation forces, and Japanese leaders Emperor 
Hirohito and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.  Several well- documented histories fall into this 
category including Robert Harvey‘s American Shogun:  MacArthur, Hirohito and the American 
Duel with Japan, Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson‘s Partners for Democracy: Crafting 
the New Japanese State under MacArthur; and Herbert P. Blix‘s Hirohito and the Making of 
Modern Japan.
26
  These books see the major events of the occupation as products of the 
personalities of the key players.  In this respect, the authors implicitly acknowledge the linkage 
between the army‘s history and the occupation of Japan through MacArthur‘s personal and 
family association with almost all of American occupations from Reconstruction through the end 
of World War II. The histories of Japan are also much more recent than the histories of the 
occupation of Germany.  The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
influenced much of the written history of Germany.  In contrast, histories of the US occupation 
of Japan reflect scholarship that is more contemporary.  The two major histories on the 
occupation of Japan are John W. Dower‘s Pulitzer Prize winning Embracing Defeat:  Japan in 
the Wake of World War II and Eiji Takemae‘s The Allied Occupation of Japan.27  The depth of 
the scholarship and unbiased perspective of the authors make these two books far superior to any 
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of the works in English on the German occupation.
28
  However, the authors do not examine the 
continuity of the occupation of Japan, even through MacArthur, to the army‘s history of 
occupation operations.
29
 
The concept of continuity in operational approach is central to this examination of 
American occupation operations.  Two military historians have addressed continuity in American 
operations and doctrine. Russell Weigley provides an analysis of American military doctrinal 
continuity at the strategic level in his 1973 classic The American Way of War: A History of 
United States Military Strategy and Policy.  As the title suggests, his focus is largely on 
conventional warfare at the operational and strategic level, and the work is thus not very relevant 
to the subject of civil affairs and military government.  However, Weigley makes the important 
point that from the time of the American Civil War, continuity existed in how the US military 
approached operations.  Andrew Birtle‘s US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 
Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941, thoroughly covers army doctrine for counterinsurgency 
operations, a type of operation closely associated with military government and civil affairs.
 30
  
Birtle completely covers the history of the relevant doctrine for civil affairs including General 
Order 100, the rules of land warfare doctrine, and ultimately the development of the first military 
government manuals.    Weigley and Birtle conclude that continuity exists in American army 
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operations and counterinsurgency doctrine.  This study tests the ideas of Weigley and Birtle 
against the mission of occupation operations and finds a similar continuity.   
Unlike doctrine, adequately described in the literature, army institutional culture, and its 
impact on operations are neglected by historians.  The only systematic attempt to describe army 
institutional culture is Morris Janowitz‘s important The Professional Soldier:  A Social and 
political Portrait.
31
   Janowitz focuses on the officer corps of the 1950s but is still relevant to this 
study in that most of his population of professional officers, particularly army officers, began 
their careers long before World War II and participated in the post-World War II occupation 
operations.  The senior army officers described by Janowitz studied at the army‘s professional 
schools in the interwar years, were mentored by the Philippine and World War I veterans, and 
led the post-World War II occupations.  Janowtiz‘s study identifies a recognizable military 
culture and enumerates some of its primary characteristics.  Janowitz, however, does not address 
the history or the operational impacts of culture. Two other social histories of the army before 
World War II are Edward M. Coffman‘s The Old Army:  A Portrait of the American Army in 
Peacetime, 1784–1898, and The Regulars:  The American Army, 1898–1941.32  Though Coffman 
provides a very vivid description of life in the army, he does not address critical aspects of 
institutional culture:  kinship relations, and mentorship.  Historians have yet to map the complex 
network of personal relationships that characterized the social and professional life of the army.  
Hints of the network are anecdotally revealed in autobiographical accounts such as Lucien 
Truscott‘s The Twilight of the US Cavalry:  Life in the Old Army, 1917–1942  and Dwight 
Eisenhower‘s At Ease:  Stories I Tell To Friends, but no historian or political scientist has taken 
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on the subject explicitly from an academic point of view.
33
  A number of recent management, 
anthropological, and sociological texts address the somewhat ill defined concept of institutional 
culture. Edgar H. Schein‘s Organization Culture and Leadership and Marcel Danesi and Paul 
Perron‘s Analyzing Cultures, An Introduction and Handbook both provide a working definition 
of institutional culture and describe its important characteristics and effects.
34
  These works, 
combined with Janowitz and Coffman, support the conclusion that the army‘s institutional 
culture accepted and understood the strategic necessity of occupation missions.  That cultural 
acceptance was critical to the success of occupation missions during and after World War II. 
This dissertation demonstrates the continuity of the American army experience with 
occupation operations and military government from Reconstruction immediately after the Civil 
War through the post-World War II occupations of Japan and Germany.  None of the histories 
written about the individual operations recognizes the continuity between them.  Each 
occupation experience built on and refined the lessons of the previous.  Written army doctrine 
was also remarkably consistent throughout the period.  The examination of the history also 
reveals a human continuity that is note-worthy.  Individual leaders, military families, and 
personal and professional relationships connected the early Reconstruction experience directly to 
World War II. The doctrine and the actual operations combine to illustrate a uniquely American 
way of conducting occupation operations, one that emphasized building democratic institutions, 
was conscious of cultural norms, rapidly transitioned to civil rule, and established a social 
foundation based on law and order, education, and the health and welfare of the population. In no 
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small way, the success of occupation operations in World War II Germany and Japan was a 
result of the experiences gained, lessons learned, and understanding achieved by the US Army as 
an institution and by individual officers during post-conflict operations  from 1865 to 1952. 
 20 
CHAPTER 2 -  The Roots of American Military Government:  
Reconstruction 
 
The US Army‘s first experience with large scale military occupation was the occupation 
of ―Secessasia,‖1 the former Confederate States, after the American Civil War.2  During the 
twelve years of operations in the South, 1865–1877, the US Army and its officers engaged in a 
variety of occupation and reconstruction duties with varying degrees of success.  The army‘s 
participation in Reconstruction marks the beginning of the formulation of the US Army‘s 
conceptual approach to military occupation —essentially an American way of conducting 
occupations. This conceptual approach characterized US Army occupations beginning in 1865 
and continued, with some additions and changes, through the World War II occupations.   During 
the post-Civil War reconstruction period the army demonstrated the ability to establish 
democratic government, an emphasis on rapidly turning governance responsibility to civil 
authorities, and  an inclination to emphasize education.  However, Reconstruction highlighted 
issues that the army and the national government did not address well.  These included 
establishing clear national policy, establishing the rule of law, and reestablishing the economic 
viability of the region.  Operations in the post-Civil War South also demonstrated the 
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dependence of army success on civil domestic policy and politics.   Without the commitment and 
support of the national government the mission could not succeed.    
Ultimately, Reconstruction failed and the army‘s shortcomings contributed to that failure. 
The accepted historiography of Reconstruction is that the American government failed to achieve 
the political and social transformation of the South envisioned during and immediately after the 
Civil War.  As historian Eric Foner observed, ―whether measured by the dreams inspired by 
emancipation or the more limited goals of securing blacks‘ rights as citizens and free laborers, 
and establishing and enduring Republican presence in the South, Reconstruction can only be 
judged a failure.‖3 The army‘s shortcoming were part of the  host of circumstances that led to the 
failure of Reconstruction.  Despite, the army‘s role in that failure, Reconstruction served as the 
starting point for the development of the army‘s institutional approach to occupations. 
Initial Occupation Policy 
The army did no serious planning for post-conflict operations after the Civil War.  Union 
General Philip Sheridan, one of  General Grant‘s most competent commanders and destined for 
high command in the occupied South, put it bluntly:  ―At the time of Kirby Smith‘s [commander 
of the last active Confederate field army] surrender the National Government had formulated no 
plan with regard to these or the other States lately in rebellion, though a provisional Government 
had been set up in Louisiana as early as 1864.‖4 Thus, the army‘s active participation in the 
occupation of the former Confederate states was essentially an ad-hoc effort that reacted to the 
changing, conflicting, and often less than clear direction of the national government. The army 
was not solely, or even perhaps primarily, to blame for the lack of planning for post-war 
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operations, which  depended largely on political policies.  In the absence of clear political policy, 
the army‘s execution of post-conflict operations in the former Confederate states became 
problematic. When the Civil War ended, President Lincoln had not articulated any specific 
thoughts on post-war political policy.  In addition, Congress did not enact any legislation 
governing the post-war circumstances.
5
 However, there were several indicators of what Lincoln 
envisioned for post-war policy, these included the president‘s limited comments on the subject, 
written army policies and orders, the most important of which was General Order 100, and the 
wartime experience in occupied Southern states.  Wartime actions, however, were imperfect 
predictors of future policy.  Lincoln intended his wartime proclamations and orders to meet the 
contingencies of the war rather than serve as permanent policy for post-war reconstruction.
6
  For 
instance, the spirit of Lincoln‘s Amnesty proclamation and the Emancipation proclamation, both 
issued during the war, were contradictory.  The former implied a return to the ante-bellum 
political order, while the latter implied dramatic social and economic change.
7
 Though wartime 
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occupation policy set a precedent for post-war policy, that was not the intent: the president 
intended wartime policies to meet specific wartime conditions and no more.  
 In addition to the President‘s proclamations, the army had written orders regarding 
operations in the territory captured from the Confederate States.  On April 24, 1863 President 
Lincoln issued General Orders (GO) 100, written under the direction of General in Chief Henry 
Halleck and based on the pamphlet ―Guerrilla Parties,‖ by legal scholar Francis Lieber.  It was 
formally entitled ―Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.‖  
The order was to guide commanders in identifying partisans and fighting insurgency. The order 
admonished federal troops to operate within the scope of the law, to be moderate if not 
considerate of the civilian population‘s rights, and to use force commensurate with the activities 
of the guerrillas. GO 100 gave the commander full authority and wide latitude.  The order 
technically applied only during hostilities, so after the surrender of the Confederate field armies, 
GO 100 was legally void. All of these indicators were just hints to what Lincoln may have 
envisioned, because the president never stated a clear post-war policy for the South before his 
assassination on April 14, 1865.  Thus, one of the first problems encountered by the army as it 
began occupation operations was a complete lack of strategic policy guidance from the national 
leadership.  
Initial Operations and Presidential Reconstruction 
The army‘s involvement in Reconstruction and the occupation of the secessionist states 
occurred in five phases.  The first phase was a short period of direct military government 
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immediately after defeat of the Confederate forces and before the organizations established by 
presidential reconstruction policies assumed control. The second phase was Presidential 
Reconstruction supported by the army but  led by President Johnson and appointed civilian state 
provisional governors.  Presidential Reconstruction lasted almost two years, until Congress 
ended it in March 1867.  Phase three of army involvement was another period of direct military 
rule while the states were prepared for civil government according to congressional mandate.  
Phase four was the period of Republican Party state government rule in the bulk of the Southern 
states.  The final period of Reconstruction occurred when Democratic Party governments 
replaced Republican state governments.  This final period ended in 1877 with the Presidential 
compromise that awarded the 1876 Presidential election to Rutherford P. Hayes. After assuming 
office, President Hayes ended the army‘s post-conflict missions in the secessionist Southern 
states. 
In the immediate post-war period, the army reorganized its jurisdictional structure into 
five geographic military divisions, which included nineteen military departments.  The military 
divisions that included former confederate states were the Military Division of the Atlantic under 
Major General George G. Meade, including the departments of Virginia, North Carolina and 
South Carolina; the Military Division of the Mississippi commanded by Major General William 
T. Sherman, including the Department of Arkansas; the Military Division of the Gulf 
commanded by Major General Philip H. Sheridan, including the departments of Louisiana, 
Texas, and Florida; and the Military Division of the Tennessee commanded by George H. 
Thomas, including the departments of Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. The only 
military division that did not have a requirement to be involved in the Southern occupation was 
the Military Division of the Pacific under Major General Henry W. Halleck.  The major focus of 
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the divisions of the Mississippi and the Pacific was frontier security.  This was also a major 
concern of the Division of the Gulf forces in Texas, though occupation duties were an equal 
priority.
8
  The reorganization of the wartime army copied the American army‘s traditional 
geographic peacetime organization and was accomplished quickly.  It facilitated focusing 
commanders on regional issues, and gave the army flexibility to demobilize or move tactical 
units without disrupting the regional command structure. 
On May 29, 1865, the new president, Andrew Johnson, issued his guidance for the 
occupation which made the army‘s role in post-conflict administration relatively simple.  He 
announced that he would continue President Lincoln‘s post-war plan.  Since, as discussed 
previously, President Lincoln in reality did not have a plan for post-war operations; President 
Johnson‘s policy was the first articulation of post-war policy and plans beyond mere conjecture. 
President Johnson envisioned a very rapid transition to complete civilian state control.  A 
presidentially appointed civilian provisional governor facilitated the quick transition.  Under the 
conditions of Presidential Reconstruction policy, the army‘s rule in the South was to be short and 
simple.  The army was to reestablish law and order, ensure the public health and welfare, and 
supervise the return to normal economic activity.  The army had the additional responsibility of 
protecting the well-being of the Freedmen through the newly created Bureau of Freedmen and 
Abandoned Lands that Congress created and mandated that the War Department operate.  The 
army pursued all but the last of these tasks only until the restoration of civil authority.  
Appointment of the provisional governors defined the beginning of reestablished civil authority; 
at that point the army would support that authority as requested.  The Freedmen‘s Bureau‘s 
duties were separate and congressionally mandated, and therefore the reestablishment of civil 
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authority did not affect the bureau.  The army‘s role in the transition to civil authority was minor 
in the months after the war because President Johnson very quickly appointed civilian 
provisional governors.  The War Department ordered departmental commanders to provide 
military force to back up the orders of these provisional governors, however, such support 
proved unnecessary.   
A significant institution designed specifically for the occupation mission was the 
Freedmen‘s Bureau.  Congress understood that conditions in the post-war South would be 
unprecedented in the history of the nation and that the existing institutions were ill equipped to 
handle them.  Congress formed the bureau on March 3, 1865, and the War Department appointed 
Union General Oliver H. Howard to head it.  The bureau was intended to facilitate integrating the 
over one million Freedmen into the population of the Southern states.  The impact of the bureau 
was more symbolic than material.  Historians generally agree that the bureau did not accomplish 
much of lasting importance for three reasons.
9
  First, presidential opposition restricted the 
bureau.  President Johnson thought the bureau violated the concept of states‘ rights.  Second, the 
bureau was undermanned relative to the sweeping social reform that was its unstated mandate.  
In its first year of existence, there were no monies or personnel allocated to its operation.  
Funding and people had to come from the War Department and its budget. At its peak, there 
were no more than 900 field agents of the bureau in the South. The average agent had 
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responsibility for 40,000 Freedmen.
10
 Finally, the bureau was an important institution of 
Reconstruction for only three years and spent most of the first year organizing its administration 
and grappling with its duties.  After 1868, the congressionally reconstructed states began to 
assert their authority, which superseded that of the bureau. As Congress recognized the new 
states most of the bureau‘s functions ceased.  Thus, though able to have some lasting effects, 
notably in the area of education, the bureau did not have a major impact on the course of the 
occupation of the South.  The emphasis on education, where the Bureau set the precedent of  free 
public education in the South, however,  became an important aspect of future American 
occupations.   
Though President Johnson provided very clear and direct policy regarding the disposition 
of the former Confederate states, most of Congress and much of the army leadership strongly 
disagreed with President Johnson‘s policies.  Thus, a policy war ensued within the government 
that completely disrupted the course of army occupation operations in the South.  Most of the 
nation was familiar with President Johnson‘s statement, made in 1864, that ―treason must be 
made odious to the traitors.‖11 In 1865, most people expected President Johnson‘s policies to be 
more punitive than those President Lincoln may have endorsed.  The broad outline for 
Presidential Reconstruction policy became apparent in two proclamations issued on May 29, 
1865.  The first proclamation contained an amnesty and pardon policy that excused all 
participants in the rebellion, except senior officials, upon their taking an oath pledging loyalty to 
the Union and support for emancipation.  The second proclamation appointed and gave 
instructions to a provisional governor of North Carolina to facilitate that state‘s return to the 
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Union.  Over the next months, the President appointed provisional governors in all those former 
Confederate states that had not begun the process during the war.
12
  According to the Secretary 
of War, by the end of 1865 the state governments were ―organizing… in subordination to the 
federal authority.‖13 
Presidential Reconstruction was about rebuilding institutions.  It ignored the more 
difficult causes of the Civil War and the post-war objectives of the Congress.  As army general 
Carl Schurz reported to President Johnson in late 1865:  ―If nothing were necessary but to restore 
the machinery of government in the States lately in rebellion in point of form, the movements 
made to that end by the people of the south might be considered satisfactory.  But if it is required 
that the southern people should also accommodate themselves to the results of the war in point of 
spirit, those movements fall far short of what may be insisted upon.‖14  President Johnson‘s 
reconstruction policy was not a reconstruction policy at all, rather, it was a reconstitution policy 
that had as its logical conclusion the reconstitution of the Union in essentially the same form that 
existed in 1860 minus the formal institution of slavery.
15
 
Though appearing to be moving quickly and efficiently toward effective reunion, 
Presidential Reconstruction was a flawed policy in the minds of many union men, particularly 
those in Congress and the senior leadership of the army.
16
 Signs that the policy was flawed 
appeared early as events unfolded in the Southern states.  Through the summer and fall of 1865, 
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and with increasing frequency in 1866, reports from army officers in the South, as well as 
commissions sent to investigate conditions by Congress, indicated the resurgence of traditional 
conservative Southern leaders.  One of the earliest damning reports regarding conditions in the 
South came from General Carl Schultz.  Schultz‘s report made several points.  One was that the 
Freedmen were not really free, but rather, Southern whites, aided by the President‘s generous 
amnesty and lack of Black suffrage, were working steadily to impose slavery in all but name.  He 
also pointed out that Southerners had no compunction about taking the loyalty oath if that was 
what was necessary to get out from under the yoke of Yankee military authority.  General 
Schultz‘s report was very pessimistic regarding the prospects of Southern loyalty.17 
Army leaders stationed in the South also saw that there were serious issues with 
Presidential Reconstruction.
18
  General Jefferson C. Davis reported from Kentucky that ―Bands 
of ‗guerillas‘ and negro regulators soon increased in numbers and audacity, and many lawless 
acts have been perpetrated by them….‖  General Sickles, commander of the Department of the 
South stated, ―In some parts of …South Carolina, a freedman has little security for life, limb or 
property apart from the presence and protection of a garrison of United States troops.‖  The more 
serious indictment of Presidential Reconstruction was not the general lawlessness in much of the 
South, but rather the conscious refusal of state law enforcement and judicial officials to extend 
the protection of the law to the Freedmen or Unionists.  Sickles commented, ―Instances of much 
gravity are too frequent, however, of the most reprehensible neglect to arrest and prosecute 
notorious malefactors and outlaws.  Inquests in case of homicide, especially if the victim be a 
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negro, seldom result in a verdict which points out the guilty.‖19 The state governments created by 
President Johnson were more than willing to tolerate the abuse and intimidation of both 
Freedmen and Unionists.  The governments, in several instances went even further –enacting 
―Black Codes‖ that severely limited Freedmen rights.   
Army commanders were in a position to recognize and report state legislative action 
aimed at controlling the Freedmen.  In October 1866, Brevet Major General Thomas J. Wood, 
Commander of the Department of Mississippi reported, ―Several of the statute laws of this State 
in reference to the negroes are very objectionable.‖  He claimed numerous statutes, including 
those that precluded Negroes from bearing arms, purchasing or leasing real estate and requiring 
contracts or licenses before doing work, to be unconstitutional.  Wood recognized that the 
Mississippi legislature was attempting to recreate conditions as close as legally possible to the 
condition of slavery for the Freedmen.
20
  
The reports of the field commanders sent to Washington in the last months of 1866 
merely verified the Northern public perception of the post-conflict environment in the South.  
The public was aware that all was not well because of two major incidents that occurred in 1866: 
the massacres in Memphis and New Orleans.  The army senior leadership closely investigated 
both events, and they were widely reported in the Northern press.  Both incidents contributed to 
Congress and General in Chief Ulysses S. Grant‘s impression that Presidential Reconstruction 
was failing. 
The massacre in Memphis occurred over 1-4 May 1866.  It was the result of an 
altercation between discharged colored soldiers and white police.  Rioters killed forty-six 
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Freedmen, injured over seventy-five, robbed over one-hundred persons, raped five women, and 
burned four churches, eight schools, and over ninety homes.  The official Freemen Bureau 
investigation of the riot concluded that the riot reflected the overall lack of respect of the white 
citizenry for the rule of law: ―No public meeting has been held by the citizens, although three 
weeks have now elapsed since the riot, thus by their silence appearing to approve of the conduct 
of the mob.‖21  The riot indicated that in Tennessee, the President‘s home state, the success of 
Presidential Reconstruction was in doubt.  
The violence in New Orleans that occurred in July and August 1866 was even more 
notorious than Memphis. The commander of the Department of the Gulf, General Phil Sheridan, 
concluded that the initial cause of the riot was the assembling of an unofficial constitutional 
convention convened in opposition to the state convention authorized by Presidential 
Reconstruction. However, Sheridan also believed that the New Orleans police instigated the 
violence with the passive concurrence of the city Mayor.  He stated in his report that the police 
gunned down members of the convention, both white and black, and then arrested many of the 
survivors who were ―were wounded by the police while in their hands as prisoners, some of them 
mortally.‖  General Grant and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, with the approval of the 
President, authorized Sheridan to impose martial law ―so far as might be necessary to preserve 
the public peace,‖ and gave Sheridan the authority to over-rule any action by a public official 
that might endanger public safety.
 22 
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The most influential report on conditions in the South was the 1866 congressional report 
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, whose task was to ―inquire into the condition of the 
States which formed the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they, or 
any of them, are entitled to be represented in either house of Congress.‖  The committee 
conducted a comprehensive study of affairs in the ten southern states still out of the Union in the 
spring of 1866.  Their conclusions were unambiguous.  They determined that the Southern white 
population was unrepentant regarding succession and harbored no remorse over the resulting 
hostilities, except as to the result.  The Committee determined that an immediate readmittance of 
the former Confederate states in the summer of 1866 would permit the South ―through their 
representatives, [to] seize upon the government, which they fought to destroy.‖  The Joint 
Committee‘s conclusion was completely at odds with the conclusion of President Johnson and 
the president‘s policy.  The Joint Committee recommended and proposed to Congress the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution.  It also recommended conditions for readmittance of the former 
Confederate States to the Union.  The recommendations of this committee became the basis for 
Congressional Reconstruction legislation in 1867.
23
 
General in Chief Grant closely monitored the events of Reconstruction throughout 1865 
and 1866.  Grant formed  the perception that the policy was not working based on his 
communications with his commanders in the South, press reports, and the Joint Committee 
report which was published in August, 1866.  The President‘s actions toward Reconstruction and 
the politicalization of the army also influenced Grant‘s position on policy, and his assessment of 
the situation.  In the fall of 1867 President Johnson made a not very subtle attempt to remove 
Grant from leadership of the army by sending him on a diplomatic mission to Mexico.  This 
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direct attempt by Johnson to remove Grant as head of the army firmly placed Grant in opposition 
to the President‘s post-war strategy, to the point that he counseled with Republican legislators on 
legislation to overturn Presidential Reconstruction.
24
 
As the year 1866 ended, policy toward the former Confederate states was in disarray.  
The President‘s policy was firmly in place but considered a total failure by both the Congress 
and much of the army leadership.  The rule of law did not exist, at least as applied to Freedmen 
and Unionist, in much of the South.  Congress was determined to make a change; however, it 
was too late to mitigate many of the adverse effects of the ineffectual presidential policy.  
Southern leadership was materially and psychologically recovered from the decisive defeat by 
the Union army on the battlefield.  The window for the best opportunity to effect permanent and 
effective political and social reform in the South was closed.  It remained for Congress, with the 
advice of the army leadership, to pursue a policy that aimed at recovering the strategic goals for 
which the Union had fought the Civil War.  However, they were beginning their policy process 
almost twenty-four months after the end of hostilities. 
Congressional Reconstruction and Army Rule 
Congress expressed its disagreement with the president over Reconstruction policy 
through legislation.  In 1866 that legislation was the Civil Rights Act, the renewal of the 
Freedmen‘s Bureau authorization, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.  That 
legislation challenged what appeared to be the growing assertiveness of the former Confederate 
states as they reformed under Presidential Reconstruction.  However, the legislation was not an 
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outright challenge to the president‘s policy.  That challenge came in 1867 in the form of  
legislation that fundamentally changed the course of Reconstruction, the Reconstruction acts of 
1867.  The Reconstruction acts were the response of Congress to the apparent failure of the 
president‘s policy to achieve the strategic goal of the Civil War:  the political and social 
transformation of the South.  The First Reconstruction Act did not mince words regarding 
reconstruction of the South almost two years after the war.  In Congress‘ view, ―no legal State 
governments or adequate protection for life or property exists in the rebel States ….25  The 
preamble to the acts was a clear statement of the failure of Presidential Reconstruction to 
establish the rule of law in the South.   The Reconstruction Acts directed the army to establish 
law and order, recreate the system of democratic governance in the states, and then turn over 
democratic governance to lawfully elected civil leaders. 
Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867,  over President 
Johnson‘s veto.  Congress, prepared for the veto, immediately over-ruled it.  The act divided the 
ten unreconstructed Southern states (exempting Tennessee, which had rejoined the Union on July 
24, 1866) into five military districts: the First District, under Brigadier General Schofield, 
included only the state of Virginia; the Second District, under General Daniel E. Sickles, 
included the Carolinas;  the Third District, commanded by General John Pope, included Florida, 
Alabama, and Georgia; the Fourth District commanded by General Edward O.C. Ord, included 
Arkansas and Mississippi; and the Fifth District, under General Phil Sheridan, included Texas 
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and Louisiana.
26
  The key provision of the First Reconstruction Act was Section 3, which 
stipulated the District Commander‘s responsibilities and authority ―to protect all person in their 
rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, and violence, and to punish, or 
cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals… and all interference, 
under cover of State authority, with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be null 
and void.‖27  This provision of the act effectively made the Military District commander the 
supreme authority in the state, with the power to ignore or overrule all civil officials and to 
substitute military tribunals for civil courts whenever warranted.  Thus, the primary mandate of 
the district commanders was to ensure the rule of law. 
General Sheridan, in the 5
th
 Military District, was enthusiastic about implementing 
Congressional Reconstruction:  ―It was, therefore, my determination to see to the law‘s zealous 
execution in my district.‖28  Despite his enthusiasm for Congressional Reconstruction, Sheridan 
recognized that civil authority was the preferred jurisdiction for governance:  ―…I laid down, as 
a rule for my guidance, the principle of non-interference with the provisional State governments, 
and though many appeals were made to have me rescind rulings of the courts, or interpose to 
forestall some presupposed action to be taken by them, my invariable reply was that I would not 
take cognizance of such matters, except in cases of absolute necessity.‖ Soon after the passing of 
the Reconstruction Act, Sheridan replaced the mayor of New Orleans, the Louisiana state 
attorney-general, and the judge of the first district court.  The commander removed the officials 
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for ―acts of omission and commission, ignoring the law….‖29 Sheridan was the strictest 
practitioner of Congressional authority among the district commanders, but Generals Pope and 
Sickles also did not hesitate to use the power given them by Congress to curb the influence of the 
state officials who came into office under Presidential Reconstruction, and to ensure the rule of 
law. 
Congress provided further guidance on the reconstruction process to commanders in the 
form of the Second and Third Reconstruction Acts.  The President vetoed both, and Congress 
again immediately overruled both vetoes.  These acts provided detailed information on the tasks 
of the military commanders and what standards the commanders were to use for registering 
voters.  The Third Reconstruction Act empowered the district military commanders to ―suspend 
or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official 
powers, any officer or person holding or exercising … any civil or military office or duty in such 
district under any power… under, any so-called State or the government thereof.‖  The third act 
boldly stated, ―no district commander …or any of the officers operating under them shall be 
bound in his action by an opinion of any civil officer of the United States.‖ In sum, the three acts 
of 1867 gave very powerful authority, unprecedented in peacetime, to the district military 
commanders.
30
   
The reestablishment of democratic governance was the top priority of the district 
commanders after ensuring law and order.  The military commanders had specific objectives 
imposed on them by the Reconstruction Acts.  The Acts ordered them to register voters, 
supervise the election of a constitutional assembly, supervise creation of a state constitution, and 
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oversee the election of state officials and a legislature.  Essentially, the acts required 
commanders to follow the same state government formation process as President Johnson‘s 
provisional state governors, however, the military closely monitored the process to ensure 
universal suffrage and maximum participation by the Freedmen.  Also, the registration process 
carefully screened out former rebels.  The substantial victories of Republican candidates in the 
1866 national elections reaffirmed Congress in its opposition to the President‘s Reconstruction 
policy.  Many in the North and in Congress expected the President to accede graciously to the 
popular will in support of more forceful terms for Southern readmittance to the Union.
31
  
President Johnson‘s response to the Republican electoral victory was not, however, conciliatory.  
Instead, he redoubled his efforts to prevent, obstruct, or disrupt the Republican-led Congress 
from imposing a new occupation policy on the Southern states.  The President‘s tactics included 
using his power as the Commander in Chief of the military, using the authority of the Attorney 
General‘s office, and finally advising and encouraging the opposition of Southern leaders. 
As army commanders in the South began to register voters for a constitutional assembly 
in accordance with the First and Second Reconstruction Acts, they were required, by the 
vagueness of the acts, to use their best judgment regarding various details of the process.  In 
most cases, the commander‘s interpretation of the acts was such that it denied suffrage to as 
many former Confederates as possible.  In addition, commanders put in place provisions to 
challenge the veracity of Southerners who took the oath of loyalty but remained suspect.  On 
June 20, 1867, President Johnson issued orders that commanders could not challenge oaths, give 
former Confederates the maximum participation in elections, forbade commanders from 
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removing civilian officials, and prohibited them from issuing proclamations that carried the force 
of law in their districts.
32
  In effect the President, as the Commander in Chief, took away from 
the district commanders the power given to them by Congress, thus undermining the First and 
Second Reconstruction Acts.  These actions by the President had only a short-term impact, as 
Congress designed the Third Reconstruction Act specifically to return supreme authority in the 
military districts to the commanders. 
Though the district commanders were interested in promoting the success of Unionist 
forces, they did not overtly influence the outcome of elections.  Generals Sheridan and Pope both 
stationed troops in the various parishes and counties to ensure Freedman and Unionists had 
access to the polls.  Pope specifically requested and the army provided cavalry troops to operate 
in northern Georgia and Alabama for this purpose.  Sheridan pulled troops back from frontier 
duty to ensure a fair registration.  While doing his best to ensure a fair vote, Sheridan also 
reported that he did not think that the pro-union forces in Texas would carry the day.
33
  Though 
the laws were pro-union, army commanders did not influence the election except in accordance 
with the law.  
Johnson continued to use his constitutional military authority to undermine the 
Congress‘s actions.   In the six months after passage of the first Reconstruction Act, Johnson 
relieved and reassigned four of the five Reconstruction district commanders.   In each case, he 
ordered the reassignment over the advice and judgment of the General in Chief of the Army, and 
each replacement commander was an individual who Johnson knew or believed to be of 
Democratic political leanings.  In addition to the generals, Johnson also effectively removed 
Secretary of War Stanton.  All of these actions infuriated the Congress, and the Stanton action 
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led to impeachment proceedings against Johnson in February of 1868.   Congress had no power, 
however, to challenge Johnson‘s orders regarding army assignments.  
Another tactic used by the President to circumvent the Congress‘s legislation was to 
obtain a narrow legal interpretation of the law from the Attorney General, conservative Ohio 
Republican Henry Stanbery.
34
 It severely curtailed the power of district commanders to 
challenge the eligibility of former Confederates attempting to register to vote.   It also precluded 
removal of civil officials and required that they defer to the President in their actions as district 
commanders.  The subterfuge of the legal opinion fooled no one. Harper’s Weekly reported: 
―The Attorney-General has given an interpretation of the law which is intended to defeat its 
purpose.
35
  The district commanders understood the impact of the Attorney General‘s opinion.  
Sheridan‘s analysis was that the Attorney General opened ―a broad macadamized road for 
perjury & fraud to travel on.‖36 Grant was not fooled nor impressed, and  promptly advised the 
district commanders, ―The shape in which the views of the Atty. Gen. have been communicated 
to district commanders is such as not to entitle them to the force of orders.‖  Grant told 
commanders to ―Enforce your own construction of the Military Bill until ordered to do 
otherwise.‖37   Grant‘s advice proved necessary only until Congress passed the Third 
Reconstruction Act.
38
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 40 
In addition to the district commanders, the President was also concerned with another 
opponent of his policy:  Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton.  Stanton was the only radical 
Republican in the Johnson cabinet —Lincoln appointed him to his position in 1862 largely 
because of his demonstrated efficiency running a large organization.  He was an abolitionist and 
staunch Unionist.   Stanton was politically close to the radical Republicans, and he advised them 
on the preparation of the Reconstruction acts.  Congress passed the Tenure Act of 1867 
specifically to prevent his removal from office by President Johnson.  On February 21 1868, 
President Johnson appointed Lorenzo Thomas Secretary of War.  On February 24, 1868, the 
House impeached President Johnson for violation of the Tenure Act.
39
 
Despite incomplete guidance from Congress, a Secretary of War who was suspended, 
commanders who were relieved, the passive and active opposition of local Southern whites, and 
ultimately, a president under trial for impeachment, the army commanders in the South doggedly 
proceeded with their mission to enforce the law and establish democratic government in the 
South.  Over the course of 1867 and 1868, they registered voters, supervised elections, organized 
constitutional assemblies, formed state legislations, and finally transferred power from the 
military authorities to legitimately elected state governments. Throughout the summer of 1867, 
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 41 
registration of voters proceeded apace.  Generals Sickles, Pope, and Sheridan, commanders of 
the Second, Third, and Fifth Military Districts respectively, were aggressive in eliminating 
former Confederates from the process, despite knowing that this would bring about presidential 
wrath.  Sheridan reported, ―the registration throughout the state [Louisiana] has been 
harmonious.  The boards having been kindly received everywhere.‖40  Sickles reported ―all the 
indications point so far to the successful administration and execution of the recent Acts of 
Congress for the reorganization of the States.‖41  In general, commanders accomplished 
registration with little difficulty, though General Sickles had to deploy several companies of 
cavalry to ensure completeness of registration in remote parts of his district.  General Schofield 
had no problems in his district and reported from the First District (Virginia) that registering 
boards ―with few exceptions, [did] their duty in the most satisfactory manner.‖42  By the end of 
September 1867, much of the registration work was complete. 
With eligible voters identified and registered, the next phase of Congressional 
Reconstruction was voting for delegates to write a state constitution.  The task was to write a 
constitution and then forward the constitution to the Congress for approval, and then to the voters 
for acceptance. In most of the military districts the voting and constitution writing was done 
under a new reign of district commanders, men who President Johnson perceived would be more 
supportive of his policy view point:  General Winfield S. Hancock replaced Sheridan, General 
George Meade replaced Pope, General Edward Canby replaced Sickles, and General Alvan 
Gillem replaced Ord.  However, there was very little immediate change in the direction of 
Congressional Reconstruction under the new commanders.  In some cases, the new commanders 
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were stricter on Southerners than their predecessors had been.  Major General Meade removed 
the governor of Georgia, Alfred Jenkins, as well as the state attorney general and the state 
treasurer, for refusing to release funds to support the constitutional convention.
43
  Thus, the 
initiation of Congressional Reconstruction was relatively unaffected in the short-term by the 
President‘s relief of key commanders. 
Over the course of 1868, the registered voters of the former Confederate states elected 
delegates and assembled state constitutional assemblies.  In the Second Military District (North 
and South Carolina), the new district commander, Major General Canby, efficiently supervised 
elections and conventions.  Congress readmitted these states to the Union on July 9 and 4, 
respectively.   In the Third District, Alabama voted on the constitution in February, and, though 
the voters rejected the proposed constitution, Congress accepted it.  The state legislature 
convened, and Congress readmitted the state to the Union on July 13.  In Florida, the district 
commander had to mediate after the convention members split and deadlocked over the content 
of the constitution.  The commander helped work out a compromise, voters accepted the new 
constitution, and Congress readmitted Florida to the Union on June 25.
44
  In the Fourth District, 
Arkansas held a convention, approved a constitution, and rejoined the Union on June 22.  
Elections to ratify the constitution in the Fifth District state of Louisiana also occurred without a 
serious problem due to very thorough preparations by army troops under the command of Major 
General Robert C. Buchanan, who noted ―this election [was] the most peaceful, quiet, and 
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orderly of any that have taken place in the State of Louisiana for a great many years, if not ever 
before.‖45  Louisiana returned to the Union on July 9. 46 
The readmittance process did not go smoothly in all of the former Confederate states.  In 
Virginia, despite a state constitution assembly that developed a constitution, disagreement 
regarding funding prevented a ratification vote in 1868.  In the Third District, although Georgia 
approved a new constitution and elected a Republican governor and legislature, later in the year 
the state removed elected Freedmen from the legislature, giving Democrats a majority.  This 
resulted in Congress refusing to seat Georgia representatives, even though they had initially 
approved readmitting the state to the Union.  It also resulted in reinstitution of military rule in 
1869.
47
  In the Fourth District, Mississippi voters rejected the proposed constitution and 
remained unreconstructed.  In the Fifth District, Texas‘s civil situation was so chaotic that the 
state could not convene a constitutional convention.   
By the end of 1868 and the first year of military rule in the South under Congressional 
Reconstruction, six of the ten former Confederate States subject to Reconstruction had rejoined 
the Union.  The remaining four states, Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas, would remain 
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under or return to military rule through 1869 and not gain readmittance to the Union until 1870.  
In each of the four remaining states, state internal politics delayed readmittance.  In Texas a 
strong conservative coalition existed that rejected the 14
th
 Amendment,  passed black codes to 
control Freedmen rights, attempted to have former secessionists admitted to Congress, refused to 
recognize federal authority, attempted to form its own state militia, and aimed to thwart the 
efforts of the Freedmen‘s Bureau and the military department commander, General Sheridan, at 
every turn.
48
   Under army control after March 1867, Texas only very slowly met the 
requirements for readmission.  This was partly due to disunity among the state‘s Unionists, who 
divided themselves into opposing radical and moderate factions.  The radicals advocated a harsh 
disenfranchisement of former Confederates as well as division of the state into two or more new 
states.  The moderates were willing to align with the Democrats and conservatives to enfranchise 
as many white voters as possible.  These internal squabbles resulted in a very lengthy 
constitutional convention that had to convene in two separate sessions before finally, after the 
intervention of the army department commander General Canby, agreeing on a constitution.
49
  
On March 30, 1870, Texas rejoined the Union.
50
  Virginia and Mississippi had preceded Texas 
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into the Union, gaining admission on January 26 and February 23, respectively.  Georgia was the 
last of the Confederate states to permanently rejoin the Union, which it did on July 15, 1870. 
Congressional Reconstruction required the army to ensure the rule of law, govern the 
former Confederate states, supervise the transition to civil rule, and ensure compliance with the 
conditions identified by Congress in the three Reconstruction acts.  The army carried out the 
tasks of Congressional Reconstruction effectively, gaining readmission for six of the ten states 
within eighteen months of receiving the mission.  The four remaining states required another 
eighteen months to rejoin the Union.  In concept, Congressional Reconstruction differed very 
little from Presidential Reconstruction; the difference between the two approaches was in the 
details.  Military supervision and a detailed strict registration process enforced the law and 
ensured maximum participation by white Unionist and Freedmen, and minimized the influence 
of former Confederates.  This coalition of very different participants produced significantly 
different state constitutions and very different legislatures than had existed under Presidential 
Reconstruction.  The Republican Party, supported by Freedmen and Unionists, gained control of 
all of the Southern states except Virginia. Freedmen not only participated in great numbers, but 
also won leadership positions in the new Republican state governments.
51
  Congressional 
Reconstruction, combined with army electoral supervision, resulted in a dramatic political 
transformation of most of the South. By the summer of 1870, the Union was whole, and the army 
had apparently concluded its mission.  It remained to be seen if Unionists and Freedmen could 
sustain their political coalition and if the Reconstruction acts could foster social change. 
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Redemption and Failure 
The removal of military district commanders by President Johnson did not appear to have 
an immediate impact on the tempo and success of Congressional Reconstruction, but 
disagreements regarding policy in the South remained both within the army and within Congress.  
The disagreements became progressively more pronounced and negative over time.    As 
President Johnson‘s tenure approached its end in 1868, the impeachment proceedings against 
him absorbed most of his energy. In the fall of that year the country elected General in Chief 
Grant to be the new President.  Grant became President on March 4, 1869, and on March 8 
General William Tecumseh Sherman became the new General in Chief.  General Phil Sheridan 
moved from department commander in Missouri to replace Sherman as the senior Indian fighting 
commander as the head of the Division of the Missouri.
52
  Much of this shuffling of personal and 
responsibilities had little impact on operations.  However, particular key individuals in critical 
positions had a great impact on the nature of army operations in the former Confederate states 
after 1869. 
With Grant as President in 1869, it appeared that the Republican forces advocating a 
strong Southern policy were never more powerful.  President Johnson leaving office removed the 
largest obstacle to Congressional Reconstruction policy. Grant‘s actions as General in Chief 
were supportive of Congressional policy, and the indications were that he would continue his 
support from the White House.  In fact, Grant indicated that his motivation for running for 
President was specifically to not ―lose to us, largely, the results of the costly war which we have 
gone through.‖53  However, Grant‘s influence as the Commander in Chief was more than offset 
by General Sherman‘s selection to be the new General in Chief.   
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Grant‘s presidency coincided with a new phase of the Reconstruction process.  By the 
time Grant took office, most of the former Confederate states had been readmitted to the Union.  
This change in status precluded the army from interfering in the political and legal affairs of 
these states.  As General Terry noted from his command in Atlanta, ―the complete restoration of 
… the States which compose the command to their original relations to the general 
government…have withdrawn from the province of the department commander many subjects 
with which he formally had to do.‖54  However, the Republican state governments in all six 
states owed their existence to the significant involvement of the district commanders in state 
political affairs.  The sudden withdrawal of army support for these relatively weak governments 
created a situation in which, absent vigorous army support, the traditional Southern political 
apparatus had an opportunity to reassert itself.  In this situation, the views of the new General in 
Chief, William T. Sherman, were key.  
Throughout two critical years of Presidential and Congressional Reconstruction, from the 
summer of 1866 to the summer of 1868, General in Chief Grant kept a careful eye on the 
political and military developments relating to the occupation of the South.  Though President 
Grant occasionally focused on Southern policy, after 1868 his attention would never return to 
Reconstruction with the same type of sustained interest and participation that he had given the 
issue during his period as General in Chief.  Unlike Grant, General William Tecumseh Sherman 
as General in Chief did not view the army mission in the South as particularly important.  He felt 
it was a major distraction from the army‘s primary mission on the frontier.  Sherman‘s 
experiences and his personal conservatism strongly influenced his views.    His pre-Civil War 
experiences living in South Carolina and  as the President of the Louisiana Military Seminary 
                                                 
54
 ―Report of Major General Alfred H. Terry,‖ October 31, 1869, ARSW, 1869, Volume I (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1869), 88. 
 48 
gave him a strong affection for the South and the Southern intellectual elite, despite the notoriety 
he gained through his marauding Civil War campaign from Atlanta to the sea.
55
  Sherman‘s 
conservative ideology was second only to his strong convictions regarding the sanctity of the 
Union.  
Sherman observed the early years of Reconstruction from his headquarters in St. Louis, 
where he commanded the Division of Missouri and was largely responsible for protecting the 
expanding western frontier.  He had no desire to serve in the South and wrote that he was 
―perfectly willing to take a Regt [regiment] of cavalry and go to fight Indians, but to hold an 
indescribable office of mixed jurisdiction, impossible of logical execution and sure to result in 
curses from both sides.‖56  Sherman viewed the Reconstruction battles between Congress and 
President Johnson as a clash of wills and egos and not fundamentally about ideology.  In 1868 he 
wrote his brother, Ohio Senator John Sherman, that if outsiders would leave Southern whites 
alone to reorganize their society all would be well.
57
  Writing his brother in 1875, he was 
unequivocal in both his view of the army‘s role in the South and unrepentant if it clashed with 
those of his friend and commander, President Grant: ―I have always thought it wrong to bolster 
up weak State governments by our troops.  We should keep the peace always; but not act as 
bailiff constables and catch thieves.  That should be beneath a soldier‘s vocation.‖58  Sherman 
did not believe that the army had a role in enforcing law in the South.  Sherman‘s conservatism 
effected the army support to the mission in the South.  Within days of taking command in 
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Washington, he ordered the deployment west of most of the cavalry companies, the most 
effective enforcement forces in the South.
59
  Though his father-in-law, Thomas Ewing, and 
brother, John Sherman, were prominent Senators, he firmly believed in a complete separation of 
the army from politics.
60
   In his office as General in Chief of the army, Sherman was in a 
position where his actions, or passive inaction, had disastrous consequences for the new 
Republican governments born out of Congressional Reconstruction. 
Other figures also played a role in the army‘s support for the fledgling Republican state 
governments.  At the level of division and department commanders, officers could also have an 
influence on state affairs even though the supreme authority of the military district commander 
no longer existed.  Here the replacement officers appointed by President Johnson or General 
Sherman began to effect the course of Reconstruction.  The actions of General Henry W. 
Halleck, who took command of the Division of the South in June 1869 and commanded until 
November 1871, represent this influence.  Halleck‘s division contained the greatest number of 
former Confederate states, and he was therefore in a position to greatly effect the political fate of 
the new Republican state governments. 
Halleck‘s personal political views were similar to Sherman‘s ideas.  While serving as the 
division commander of the Pacific in 1867, he wrote that it was ―improper for officers of the 
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Army to take, under ordinary circumstance, active part in political party contests.‖ In his first 
report as commander of the South in 1869, he wrote, ―In regard to the interference of military 
officers in local difficulties under the pleas of maintaining peace and good order, I think that no 
such military interference should be permitted, except on the requisition of the governor of the 
State, and by the order of the President, as provided by law.‖61 This overly legal mindset, 
combined with an ideological conservatism unsupportive of Freedmen suffrage, explains 
Halleck‘s inaction in state affairs. Thus, in the critical years of his command, as white supremacy 
groups killed hundreds of Freedmen and Unionists and intimidated thousands more throughout 
his division, Halleck took no action in support of local law and order and maintained that 
―official investigations have generally proved the reports to be either unfounded or greatly 
exaggerated.‖62    
Halleck‘s conclusions regarding the state law and order within his division indicate 
complete detachment from the reality of conditions within his command in 1869 as reported by 
his four very experienced subordinates: Generals Alfred Terry in the Department of the South, P. 
St. George Cooke in the Department of the Cumberland, J. A. Mowler in the Department of 
Louisiana, and Adelbert Ames commanding the Department of Mississippi.  Terry reported that 
in Alabama ―the middle and northern parts of the State… are in a very disturbed condition,‖ and 
in much of Georgia ―there is practically no government;‖  Cooke stated ―in the interior of 
Kentucky and Tennessee…freedom of negroes is a mockery;‖ Mowler reported that parts of 
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Louisiana were ―invested with desperadoes and thieves who defy and ignore the local civil 
authorities entirely;‖ and in Mississippi Ames reported, ―A prevailing sentiment in many 
sections of the State has been that the whites who entertain political sentiments different from the 
community [Unionists] should be driven therefrom, and that the blacks should be, if not deprived 
of rights undeniably theirs by law, at least seriously curtailed in the exercise of them.‖63 
Halleck‘s mindset limited the freedom of action of these subordinates and ensured that the new 
Republican state governments and their Unionist and Freedmen supporters could not rely on 
army support.  
Although some of the department heads did what they could to support the state 
governments, others such as Canby in Virginia and Rousseau in Louisiana remained uninvolved 
or actively supported the conservative forces.  In North Carolina, Freedmen‘s Bureau Chief and 
future General in Chief of the Army Nelson Miles‘s disagreements with General Terry‘s 
predecessor, General George Meade, over Meade‘s reluctance to authorize the use troops to 
support the state government, finally led Meade to request Miles‘s relief from command.64 
Passive nonsupport of the occupation objectives by some army officers aided the opponents of 
Republican rule in the South. A friend and supporter of President Johnson, General Lovell H. 
Rousseau commanded in Louisiana during the 1868 election.
65
 He refused to take action against 
violence that resulted in the deaths of as many as 200 Freedmen prior to the election. In fact, 
Rousseau advised Freedmen to stay away from the polls for their own self-protection. He stated 
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that the ―ascendance of the negro in this state is approaching its end.‖66  Passive non-support to 
Congressional Reconstruction by army leaders after 1869 denied the new Republican state 
governments the support they needed to survive, removed the force of Congressional legislation, 
and emboldened and encouraged Southern resistance.  Without army involvement in state affairs, 
lawlessness descended on much of the South. 
As the new state governments took power in 1868 and as army support diminished at the 
same time, a significant threat to law and order and the state governments came to the nation‘s 
attention in the form of the Ku Klux Klan. As indicated by the department commanders above, 
politically inspired violence swept through most of the South beginning in 1868. Intimidation 
and terror against Unionists and Freedmen existed before the war ended and continued after the 
peace. Violence increased noticeably after 1866, when former Confederate soldiers founded the 
Ku Klux Klan as a Tennessee social club. By 1868, the Klan had spread to every Southern state 
and had launched a deliberate reign of terror intended to intimidate the Republican vote, black 
and white, in the Southern states.
67
  General Halleck was technically correct when he stated in 
1869, ―Although there may be special organizations of outlaws in particular localities under the 
name of Ku-Klux, I am of the opinion that no such general organization now exists in the 
Southern States,‖ but his analysis was incomplete and demonstrates a complete lack of 
understanding of the threat.
68
  Though they did not have a central command and control 
apparatus, the Klan had a common ideology and purpose and a common set of tactics that united 
the various local Klan groups.  Public acclaim for their activities reinforced their effectiveness, 
encouraged their boldness, and encouraged the formation of similar groups practicing similar 
                                                 
66
 Foner, Reconstruction, 342. 
67
 Ibid., 342. 
68
 ―Report of Major General H.W. Halleck,‖ ARSW, 1869, 78. 
 53 
activities in other regions. Historian Eric Foner did not exaggerate when he concluded, ―In 
effect, the Klan was a military force serving the interests of the Democratic Party, the planter 
class, and all those who desired restoration of white supremacy.‖69  Thus, while one faction, the 
Democratic Party, had an effective military force supporting its political activity, the other 
faction, the new Republican state governments, did not. 
Although the third phase of Reconstruction was largely successful, after commanders 
turned over authority to civil leaders, disgruntled whites increased the use of criminal terror and 
intimidation to erode Freedmen and white Unionist political power.   The Southern white 
population was defiant in the face of the army‘s initial success imposing Reconstruction policy 
and then more so after the noticeable change in the army leadership‘s aggressive attitude toward 
law enforcement.  A Democratic newspaper vowed, ―These constitutions and governments will 
last just as long as the bayonets which ushered them into being, shall keep them in existence, and 
not one day longer.‖70  The Klan and like groups were effective at discouraging blacks and 
Republican whites (carpetbaggers and scalawags) from voting, especially after the army stopped 
aggressively employing the bayonets that protected those rights.  
Local army commanders, after turning power over to elected civil officials in 1867–68, 
were aware of what was happening. When General Terry took command in Georgia, he 
recommended to Halleck that ―all orders recognizing Georgia as a state of the Union be revoked, 
and that the military authority of a district commander under the Reconstruction laws, with 
authority to try citizens by military tribunals, be restored or resumed in that state.‖71  He further 
reported, ―There can be no doubt of the existence of numerous, insurrectionary organizations 
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known as the ku-klux klans, who shielded by their disguises, by the secrecy of their movements, 
and by the terror which they inspire, perpetrate crime with impunity.‖72  General Halleck, his 
superior, did not concur. In the critical year of 1869 senior army commanders were unwilling to 
take action.  General Sherman was determined that the army be as removed from politics as 
possible.  
There is no debate as to the effectiveness of the Klan. The Klan and other supremacist 
organizations, such as the White League in Louisiana, were almost unchallenged wherever army 
troops were absent.  Historian Eric Foner described a ―wave of counterrevolutionary terror that 
swept over large parts of the South between 1868 and1871 [that] lacks a counterpart either in the 
American experience or in that of the other Western Hemisphere societies that abolished slavery 
in the nineteenth century.‖ One out of every ten black members of the 1867–68 state 
constitutional conventions became the victim of Klan violence, and seven were murdered. It was 
no surprise that in the 1868 Presidential election the two southern states that Grant did not carry 
were Louisiana and Georgia, where army leadership was least aggressive and where violence 
decimated the Republican organizations and made it impossible to get out the black vote.
73 
The army response to the terrorist threat was haphazard.  During the Johnson 
administration, commanders who acted decisively against terrorists were relieved.  After Grant 
became President in 1869, conservative commanders installed by Johnson still were in key 
positions and had strong influence. General Sherman‘s influence restrained others from acting 
aggressively.  In 1871, Sherman insisted that what lawlessness existed was a function of corrupt 
Republican state governments and that ―If Ku-klux bills were kept out of Congress, and the army 
kept at their legitimate duties, there are enough good and true men in all Southern States to put 
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down all Kuklux or other bands of marauders.‖74 Clearly, the Klan threat did not impress the 
senior leader of the army.
75
 
 The Southern governments were at a disadvantage trying to subdue terrorists until Grant 
and his Administration finally made a priority of reestablishing the rule of law.   This occurred in 
1871 when the federal government determined to pursue the Klan through the offices of Attorney 
General Amos T. Akerman, and Solicitor General Benjamin H. Bristow.
76
  Grant established a 
new organization, the Department of Justice, and district attorneys, marshals, and the army began 
a campaign to eliminate the Klan.  Army headquarters at last recognized the extent of the Klan 
challenge.  The Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, reported in 1871 ―indisputable evidence 
establishes the fact… that an armed rebellion of regular organization and great strength in parts 
of those States [east of the Mississippi].‖77  Using a variety of tools, including the army, the 
Federal government made progress fighting the Klan.  In North Carolina troops helped make 
arrests.  In Mississippi federal authorities obtained nearly 700 indictments against Klan and other 
insurgent group members. However, most cases that went to trial resulted in suspended 
sentences.  South Carolina was the only state where authorities used troops, including six 
companies of the 7
th
 Cavalry Regiment, on a large scale. The President suspended the writ of 
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habeas corpus in nine South Carolina counties.  As many as 2000 Klansmen may have fled South 
Carolina to avoid arrest.  The army and prosecutors arrested and imprisoned most of the 
leadership.
78
  The legal offensive of 1871 broke the organized Klan‘s back in South Carolina and 
drastically reduced violence everywhere. 
However, the 1871 campaign came too late.  Major Lewis Merrill leading the 7
th
 Cavalry 
against the Klan in 1871 and 1872 recognized the Klan‘s lasting influence:  ―the tyranny of that 
organization over public opinion was so nearly perfect that its effect will be for a long time very 
great.  So strong is this effect still that it is idle to expect for a long time to come that the State 
laws will be enforced in any Ku-Klux cases.‖79  By 1871 the terrorists had succeeded in 
undermining several state governments and reestablishing white political dominance in much of 
the South.  The Unionist and Freedmen vote was substantially intimidated.  Violence had proven 
an effective tool of the conservative political movement, and in 1874 and 1875 it was key to the 
destruction of the last Republican state governments.
80
 
In 1870, the remaining former Confederate states entered the Union, but unlike the earlier 
states, these states entered with either bipartisan civil governments or governments controlled by 
the Democratic Party.  Disengagement by the army leadership combined with an effective 
terrorist campaign contributed to the gradual undermining of the Republican civil governments 
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created by Congressional Reconstruction and contributed to the willingness of southern 
Republicans to compromise with Democrats.  National events, the increasing power of northern 
Democrats, the increased strength of moderate Republicans uninterested in Reconstruction, as 
well as economic recession, all weakened support for strict enforcement of Congressional 
Reconstruction policy and the strength of Republican governments in the South. 
The political will to achieve the goals of Congressional Reconstruction was never higher 
than after the elections of 1868, when General Grant became President. However, it began to 
decline even before the 1870 mid-term election. Though Grant won the presidency, the election 
of 1868 saw major Democratic gains in northern states. The Democrats picked up twenty new 
seats in the House. One Ohio politician remarked on the future focus of national politics, ―The 
Negro will be less prominent for some time to come.‖81 In the 1870 House elections the 
Democrats picked up thirty-seven seats while the Republicans lost thirty-five. In 1872, many 
Republican supporters of Reconstruction moderated their views in order to retain their seats. 
After 1871, a coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats toned down the vigorous support 
of Reconstruction in the Congress. In addition, by 1872 three Southern states, Georgia, 
Tennessee and Virginia, reverted to Democratic control. The President‘s interest and ability to 
continue to support Reconstruction in the South waned. In the 1874 mid-term elections, the 
Democrats, spurred by an economic depression for which the public blamed Republicans, 
crushed the Republicans. Grant‘s party lost ninety-six seats while the Democrats gained ninety-
four, and control of the House for the first time since the beginning of the Civil War. As 
important, the Democrats regained control in Alabama, Texas and Arkansas, giving them 
effective control of six of the eleven former Confederate states.  
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In December 1874, White League gangs in Vicksburg, Mississippi, prevented blacks 
from voting. When confronted by a black sheriff, the whites, with superior firepower, dispersed 
the black posse and then went on a rampage. As many as three hundred blacks may have been 
murdered in the area before federal troops restored order in January 1875. The Vicksburg events 
became the Democratic blueprint for redeeming the state in the fall elections of 1875.
82
 Similar 
tactics occurred in Louisiana.  The most violent and publicized event in Louisiana occurred in 
New Orleans on September 14, 1874, when over five thousand White League members, 
organized into military units, attacked and dispersed over three thousand men, mostly Freedmen, 
protecting the Republican state governor. The riot resulted in over one hundred wounded and 
twenty-five killed; mostly on the Republican side.  Army commanders were restrained by 
General Sherman‘s guidance ―not to call for force from without unless in case of manifest 
necessity.‖ The Democrats installed their own governor for three days until army units arrived in 
sufficient force to reinstall the elected Republican.
83
  President Grant, acutely aware of declining 
political and popular support of Reconstruction policy, responded, ―The whole public are tired 
out with these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South . . . [and] are ready now to condemn any 
interference on the part of the Government.‖ In 1876, the Republican governor of Mississippi, 
Adelbert Ames, resigned, saying, ―A revolution has taken place—by force of arms—and a race 
are disfranchised.‖84 
Grant‘s failure to act to ensure proper elections in Mississippi and to prevent the 
usurpation of power by Democrats, along with the presidential election of 1876 and the contested 
returns in the states of Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina, spelled the death-knell of 
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Reconstruction. Democrats won clear control of Mississippi and North Carolina. The contested 
returns caused a compromise, brokered by moderate Republicans and Democrats, that conceded 
Democratic control of South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana in return for electoral votes for 
Republican presidential candidate Rutherford P. Hayes. By the summer of 1877, all of the 
Southern secessionist states were back firmly under Democratic Party control, as they had been 
prior to the Civil War. 
A Blueprint for the Future 
Modern historians see the occupation of the South as a failure because the South 
successfully undermined or blocked most of the political objectives of Reconstruction policy. By 
1877, the leadership of the Southern states, governors, congressmen and other notable state and 
local officials, was predominantly of the same class and ideology that had led the South into 
rebellion in 1861. Even more disheartening was the undermining of abolition. Though the slaves 
were free, the resurgent Southern leadership, and their political Allies in the North, restricted the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the point that most Southern Freedmen were unable to 
vote, did not have equality of opportunity, and were legally and socially relegated to a 
subservient class. Thus, the social status of the Freedmen and the political structure of the South, 
though altered from the antebellum form, fell far short of the objectives envisioned by the 
American government at the end of the Civil War.
85
 The failure of Reconstruction was more a 
political failure than a military failure, but that political failure was at least in part due to the 
performance of the US Army.   
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By the time that President Rutherford Hayes ordered the army in the South confined to 
military garrison duties, the army had experienced the complete cycle of an occupation 
experience. The army‘s participation in Reconstruction marks the beginning of a pattern that 
would come to define the US Army‘s conceptual approach to military occupation.86  Army 
officers oversaw an attempt to remake completely a society both politically and socially. The 
variety of non-traditional tasks required of them was immense. They successfully transitioned 
from a conventional war footing to focus on occupation operations.  Army leaders demonstrated 
how to create democratic government.  Military leaders learned to defend their efforts from 
enemies who attacked them using diverse asymmetric means such the media, the legal system, 
politics, and terrorism.   These positive lessons regarding occupations became part of the legacy 
of the Civil War occupation experience. 
Army leaders also learned from their failures.  They witnessed how the lack of a secure 
environment and the rule of law could undermine political successes.  Officers learned that the 
type of social tasks assigned to them were time-consuming and reliant for success on many 
factors that were beyond their ability to control.  Army leaders learned that one of the major 
factors impacting the conduct of military occupation activities was the national political policy, 
and they learned that they had only limited influence over that policy.  Without timely, clear, and 
consistent strategic policy, successful military occupation operations became problematic.  
During Reconstruction, the failure to define a politically acceptable national policy resulted in 
lost time and opportunities, dramatic policy changes, undermined law and order, and ultimately 
contributed to conditions of resistance that the US government was not able to overcome.  These 
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conditions contributed significantly to the failure of Reconstruction and the failure of the 
occupation of the South.  These failures were also part of the legacy the Reconstruction 
experience left the army.  
 62 
CHAPTER 3 - The Frontier Army 
 
The American army turned its primary focus to duty on the frontier soon after the Civil 
War ended. General John Crooke described the nature of service on the plains:  ―Indian warfare 
is, of all warfare, the most dangerous, the most trying and the most thankless.  Not recognized by 
the high authority of the United States Senate as war, it still possesses for you the disadvantages 
of civilized warfare, with all the horrible accompaniments that barbarians can invent and savages 
execute.  In it you are required to serve without the incentive to promotion or recognition; in 
truth, without favor or hope of reward.‖1  Army officers serving on the frontier experienced a  
hard life, hard campaigning, but little fighting.  Though fighting was uncommon, the frontier 
period provided a rich set of experiences for the army officer corps that reinforced the lessons of 
the occupation of the South, and would served the army well as it entered into occupation 
operations in the twentieth-century.  In the process, the small officer corps built strong ties 
among themselves and their families.  These strong personal ties, combined with the intense but 
isolated conditions of service, created a strong shared institutional culture among the officer 
corps and facilitated passing the lessons of one generation of officer on to the next.  A part of 
that shared cultural identity was a shared concept of the role of the army in the life of the nation.  
General Sheridan, commanding the Division of the Missouri in 1873 expressed how army 
officers viewed the service the army provided to the nation during the frontier years: ―the army‘s 
task [on the frontier] was to do generally all that is constantly required … in the way of helping 
and urging forward everything which tends to develop and increase civilization upon the 
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border.‖2 Army resources on the frontier were devoted to a variety of non-combat tasks.  As the 
most effective arm of the government in what was a often a vacuum of lawlessness the army was 
deeply involved in Indian relations and policy,  and supervised and assisted the transformation of 
the American western frontier into a viable partner in the Union.  Advancing the frontier 
included interacting with the various tribes and their diverse cultures, dealing with foreign 
powers on the nation‘s borders, assisting economic development, and exploration.  These 
experiences and activities, though not occupation operations, were important unconventional 
military tasks that reinforced the experience of Reconstruction, and expanded the experiential 
knowledge and intellectual horizons of American army officers in ways that prepared them for 
later military government roles. 
The Frontier Army 
The army‘s post-Civil War frontier experience began immediately after the Civil War and 
continued long after Reconstruction.  Officially, the last campaign against the American Indian 
tribes was the Ghost Dance uprising which culminated in the battle at Wounded Knee in 1890.  
The Plains Indian wars were not a single war but a series of wars fought almost continuously 
from 1866 to 1890, against different tribes, across the depth and breadth of the western plains. 
These wars were only the highlights of continuous small scale patrolling, policing, raiding, and 
engagements, which kept the regular regiments of US Army in a constant state of operations 
throughout the period. 
The frontier army was a small tightly knit force.  Throughout its life, its total size never 
exceeded about 25,000 men, of which approximately 2000 were officers.  As indicated in the 
previous chapter, during the years 1866 to 1877 a large portion of the frontier army was not on 
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the frontier, but rather was committed to occupation duty in the former Confederate States.   
Additionally, coastal garrisons also accounted for a significant force.  Some historians question 
whether the army was an army in fact.  Historian Robert Utley observed, ―The special conditions 
of the Indian mission made the US Army not so much a little army as a big police force.‖3  The 
army‘s primary purpose on the frontier was to provide security for US citizens and interests.  
This was the reason for its presence on over 200 small cantonments across the frontier.   
The army showed great flexibility in organizing for the conditions of the frontier.
4
  
Above regimental level, the army organized geographically into regional divisions and 
subordinate departments.  This organization generally followed established political state and 
territory boundaries that facilitated the army coordinating its activities and operations with the 
civil representatives of the local government.  Army organization was adapted to the conditions 
of the frontier and bore little resemblance to the conventional war organization of the Civil War.
5
  
The leadership of the army understood that the army was a tool of government policy and in the 
post-Civil Wars years, it had to organize for a variety of governmental tasks in addition to 
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frontier security.  Geographic organization facilitated command of a wide variety of disparate 
missions. 
While engaged in frontier duties, the officer corps did not lose the knowledge and 
experiences gained in the occupation of the South.  Most of the senior army commanders, and all 
of the Commanding Generals of the army through the beginning of the twentieth Century had 
both direct experience with the frontier and the occupation of the South.  Many important mid-
grade officers also did substantial duty in the South. Veterans passed the knowledge gained in 
Reconstruction on to younger officers through a variety of venues including the budding army 
education system.  More effectively, soldiers informally handed down the experiences of 
Reconstruction through the professional, social, and personal connections between officers. The 
small post-Civil War army officer corps included West Point classmates, regimental comrades, 
campaign partners, relatives, and often combinations of these relationships.   This informal 
network preserved the knowledge gained in Reconstruction, and also the relevant experiences of 
the late nineteenth century frontier army, for the next generation of officers.   
Reconstruction experience was common in the frontier army.
6
  It was only the most 
junior officers in the frontier regiments who lacked any experience in the occupation of the 
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South.  Units and senior commanders rotated regularly to new assignments throughout the 
frontier period.  This ensured that most senior frontier commanders commanded in the South and 
many frontier regiments rotated into garrisons in the South during the course of Reconstruction.  
The army‘s policy of transferring units wherever there was a need, partly a consequence of its 
small size and partly a conscious decision to equitably distribute the most arduous duty, resulted 
in much of the army experiencing some aspect of the occupation of the South.  Even elements of 
the very valuable cavalry regiments saw service in the South.  Because of this the Southern 
occupation was very much a part of the character of the frontier army.  Through the end of the 
frontier army in 1890, if an army officer had not served on occupation duty, he was in contact 
with a commander, a peer, or a subordinate who had.     
Despite being a force primarily designed for combat, the frontier army was involved in a 
host of activities not related, or only indirectly related to fighting Indians.  The army was the 
single most important and influential government institution on the frontier.  An army wife, 
describing her experiences traveling the frontier commented, ―I never realized what a potent 
influence that uniform wielded in those troublesome times.‖7  Activities other than fighting 
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of the Chief Joseph‘s band during the 1877 Nez Perce‘ war.  Other senior officers with significant Reconstruction 
experience included Generals O.C. Ord who served in the 4
th
 Military District and Texas, and General Edward 
Canby who had important assignments in the Carolinas, Virginia and Texas. 
The senior officers were not the only ones who brought their occupation experience to the frontier.  
Numerous field grade and company grade officers also served in the South and then transferred to frontier service.  
Perhaps the most famous of these was Colonel Nelson Miles.  Miles transferred in 1868 from his position of 
Military Governor of North Carolina to command the 5
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 Infantry Regiment in the Department of Dakota.  During 
the frontier period, his regiment became the most prominent of the Indian fighting infantry regiments, and Miles one 
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Indians, in fact, took up the bulk of the army‘s time and resources in the years 1866 to 1890.  
These diverse activities included service in support of Indian relations, encouraging economic 
development, and scientific research and exploration.  
The Army and Indian Policy 
Though the Indian tribes of the plains were the army‘s primary adversary in the years 
after the Civil War, actually fighting with the Indian took less of the army‘s efforts than a host of 
other activities that required the army to interact with the Indian.  Though the Indian tribes of the 
frontier were the army‘s primary focus between the years 1865 and 1890, the army was not the 
government‘s lead agency for Indian relations.  The lead agency for Indian policy, much to the 
frustration of the army leadership, was the Bureau of Indian Affairs within the Department of the 
Interior.
8
  The army did not fundamentally disagree with the government‘s general Indian policy.  
Rather, the major army concern was with its effective implementation.  The army was frustrated 
first with the corruption and ineptness of the Indian Bureau, and second with the disinterest and 
lack of funding of Congress.  Army officers were in accord with the broad outlines of the policy:  
the removal of Indians from the path of westward expansion.  They also agreed the best way to 
accomplish this was to concentrate the Indian tribes on reservations where they were away from 
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the path of the frontier immigrants and where there was little in the way of agriculture and 
mining to interest frontiersman.
9
   
Army officers also agreed with the government policy of assimilation.  Army leaders, 
along with the Department of the Interior and eastern reformers, believed that for Indians to 
survive they would have to survive not as distinct tribes, but rather as individuals assimilated into 
American society.
10
  Where the army parted ways with many Indian Bureau agents and eastern 
reformers was the manner of assimilation.  The civilian view was that the process of assimilation 
consisted of first, conversion to Christianity, and second, the establishment of the individual 
Indian as a farmer.  Most army officers were less concerned with the Indian‘s spiritual 
conversion.  In fact, many officers respected the Indian‘s unique religious views.  Many army 
officers also did not agree with forcing the Indian to adopt an agricultural life-style.  Army 
officers believed that establishing the Indian as a rancher was more reasonable given the 
geography of most reservations and the abilities and cultural inclinations of the tribes.
11
  In 
general, army officers were sympathetic to the motivation of the Indians to retain their traditional 
way of life.  General Sheridan explained that ―We took away their country and their means of 
support, broke up their mode of living, their habits of life, introduced disease and decay among 
them, and it was for this and against this they made war.  Could any one expect less?‖12  Captain 
Richard Pratt of 10
th
 Cavalry echoed the General‘s conclusions, ―It was perfectly human for the 
Indians to attempt to maintain their freedom and to hold on to their primitive life and 
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resources…‖13  Nonetheless; officers believed that Indian removal was necessary for the 
development and civilization of the frontier. 
Rather than use force to gain the cooperation of the Indians, in most cases the army 
preferred to talk to the tribes and chiefs.  Negotiating with the Indian leaders required significant 
cultural and political skills.  Many senior army officers had extensive experience actively 
engaged in political negotiations in the South and in the halls of Washington.  Virtually all the 
senior commanders on the frontier carried out important negotiations.  In addition, all army 
officers, regardless of rank and experience, could find themselves in the position of representing 
the government to Indian leaders.  Negotiating with American Indians placed army officers in 
the position where they were essentially negotiating with foreign sovereign powers as the 
representatives of the United States. Negotiations commonly took place within the context of 
constant danger and vastly different languages, culture, and worldviews.    
Sometimes leaders negotiated as part of a deliberate pre-arranged process, while on other 
occasions negotiations occurred spontaneously.  Such was the case when Colonel George 
Randall, Colonel T.H. Stanton, and Captains W.P. Clark and John Bourke negotiated with Sioux 
Chief Crazy Horse for his surrender at the conclusion of the 1876–1877 winter campaign.14 
These negotiations ended with Crazy Horse‘s band surrendering peacefully to the army officers.  
The success of army officers under these spontaneous circumstances required that they 
demonstrate a degree of political savvy, mental flexibility, and cultural sensitivity. 
15
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The other common form of negotiations in which army officers participated were formal 
missions aimed at resolving or forestalling hostilities. The army usually assigned these 
diplomatic missions to senior commanders who had reputations within the army, the 
government, and among the Indians.  Such missions could be physically arduous and often 
dangerous.  The Modoc leader Captain Jack murdered General Edward Canby, commander of 
the Department of the Northwest, during negotiations to end hostilities between the tribe and 
government in 1873.
16
  The problems the army assigned these officers to resolve were often quite 
complex.  General Howard described his task as the President‘s representative to resolve Arizona 
Indian problems in 1872:  
The instructions [from the Secretary of the Interior] revealed a host of complaints 
and grievances on the part of various tribes: for example, by the Umas, the Pimas, 
the Maricopas, the Arivipas, the Mojaves, the Tontos, and the White Mountain 
Apaches.  There were also lively disturbances in the Warm Spring tribe, recently 
moved to Tularosa, a disagreeable region in the western part of New Mexico; and 
feuds of all sorts existed between the Navajos and their neighbors.  There were 
Indians at Fort Stanton who were breaking out from their reservation and 
depredating upon the scattered settlements.  All these surrounding tribes were to 
be quieted by my expedition, but the main thing was to make peace with the 
warlike Chiricahuas under Cochise.
17
   
Howard‘s complex and politically sensitive mission was successful.  He established the 
disaffected tribes on reservations under army observation.  However, Howard‘s negotiations also 
revealed that there was almost always a constituency dissatisfied with the results of army 
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negotiations.   Western newspapers decried Howard‘s efforts and the leniency of the 
agreement.
18
   
The army was not only willing to talk to the Indian tribes but was often a strong advocate 
for their just treatment.  As mentioned above, for their own reasons as well as the Indian‘s 
welfare, army officers were vocal and public critics of the Indian Bureau.  In addition, leaders 
such as Generals Crooke, Miles, Pope, and Sheridan wrote private humanitarian leaders as well 
as public officials advocating for support of various tribal causes.  After the defeat of the 
southern tribes in 1874, incompetence in the Bureau of Indian Affairs threatened starvation for 
the tribes.  General Pope, commanding the Department of the Missouri, was one of the first to 
sound the alarm as his inspectors found the tribes starving and much of the meat supplied by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs spoiled or of poor quality.  Pope warned of renewed hostilities if 
conditions were not improved:  ―Who can blame them if, rather than starve to death and see their 
women and children suffering the pangs of hunger in slow process of starvation, they break away 
and get food for them in any manner and as soon as they can.‖  The government averted 
starvation by releasing army supplies to the Indian agents and permitting Indians to hunt off the 
reservations.  Conditions did not improve in future years, and agents and army officers 
frequently worked together to keep the tribes fed.
19
   
Army leaders also sponsored trips by tribal leaders to Washington to make the tribes‘ 
case in person.  For these trips, they arranged transportation, army officer escorts, made 
appointments, and provided translators for the Indian leaders.  Such was the case in 1883 when 
Brigadier General Nelson Miles arranged for three chiefs of the Okinagan tribe to travel to 
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Washington escorted by Captain Frank Baldwin of the 5
th
 Infantry.  In Washington, they met 
personally with the Secretary of the Interior and renegotiated the boundaries of their reservation 
and other issues.  Both Miles and Baldwin concluded, ―great good had been effected by the visit 
of the three chiefs to Washington.‖20 Trips such as these, however, would not have occurred 
without the initiative and support of army officers on the frontier.   
The rule of law was a constant guide to Army actions in relation to the Indian tribes.  
When authorized, the army used troops to protect Indian land from trespassing miners, settlers, 
and ranchers. Army officers also attempted to ensure that unscrupulous businessmen and Indian 
agents did not cheat the Indians in contracts and other business activities.  After newspapers 
declared that the Black Hills of Dakota contained ―Gold Bearing Quartz in Mountain Piles,‖ 
army units were required to turn back hordes of prospectors.  General Sheridan went so far as to 
have a telegram published in frontier newspapers such as the Bismarck Tribune, in which he 
ordered General Terry to ―use the force at your command to burn the wagon trains, destroy the 
outfits and arrest the leaders.‖21 Protecting the Indian‘s country from trespassers was the 
dominant mission of the 10th Cavalry from 1869 to 1873.  During that time, the regiment was 
essentially on occupation duty in the Indian Territory where its major mission was ―frequent 
scouting for marauders and trespassers.‖22  After the defeat of the Southern tribes, General 
Sheridan urged ―Congressional action to keep out intruders from the Indian Territory.‖23 The 
mission became more important over time.  Throughout the summer and fall of 1880, elements 
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of the 23
rd
 Infantry Regiment sparred with frontier immigration advocate David Payne and his 
followers who were seeking to establish settlements in the Indian Territory.  Troops evicted 
Payne and his followers from the territory twice during the summer.  After the last arrest, the 
army turned them over to US Marshals.  In October 1880, the army stationed a company of 
infantry and supporting Indian scouts outside Wichita Kansas to intercept any further attempts by 
Payne.
24
 Enforcing treaty boundaries and Indian rights was frustrating duty.  Soldiers did not 
have the power to arrest and were limited in most cases to merely escorting the offenders beyond 
the reservation boundary.  Officers were often in peril of personal prosecution by biased local 
civil courts and suit by civilians arrested for trespassing on Indian land or attempting to defraud 
Indians in business deals.
25
 
To deal effectively with the diverse Indian tribes required that army officers understand 
the cultures with which they interacted.  This understanding was encouraged by the senior army 
leadership and was an expected characteristic of competent frontier officers.
26
  Young lieutenants 
who wanted to be a success followed the example of Hugh Scott of the 7
th
 Cavalry who began to 
learn Indian language and culture from Indian scouts on his very first expedition in 1876.
27
  It 
was essential that officers understood simple facts about dealing with a foreign culture.  For 
example, leaders were schooled to take whatever food an Indian provided and eat it heartily even 
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when they were personally unfamiliar with it or found it distasteful.
28
  Army officers knew that 
understanding the culture, not fighting, was the key to successful interaction with Indians.  One 
frontier army veteran astutely observed that the term ―Indian fighter‖ was inaccurate:  ―It would 
be better and more truthful to call us [frontier officers] ‗Indian thinkers‘ rather than ‗Indian 
fighters.‘ ‖29   
Many of the army‘s best officers, certainly some of its brightest minds, were recognized 
experts on Indian culture.  These included Lieutenant William P. Clark of the 2
nd
 Cavalry, who 
published a comprehensive book on Indian sign language, The Indian Sign Language, With Brief 
Explanatory Notes.
30
 Possibly the foremost army expert on Indian culture was Captain John G. 
Bourke of the 3
rd
 Cavalry.  Bourke was an aide to General George Crook and became one of the 
army‘s most experienced Indian experts.  He wrote extensively on campaigning in the West but 
his anthropological works on the Indians of the Southwest garnered the most academic respect.
31
  
Although junior officers such as Clark and Bourke were most closely associated with the Indians 
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as scout commanders, senior officers also understood Indian culture and used that knowledge to 
attempt to influence Indian policy.  General Oliver O. Howard wrote extensively about the 
Indian and his ways including Nez Perce Joseph (1881), and My Life and Experiences Among 
Our Hostile Indians (1907).  Colonel Richard Irving Dodge was another senior officer with a 
keen interest in Indian culture.  The army command supported and encouraged Dodge‘s writing 
which was very comprehensive and included detailed analysis of the geography of the west, 
Indian culture, and a strong critique of government Indian policy.
32
 
 The army employed Indian warriors extensively as scouts and auxiliaries.  Beginning in 
1866, the Congress formally authorized the army to recruit Indians as scouts.  Typically, the 
army enlisted Indians as scouts for a period of one year but usually they only served for the 
duration of a specific campaign.  Indian scouts gave the army several important capabilities:  
field craft that regular soldiers lacked, knowledge of the terrain and tracking skills essential to 
pursue fleeing Indians and locating Indian camps, and language and cultural understanding 
necessary to perceive Indian intentions, negotiate with leaders, and interrogate prisoners. 
Another reason the army employed Indian scouts and auxiliaries was because army officers 
believed that employment by the army provided a viable cultural outlet for young male warriors 
that diverted them from hostile activity against settlers.  
In 1891, the army drastically reduced the recruiting of scouts and, instead, recruited 
Indians to serve in special segregated companies in selected regular regiments.  The Indian 
companies were different from the scouts.  The army considered these units part of the regular 
establishment and enlisted the Indians for five years under exactly the same conditions as all 
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other enlistees.
33
  Scout company officers benefited greatly from the experience.  Leading Indian 
soldiers developed ―self-reliance, coolness, and woodcraft‖ and opened another means of 
exposing young officers to Indian culture.
34
  Officers who commanded Indian Scouts, including 
future Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Lieutenants Hugh Scott and John Pershing, had to lead the 
Indians on the Indian‘s terms and could not rely on the authority of their army commissions.  
Personal bravery, physical endurance, and a thorough knowledge of Indian culture were the 
prerequisites of successful command.  Commanders of Indian soldiers often encouraged the 
Indians to prepare themselves spiritually through dance and prayer for their missions.  In some 
cases, the Indians treated army commanders as chiefs and the officers participated in the social 
and religious activities of the scouts.
35
  Close interaction with the American Indian tribes through 
negotiations, advocacy, as policy makers and as leaders of Indian scouts and soldiers created 
with the army officer corps a general understanding of Indian culture and an intellectual 
acceptance of cultural diversity.  These traits were essential to successful operations on the 
frontier and were a key to future occupations.  Cultural understanding became a characteristic of 
the army. 
While many army officers embraced Indian culture, others, in accordance with 
government policy, saw Indian culture as an obstacle to the humanitarian goal of assimilation.  
The army considered close association with the army, army discipline, and supervision by army 
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officers very positive steps toward the civilizing of the Indian tribes.
36
   Some army officers were 
deeply involved in assimilation efforts.  Captain Richard Pratt of the 10
th
 Cavalry was a leader of 
Indian scouts throughout his early career in the 1860s and 1870s.  By 1879, Pratt had transitioned 
from managing Indian prisoners to heading the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, one of the 
single most powerful expressions of the assimilation ideal.  Pratt expressed the intent of the 
school and the vision of the assimilation reformers when he described his intent to the Secretary 
of the Interior Carl Schurz in 1879.  The school would ―give Indian youth the English language, 
education, and industries that it is imperative they have in preparation for citizenship.‖37  Pratt 
became one of the national leaders of the assimilation movement as he directed the school for 
twenty-five years.  During his duty at Carlisle, Pratt was still on active service but on detached 
duty to the Indian Bureau.  Though the humanitarian impulse toward assimilation was in many 
respects misguided, Pratt‘s efforts represent the fact that the army fully embraced the concept, 
and contributed significantly to its implementation.  Most important, army support of the Carlisle 
School represented recognition by the army that education was as a key component of the 
improving the social and economic status of populations subject to army control. 
Border Operations 
Another important aspect of the frontier experience was the independence of action 
allowed and required of officers.  The requirements of frontier service dispersed the army among 
hundreds of small encampments ranging from the most austere temporary cantonments of tents 
to large permanent establishments with brick buildings and modern plumbing.  In 1870, the total 
number of organized military posts was 203, and this number did not include temporary 
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cantonments, stations, and camps.
38
 Lieutenants and captains commanded most of the small 
garrisons.  Campaigns took the army even further afield. This dispersal of the army required that 
young, relatively junior commanders, operate on their own.  Messages and guidance from higher 
commanders could take days or weeks to receive.   Relatively junior officers often had to make 
decisions that could cause or avert war.  Typical of these situations were the experiences of 
Colonel Nelson Miles on the Canadian frontier in 1877–78 and later in 1879–80.  Miles' mission 
was to secure the northern border to prevent the migration and raiding of Canadian Sioux into the 
United States.  Successful completion of the mission, while avoiding an international incident, 
required careful supervision of limited troops, coordination with state and local civil government, 
and close coordination and cooperation with Canadian authorities.
39
 
The most politically sensitive area on the frontier was the American southern border with 
Mexico.  Many Indian tribes used Mexico as a sanctuary for raiding into Texas, New Mexico, 
and Arizona.  The army prohibited commanders along the southern border from crossing the 
border into Mexico and the Mexican government was usually hostile to US military operations 
along the border.  Despite these conditions, cross border operations occurred. Commanders had 
to carefully balance using force, negotiations, and cooperation with Mexican officials to facilitate 
their pursuit of Indians across the border.  Usually American forces honored the border, 
however, commanders had the freedom to selectively ignore it when they deemed circumstances 
warranted.  In 1874, Colonel Randall MacKenzie led elements of the 4
th
 Cavalry on a raid into 
Mexico to destroy Lipan and Kickapoo bands that were using Mexico as a sanctuary.
40
  The raid 
broke the back of Indian raiders in south Texas and brought portions of the tribes back to US 
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reservations.  The decision making process used to justify such action  was described by 
Lieutenant Colonel George Forsyth who led elements of the 4
th
 and 6
th
 Cavalry across the border 
after Apaches in the Spring of 1882. 
After thinking the matter over, I decided to follow the Indians.  They had 
murdered and plundered our citizens, believing we dare not follow them into 
Mexico, and that once they were there they were safe…. Furthermore, we were in 
wild country, and might possibly find this band, and completely scatter it, and get 
back to our own side of the line without the knowledge of the Mexican 
government.
41
 
 
Forsyth‘s excursion had mixed results.  His force did not destroy the Apache but instead forced 
them into an ambush laid by Mexican forces.  The Mexican army then confronted Forsyth who, 
having killed or captured the Indians, led his force back to the United States.  Forsyth fully 
understood that his commander might discipline him for disobeying orders, and made a full 
report of the incident.  His department commander, ironically General Mackenzie, admonished 
him but stated that unless the State Department became involved he would let matters lie.
42
  
Virtually all officers of the army were cognizant of the challenges of operations along the 
nation‘s international borders.  Though militarily insignificant in the grand history of the 
American military, operations along the nation‘s northern and southern borders required junior 
army commanders to be cognizant of strategic and political policies and the relationship between 
their tactical actions and strategic effects. Young officers learned to analyze their tactical means 
against the strategic ends of the senior leaders, and take responsibility and make decisions 
independently. Successful frontier army commanders navigated this complex matrix of issues, 
often with incomplete or no guidance from superiors.  In fact, General Sheridan, the senior army 
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field commander during most of the period of Indian engagement, made the point that 
commanders needed wide discretion in their orders.
43
   
The Frontier Economy 
On the frontier, army officers were keenly aware of the importance of the frontier to the 
national economy. The key to the economic prosperity of the United States after the Civil War 
was the railroad.  The most important of the railroad projects was linking the east and west coasts 
by a transcontinental railroad.  The transcontinental railroad not only politically tie the west coast 
to the east, but also enhanced the military defenses and capabilities of the nation.  In 1865, 
Secretary of War Stanton argued ―the vigorous prosecution of the works of the railroads to 
connect the Mississippi Valley with the Pacific coast, was a military precaution and a measure of 
economy, deserving the fostering care of the government.‖44 The army played a major role in 
building the railroads:  it surveyed the routes, provided much of the technical engineering 
expertise, advocated for government subsidies, and provided protection during construction. 
45
 
Civil War Generals Sherman and Sheridan had ample experience with the military value 
of the railroad for operational mobility and logistics.
 46
  However, the railroads also had an 
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important civilizing effect on the frontier.  With the railroad lines came commerce, towns, 
government, and most importantly, people.  The civilizing impact of the railroads was not lost on 
the senior army leadership.  Sherman noted that the railroads were the ―newest and greatest of 
civilizers.‖47  Sheridan also was aware of the social influence of the railroads calling them ―our 
staunchest Allies in the march of civilization on the frontier.‖48  Army commanders realized that 
the success of the army‘s military role on the frontier, providing security, influenced the speed 
with which the frontier was civilized. 
Because of the civilian importance of the railroads, the army‘s commitment to supporting 
the railroads was significant.  In 1868, more than 4,600 troops —almost twenty percent of the 
army, had some role in guarding the railroad.   In 1866, the railroads laid 568 miles of track.  By 
1869, the Union Pacific railroad had completed 1,086 miles of track.  The Union Pacific teams 
met the Central Pacific building crews at Ogden, Utah on May 10, 1869.  As officials drove the 
final spike connecting the east and west coasts of the continent and forever changed the 
economic and social dynamics of the nation, several companies of the 21
st
 Infantry Regiment and 
the Regimental band added pomp to the ceremony and symbolized the army‘s role in the 
railroad‘s conquest of the American frontier.49 
The army not only actively supported the railroads with protection; they also assisted the 
railroad‘s lobbying efforts for government financial support.  The Quartermaster of the Army, 
General Montgomery C. Meigs, made a strong case for the Northern Pacific Railroad to 
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Congress in 1866.  Meigs‘ argument went beyond just military needs.  He also highlighted 
economic benefits, and social and political change.  He argued that the northern railroad would 
assist the army guarding the Canadian border, reduce army transportation expenditures, link the 
commerce of the northwest with the nation, inspire the growth of large cities, and increase the 
nation‘s access to Asian markets.50 
Another important, but not as financially or publically dramatic, infrastructure capability 
that the army was instrumental in bringing to the West was the telegraph.  The army built 
military telegraphs throughout the frontier area of operations.  Typical of the army telegraph 
projects was the completion of 540 miles of military telegraph connecting San Diego, California 
with Tucson and Prescott, Arizona in 1873.  The military telegraph was open to paid private use, 
and in 1873 the $757 average monthly revenue from private messages partly offset the $906 
monthly cost of maintenance and operations of the San Diego line.
51
  General William Carter 
described the work of troops building the telegraph structure in the Southwest in 1877: 
The necessity for telegraphic communication in Arizona had become apparent 
before the regiment arrived in the department, and troops had begun the 
construction of a military line.  The duty was taken up by a number of lieutenants 
in charge of detachments, and a really great work completed by connecting the 
Pacific Ocean at San Diego with the Gulf of Mexico, with lateral branches to all 
semi-permanent military posts. …The difficulty of supplying working parties with 
water was, alone, enough to discourage any corporation, yet this great public 
improvement was accomplished without any blare of trumpets by the men of the 
regular army, working in harmony in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, that when 
the moment arrived for the last connection to be made on the high plains of 
southern New Mexico, the instruments in all the modest frontier offices 
acknowledged the call through several thousand miles of wire.
52
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With the knowledge gained putting the wire in, army posts throughout the frontier were 
technically capable and expected to ―repair the line whenever raiding parties or the elements 
caused a break.‖53  
The interaction of the army with infrastructure requirements of the western frontier, in 
particular the building of the transcontinental railroad system and the regional telegraph system, 
exposed the army to several important characteristics of governmental policy.  First, economics 
were an incredibly important driver of policy.  Second, army officers observed first hand that 
often the economic interests of the country could best be furthered, sometimes only furthered, 
through the application of the unique military capabilities of the army.  Finally, the impact of 
railroads and other infrastructure improvements on the West demonstrated to army officers that 
modern technology and knowledge could transform a wilderness into a first rate economic and 
political community much more effectively than military power alone. 
Army Exploration 
The railroads and telegraph represented scientific progress and the army‘s enthusiastic 
support for those technologies demonstrated the whole-hearted support of science and progress 
by the officer corps.  This enthusiasm for science also manifested itself in the army‘s support of 
exploration and scientific discovery.  One of the significant contributions of the frontier army to 
the western expansion of the nation was in the area of exploration and science.  These activities 
had an egalitarian aspect, as well as a very practical military value.  Future economic 
considerations were also an important aspect of the government's, and hence the army's, interest 
in exploration.  Exploration further demonstrated to the army the close relationship between 
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military capability, economics, and social and political progress.  It reinforced the idea that the 
army played a role in American policy and politics beyond mere war fighting. 
Exploration and mapping and been virtually the sole prerogative of the military prior to 
the Civil War.  The army established its role in exploration during the early years of the nation, 
most famously by Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark.  In the 1850s, the army 
focused on reconnoitering a variety of possible rail routes from the Mississippi River to the west 
coast.
54
  During the war, the army disbanded its elite Corps of Topographical Engineers, which 
had been responsible for most exploration activity. After the war, Reconstruction and 
demobilization contributed to the lack of immediate emphasis on exploration.  However, Joseph 
S. Wilson, the US government‘s Commissioner of the General Land Office, stressed in his 1866 
annual report the economic necessity of geological information relating to the mineral wealth of 
the nation.  This prompted a renewed interest in exploration by the army Corps of Engineers.
55
  
The military returned to leading major expeditions in 1871 when Engineer Corps 
Lieutenant George M. Wheeler convinced the army to support the United States Geographical 
Surveys West of the One Hundredth Meridian. 
56
 The army justified its own military led surveys 
on the grounds that the civilian surveys, though they included topographers, did not focus on the 
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mapping needs of the army.  Congress approved 2.5 million dollars for the Wheeler surveys to 
systematically map over 6.8 million square miles of the frontier over a period of fifteen years.
57
 
Wheeler‘s operation was quite extensive.  The letter of instruction to Wheeler from 
General A.A. Humphries, the Chief of Engineers, gave sweeping directions: 
The main objective of this exploration will be to obtain correct topographical 
knowledge of the country traversed by your parties, and to prepare accurate maps 
of that section.  In making this the main objective, it is at the same time intended 
that you ascertain as far as practicable everything relating to the physical features 
of the country, the numbers, habits, and disposition of the Indians who may live in 
this section, the selection of such sites as may be of use for future military 
operations or occupation, and the facilities offered for making rail or common 
roads, to meet the wants of those who at some future period may occupy or 
traverse this part of our territory. 
 
In ascertaining the physical features, your attention is particularly called to the 
mineral resources that may be discovered, and, where the indications would seem 
to justify it, you should have minute and detailed examinations made of the 
locality and character of the deposits.
58
 
 
Humphrey‘s orders indicate that commercial civil interests were as important to the expedition as 
were military requirements.  Wheeler specifically acknowledged that one of the major 
motivations for the survey was increasing ―enthusiasm to emigration and to the legitimate 
establishment of the great industries.‖59  Thus, Wheelers task, besides the technical task of map-
making, included an analysis focused on future commercial economic development.  
Wheeler‘s various expeditions operated for eight years; 1871–1879.  They typically 
launched their annual missions in mid-summer and completed their tasks for the year by late fall 
or early winter.  The Wheeler surveys made great progress toward mapping the United States 
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west of the 100
th
 Meridian.  The numerous expeditions mapped approximately one third of the 
country west of the 100
th
 meridian including the first mapping of the infamous Death Valley. 
They collected over 61,000 samples of plant and animal life and sent them to the Smithsonian 
Institute in Washington.
60
  When the government terminated the Wheeler surveys in 1879, they 
were still well short of their long-term goal but had accomplished much, including demonstrating 
the ability of the army to make significant national contributions aside from warfare.   
The major survey expeditions of Lieutenant Wheeler, though the most extensive and 
important, were not the only army exploratory expeditions organized on the western frontier.   
The army conducted many other expeditions that had much more limited objectives than 
Wheeler‘s mandate.  These expeditions included the numerous expeditions into the Yellowstone 
and Black Hills regions.  Typically, these expeditions had a smaller scope and related more 
directly to operations or other pressing issues. 
61
  
As Americans mapped and settled the west, and the frontier quieted, army officers looked 
for new frontiers in which to exercise their talents and contribute to American progress.  The last 
of the American frontiers was north in the new Alaskan territory.  Alaska became the focus of 
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army exploration in the 1880s. Serious exploration of the territory began in 1881 when Brigadier 
General Nelson Miles became commander of the Department of Columbia, which included the 
Alaskan Territory.  Miles was very interested in promoting the development of his new 
command and became the sponsor of numerous forays into the Alaskan unknown by a group of 
young officers who would become the last of the noteworthy army explorers.
62
  
The most important of the Miles‘ sponsored Alaska explorations was the third and last 
expedition led in 1885 by Lieutenant Henry Allen of the 2
nd
 Cavalry.   Allen‘s six-month 
expedition, though not as widely publicized as an earlier expedition led by  Lieutenant Frederick 
Schwatka of the 3
rd
 Cavalry, was much more important in terms of opening new territory and 
gaining scientific insights into the region.  It was widely acclaimed within the scientific 
community.  Its success validated General Miles‘ interest in the territory and established a bond 
between the Miles and Allen that lasted throughout their careers.  Noted geologist and historian 
Alfred Brooks observed, ―No man through his own individual explorations has added more to 
our knowledge of Alaska than has Lt. Allen.‖ Historians of exploration have endorsed General 
Miles‘ view that Lieutenant Allen‘s mission was ―the major exploration on the continent since 
Lewis and Clark.‖63   Allen subsequently went on to important command positions in the 
Philippines, on the Mexican Border, and in Germany after World War I. 
The exploration efforts of the frontier army were important to nurturing a culture in the 
army that viewed the army‘s role in society as much larger than a narrow focus on war fighting.  
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Exploration complimented the army endeavors to culturally interact and understand American 
Indians, to advance science and technology, and to encourage and promote economic 
development.  It also reinforced the trust and confidence that senior leaders put in junior officers 
exercising good judgment in important independent commands.  Thus, relatively junior officers 
such as Charles Wheeler and Henry Allen represented a broad definition of the professional 
competence of the army officer, and through their successes and example, extended that 
definition throughout the army officer corps. 
Passing on the Experience  
The army‘s years of work on the frontier reinforced the Reconstruction experience.  
There were a number of reasons for this.  First was the fact that the much of the frontier 
experience occurred concurrently with Reconstruction.  Many officers experienced both 
missions.  Second, the army‘s small but important professional education efforts captured and 
passed on the Reconstruction experience.  Third, and most important, the frontier experience 
facilitated informally passing of the Reconstruction experience to the next generation of leaders.  
The regimental system, and the professional and personal associations formed through army 
social structures enabled this informal transmission of lessons learned and experiences.‖ 
Formal army education took important forward steps in the last decade of the frontier 
army.  The Generals in Chief of the army, Sherman, Sheridan, and Schoefield were all strong 
advocates for increased education.  Prior to the Civil War, the army‘s primary education 
institution was the Military Academy at West Point.  Formal education ended upon 
commissioning.  In 1882, General Sherman directed the establishment of the School of Infantry 
and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth.  Though it would be many years until the school at Fort 
Leavenworth developed into a full-fledged staff college, it quickly became an important source 
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of formal military education for army officers.   Significantly, a portion of the Leavenworth 
education in the 1880s and 90s included occupations and military government experience.  
Post-conflict operations were not part of the strategy and tactics instruction at the School 
of Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth.  However, Leavenworth did focus on an officer‘s 
knowledge of the law and legal responsibilities.  Toward this end, the Department of Law 
focused on military, constitutional, and international law.    A major emphasis of the legal 
instruction was issues relating to post conflict operations and military government.  The military 
and international law aspects of the curriculum highlighted experiences and lessons learned from 
the Civil War and Reconstruction.  Specifically, the curriculum investigated and discussed the 
relationship between the army and the opposing civil population.  Leavenworth based its 
instruction on the leading texts on international law —Theodore Woolsey‘s Introduction to the 
Study of International Law, and George Davis‘ Outlines of International Law:  With an Account 
of Its Origin and Sources.  Military Law utilized Lieutenant Colonel W. Winthrop‘s text, 
Military Law, which focused on the mechanics of the military court martial system as well as the 
relationship between the law of war and combatants and non-combatants.  Winthrop specifically 
addressed many of the issues of Reconstruction in a chapter entitled ―Military Authority and 
Jurisdiction under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867.‖64  In 1897, the army added the study of the 
first five articles of the Geneva Convention to the curriculum, which in total included 35 
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recitations devoted to military law.
65
  The intent of the study of international law was immensely 
practical.  In 1898, the law examination included a fictional scenario placing the student in the 
position of "the Colonel of a regiment of infantry sent to Nicaragua with instructions to protect 
the lives and property of American citizens.‖66  Reconstruction, as well as the influence of 
frequent legal treaties with Indian tribes, and operations on the Mexican and Canadian border, 
informed the army‘s understanding of the need for a practical knowledge of law, and the 
curriculum of the army‘s foremost educational institution reflected that understanding. 
A number of prominent historians have criticized the post-civil war officer corps, 
charging that the ambition and petty rivalry between commanders, inordinate ambition for glory 
and promotion, prejudices against Indians as both enemies and Allies, and an unwillingness to 
adapt to the unique operational circumstances of frontier warfare were all detrimental to the 
operational functioning of the army.
67
  Though the critique is valid as it relates to some 
individuals, it is overstated.  Despite the internal politics characteristic of any bureaucratic 
organization, the army was also a closely-knit kinship of officers who shared hardships, danger, 
and isolation.  This experience encouraged a familial relationship between officers, which, 
though sometimes petty and dysfunctional, was also loyal and supportive.  Like families, army 
officers not only shared a contemporary experience, they also shared a common history.  The 
frontier army‘s immediate history was the Civil War and the associated Reconstruction years.  
This history was passed down through the regiments, around the campfires, from mentor to 
subordinate, and from father to son. 
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For many army officers their military experience began at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point.  At West Point, cadets lived and worked in a stressful competitive 
environment with their social contact limited to peers and faculty.  Relationships and impressions 
formed at West point were strong and lasted a lifetime. The faculty, most with Civil War and 
frontier experience, had important influences on them.  John Pershing graduated from West Point 
in 1886.  The Civil War and frontier army, in the person of General Wesley Merritt, the 
Superintendent of Cadets, strongly influenced Pershing‘s ideas about officership.  Merritt was 
superintendent during Pershing‘s four years as a cadet.    Pershing, as First Captain of the cadet 
battalion in 1885–86, had frequent contact with Merritt.  Avery D. Andrews, Pershing‘s 
classmate, opined that Merritt had a lasting impact on Pershing‘s views of officership.68 Many 
faculty left similar developmental impressions on cadets attending the Academy.    
Once the new lieutenant arrived on the frontier, the small garrison and his regiment 
became the center of his life.   Months and years at isolated frontier posts inspired a unique 
relationship among army officers. George Forsyth, a veteran of the occupation of Louisiana and 
a former member of Sheridan‘s staff, wrote about frontier garrisons:  ―Social intercourse, on 
account of their isolation and peculiar experiences, was without formality; companionship begot 
friendship and affection.  To have lived a season together in a frontier post weaves a bond that is 
never loosened….Oh, the tales those old abandoned forts could tell… —tales of love, tales of 
war, tales of the hunt, of red men and white men, tales of danger and of death, of peace and of 
life!‖69  The circumstance of the frontier caused the relationship between officers, even those of 
greatly different ranks, to be close.  For example, Lieutenant Colonel George Custer of the 7
th
 
                                                 
68
 Don E. Alberts, General Wesley Merritt:  Brandy Station to Manila Bay (Columbus Ohio:  The General‘s 
Books, 2001), 283–290; Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York:  
Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1973), 13. 
69
 Quoted in Oliver Knight, Life and Manners in the Frontier Army (Norman:  University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1978), 111; Forsyth, Soldier, 109. 
 92 
Cavalry and his subordinate, Captain Frederick Benteen, were not only widely separated by rank 
but also personality.  Benteen despised Custer‘s flamboyant ego.  However, this strong personal 
animosity did not prevent Benteen from routinely playing poker with Custer and relishing his 
frequent trouncing of his superior.
70
  In fact, close socializing and association between senior and 
subordinate was very common even when a close personal relationship did not exist between 
them. Officers on the frontier were forced to depend on each other for companionship, ―day after 
day, month after month.‖  They knew the intimate details of each other‘s lives.71  James Parker 
of the 4
th
 Cavalry recalled the camaraderie: ―We were a band of brothers, often deeply devoted to 
one another.‖72  Under such social circumstance, the operational experiences of the 
Reconstruction veterans passed to the young officers of the regiment and preserving it as a 
reference for the next generation of army officers. 
 Charismatic leaders and heroes of the Civil War inspired and served as models for the 
new lieutenants arriving from West Point in the late 1860s through 1890.  A subordinate in the 
4
th
 Cavalry recalled, ―[Colonel] Mackenzie had an unusually magnetic influence on his officers, 
his personality impressing itself upon them.  This influence was lasting with all those who served 
under him or with him.  Thus the Mackenzie spirit reigned long after his death.‖73  The 
operational experiences of leaders like Randal Mackenzie, who had extensive experience in 
Reconstruction Texas, inspired the future decision making of their subordinates. 
Months of marching through what was essentially wilderness in often-brutal conditions 
of heat and cold characterized the campaign experience on the frontier. These conditions, in the 
                                                 
70
 Jules C. Ladenheim, Custer’s Thorn: The Life of Frederick W. Benteen (Westminster, MD:  Heritage 
Books, Inc., 2007), 72–73. 
71
 Quote from Merrill J. Mattes, Indians, Infants, and Infantry:  Andrew and Elizabeth Burt on the Frontier 
(Lincoln:  University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 103; Knight, 131–132. 
72
 James Parker, The Old Army.  Memories, 1872–1918 (Mechanicsburg, PA:  Stackpole Books, 2003), 43. 
73
 Ibid., 45. 
 93 
same way as garrison operations, caused officers to share their personal histories, thoughts, and 
pass down lessons to future generations.  John F. Finerty, a newspaper reporter, described how 
officers shared their experiences, thoughts and aspirations during a typical evening on the march 
with the 3
rd
 Cavalry during the 1876 Sioux campaign:  ―Schwatka‘s mind, then, as since, ran on 
science.  He had no love for light literature, and he lay awake of nights thinking of the north pole 
and Sir John Franklin‘s bones…. Bourke, always entertaining, occasionally condescended to tell 
about his Arizona experiences, while brave old Lieutenant Lawson, eccentric, but beloved, 
would nod drowsily over the camp fire.‖74  Finerty, though not a fellow officer, nonetheless 
gleaned much from his campmates including Schwatka‘s aspirations for arctic exploration and 
Bourke‘s expert knowledge of Indian culture.75 
On the frontier, veteran officers took on the role of mentor and educator to young 
officers.  They passed on their experiences of all types.   This mentoring covered the spectrum 
from local culture to tactical deployment. Lieutenant John Bigelow described introducing one 
young officer to campaigning on the Mexican border: ―The Doctor, a youngster from Boston, 
Mass., recently joined from Harvard College, had never been at a Mexican ball, or baile; so it 
was with certain feelings of a chaperone that I went with him….‖76  When Bigelow introduced 
contract surgeon Leonard Wood to the experience of a Mexican ball he was sharing the type of 
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cultural knowledge essential to operational success in the ambiguous environment of the frontier 
where cultural and other non-military factors were important. 
Frontier posts often did not have the facilities for entertainment and many army officers 
therefore turned to reading.
77
 Captain Arthur MacArthur, another veteran of the occupation of 
Louisiana, represented the type of officer who took up the opportunity for self-education through 
reading.  He also illustrated the influence that a senior officer mentor could have on a junior.  In 
MacArthur‘s case his superior was retired General of the Army and former President Grant.  
Captain MacArthur struck up a friendship with former President Ulysses Grant in 1882 through 
the Captain‘s father, a federal judge in Washington.  Grant and MacArthur shared ideas 
regarding relations with China and Grant encouraged MacArthur to seek an assignment there.  
MacArthur subsequently educated himself on Asian history and on his own initiative provided to 
the army a forty page well constructed analysis of the strategic importance of Asia and China.
78
 
Operations brought officers of different regiments together for extended periods and 
expanded their social and professional contacts beyond their regiment.  The 1874 Black Hills 
expedition brought together Lieutenant Colonels George Custer and Sandy Forsyth, Engineer 
Captain William Ludlow, and 1875 West Point graduate Lieutenant Frederick Grant, son of the 
President.  The army assigned young Grant as a member of Sheridan‘s Division of Missouri 
staff, and tasked him to observe and support a variety of field operations.  A year earlier, he 
accompanied Lieutenant Colonel James Forsyth on an exploration of the Yellowstone River.
79
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The 1886 Geronimo campaign included Reconstruction veterans such as Nelson Miles, Sandy 
Forsyth, Eugene Carr, and Arthur MacArthur; and young promising officers such as Henry 
Lawton, James Parker, Leonard Wood, Joseph Dickman, and Robert Bullard.  The Ghost Dance 
campaign of 1890–91, similarly brought together elements of many regiments including Miles 
and fellow Civil War veterans Wesley Merritt, William Shafter, Eugene Carr and James Forsyth; 
among the promising lieutenants were John Pershing, Robert Lee Howze, Hugh Scott, and 
Franklin Bell.  Participation in campaigns did not guarantee a tutorial in Reconstruction history 
but they did intensify the interaction between Reconstruction veterans and junior officers. 
The son of President Ulysses Grant, Lieutenant Frederick Grant, served on the on the 
frontier for almost ten years.  His service was representative of how for many the army was very 
much a family profession.  It was not uncommon for the son‘s of officers to follow their father‘s 
career and carry the father‘s experiences into the next generation.  Families were an important 
part of transmitting the army‘s history and experiences from one generation of officers to the 
next.  Nelson Miles, Adna Chaffee, and Charles Gatewood, are just a few of the more well-
known frontier officers whose sons followed them into the army through West Point.  Between 
1871 and 1890, the relatives of alumni made up more than twenty-eight percent of the graduates 
of West Point.
80
 
Marriage also perpetuated the family connections between generations of officers.  An 
example from lieutenants of the 7
th
 Cavalry illustrates how prevalent inter-army marriage was 
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and how regimental relations could grow into family relations, thus further strengthening the 
bond between officers:  Lieutenant Hugh Scott of the 7
th
 Cavalry married the daughter of Major 
Lewis Merrill of the same regiment.  Marriage connected Scott to the Civil War and the army‘s 
campaigns against the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina and Louisiana.  Similarly, Lieutenant J. 
Franklin Bell of the 7
th
 Cavalry married the sister of the wife of one of his comrades, Lieutenant 
Ernest A. Garlington.   Both Scott and Garlington had sons that followed them into the army. All 
three officers went on to extensive army careers and achieved general officer rank in the 
Twentieth Century.  These relations are a small sample of the extension of army family ties 
through matrimony.
81
  Family relations represent especially strong bonds between individuals 
and were another important avenue through which lessons and experiences of the Civil War, 
Reconstruction and the frontier passed between officers and on to future generations. 
Though western historian Robert Utley viewed the army of frontier as a rather 
incompetent police force, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington saw the years of the frontier 
army as the birth of military professionalism in the army.   He believed this occurred because the 
army officer corps was physically isolated from the anti-military and pacifists views of American 
society and because of the influence of foreign military reform, notably the Germans, and 
progressive army thinkers such as Upton:  ―the nineteenth century produced the high standards of 
professional excellence essential to national success in the struggles of the twentieth century.‖82   
Large scale conventional warfighting capabilities certainly waned in the frontier army, however, 
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frontier commanders astutely recognized that the problems and tasks they were assigned on the 
frontier were not going to be solved through drill and military technology.  The Indian was not 
just a military problem, but also a vexing political and social issue.  The frontier army‘s 
intellectual resources were therefore focused on solving it.  Frontier officers recognized that 
understanding and operating within the context of Indian culture was a key to success.  Other 
challenges of the frontier such as furthering economic development and scientific discovery also 
did not fall within the realm of conventional military tasks.  Frontier commanders were, 
correctly, as focused on policy, culture, economics, and politics as they were on fighting.  That 
wide-ranging focus and their success in a variety of roles, as well as their military strategy, were 
the keys to winning the West.  Samuel Huntington describes the mature frontier army‘s self-
image ―as the government‘s obedient handyman performing without question or hesitation the 
jobs assigned to it.‖83  Though analysts and historians disparage the frontier army‘s conventional 
military capabilities, its operations, leaders, and experiences made it an effective tool of national 
policy and an exceptional school for future military governors.   
                                                 
83
 Ibid., 261. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Military Government in Cuba, 1899–1909 
 
Following victory in the Spanish-American War, American military forces occupied the 
former island colonies of Spain.  For the first time American forces had fought for, won, and 
then retained responsibility for lands not contiguous to the continental US.  It also placed them in 
control of populations with a disparate languages, cultures, political histories, and religions.  The 
government and the army both groped for policies and methods to deal with the situation.  The 
occupation of Cuba became the US government‘s first experience in military occupation as a 
post-conflict operation after the conclusion of formal hostilities with a sovereign power since the 
war with Mexico. The occupation demonstrated continuity with ideas formed during 
Reconstruction and on the frontier as well as new aspects of the American approach to post-
conflict operations.  In Cuba the army continued to demonstrate that it understood how to create 
democratic institutions, that the rule of law was central to the American occupations, and that the 
army could quickly and effectively transfer power to civil authorities.  The army also continued 
its increasing interest in public education.  Other, negative characteristics of the previous 
occupation experiences also continued: the national government continued to demonstrate a 
reluctance to give specific clear policy guidance to the occupation command and an inability to 
deal with economic issues.  The army also encountered the problems associated with trying to 
apply foreign concepts to systems the population regarded as legitimate, such as the legal system.  
The army showed new occupation capabilities in Cuba, displaying a very effective medical 
capability that protected both the occupation forces and indigenous population from disease and 
famine. Importantly, a new generation of army officers, schooled on the western plains and too 
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young to serve in Reconstruction, experienced the challenges of military governance and 
occupation operations. 
Leonard Wood in Santiago 
The first occupation of Cuba revolved around the personality and actions of General 
Leonard Wood who took command of the occupied Cuban city of Santiago in 1898.
1
  As Wood 
took command of the occupation of the city, he reflected on the path he had traveled since he 
was a young army surgeon on the frontier in 1885 and Lieutenant Bigelow introduced him to 
Mexican culture in the Department of Arizona: ―In these strange changes, here I am Military 
Gov. of Santiago, stuck up in an old Palace opposite the picturesque old cathedral with the whole 
town under military law, including all in the harbor and the Spanish prisoners, some 12,000…. 
And the whole thing seems like a dream.‖ 2 Leonard Wood was uniquely qualified to take 
command of the occupation of Santiago.  He had a diverse military background and personal 
relationships and contacts that facilitated his operating simultaneously in the military and the 
political spheres. His army career started in 1885 when, after graduating from Harvard Medical 
School and finishing an internship at Boston City Hospital in 1884, the army hired him as a 
contract surgeon.  While accompanying troops in the field against Geronimo in 1886 the 
command appointed him as a provisional company officer.  During this period, he established 
close relationships with Captain Henry Lawton, his commander during the Geronimo campaign, 
and with the Department Commander, Brigadier General Nelson Miles.  When William 
McKinley won the Presidential election in 1896, Wood became the personal physician to the 
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2
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President‘s ailing wife, and was in almost daily contact with the President and became close 
friends with Theodore Roosevelt, then Under-Secretary of the Navy.  When war broke out in 
1898, he left the army medical corps and with Theodore Roosevelt formed a regiment of 
volunteer cavalry.  During operations in Cuba, the army promoted him to brigadier and then 
major general of volunteers for gallantry in action.
3
  
Wood took command of the city of Santiago on 20 July 1898 and immediately began to 
set a standard for American military government operations.  He became the military governor of 
the department of Santiago on 12 October 1898 and continued in that position as the United 
States and Spain negotiated the treaty ending the war.  The city of 40,000 under Wood‘s charge 
was in a dismal state.  Like most cities in the Spanish Empire, the city‘s sanitary system was 
non-existent.  Streets were unpaved, sidewalks did not exist, and no sewage system served the 
city.  Animal and human corpses lay openly in the city, as did excrement of all kinds.  General 
Wood gave a detailed description in a letter to the Secretary of War:  ―There were a great many 
dead in the houses, between 2000 and 4,000 Spanish wounded and sick, and a great horde of 
half-famished and sick people, nearly 20,000 in number, who had just returned from El Caney, 
where they had gone during the siege.  The water supply of the city had been cut off; there was 
no water to be obtained except from cisterns and a few wells and the streets were full of dead 
animals and all sorts of filthy materials.‖4  One American reporter called Santiago the dirtiest 
city in the world.  In August, the death rate was over 100 people a day.
 5
  Wood‘s job was to 
establish order from the chaos. 
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Wood quickly set to work attempting to gain control of the city and create a healthy 
environment.  He divided the city into five districts and then placed each district under the 
command of an army surgeon.  Wood hired Cuban doctors educated in the United States to staff 
clinics and hospitals.   They also visited the sick in their homes.  The army provided medicines 
and food.  The districts organized central dispersing centers where food was distributed.  The 
army was issuing approximately 15,000 rations a day through October and doctors were giving 
600–700 medical prescriptions daily.  The American created a city police force that worked 
within the district commands and with the doctors to maintain daily lists of those who were sick.  
Work parties removed and burned dead bodies, and an army led sanitation department enforced 
sanitation regulations.  Over 170 employees worked in shifts to move filth from the city streets, 
courtyards, and clear outhouses.  The command punished, and in at least one case, horse 
whipped, those who did not comply with the army‘s sanitation regulations.  By the end of 
August, the immediate crisis was averted and the city was relatively clean.  By October, the 
command reduced the overall death rate in the city by seventy-five percent.  By the beginning of 
November, there had not been a case of yellow fever reported in sixty days and the army reduced 
overall disease and illness in the city by ninety percent.
6
  In the meantime, the American 
expeditionary forces redeployed to the United States, leaving only eight regiments under Wood‘s 
command.
7
   
Wood‘s independent command of Santiago lasted for five months.  During that time, 
Santiago and the surrounding area were the only portions of Cuba under American control, and 
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were the only areas of Cuba where order and health prevailed.  After the official end of the war, 
Wood remained the military governor of Santiago until becoming the commander of the Division 
of Cuba in December 1899.  The belligerents signed the treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898 
officially ending the war.  As part of the treaty, Spain passed responsibility for Cuba‘s 
sovereignty to the United States.  On December 13,
 
1898, the army formed the Division of Cuba 
to command the military occupation of the island, and on January 1, 1899, the US Army 
officially took responsibility for the entire island of Cuba.  General John R. Brooke took 
command of the American army of occupation and included Wood‘s command within the 
occupation forces.
8
 
First Year of the Occupation 
As Major General Brook took command in Cuba, his mission was not clear.  The treaty 
between Spain and the United States did not grant independence to Cuba.  The terms of the treaty 
intentionally granted the United States responsibility for Cuban sovereignty but did not specify 
Cuban independence.  Confusing the matter further was that fact that the other possessions of 
Spain, the Philippines and Puerto Rico, were ―ceded‖ to the United States while Cuba was 
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merely ―relinquished.‖  This choice of words indicated the different but unclear status of Cuba.9  
The McKinley Administration was uncertain whether sovereignty was the best course for Cuba.  
The President gave his guidance to General Brooke in a confidential letter in which he 
emphasized that the conduct of the occupation and government of Cuba should be ―in the interest 
of order and peace and for the preservation and promotion of the rights of liberty and property 
and the protection of the people.‖  McKinley made it clear that the occupation and control of 
Cuban sovereignty was ―temporary,‖ but he did not give any indication of how long the 
temporary situation might last.  McKinley was obtuse on this point, stating, ―This authority must 
continue until Congress provides otherwise, or until such time as the people shall have 
established a firm and stable government of their own.‖10  This guidance hinted at self-
government for the Cuban people.  It also reflected the strength of popular sentiment by some 
Americans for the annexation of Cuba, and thus left the door open on that sensitive subject.  
Annexation was a possibility if the ―Congress provides otherwise.‖11  Like the Reconstruction 
experience, there was no clear policy guidance to the army and thus the initial occupation was 
limited in scope. 
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Cuba‘s complex society presented numerous challenges to the occupying army 
command.  When General Brooke took command of the Division of Cuba, he became 
responsible for an island territory of 43,124 square miles —roughly the same size as the state of 
Pennsylvania.  The civil population under his control numbered approximately 1,500,000, of 
which approximately a third were an especially poverty stricken black or mulatto minority.  The 
balance of the population was mostly recent immigrants from Spain —over 700,000 immigrants 
arrived from that country between 1868 and 1894.  The only significant non-Hispanic minority 
was between 30,000 and 40,000 laborers imported from the Philippines.  Over sixty percent of 
the population was illiterate.  It was a society distinguished by rigid economic division and 
ethnic differences.  In contrast to these differences, the population shared a common Hispanic 
culture, the Spanish language, and the Roman Catholic religion.
12
 
With no definitive guidance regarding US long-term policy toward Cuba, General Brook, 
as commander of the occupation, focused on the short term.  His priorities were to establish the 
organization of the military government, assert the rule of law, and ensure the health and welfare 
of the population.  This latter issue was the top priority in 1899 as the Cuban insurrection and the 
Spanish-American War had left the country‘s economy in ruin, and famine threatened the 
population. The occupation of Cuba followed the pattern of US Army organization in the 
continental United States.  The army designated the island as the Division of Cuba and the 
division reported directly to the War Department.  The division contained four departments.  
Three of the departments followed the traditional political provincial boundaries of Cuba and 
contained two provinces each:  Major General James H. Wilson commanded the Department of 
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Matanzas and Santa Clara , Major General Fitzhugh Lee commanded the Department of the 
Province of Havana and Pinar del Rio,  and Major General Leonard Wood commanded the 
Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe.  Major General William Ludlow commanded the 
city of Havana, which constituted a department in itself, designated the Department of Havana.
13
 
The army organization had a parallel civil organization with General Brooke was the overall 
military governor of the island.  Each subordinate department commander governed two 
provinces.  The military staffs provided support to the generals in both their roles as military 
commanders and governors.  The Americans left the Spanish civil administration mostly intact.  
At the division level, they organized the administration into five departments, each headed by a 
Cuban, most of whom had held the position under Spanish rule.  American officers served as 
assistants to the department heads and in some cases operated key bureaus within the 
departments. 
In 1898 General Brooke was a sixty-year-old distinguished Civil War veteran who had 
almost three years duty in Reconstruction Louisiana from September 1874 to June 1877.  
Brooke‘s immediate staff was very experienced.  His Chief of Staff was the veteran cavalryman 
and scourge of the east Texas criminal gangs, Major General Adna Chaffee.
14
  Possibly the least 
experienced of Brooke‘s staff, but arguably one of the most talented, was the division 
quartermaster, Lieutenant Colonel Tasker H. Bliss.   Bliss‘s superiors recognized him as one of 
the sharpest minds in the army and his intellect more than made up for his lack of field 
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experience.  He was fluent or conversational in five languages including Spanish and came to 
Cuban service from the position of Military Attaché to the US legation to Spain.  
15
    
Most of Cuba‘s problems were either systemic issues never addressed or resolved by the 
Spanish, or were problems that were a result of the insurgent war waged between the Spanish 
military forces and the insurgent army of Cuba.  Little damage resulted from the Spanish-
American War itself.  The Cuban-Spanish War, in contrast, caused the destruction of Cuban 
agriculture.  When the US occupation force arrived in Cuba, famine was widespread and near 
starvation conditions existed in much of the country.  This was the immediate and top priority of 
Brooke‘s new military government.  Brooke‘s command used the army of occupation 
organizational structure to immediately issue rations.  Brooke directed subordinate commanders, 
―In all cases where you may find destitution, you will immediately relieve it.‖16  The command 
issued over 1,000,000 humanitarian rations and over 5,000,000 individual army rations in the 
first months of the occupation to relieve starvation and bring the population in general to a 
minimum level of nutrition.  By the spring of 1899, the food crisis had largely passed and the 
army focused on avoiding a similar situation the following winter by addressing the needs of 
Cuban agriculture.
17
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Sanitation and health issues were also a top priority of the military government.  The 
army knew that Cuba was the heart of the yellow fever region and disease was a major concern.  
Typhoid and yellow fever were the two main fears. Science did not know the transmission 
method of yellow fever, but military doctors understood the relationship between unsanitary 
conditions and disease.  The threat of yellow fever, and the sanitation related disease problems 
the army encountered in the 1898 mobilization camps ensured the command‘s focus on these two 
related issues.
18
  General Wood‘s sanitation program in Santiago set the standard for the rest of 
the country as each of the occupation departments published and enforced rigorous and 
mandatory sanitation regulations.  In addition, there was a demanding need for increased and 
improved hospital capability to support the civilian population.  The army provided funds and 
supervised the revitalization and creation of hospitals and asylums throughout the country.  In 
Havana, General Ludlow ensured sanitation and hospital operations were two of the few 
positions that remained under the control of American army officers.  By July of 1899, American 
health reforms reduced the death rate in the city to below the 1890–95 average (before the arrival 
of large numbers of Spanish troops).
19
 Major Tasker Bliss, the division commissary officer, and 
the Collector of Taxes for Cuba, reported that the single biggest use of tax revenue through June 
1899 was for sanitation (thirty-four percent), while the second biggest cost to the military 
government was charities and hospitals (eight percent).
20
   
After health and welfare issues, law and order was the focus of command priority.  Major 
Edgar S. Dudley, Brooke‘s staff judge-advocate, supervised law and order activities.  He had a 
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monumental task given that the Spanish legal system in Cuba was completely different from that 
practiced in the United States and, as he observed, ―the courts were said, and appeared from 
satisfactory indications, to be corrupt.‖21 The American officers showed a mature understanding 
of the difference between essential changes, and changes that were merely more in accord with 
American traditions but not necessarily linked to Cuban or Spanish traditions.  Though the 
Cuban system was different, it was not inherently corrupt.  The system, which paid judges and 
employees of the court through fees collected from defendants, caused widespread and endemic 
corruption.  Over time, fees became associated with verdicts, and the fees were the major portion 
of judicial pay.  The fee system was so embedded in the culture that the bulk of the population 
did not recognize it as corrupt.  The American government installed centrally controlled salaries 
for all judicial officials and eliminated the most corrupt aspect of the Cuban judicial system.  
Unresolved during Brooke‘s tenure as commander, was the procedural clumsiness of the Spanish 
system that in many cases incarcerated individuals for months at a time while awaiting trial.
22
 
The Cuban police structure dissolved with the departure of the Spanish army.  American 
troops initially took over the police function in many areas including the city of Havana.  In other 
areas, particularly remote rural locations, until the arrival of American troops, the Cuban 
insurrection army maintained order.
23
  Building a police took place without the benefit of central 
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direction from General Brooke‘s headquarters.24  The result was effective but different police 
organizations in each of the four occupation departments and sometimes within different 
provinces within the same department.  For example, General Wilson organized three types of 
police in the Province of Santa Clara:  municipal police in the towns, rural police for the non-
urban areas, and Governor‘s police with general jurisdiction and for special missions. In contrast, 
in the Province of Matanzas, also under Wilson, the force consisted of Governor‘s police and 
municipal police but no rural police.  Both provinces combined fielded a force 1322 men in the 
summer of 1899.  Under General Wilson‘s command, the direction of the police force was 
entrusted to local Cuban leaders and officered by Cubans.  There was virtually no direct 
American participation.
25
   
In his role as military governor, General Brooke had to create or absorb the capacity for 
government administration.  In most cases, the preferred solution was to absorb the existing 
Spanish appointed officials.  However, in some cases no Spanish officials existed, in other cases 
the need for new operational methods or honesty were so dominant that American officials, 
usually army officers, were appointed to operate that portion of the bureaucracy.  This was the 
case in the critical government run telegraph services, customs and treasury operations, 
education, and the postal service.  The Military Governor modified Spanish law to accord with 
the new more efficient administrative organization.   
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Though the Americans placed Cubans at the head of the major bureaucratic departments 
of the military government, there was no real movement toward actual civil rule in Cuba during 
the command of General Brooke.  Other more pressing matters distracted the McKinley 
Administration and the American civil leadership gave no directives or guidance to Brooke.  For 
its part, the command demonstrated no inclination to go beyond the limited instructions that it 
had.
26
  Brooke did not consider policy part of his responsibility as the military governor.  Brooke 
stated, ―The kind of government to be established, and when, is not a subject which the military 
governor believes to be a matter which can be discussed in this report, if at all.  Obviously, this 
must be determined by higher authority, to whom such matters properly pertain.‖27  Brooke was 
unconcerned with the future, and he believed the Cuban people should focus on accomplishing 
the immediate tasks necessary to make the country better under the control of the military 
government. 
General Brooke‘s command of the military government was competent but uninspired. 
Because of this, little of a permanent nature was accomplished during the first year of the 
occupation.  General Wood was unhappy with the selection of General Brooke as the military 
governor of Cuba from the very beginning.  Initially, Wood felt that no one general officer 
should be in command of all of Cuba.
28
  The subordinate generals' fundamental complaint with 
General Brooke was that he was too conservative.  Brooke maintained that the future of Cuba 
was a political problem and that professional soldiers had no role in determining political policy.  
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The other occupation commanders could not have disagreed more.  The main controversial issue 
was annexation. 
Though Brooke was decidedly neutral in his views of Cuba‘s political future, his 
subordinates were not.  Leonard Wood hinted strongly that annexation was the best solution in 
an interview with the New York Times in June 1899.  Wood said, ―All the foreigners, including 
the Spaniards, and the property holding Cubans, favor annexation to the United States, because 
they realize that we can give them a stable government…. They [the Cubans] are rapidly 
realizing that annexation is the best thing for them.‖  He also insinuated that the Brooke military 
government was not aggressive enough when he said, ―The Cuban problem can easily be solved.  
With the right sort of an administration everything could be straightened out in six months.  Just 
now there is too much ‗tommyrot.‘‖29  Wood also criticized Brooke in private correspondence 
with Theodore Roosevelt and directly to President McKinley.
30
  General Brooke did not ignore 
Wood‘s agitation against him.  Brooke dispatched General Adna Chaffee, his Chief of Staff, to 
Wood‘s headquarters specifically to dress Wood down for criticizing the military governor in 
public. 
In July 1899 Elihu Root became the US Secretary of War and his influence greatly 
changed the course of the Cuban occupation.
31
   As soon as Root took office, both Generals 
Wilson and Wood used their political contacts with Theodore Roosevelt and various Senators to 
provide negative information regarding their commander to the new Secretary of War.  Root, 
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however, was a methodical operator and he carefully studied the Cuban issue before making his 
own judgment regarding Brooke‘s future.  After careful study of all the facts, Root concluded 
that Cuban policy was not progressing and that Brooke was at least partly responsible.  He then 
made the decision to relieve Brooke and replace him with Major General of Volunteers Leonard 
Wood.  Major General Wood took command of the Division of Cuba and assumed the office of 
Military Governor on December 13, 1899.
32
 
Military Government Under Major General Wood 
The arrival of Leonard Wood as military governor, combined with the energy and 
effectiveness of Elihu Root as Secretary of War, marked the beginning of aggressive governance 
in Cuba and a second and final phase of the first occupation of the island.
33
  The first change in 
the American approach to Cuba was style.  Root was an accomplished lawyer with a brilliant 
mind.  He told a friend, ―The first thing I did after my appointment was to make out a list of a 
great number of books which cover in detail both the practice and the principles of many forms 
of colonial government under the English Law, and I am giving them all the time I can take from 
my active duties.‖34 Root‘s intellect combined with his dedication to efficiency ensured that he 
addressed the military problems facing the United States with a straight-forwardness that was 
unusual for the War Department.  Wood, carrying an ego much larger than that supported by his 
military record, came to his new position with no option but to produce results or invite 
incredible criticism.  He took command of the Cuban division still only holding a regular 
commission as a captain assistant surgeon.  Wood's rank did not change until his political Allies 
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got him promoted to brigadier general in the regular army in February 1901.
35
  Thus, compared 
to 1899, vigorous action characterized the American occupation from 1900 on. 
As General Wood took command, US policy toward Cuba was no more clear than it was 
under General Brooke.   Root favored guaranteeing Cuban sovereignty.  Wood preferred to drag 
his heels and prolong military government with some vague idea of possible US annexation in 
the future.  The President made no policy decisions.  Ultimately, three events decided American 
policy and accelerated the movement toward independence:  the unrest caused by rumors of 
annexation, the Philippine war, and scandal in the military government.
36
 
Just before Wood took control in Cuba, in November 1899, the Cuban and American 
press was full of speculation regarding the future of American rule in Cuba.  One of the rumors 
was that the Americans would replace Brooke with a civil governor.  To the Cubans, such a 
decision indicated long-term American rule and thus an effort to delay or thwart Cuban 
independence.    Riots and rAllies broke out all over Cuba protesting American rule.  These 
protests, though nonviolent, demonstrated the underlying unease of the population with 
American rule. Secretary Root was concerned that a wayward policy step could provoke the 
Cubans and result in a popular insurrection similar to that which broke out in February 1899 in 
the Philippines.
37
 In December, the McKinley Administration put to rest the idea of creating an 
American civil government.
38
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In the spring of 1900, General Wood and Secretary Root became aware of irregular 
accounting within the Cuban postal department.  Americans supervised and operated this 
department, but it was one of the few departments that the army did not staff or control.  US 
Postal Service appointees manned and administered the department.  Root, after some 
deliberation, ordered a complete investigation and rigorous prosecution of those found guilty.  
Though the postal scandal did not directly implicate the military government, it became part of 
the partisan domestic political argument during an election year, and was another signal to 
Secretary Root that the military government of Cuba was rife with potential political traps.
39
  The 
postal scandal, coming after the outbreak of war in the Philippines, and combined with the 
obvious dissatisfaction of the Cuban people, all convinced Root that the sooner Cuba was 
granted its independence from the United States the better.   
While the case for political independence was building, Major General Wood was very 
busy continuing the social and economic reconstruction projects begun or identified as necessary 
by Major General Brooke.  These included education reform, economic reform, legal and police 
policy, and health and sanitation reform.  As part of the process, Wood gradually reorganized the 
Division of Cuba.  Under Brooke‘s command the Division of Cuba was a divided into four 
departments, each with a general officer commander.  This organization had proved to be very 
contentious with constant bickering over policy and three of the subordinate department 
commanders (Generals Wood, Wilson, and Ludlow) actually maneuvering to oust Brooke and 
take his job themselves.  As division commander, Wood used his influence to have most of his 
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subordinate commanders transferred and then eliminated the subordinate headquarters.  Soon 
after taking command, all of Cuba was under the direct command of the Military Governor of 
Cuba and the Commander of the Division of Cuba, Major General of Volunteers Leonard 
Wood.
40
  With his command firmly under his control, Wood embarked on a vigorous campaign 
to reform Cuban society. 
Wood believed the long-term reform of Cuba required a focus on education. He directed 
Lieutenant Matthew E. Hanna to write a national school policy based on the education program 
in Hanna‘s home state of Ohio.  Under Hanna‘s direction, the Americans organized the school 
system into six provincial school boards headed by a superintendent.  In total the army 
established more than 2,600 new schools in Cuba in the first three months of 1900.
41
  Most 
important, the Americans emphasized quality teachers and established a robust teacher-training 
program in cooperation with Harvard University.  The government sent 1175 of Cuba‘s 
approximately 3,500 teachers to Harvard for a summer training program in 1900.
42
  They also 
dramatically increased teacher salaries to attract educated women.  In 1901, the occupation 
administration paid Cuban teachers better than virtually any teachers in the United States.  By the 
end of 1901 the new system dramatically reduced truancy and the average daily school 
attendance was 140,000 students.  The Americans laid a solid foundation of policy, and the 
education reforms implemented under the military government had the potential to completely 
transform Cuba both socially and economically in the long term.
 43
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Though the military government was successful in building the foundation of a 
progressive education system, it was not as successful in the critical arena of economic policy.  
The major economic problem faced by the military government was the nature of the Cuban 
economy.  Two major cash crops, sugar and tobacco sustained the Cuban economy.  Over half of 
the Cuban population was dependant on the success of the sugar industry for their livelihood.  
The war had devastated the sugar plantations but during Wood‘s first year as governor the 
security, stability, and infrastructure improvements the military government provided allowed 
the sugar plantations to recover.  By the middle of 1901, one hundred and fifty-seven sugar 
plantations were in operation producing over 800,000 tons of sugar.  This was almost three times 
the production in 1899.
44
  With the plantations operating, the problem then became markets.  
Prior to the Cuban-Spanish war, Cuban sugar was in high demand in the United States   During 
the war, as Cuban sugar became unavailable, markets in the United States turned to domestic 
beet-sugar as an alternative. In 1901, when Cuban sugar returned to the marketplace, American 
protectionism blocked it from many of its former markets.
45
  Wood realized that Cuba would 
never be economically viable without a market for its sugar.  However, he was unable to 
overcome the protectionist sentiment in the American Congress.  Eventually, it took a direct 
order from Secretary Root to cease lobbying for a reduced Cuban tariff to convince Wood that 
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the effort to reintroduce Cuban sugar to the US market was in vain.  This defeat left Cuba‘s 
economy weak and unstable.
46
 
General Wood‘s efforts in the area of law enforcement were much more successful than 
his economic policies.  The Military Government modified police policy to create a standardized 
police force for the entire island.   By the end of the occupation, a professional rural police force 
of 1,300 mounted men, armed with carbines enforced the law outside of municipalities.  They 
were not a military force but a branch of the central government.  The municipal police, who by 
the end of the occupation the local municipal governments funded and controlled, provided 
additional law enforcement within towns and villages.
47
 Wood‘s administration was very 
successful creating conditions of law and order enforced by a professional, apolitical police 
force. 
Comprehensive reform of the legal system proved to be a more difficult task than 
creating a police force.  In 1899, Brooke made reforms that took the approach of making Cuba‘s 
Spanish based legal system less corrupt, while not changing it fundamentally.  Under Wood‘s 
direction, the American government tried to convert the Cuban system, fundamentally based on 
Roman law, to a system based on Anglo-Saxon legal concepts.  This proved difficult to do in the 
short run, and impossible in the long run.  In the second year of the occupation, the Americans 
introduced the jury system and the concept of habeas corpus.  Wood believed that fundamental 
change was essential because it was not possible to ―establish a liberal government under 
Spanish laws.‖ However, educated Cubans, upon whom the system had to rely, were satisfied 
with the existing system and more important, considered it a part of their cultural heritage.  Thus, 
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though army lawyers eventually wrote Cuba‘s legal code, there was no intellectual buy-in by the 
Cuban legal profession or the people.
48
  This was one of the most significant failings of the 
Wood regime. 
One of the successes of the occupation was in the area of health and sanitation.  The 
vigorous sanitation efforts begun by Wood in Santiago and initiated by General Ludlow in 
Havana continued apace through Wood‘s tenure as Military Governor of the island.  As 
independence approached Wood was very concerned that the Cubans would not continue the 
program after the Americans left.  He felt its continuation was essential for two reasons.  First, 
the army reduced the mortality rate in Havana  by half during the occupation.  Second, Wood 
believed that Havana was the source of many diseases that occurred in the southern United States 
port cities.  Wood‘s concerns were such that he required that the Cuban constitutional assembly 
include a sanitation clause in the Cuban constitution.
49
 
Another very successful aspect of the occupation was the construction of and transition to 
Cuban civil rule.  By the spring of 1900 General Wood was under orders to transition to civil 
rule as quickly as possible.  This required a thorough understanding of the Cuban political 
situation.  Cuban politics were quite complex after four-hundred years of Spanish colonial rule.  
Local political views divided into two ideological groups:  liberal and conservative.  The Cuban 
National Party represented the liberal movement.  The poorer elements of society, the illiterate, 
and the veterans of the insurrection army were the major constituents of this group.  The former 
officers of the Cuban insurrection army led it.  The second group formed the Union Democratic 
Party made up of the planter class of Cubans, and the small middle class.  This group was well 
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educated, relatively prosperous, and favored close relations with the United States.  The major 
important issue that separated the two groups was independence.  The liberals favored total 
independence as soon as possible with no restrictions.  The Union Democrats favored close ties 
to the United States, a slow controlled movement toward independence, and some advocated 
outright annexation by the United States.   The dilemma that US officials had was that the best 
administrators, best educated, and most supportive of US policy were the Union Democrats.  
They were also the least popular. The occupation addressed the dilemma of how to guarantee 
American interests in a democracy that might not have the same interests in two ways.  One was 
by controlling suffrage criteria.  The other was through the Cuban constitution.  The military 
government and the McKinley administration hoped that by including American priorities in the 
Cuban constitution and by managing the right to vote they could safeguard American interests in 
Cuba.  
General Wood and Secretary Root understood that the fundamental ideology of the 
Cuban National Party was Cuban independence.
50
  The American Administration did not believe 
that the Cubans as a political body were mature enough to handle independence and the great 
fear was that Cuban self- government would disintegrate into chaos similar to what had befallen 
the Haitian government after independence.  Thus, American interests and those of the National 
party did not coincide.  A technique used to control the strength of the National party was 
suffrage restrictions. The Americans unilaterally declared that the suffrage in Cuba was limited 
to adult males, 21 years or older, and who were Cuban natives or Spanish immigrants who 
choose Cuban citizenship.  In addition, voters had to meet one of the following criteria: able to 
read and write; own more than 250 dollars worth of property; or had served honorably in the 
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Cuban insurrection army.
51
  The Americans hoped that these restrictions were sufficient to 
control the power of the National Party while at the same time remaining sufficiently democratic.   
The first free elections in Cuba proved the Americans wrong. The military government 
supervised the first Cuban post-war elections, for municipal officers, on June 16, 1900.  In the 
elections 110,816 of a pool of 150,648 registered voters participated.  The 1899–1900 census 
located approximately 365,000 males over twenty-one years old, thus, about forty-one percent of 
adult males were eligible and about thirty percent participated.
52
  The elections were sufficiently 
democratic, but the election results did not go in favor of American policy.  The National party 
won the bulk of the municipal leadership positions.  Though there were isolated cases of fraud 
allegations, all provinces reported the elections peaceful.
53
  The results of the election indicated 
to the Americans that a truly independent Cuba might not be submissive to American policies.  
Thus, to achieve the goal of the occupation, a Cuba aligned with US polices, required that the 
Americans influence the writing of the Cuban constitution. 
Planning for the municipal elections of 1901 and the election of a constitutional assembly 
began immediately after the 1900 municipal elections.  The Cuban people elected a 
constitutional assembly in the summer of 1900 and it began meeting that fall.  General Wood 
gave the Cuban constitutional convention three objectives:  frame and adopt a constitution, 
establish the relations to exist between the United States and an independent Cuba, and provide 
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for the election and formation of a sovereign government. The Cuban assembly was not 
enthusiastic about the requirement to define the relationship between the United States and Cuba 
so the Americans took the lead in that area.  The War Department, President McKinley, and the 
Congress consulted and agreed upon the desired relationship between the United States and 
Cuba.  Secretary Root communicated the resulting policy to General Wood, and Congress 
codified it in the Platt Amendment.
54
   
The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment as part of the War Department 
appropriations bill in February 1901.  The amendment stipulated the relationship with Cuba and 
required its inclusion in the future Cuban constitution. The important part of the amendment 
allowed the United States to intervene in Cuban domestic affairs under conditions of unrest.
55
  
On June 12, 1901, the Cuban convention agreed to include the Platte amendment verbatim into 
the Cuban Constitution.  National elections occurred in accordance with the constitution on 
December 31, 1901, and the people elected Tomas Estrada Palma President of Cuba.  He took 
office on May 20, 1902 as the US military government disbanded.  American occupation troops 
began reducing their presence in the country in the fall of 1901 and the last of the troops left in 
the summer of 1902.  The only remaining troops after the summer of 1902 were those that were 
training Cuban artillerymen to operate the various coastal defenses. 
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At the end of the first American occupation, the Americans left after achieving some 
impressive results.  The army supervised the establishment of the rule of law, including a 
completely reformed legal system and professional police force.  Under army supervision, 
Cubans wrote a Constitution, held elections, and then installed a democratically elected 
President.  In addition, impressive gains were made in health and sanitation and army doctors 
virtually wiped out yellow fever.  Yet, some aspects of the occupation remained incomplete.  
Though the legal system appeared comprehensive, many Cuban legal professionals did not 
believe in its legitimacy.  Also significantly, American protectionism prevented quickly 
revitalizing the Cuban economy, and Cuba‘s cash crop economy was not substantially altered 
leaving Cuba economically unstable.  In addition, education reform had barely made any 
progress toward alleviating Cuban illiteracy which was inherently a long-term process.  Thus, 
though it appeared as the Americans left that Cuba was a safe and functioning democracy allied 
to the United States, that appearance was merely a facade 
The Army Returns:  Occupation 1906–09 
Soon after the American‘s departure, Cuba‘s situation deteriorated and the government 
bureaucracy began to fail.  The Cuban government constructed under American occupation did 
not complete a single presidential term before it was beset by crisis.  Cuban politicians focused 
on lining their pockets and rewarding their supporters.  Individual leaders were more important 
than party unity.  Within the municipalities, politicians used their authority and loopholes in the 
law to purge members of the opposition from positions of responsibility.  Politicians replaced 
non-elected public officials, including trained teachers and police, with people who were 
politically loyal regardless of qualifications.  Partisan politics and political favoritism took 
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precedent over public policy.  Cuban politicians demonstrated almost no ability to compromise 
and arbitrate political differences.
56
  The country steadily descended into political turmoil. 
 In 1905 Cuban President Palma stood for reelection in Cuba‘s first national election 
since the end of the US occupation.  In preparation for the elections, Palma and his key advisors 
used the authority and control of the government to ensure Palma‘s reelection.57  Corrupt 
government actions had the effect of pushing the opposition liberals into open revolt with the 
support of much of the population.  Over six thousand rebels took to the field against the 
government.  By September 1906 it was clear that the insurgents in Cuba had the initiative and 
that the only forces of the government, the Rural Guard police force, were insufficient to stop 
them.  US President Theodore Roosevelt, partly based on the military advice of the army, was 
not inclined to support the Cuban government with American troops.
58
  Both the insurgents and 
the Cuban government pursued strategies designed to encourage US intervention.  The 
insurgents hoped to use the threat of military force to prompt US intervention and new elections; 
given fair elections, they were sure they could win.
59
  President Palma hoped the US military 
would protect the government from attack.  In September, President Roosevelt received an 
urgent message that the Palma government was about to fall.  He ordered two US Navy ships 
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into Cuban waters.  This action committed the United States to a military intervention in Cuba.  
Both sides of the Cuban conflict appeared to achieve their objective of US intervention.
60
  The 
failure of the reforms of General Wood to actually create stable civil governance in Cuba 
resulted in the intervention by US troops four years later. 
 As political chaos developed in Cuba, President  Theodore Roosevelt‘s first priority was 
avoiding involvement in  a Cuban insurgency.  Thus, along with the initial contingent of US 
Navy and Marine Corps troops he also sent a peace commission consisting of Secretary of War 
William Howard Taft and acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon. The peace commission‘s 
leaders were newcomers to Cuban politics.  Secretary of War Howard Taft had previously served 
as the first civil Governor of the Philippine Islands before President Theodore Roosevelt selected 
Taft to replaced Elihu Root in the War Department.  Robert Beacon was the acting Secretary of 
State and an experienced businessman, but not an experienced diplomat.  Veteran army Captain 
Frank McCoy, the former senior aid to General Wood, assisted the two secretaries.  McCoy 
spoke fluent Spanish, and had significant experience in the Philippines and was an expert on 
Cuba.   
Taft‘s initial analysis of the situation in Cuba was accurate: ideology was not an issue but 
rather the crux of the problem was the 1905 elections.  He quickly determined that the Liberals 
who were revolting against the government were correct in that the Moderates had rigged the 
election. The peace commission found that the belief that the government under Palma took 
―recourse...to unlawful exercise of power and perpetration of gross injustice to the extent as to 
vitiate the elections … was well founded.‖  Even some Moderates admitted to the accusation. 61    
The motivation of the Moderates, as well as the Liberals, was not ideology but quite simply 
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wealth and power that accrued to those who controlled the government.  Taft‘s compromise was 
to void all election results, and conduct new elections under the supervision of a commission 
consisting of three moderates, three liberals, and one American. The moderates did not accept 
Taft‘s plan.62 On September 29, 1906, President Palma resigned from the office of President of 
Cuba.  That night US Marines of the First Expeditionary Brigade under Colonel I.W.T. Waller 
landed and dispersed in company size units throughout the island to establish order, separate the 
insurgents from government forces, and protect American lives and interests.
63
  Secretary Taft, 
as the senior representative of the United States and under the authority of President Roosevelt, 
proclaimed the provisional government of Cuba with himself as the governor of the island.
64
 
The second American occupation of Cuba and the new provisional government were 
quickly and effectively organized. The US military quickly disarmed the insurgent army and 
within weeks the army‘s twenty-five thousand members had returned to their homes.  A handful 
of American army officers and the Marine brigade accomplished this sensitive task without 
encountering any problems.  By the end of October, 1906, the 2,000 US Marines were 
augmented by the American Army of Cuban Pacification‘s seven army regiments totaling 5,000 
troops. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the army Chief of Staff, came from Washington to be 
the initial commander, and 1,000 Marines remained under army command bringing the final total 
occupation force to 6,000 men.  General Bell remained in Cuba until December 31, 1906, when 
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he returned to his position as the army Chief of Staff.  The command fell to Brigadier General 
Thomas H. Barry who took over February 16, 1907.65   
The goal of the second Cuban occupation was to reestablish Cuban civil government as 
quickly as possible.  The mission of the Army of Pacification was to ensure the security required 
by the provisional government to achieve the United States‘ objective of political stability.  Since 
there were no active hostilities when the army arrived, implicit in its mission was to prevent the 
outbreak of hostilities.  The US national leadership put significant restrictions on the army 
executing its mission.  The army's orders explicitly prohibited troops from engaging directly with 
the Cubans except in the extreme circumstance.  Secretary Taft‘s orders to the army were very 
clear:  ―The President of the United States deems it of the utmost importance that the American 
forces do not engage in conflicts with Cubans, but that disorder by Cubans be suppressed by 
Cubans.‖ General Bell later echoed this guidance directly to the troops ―Troops are…not 
expected to take part in an active way in the suppression of disorder unless an extreme 
emergency arises .‖ The army expected local police and the Rural Guard to handle routine law 
enforcement.
66
 
On October 13, 1906, Charles E. MaGoon assumed the duties of provisional governor 
and Taft returned to his position of Secretary of War. MaGoon came to Cuba from his position as 
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Governor of the Panama Canal Zone.
67
 Though the New York Times reported MaGoon ―will 
exercise all the power which was vested in Gen. Leonard Wood when he ruled Cuba under the 
title of Military Governor,‖ in fact he would not.  The difference was that Leonard Wood was 
simultaneously the military governor and the military commander of the division of Cuba.  In 
1906, the Army of Cuban Pacification reported directly and separately to the Secretary of War.  
The army had the mission to support the efforts of the governor but the governor was not in the 
military chain of command.  The only military forces that the governor commanded were the US 
Army officers detailed to his staff, the Cuban Rural Guard forces, and the small group of Cuban 
artillery forces.  Fortunately, both General Barry and MaGoon were accommodating 
personalities, had a cordial relationship, and coordinated their activities.  Most important, the 
military officers who were MaGoon‘s senior assistants had personal and professional 
relationships with the leaders of the army forces and these relationships formed a strong bridge 
to General Barry and his staff.
68
 
When President Palma resigned so did all of his cabinet secretaries.  As the Americans 
formed the provisional government, they promoted the chief clerks of the departments to acting 
secretaries.  They also assigned a US Army officer as an advisor to each department.  The 
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advisors were the de facto department heads and were a very experienced group of officers:  
Colonel E.H. Crowder supervised the Department of State and Justice,
69
  Lieutenant Colonel E. 
St. J. Greble oversaw the department of government, Colonel W. M. Black supervised the 
department of public works,  army doctor  Major J.R. Kean headed the department of sanitation,  
Major H. J. Slocum supervised the police and armed forces; and Mr. J.D. Terrill of the US 
Treasury oversaw the treasury department.  All of these officers were aggressive reformers and 
knowledgeable if not expert in Spanish language and culture.  They had the dual tasks of 
administering their department‘s responsibilities while at the same time implementing 
administrative reforms and efficiencies.
70
   The army detailed a total of twenty-nine officers to 
serve on the provisional government staff.
71
   From the standpoint of the long-term effects they 
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may have had on Cuban administration, they may have been too competent because after their 
departure no Cuban official would match their zeal and expertise. 
Economic improvement reflected the effectiveness of the overall American response to 
the Cuban revolt. There was a fear that the revolt would cause a credit crisis that would be fatal 
to Cuba‘s agricultural economy.  A drought added to the potential ill effects of the revolt, as did 
a devastating hurricane that hit the island in late October 1906.  Surprisingly, the sugar crop of 
1907 was good.  In addition, the treasury receipts of 1907 were significantly higher than those of 
1906.  Though the provisional governor attributed the solid economic performance to ―the 
marvelous productiveness of the island,‖ the lack of an economic impact was more likely the 
result of the real and perceived stability and the elimination of bureaucratic corruption that 
followed the robust US military intervention.
72
 
The major economic issue that faced the provisional government was that of 
unemployment.  This problem was the same that had faced the Spanish colonial government and 
the previous military government of General Wood.  The labor cycle of the sugar industry that 
left 75 percent of sugar workers unemployed for six months of the year, June to November, 
caused the chronic unemployment.  American leaders recognized that the high unemployment 
was not only an economic issue but also a political stability issue.  The solution, as it was under 
Wood, was a robust public works program.  The army officer who was the supervisor of the 
public works department was Colonel William M. Black.  Colonel Black had been the chief of 
public works in Havana under General Ludlow and then the Chief Engineer in the division of 
Cuba under General Wood.  He was intimately familiar with all aspects of engineering work on 
the island, knew what needed doing and how to do it.  Under his supervision, the provisional 
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government pursued a vigorous public works program. The central focus of the program was 
road building.  Black and the officers and men of the army‘s 2nd Engineer battalion planned, 
organized and supervised this work.
73
   
The top priority of the American Administration was fixing the flaws in Cuba‘s 
governmental structure. One of the causes of the corrupt 1905 elections and the 1906 revolt was 
flawed laws or lack of laws.  After the departure of the US Army in 1902, the Cuban legislature 
failed to pass many of the laws necessary to implement the 1902 Cuban constitution.  In addition, 
the Cuban Congress failed to pass routine laws necessary for the government to operate.  In three 
of the five years between 1902 and 1906 it failed to pass a budget.  Much of the limited 
legislation that did pass was nothing more than government handouts to important 
constituencies. The constitution allowed, in the absence of law, that the President could issue 
decrees with the force of law.  This was an aspect of the constitution that was exploited by 
President Palma, and combined with the ineffective legislature, effectively gave the President 
legislative power.  Palma exploited this legal power to facilitate his reelection and it was one of 
the key causes of the revolt of 1906.
 74
 
To fix the systemic problems in the Cuban system of government MaGoon formed an 
―advisory law commission‖ headed by army Colonel E.H. Crowder.  It consisted of eight Cubans 
and three Americans.  The mission of the commission was extensive.  Governor MaGoon 
ordered it to prepare new electoral law, municipal and provincial laws, judiciary law, civil 
service law, law covering national administration and the executive organization, and laws 
covering the armed forces.  The intent was to compensate for the lack of laws produced since 
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1902, create an apolitical civil service, and to facilitate the effective functioning of the legislature 
in the future. Crowder‘s committee produced the required codes in a timely manner and 
Governor Magoon then activated them through proclamation. 
Prior to the new scheduled provincial government elections, the terms of officials elected 
in 1903 and 1905 ended.  Because no Cuban citizens were acceptable to all of the Cuban political 
parties, Governor MaGoon appointed army officers as provincial governors for the last several 
months of the occupation.  These army officers were Captain George W. Read in Pinar del Rio, 
Major Frederick S. Foltz in Havana, Captain Edmund Wittenmyer in Matanzas, Major William 
Beach in Santa Clara, Major Wallis O. Clark in Camaguey, and Captain Andrew J. Dougherty, 
Oriente.  Most of these officers came from the group advising the Rural Guard.  Once again, the 
military government was fortunate in recognizing administrative and leadership talent and 
putting it in positions of responsibility.  Of the six provincial governors, four would serve as 
generals commanding army divisions in the American Expeditionary Force in France during 
World War I.
75
 
The government held municipal elections on August 1, 1908.  The results were successful 
from an American point of view.  The elections went smoothly and no violence occurred.  The 
government prohibited military forces, Cuban or American near the polls except one police 
officer who had to remain 25 meters from the poll and direct traffic.  In the national elections in 
November, 1908, Liberal Party presidential candidate Jose Miguel Gomez and vice-president 
candidate Alfredo Zayas won approximately 60 percent of the popular vote and all 107 electoral 
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votes.
76
  On January 28, 1909, the provisional governor turned over control of the government to 
the newly elected President Gomez.  That afternoon Charles MaGoon sailed back to the United 
States on the battleship USS. Maine.  The Army of Cuban Pacification returned to the United 
States over the next few months with the last troops of the 27
th
 Infantry Regiment and the 2
nd
 
Engineer battalion sailing on US Army transports on April 1, 1909.
77
  The US Army viewed 
Cuba as a mission accomplished.  Most parties were content with the results of the occupation.  
American politicians viewed Cuba as a political problem solved to the satisfaction of US, not 
Cuban, politics.  The army officers serving in Cuba were not as optimistic.  They recognized as 
historian Allen Millet noted, ―stability without reform and institutional change brought no peace 
at all.‖78 
Another Failure 
The mission of the first US occupation of Cuba was to set up a stable function democracy 
supportive of US interests.  That mission required an economic, a social, and a political 
transformation. What the United States did not want was an unstable strife-torn country that 
would require constant US attention.  To achieve these goals the United States had to transform 
Cuban society.  The country needed to eliminate the widespread illiteracy, clean up and sanitize 
the cities, eliminate corruption, and establish acceptance of the rule of law.  Of equal importance 
was the economic transformation of the country.  The United States had to solve the problems of 
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systemic unemployment and trade relations with the United States.  As part of these solutions, 
the economic infrastructure of the country required dramatic improvement. 
Given these goals for the first US occupation, the occupation was a failure.   Had the 
occupation been a success US troops would not have reoccupied the country in 1906.  General 
Wood‘s regime put in place many of the systems necessary to eventually achieve success:  they 
built a robust school system with qualified staff, they created an apolitical police force, the 
country was rigorously sanitized and the threat of yellow fever was virtually wiped out,  they 
reorganized the legal system to eliminate much of the graft, they dramatically improved the 
economic infrastructure by building roads and railways and improving ports, and they oversaw 
the writing of a fair constitution and overseeing free and fair elections.  However, their failures 
were more important than their successes. 
Several shortfalls of the military government contributed to future Cuban instability.  The 
Americans failed to ensure that the Cuban legal system backed up the constitution.  This 
contributed directly to the revolt and occupation of 1906.  More importantly, the Americans 
reinforced Cuba‘s single crop economic system with its cyclic labor requirements.  A single 
source economic system was not catastrophic if it was part of a larger cooperative economic 
system, however, a single source economic system for a nation state, particularly a source as 
volatile and vulnerable to fluctuation as the sugar market, could not help but have important 
negative political impacts.  Thus, one of the most important failures of the military government 
was not moving Cuba toward economic diversity, and not recognizing the future political 
problems associated with the sugar industry.  The occupation actually reinforced the strength of 
the industry within Cuba. 
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Time also contributed to the American failure.  The Americans based their reform efforts 
on a vision of a liberal, well educated, and economically diverse society that did not exist in 
Cuba.  The Americans put in place the systems necessary to execute the processes of democratic 
society but the social and economic structures that were necessary for those systems to function 
were lacking.  The first American occupation of three years was not sufficient time for new 
social norms to develop.  The second occupation operated under similar and even more stringent 
time constraints.  The result was a veneer of liberal democracy, represented in the institutions 
and laws created by the Americans that covered the corrupt socially segregated culture 
developed under Spanish colonial rule. Therefore, given the time circumstances, it is unlikely the 
American army could have done more than it did. 
The American government did not envision the  second occupation of Cuba as anything 
more than band-aid designed to eliminate an issue that had the potential to cause US domestic 
political problems.  The objectives of the second occupation were to correct aspects of Cuban  
public administration that had resulted in the revolt of 1906 and to prevent civil war.  It 
accomplished these objectives very well without delving into the deeper systemic problems of 
Cuban governance.   
Regardless of the long-term success or failure of the American occupations of Cuba, in 
the short-term both occupations were viewed as successful missions and had a powerful impact 
on the army‘s view of occupations.  They confirmed lessons learned in Reconstruction and on 
the frontier.  The occupations of Cuba also taught the army new elements to consider when 
conducting occupation operations. 
The occupation of Cuba illustrated the importance of several ideas and concepts 
regarding occupations learned in the occupation of the South or on the American frontier:  
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building democracy, law and order, education, respect for local institutions and culture, the 
primacy of civil policy, and the transition to civil rule.  Wood and later MaGoon followed almost 
exactly the same process for building the Cuban government used in reconstructing democracy 
in the South.  The priority placed on law and order created the emphasis on legal reform during 
both the first and second occupations.  Army priority to school policy in Cuba reinforced the 
importance of education to building stable and lasting institutions in a post-conflict environment.  
While attempting to reform Cuban governance, the army often did not work within the cultural 
boundaries of Cuban society.  This contributed to the lack of success in several instances.  A 
major driver of Cuban policy was the US domestic scene.  Cuban economic policy, annexation, 
and length of the occupation all were fundamentally influenced by US domestic policy.  Finally, 
the desire for a quick transition to civil rule strongly influenced both occupations.  In the first 
occupation, Secretary Root insisted on a quick road to Cuban independence.  During the second 
occupation, military occupation occurred under the supervision of an appointed American civil 
governor. The emphasis on speedy transition may hurt the effectiveness of the occupation.  The 
American‘s quick departure in 1902 occurred before any effort to validate the ability of the 
Cuban government to function.  These six characteristics of the occupation of Cuba, though not 
universally successful in Cuba, became a model for an American way of occupation that 
persisted through the first half of the twentieth century. 
Cuba illustrated the critical role of economics to occupation and governance mission 
accomplishment.  The Cuban experience made clear the relationship between economic structure 
(the sugar industry and tariffs), labor, and political stability.  The inherent instability of the sugar 
based economy was a direct contributor to political instability.  Cuba demonstrated the 
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importance of synchronized and comprehensive military, political, and economic policy.  Neither 
occupation command made an effort to fundamentally reform the Cuban economy. 
Finally, the Cuban occupation, along with the concurrent Philippine experience, 
fundamentally changed the nature of American military service. Occupations required 
experienced officers willing to devote long years of service overseas to achieve the army‘s and 
the nation‘s objectives.   Major Slocum, supervisor of police operations and the rural guard spent 
seven years in Cuba between 1899 and 1909.  Colonel Crowder spent nine years overseas in that 
same period and would devote the bulk of the remainder of his professional life to the issues 
surrounding Cuban-American relationships.  These types of overseas commitments by the 
American officer corps were a completely new requirement of the officer profession as it entered 
the twentieth century and were essential to success. Most of the key army leaders until the 
beginning of World War I were heavily involved in the Cuban occupations.  General Chaffee, 
Brooke‘s chief of staff, and General Wood both left Cuba for important military government 
assignments in the Philippines and later became Chiefs of Staff of the army.  Two of Wood‘s key 
staff officers, Tasker Bliss and Hugh Scott, also went on to service in the Philippines and served 
as Chiefs of Staff of the army.  Chief of Staff General Franklin Bell personally led the initial 
troops of the second occupation. Thus, the Cuban occupations involved five future army Chiefs 
of Staff:  Chaffee (1904–1906), Bell (1906–1910), Wood (1910–1914), Scott (1914–1917), and 
Bliss(1917–1918).  Wood‘s aide, Lieutenant Frank McCoy also continued involvement in 
military occupation and governance assignments, served through World War II, and played an 
important role in the occupation of Japan. Partly through the experiences of these very senior 
leaders, Cuba became an important model for future army occupations. 
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Cuba represented a continuation of American army‘s professional experience in the 
unconventional post-conflict environment of military occupation operations.  It confirmed many 
of the experiences of Reconstruction and the frontier while adding new requirements and new 
levels of complexity.  Successful in the short-term, and the ultimate failure of the Cuban 
missions became apparent decades after the occupation ended.  However, Cuban operations, for 
all their complexity and importance, were not the major focus of the Army in the first decades of 
the twentieth century.  That focus was on another occupation operation also stemming from the 
Spanish-American War but posing greater physical and operational challenges a half a world 
away.  That operation was the occupation and governance of the Philippine Islands.   
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CHAPTER 5 - Military Government in the Philippines, 1898 to 1913 
 
The American military government experience in the Philippines exposed the majority of 
the US Army to occupation operations.  It was an extremely complex and difficult governance 
mission because it required the army to govern and fight simultaneously.  Many of the 
characteristics of the occupation of the Philippines were common to the army experiences in 
Reconstruction, on the frontier, or in Cuba.  These included the lack of clear strategic guidance, 
emphasis on building democracy, quick transition to civil rule, an emphasis on education policy, 
a focus on health and sanitation, and  the requirement to adapt to local cultural norms.  Also, like 
the other army experiences, operations in the Philippines neglected economic development.  The 
Philippine occupation also revealed some unique aspects of military governance.  One unique 
characteristic was the length of the army‘s involvement, which at fifteen years was considerable.  
Another unique aspect of the Philippine experience was that the army fought a skillful and 
determined insurgency at the same time as it was attempting to govern, and therefore the military 
government operations became part of the strategy to overcome the insurgent.  
The army‘s governing experience in the Philippines divided into four distinct phases:  
limited governance during the occupation of Manila prior to the Treaty of Paris, governance 
during the conduct of the war under Generals Otis and MacArthur, military governance support 
of Governor Taft and the Philippine Commission, and military government of the Moro Province 
from 1903 to 1913.  The purpose of military governance was in every case to create conditions 
such that the army could turn over the governance mission to the American civil authorities..  
Operations began upon the arrival of US ground forces in the summer of 1898, and continued 
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with greater and lesser US military involvement until 1913 when the US military‘s involvement 
in the civil rule of the islands ceased.  During this time the military governors frequently 
commanded combat operations at the same time they conducted the  governance mission. 
Limited Governance Operations 
The army‘s occupation prior to open hostilities with the Philippine Revolutionary Army 
set the pattern for the governance after the war began.   On May 4, 1898, President McKinley 
ordered the American army to deploy to the  Philippines in response to Admiral George Dewey‘s 
request for  reinforcement.  Within days, the force began assembling and training at the Presidio 
in San Francisco.
1
  The army ordered Major General Wesley Merritt to lead the American 
Expeditionary Force to the Philippines and organized his command as the Department of the 
Pacific.
2
  Like the Reconstruction experience and General Brooke in Cuba, Merritt received little 
guidance from President McKinley regarding his mission in the Philippines.  He met with 
President McKinley as he traveled from his old headquarters in New York to his new command 
assembling in California.  The President‘s instructions to Merritt were to destroy Spain‘s military 
capability in the Philippines and to ensure order and stability in the island areas under American 
control.
3
  At the time, though active operations in Cuba were over, Spain and the United States 
were still formally at war.  Thus, Merritt‘s only obvious mission was to defeat Spanish land 
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forces in the Philippines.  McKinley had not established short or long-term policy regarding the 
final disposition of the Philippines and so Merritt sailed with little useful political guidance. 
The first American army forces arrived in the Philippines on June 30, 1898 under the 
command of Brigadier General Thomas Anderson and they immediately became involved in the 
political affairs of the islands.  These troops were part of the 2
nd
 Division of the VIII Corps —a 
subordinate command of the Department of the Pacific.  Over the next two months, additional 
troops arrived and by the end of August the total US Army strength in the Philippines was over 
15,000 troops.
4
  General Anderson, the first senior army commander on the scene, met with 
Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Philippine revolt against Spanish rule, soon after arriving.  
Anderson avoided making any formal commitments toward the rebels or articulating any policy 
on behalf of the US government.  General Merritt arrived in late July and established his 
department command as the senior army command in the Pacific. US troops joined the 
Philippine Revolutionary Army surrounding the Spanish army garrison defending Manila.  On 
August 13, after secret negotiations with the Spanish commander of Manila, which did not 
include Filipino participation, US troops attacked by themselves and captured the city.  The 
Spanish offered only token resistance.  US troops occupied Manila and the Spanish-American 
war in the Philippines was essentially over.  The relationship of the American military to the 
Filipino population and the Philippine Revolutionary Army remained at issue. While Americans 
occupied Manila, Aguinaldo‘s army surrounded them.  
Two weeks after the fall of Manila, on August 29, 1898, General Merritt was relieved of 
command of the Department of the Pacific at his own request by his deputy Major General 
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Elwell S. Otis.  Otis had served as the deputy to the Department Commander and as the 
commander of the VIII Corps.  Otis became the new Department Commander but did not 
relinquish his command of VIII Corps.  Merritt may have believed as he left the Philippines that 
the major fighting portion of the war was over and that all that remained was the inglorious task 
of setting up the US administration.  If he did, he was very wrong. 
 Though a decorated Civil War veteran, the new commander General Otis had a strong 
scholarly bent.
 5
   After graduation from Harvard law school, he specialized in army Indian 
policy and in 1878 outlined his views in a book, The Indian Question.
6
   After assuming 
command of forces in the Philippines, he directed military operations on the islands and 
constructed the initial framework of military government.  Historian Stuart Miller described him 
as a ―fastidious, pompous, and fussy man who inspired few of his subordinates.‖7  Though 
recognizing his faults, historian Brian Linn was more charitable when he described the 
commander having ―formidable intellect, legal training, reforming interests, and managerial 
experience.‖8 Otis proved to be a cautious but competent commander to whom no detail was too 
small to warrant his personal attention.  He was a frustration for his more aggressive field 
                                                 
5
 General Elwell S. Otis, like Merritt, began his career in the Civil War where he received two awards for 
gallantry and was wounded.  After the war, he spent the bulk of his service on the frontier.  Unlike Merritt, Otis was 
not a West Point graduate, but had graduated from the University of Rochester and then Harvard Law School.  He 
had risen to command the 20
th
 Infantry Regiment in 1880 and in 1893, the army promoted him to brigadier general.  
From 1881–1885 he was the first commandant of the army‘s new School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1893, he commanded the Department of Columbia and then prior to his assignment to 
the Philippines, the Department of Colorado.  General Otis‘ career is summarized from William H. Powell, List of 
Officers of the Army of the United States from 1779 to 1900 (New York:  L.R. Hamersly & Co., 1900), 514; Stuart 
Creighton Miller, ―Elwell S. Otis (1838–1909),‖ Benjamin R. Beede, Editor, The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 
1898–1934:  An Encyclopedia (New York: Taylor and France, 1994), 390–393;  Thomas F. Burdett, ―A New 
Evaluation of General Otis‘ Leadership in the Philippines,‖ Military Review (Vol. LV, January 1975, No. 1), 79–90. 
6
 Elwell S. Otis, The Indian Question (New York:  Sheldon and Company, 1878). 
7
Stuart Creighton  Miller, Benevolent Assimilation:  The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903 
(New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1982), 46. 
8
 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence:  University of Kansas Press, 2000), 
29.  Former Philippine Commission member Charles Elliot supports Linn‘s view writing in 1916 ―but when all the 
difficulties are taken into consideration every fair-minded and unprejudiced person will now concede that his 
administration was reasonably successful.‖  Elliot, 481–482. 
 142 
commanders, but gave them sufficient guidance and support, and allowed them enough freedom 
of action that their military operations were generally very successful.  He rarely left Manila, and 
devoted the greater portion of his energies to the management tasks required of his role as 
Military Governor of the Philippines —a role for which his legal training and study of native 
American issues uniquely qualified him. 
The situation that Merritt left Otis was very complex and volatile.  Military opposition 
aside, the characteristics of the Philippine archipelago presented a significant challenge to 
military occupation operations.  The geographic size of the islands, about 115,000 square miles 
—similar to the state of Arizona, was not particularly daunting to the American army.  The most 
obvious geographic challenge was that the Philippines consisted of over 600 individual islands.  
Of these, eleven were of geographical importance and two, Luzon and Mindanao, together were 
larger than the rest of the archipelago combined.  Both Luzon and Mindanao had significant 
mountain ranges and all the major islands had mountainous interiors.  Thick forests covered most 
of the mountains and highlands.  Virtually no road networks existed on the islands and the only 
railroad was a hundred and twenty-five mile track from Manila north to Malolos.
9
 The climate 
also challenged the Americans.  It varied significantly depending on location but was generally 
tropical and therefore hot and wet.  Typhoons, earthquakes and floods were a constant threat.  
Weather and the potential for natural disasters were obstacles to economic development and 
army efforts to govern the islands effectively.
10
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The most significant challenge to occupation operations was the island‘s large and very 
diverse population.  It took the army over a year to acquire a general idea regarding the 
population size and composition, and several years to form an accurate accounting.
11
  It was not 
until 1903 that conditions permitted the Philippine Commission to conduct a detailed formal 
census.  The results of that census indicated that the population of the Archipelago was 
7,635,426, more than four times the size of Cuba.  Of that number, the Americans considered 
approximately seven million ―civilized,‖ while they classified the remaining as ―wild people.‖  
The bulk of the population considered civilized was foreign born or Roman Catholic natives.  
Roman Catholic natives made up 91 percent of the population.  The wild people were either 
aboriginal tribes or, in the case of about three-fifths of the total, tribal Muslims.  The Muslim 
population, known collectively as Moros, totaled approximately 278,000, or less than four 
percent. The vast bulk of the population, Christian and Moro, shared a common Malaysian 
ethnicity.  Forty-six percent of the adult male population was literate or partially literate.  The 
three largest tribes were the civilized Visayan (central islands), Tagalog (southern Luzon and 
Mindoro), and Ilocano (northern Luzon) tribes who made up forty-two, nineteen, and eleven 
percent of the population respectively.  Spanish was the language of the educated classes and the 
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American census estimated that less than ten percent of the population could speak Spanish.
12
 
Based on ethnicity, customs, and linguistics, the Philippine Commission expressed the initial 
impression of the Americans when it noted,  ―the masses of the people are without a common 
speech and they lack the sentiment of nationality.  The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated 
assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type.‖13 The 
assessment was essentially correct and complicated the task of governing the islands immensely. 
When General Merritt left, Otis faced a large and potentially dangerous enemy, a 
precarious military position, and had only vague guidance from the President regarding ultimate 
US policy. Otis walked a diplomatic and legal tightrope throughout the fall of 1898, attempting 
to remain on cordial relations with the revolutionary government of Emilio Aguinaldo, while at 
the same time making no commitments or rendering any opinion on future US policy.  General 
Otis described this period before the ratification of the Treaty of Paris as a ―period of quiet, in so 
far as strictly military affairs were concerned, [but] the labors of civil administration were very 
exacting.‖14  During this period, the United States established administration over the city of 
Manila and implemented many of the policies that would later characterize US government 
operations throughout the islands.   
After the capture of Manila from Spanish forces in August 1898, the American command 
assumed the responsibility under the laws of war for the administration, health, and well-being of 
the population of over 200,000.  The military command had no specific preparation for this 
                                                 
12
 J.P. Sanger, Census of the Philippine Islands, vol. II (Washington, D.C.:  United States Bureau of the 
Census, 1905), 15–16, 49, 46, 78. 
13
 Among the population in 1903 the census identified twenty-four major tribes distinguished by different 
customs and language.  Within the major tribal divisions were numerous sub-divisions, each speaking their own 
dialect.  The census counted literacy regardless of which language the individual had capacity in.  Philippine 
Commission, Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Volume. I (Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1900), 189. 
14
 Otis, 1899, 44. 
 145 
significant responsibility. In assuming control of Manila, the command faced the immediate 
problems of law and order, sanitation, and commerce. During the initial occupation, until 
February 1899 and the ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty, the American military considered 
Filipinos to be Spanish Citizens whose citizenship was in abeyance.
15
 
The law and order problems of Manila were significant.  There was no police force and 
no court system.  In addition, elements of Aguinaldo‘s revolutionary army had a presence inside 
the city, as well as the sympathy of the city populace.  General Otis responded by placing the 
VIII Corps Provost Marshal, Major General Robert Hughes in command of the city.
16
  Hughes 
commanded three volunteer infantry regiments that formed the city provost guard.  Otis ordered 
the three-thousand man guard ―to check the demonstration of the natives and preserve order 
within Manila.‖17  They also monitored access to the city, policed the streets, and administered 
the prison. The guard proved its effectiveness as it helped to quell any possibility of an urban 
uprising when Aguinaldo‘s forces and the Americans went to war in February 1899.18 
By October 1898, courts were again operating in Manila.  These were Spanish courts, 
operating under US supervision and enforcing Spanish laws in accordance with traditional local 
rules of jurisprudence.  However, the Spanish judges gradually refused to work under the US 
military government and the local courts closed.  Initially, the military government replaced 
them with military commissions.
19
  Eventually, the army reorganized the entire judiciary system 
and staffed it using a combination of American officers and native Filipinos. 
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A major concern of the American command was health and sanitation.  The American 
command viewed Manila, because it had no sewer system, as particularly susceptible to disease.  
Army Chief Surgeon Major Frank S. Bourns established and led a city Board of Health.  It was 
composed of both prominent Filipino and American health experts.  The Board appointed 
municipal health boards and established a free clinic staffed with doctors and midwives for the 
poor.
20
  The provost guard backed up sanitation inspectors who rigorously enforced health and 
sanitation regulations. The sanitation department operated under the supervision of the Provost 
Marshall and immediately began a general clean up of the deplorable conditions in the city.  The 
department increased its employees from 240 to 520.
21
  Small pox broke out among the Spanish 
army prisoners and the Board of Health vaccinated all of the 13,000 prisoners in three weeks.  
By January 1899, the vaccination of the command against small pox was complete and the 
medical officers began a program to vaccinate the civil population.
22
 The army also tackled 
venereal disease.  Army doctors inspected prostitutes weekly and issued certificates if they were 
disease free.
23
  The effective work of the sanitation board, supervised by the Provost Marshal, 
ensured both the health of the command and the city population.  Manila became the model for 
health and sanitation policy wherever the army subsequently established garrisons in the islands. 
General Otis recognized that the Manila school system was an important stabilizing and 
legitimizing organization within the city.  It was not operating when the Americans occupied the 
city.  The command gave Captain William D. McKinnon, chaplain of the 1
st
 California 
Volunteer Regiment, responsibility for operating the schools.  Chaplain McKinnon was a Roman 
Catholic priest who had experience with school systems having managed a 500-pupil orphanage 
                                                 
20
 John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902 
(Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 58. 
21
 Ibid., 60. 
22
 Otis, 1899, 93. 
23
 Gates, 58. 
 147 
and school in California before volunteering for military service. His status as an American 
Roman Catholic priest created a bridge for him to reach out to the former sectarian Spanish 
school officials and employees, and allowed him to separate his new secular school system from 
the influence of the Spanish friars.  McKinnon, with Otis‘s strong support, sanitized and repaired 
school facilities, reorganized the administration, recalled old faculty and recruited new teachers 
(including American soldiers), and revised and updated the curriculum.  In ten months, 
McKinnon created a school system that included 32 separate schools and enrolled 4,800 
children.  Both McKinnon and Otis understood that the creation of the democratic institutions in 
the Philippines relied on the creation of an educated electorate.
24
 Manila served as model for the 
expansion of the American school system as the control of the military government expanded. 
The army‘s provost marshal governed the city of Manila for three years very effectively.  
By the time the army returned the city to civil control it had a functioning judiciary, was one of 
the most sanitary cities in Asia, operated effective municipal police and fire departments, and 
was the center of commerce for the archipelago.  On August 7, 1901, the army provost marshal-
general turned over responsibility for the approximately 250,000 people of the city to a civilian 
municipal board appointed by the Philippine Commission.  General George W. Davis, then the 
Provost Marshal, also passed the board a draft charter for administration of the city, modeled 
after the charter used to administer Washington D.C.
25
 
While the American Provost Marshal focused on securing and governing the occupied 
city, General Otis focused on controlling the strained relationship with the Philippine 
revolutionary government and Aguinaldo.  The tense situation culminated in December 1898 
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when the US government announced the results of the Paris Peace Treaty formally ending the 
war between the United States and Spain.  This treaty relinquished Spain‘s sovereignty over the 
Philippines to the United States and confirmed that President McKinley‘s intent was to annex the 
islands.   To the Filipino revolutionaries this policy was a declaration of war.  Aguinaldo‘s forces 
did not immediately attack US forces, though Aguinaldo commented that the Philippine 
―government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible 
possession of the Visayan Islands.‖26  Aguinaldo‘s restraint was at least partly due to the fact that 
the ratification of the treaty by the US Senate was far from certain.
27
   From the beginning, 
American domestic politics had a large influence on the actions of the Filipino revolutionaries. 
The President‘s guidance to Otis as ratification of the treaty approached was very clear:  
avoid war.  McKinley hoped to avoid war and wait out the insurgents.  The President said: 
Time given the insurgents can not injure us, and must weaken and discourage 
them.  They will see our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can 
give them good government our sovereignty must be conceded and unquestioned.  
Tact and kindness most essential at this time.
28
   
Though Otis understood McKinley‘s intentions, avoiding war proved to be impossible, and 
reconciling the Filipinos to American rule was problematic.  Though McKinley was giving clear 
guidance, annexation and avoid war, the guidance was not attuned to the reality of conditions in 
the Philippines and of little use to Otis. 
There was a sharp contrast  between the President‘s guidance and military and 
geographic realities in the Philippines.  The military shared part of the blame for the state of 
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political affairs in the Philippines in February 1899.  General Otis did little to diplomatically 
engage the opposing Filipino leadership on the peace treaty issue.  He appears to have been 
completely ignorant of the fact that war was likely after ratification of the peace treaty. His 
communications to Washington were imprecise and vague.  Overall, they gave the impression 
that although there was a radical group of insurgents that would oppose the United States, the 
vast majority of the people would not.
29
  He also did little to make his superiors aware of the 
shortage of troops needed to accomplish his assigned tasks.  Even if Aguinaldo‘s army did not 
declare war on the United States, there were not enough troops in Otis‘s command to relieve the 
Spanish garrisons and occupy the islands.
30
   
War came to the Philippines in February 1899 and greatly complicated the task of 
governing the islands.  On the night of February 4, 1899, an altercation occurred between 
Philippine soldiers and US guards that produced a nightlong exchange of gunfire.  By morning, 
the two armies were at war.  On February 5, The New York Times declared ―GAIN FOR THE 
TREATY; The Battle at Manila Expected to Aid Its Ratification.‖  On February 7, 1899, the US 
Senate ratified the treaty and the Philippines became officially a part of the United States.  The 
treaty was not overwhelmingly popular: the Senate approved the treaty by a margin of one vote.
 
31
 For the eight months following the San Juan bridge incident, the US Army‘s VIII Corps 
pursued the military forces of Aguinaldo throughout Luzon and the other islands —defeating 
them in every pitched battle.  Finally, with his forces defeated and routed everywhere, Aguinaldo 
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issued orders in October 1899 to change tactics.  Rather than meet the Americans in conventional 
combat, henceforth the Philippine Revolutionary Army would rely on hit and run guerrilla tactics 
and the ability to blend in with the population.  The Philippine insurgents determined to make the 
occupation of the islands as difficult as possible and cause as many casualties as possible.  This 
change in Filipino tactics was not immediately apparent to the US command.  Otis returned to 
the United States in May 1900 thinking he had won the war against the Philippine Revolutionary 
Army, but in fact, he left his replacement, General Arthur MacArthur, with an unchecked 
insurgency.
32
 
Under Otis‘ command, US military forces in the Philippines had two separate missions.  
First, was the defeat of the insurgent forces resisting US government sovereignty over the 
islands.  The second was governance operations designed to establish US sovereignty in practice 
throughout the islands.  The first mission was the primary mission of the US military and was an 
absolute requirement for the success of the second mission.    
Extending Military Government  
The US Army officially began combat operations against the Filipino revolutionaries on 
February 7, 1899.  Otis focused his initial military operations on Luzon.  Almost immediately 
after the outbreak of hostilities, he launched his forces north to destroy the revolutionary army.  
Through the spring of 1899, the Americans pursued and defeated the revolutionary forces 
throughout northern and southern Luzon.  By October of 1899, it appeared the campaign was 
over, and the Americans set about setting up a framework of government.  The army divided the 
Philippines into four geographic district commands:  Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayan, 
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and Mindanao and Jolo.
33
  Each command was responsible for establishing local government, 
with the district commander also serving as the area military governor.  Below the district level, 
subordinate military commanders became the military governors of towns and villages. 
The major challenge for the commanders of Northern and Southern Luzon districts was 
that while they were attempting to establish governance, the Philippine Revolutionary Army 
began a dedicated insurgent campaign.  This campaign complicated the governance task 
throughout 1900 and into the spring of 1901.  The army effectively eliminated resistance in 
Northern Luzon, by early 1901.  The capture of Philippine leader Aguinaldo in February 1901 
greatly contributed to the end of resistance in the north.  In Southern Luzon, the insurgents were 
not effectively pacified until the brutal Bentagas campaign led by Brigadier General Franklin 
Bell in the spring of 1902.  By the summer of 1902 Luzon, the center of resistance to American 
rule, was under the effective control of the American army and President Theodore Roosevelt 
declared the end of active military operations in the Philippines. 
American commanders recognized the relationship between their two mission tasks in the 
Philippines, pacify the country and establish governance.  The insurgents had to be subdued in 
order for the work of governance to progress satisfactorily.  To accomplish these two tasks the 
command under MacArthur pursued a two-pronged strategy.  One aspect of the strategy was the 
policy of chastisement.  This policy required the vigorous pursuit of guerrilla bands by the US 
Army.  The other aspect of the strategy was the policy of attraction.  The goal of this policy was 
to win the loyalty of the Filipino population through the demonstrated benefits of American 
governance. 
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Throughout most of 1900, the efforts of the American command to put their strategy in 
effect achieved only mixed results.  The policy of chastisement suffered partly because initially 
the command put priority on  the policy of attraction.
34
  Local government by Filipinos was a 
central tenant of the policy of attraction.
35
 As part of the attempt to reconcile with the insurgents, 
General MacArthur issued a general amnesty declaration in June 1900.  It elicited little response 
from the insurgents who were in the midst of escalating their guerrilla campaign.
36
  Throughout 
1900, commanders found it exceedingly difficult to establish local government.  There were 
several reasons for this.  Despite establishing over 550 separate outposts, commanders did not 
have the resources to impose American rule everywhere.
37
  A second reason was that not all 
commanders agreed that the Army‘s role should be to establish governance and therefore did not 
give the mission the priority it required.  Finally, and most important, the guerrillas used violence 
and intimidation to actively frustrate the integration of the local population into the American 
government scheme.  
The guerillas used a variety of methods to undermine American local governance and the 
policy of attraction.  The local guerrilla commanders established shadow governments that used 
intimidation as well as the appeal of nationalism to gain support from the local population.  The 
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shadow governments built upon the existing Philippine social structure of relationships.
38
  The 
leadership of the guerrillas was often well educated and had close personal ties to the local civil 
government leaders appointed by the Americans.  Sometimes the shadow government used the 
same villagers placed in leadership positions by the Americans.  This gave the guerillas 
phenomenal intelligence ability.  It also allowed the guerrillas to use the civil population for 
logistic support and sanctuary.  Insurgent control of the population facilitated continued attacks 
against American forces.  The guerrillas ruthlessly dealt with villages that hesitated to support 
them, and leaders that appeared to favor working with the Americans. 
The military governance mission, however, was not without some important successes in 
1900.  General Otis issued General Order No. 43 in 1899 directing commanding officers to 
establish municipal government as quickly as possible in all towns and villages under American 
control.  That order was followed in 1900 by General Order No. 40, which gave more detailed 
instructions on forming municipal organization in larger towns and cities.  Municipal 
organization occurred at a rapid pace throughout 1900.  The Philippine commission, upon 
activation of its legislative authority, incorporated the army municipal plans, with additional 
adjustments into Act No. 132 in 1901.  By the summer of 1901, over six hundred towns had 
functioning democratic municipal governments.
39
   
Education efforts expanded in 1900.  General MacArthur, like Otis, believed that 
educating Filipinos was a critical step in the governance process as well as integral to the anti-
guerrilla campaign.  Education, according to MacArthur, was ―an adjunct to military operations, 
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calculated to pacify the people and procure and expedite the restoration of tranquility throughout 
the archipelago.‖  Where Otis had encouraged schools, MacArthur more formally organized the 
educational effort under army Captain Albert Todd.  During 1900, Todd enrolled over 100,000 
students in almost one-thousand public schools, and distributed over $100,000 for school 
supplies and materials.
40
 
Another important step in the governance task was the organization of a pro-American 
political movement by Filipinos.  The establishment of the Federal Party represented this 
movement.  Filipino intellectuals, some who had favored the Americans since 1898 and others 
who were former insurgents, populated the party.  They organized the party formally in 
December 1900, and adopted a platform that unconditionally recognized US sovereignty while 
continuing to advocate for self-governance for the Philippines.  Throughout 1901, they were a 
key element in convincing insurgents to surrender and in continuing the organization of local and 
provincial government.
41
 
The counterinsurgency and governance missions did not achieve many noticeable 
successes in 1900, but that changed in 1901.  Several factors came together in the fall of 1900 
and the spring of 1901 that permitted the Americans to overcome the guerrilla hold on the 
population and gradually establish effective and loyal local government.  General MacArthur 
recognized that the campaign in early 1900 had put too much emphasis on attraction and not 
enough on security operations.
42
  The reelection of Republican President McKinley over anti-
imperialist Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryant in November 1900, eased pressure on 
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the command to avoid controversial battles and casualties. MacArthur determined to cut off the 
relationship between civilian supporters and insurgents.  He reissued the Civil War era General 
Order No. 100, which strictly regulated the behavior of civilians in time of war.  As the first 
American civil governor of the islands, Howard Taft, later reported, ―it ceased to be regarded as 
an innocent amusement to enjoy life within American garrisons and assist the guerrillas in the 
woods and mountains.‖43 McKinley‘s reelection was a severe blow to the strategy and the morale 
of the insurgents whose leadership had declared that a Democratic victory was certain and would 
force a change in US policy.  Finally, in March 1901 General Frederick Funston led a daring raid 
that captured the insurgent military and political leader Emilio Aguinaldo.
44
  These factors led to 
unprecedented surrenders by insurgent forces, particularly in northern Luzon. 
MacArthur‘s more aggressive military campaign destroyed most of the guerrilla 
capability by the summer of 1901.  All of northern Luzon, and much of southern Luzon was 
pacified, and  pacification enabled commanders to focus even more on effective local 
government.  The army pacified thirty of thirty-five provinces (the exceptions were Batangas, 
Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Mindoro) by the time of MacArthur‘s departure in the summer of 1901.  
As MacArthur left, the President appointed a civilian governor to replace him: William Howard 
Taft.  Governor Taft‘s priority was establishing civil government in the newly pacified regions.45  
During the two years when the army focused on operations in Luzon, it did not ignore the 
Visayan Islands.  The Visayan Islands were a mixed collection of quiet islands and islands 
harboring determined insurgents.  From the perspective of the command in Manila, it was a 
secondary theater.  Many of the islands had virtually no insurgent movements.  The Americans 
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governed the islands of Cebu and Negros with only slight and easily controlled interference from 
insurgents.  On the island of Panay, the insurgents fought fiercely and the army responded with 
an equally brutal counterinsurgency campaign led by the department commander General Robert 
Hughes.  By the end of 1900 the army completed the pacification of Panay.  The two remaining 
main islands were Leyte and Samar.  Governance and military operations on Samar, after it was 
determined that a significant insurgency existed, were set aside until after the pacification of 
Luzon.  Leyte however, was the focus of an extensive and successful counterinsurgent campaign 
that balanced strict military operations and punishment of insurgents and their supporters, with 
democratic municipal government, schools, and material aid in towns and villages that supported 
the Americans.  Major Henry T. Allen established himself as an effective administrator and 
combat leader in that campaign.  Another officer described Allen‘s strategy as ―treating the good 
man very well indeed and treating the bad man harshly.‖46 The majority of insurgents on Leyte 
surrendered by May 1901.
47
  Allen‘s abilities demonstrated in the campaign contributed to his 
later selection to organize and command the Philippine Constabulary —the new indigenous 
national police force. 
American operations in 1900 and 1901 in the Sulu Archipelago were relatively limited.  
They consisted primarily of garrisoning the island of Jolo as well as the coastal region of 
northern Mindanao.  The major population of the department was 300,000 Moro tribesmen.  The 
Moros were traditional enemies of the Christian Filipinos and were not part of the anti-American 
insurgency led by Aguinaldo and his lieutenants.  The Sultan of Sulu nominally governed the 
Moro population of the island of Jolo.  The army pacified this portion of the population through 
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the device of perpetuating the Spanish agreement with the Sultan.
48
  The problem of the 
Mindanao Moros was more complex because their location was more remote and they did not 
share allegiance to a single sultan.  The American solution to governing the northern Moro was 
relatively simple —ignore the problem until after the pacification of the Christian portions of the 
archipelago.
49
 
William Howard Taft arrived in the Philippines with the second Philippine Commission 
on June 1, 1900.  An earlier commission served in the islands in 1899 as a fact-finding 
organization  to make recommendations on policy to President McKinley.  The new second 
commission, headed by Taft, had a different purpose.  Taft‘s mission was to assume control of 
the governance task from the army and establish American civil government in the Philippines. 
The Americans accomplished this in two phases.  In September 1900 the Commission assumed 
legislative authority over the islands.  During this phase, executive power continued to reside 
with the military governor, General MacArthur.  Over the next two years, the Commission, in its 
legislative capacity, passed 449 laws.
50
  In the summer of 1901, as MacArthur departed, the 
president of the commission, Taft, took over executive responsibility from the army as well.  
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General MacArthur‘s replacement, General Adna Chaffee, veteran of  Reconstruction, the 
frontier and Cuba, became the commander of the Philippine Division.  Chaffee reported directly 
to the Secretary of War, as did Taft, and had the mission of supporting Taft and the governance 
mission.  On July 4, 1902, coinciding with President Roosevelt‘s declaration of the end of 
hostilities, the Philippine Commission reorganized under the general provincial government plan.  
As Governor Taft described it, ―all the territory occupied by the Christian Filipinos, except a 
small district of Dapitan, the town of Zamboanga, the town of Cottabato, and the town of Davao, 
all in the island of Mindanao, was brought under civil government.‖51  As of the summer of 
1902, the only responsibility the army had for governance in the northern islands was to support 
the civil constabulary when called upon.  However, the army continued to have significant 
responsibilities for governance in the southern islands. 
The Moro Era 
The army and the Philippine Commission addressed the Moro population of the 
Philippines in a manner completely different from the policies enforced with the Christian 
population.  The American Congress, while approving increased Filipino participation in 
governance and ultimately a Philippine Assembly, was skeptical of placing the non-Christian 
Filipinos under the control of the Christians.  Thus, throughout the first decade of American 
governance, the largest non-Christian population, the Moros, remained exclusively under the 
supervision of the Philippine Commission, and largely, the army.
52
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The Philippine Commission understood that with the cessation of insurrection and the 
beginning of American civil rule in 1902, it was necessary to confront the control of the Moros 
issue.  The Americans could not indefinitely neglect policy toward the Moro because of the 
Moro practice of slavery and their proclivity to raiding and piracy.  The Americans all agreed 
that the practices had to be terminated.  However, differences existed between the Americans in 
regards to strategy.  Two camps existed:  one advocated a ―soft‖ approach that envisioned 
outlawing slavery, purchasing the freedom of existing slaves, and curbing piracy and raiding 
through alliances with the Sultan of Sulu and important datus on Mindanao.  Taft articulated that 
strategy in 1901 when he indicated that ―if…the taking or acquiring of new slaves is prevented, 
the question will settle itself in a generation without bloodshed or the bitterness necessarily 
engendered by an armed strife.‖53 Most army officers concurred with this view. The other, 
―hard,‖ strategy advocated using the army to free existing slaves, disarm the tribes, and arrest 
any group or individual who resisted or persisted in raiding and piracy.   
The areas that were not incorporated into the civil structure established by the Philippine 
Commission in July 1902 were the largely Moro inhabited region of the Sulu archipelago.  This 
included the important islands of Jolo and Mindanao.  This area remained without a Filipino 
province governor and was controlled by the commander of the 7
th
 Separate Army Brigade.  In 
April 1902, President Roosevelt gave very specific instructions to the War Department that 
violence would be an absolute last resort in relations with the Moros.
54
  Governor Taft 
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considered the Moro issue too difficult to tackle given the problems facing the Americans 
building governance in the rest of the islands: 
Meanwhile, I think it is wiser on the part of the Commission to postpone the 
consideration of the Moro question until we have passed legislation to meet needs 
that are more pressing throughout the northern part of these possessions of the 
United States.  For a great many years to come there will be no question of 
popular government in the Moro country; the Moros do not understand popular 
government, do not desire it, and are entirely content with control of their dattos.
55
   
Taft was uncomfortable with the Moros.  In his three years in the Philippines, he only visited the 
southern islands once.  The Muslim tribesmen‘s culture was alien to the Americans and living 
conditions in the district were harsh.  The lack of an educated Christian Filipino cadre upon 
which to build an indigenous administration made the prospects of quick progress in the district 
unlikely. Thus, the Philippine Commission largely focused its attention on the northern islands, 
and the southern Philippines remained a uniquely army problem. 
During the insurrection period, to 1901, a series of officers commanded the army military 
district of Mindanao and Jolo and took a low-key approach to the Moro issue.  Guided by the 
Bates Agreement, which left Moro upon Moro issues to the resolution of the Sultan of Sulu and 
the datus, and limited by military resources, the various commanders were content to curb piracy 
and raiding, eliminate such small elements of the Philippine Revolutionary Army that existed, 
and protect the non-Moro pagan tribes from exploitation.
56
  The only situation where the Moros 
directly confronted the Americans and the US Army was on Mindanao in 1902, when the army 
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attempted to open access into the interior of the island and the Lake Lanao region.  This task 
entailed significant engineering and military challenges.
57
 
Efforts to open access to the Lake Lanao region were achieving only marginal success 
until the department commander, General George W. Davis, turned the operations over to 
Captain John J. Pershing, the commander of the garrison at Iligan on the north coast of the island 
of Mindanao.  Davis gave Pershing, who for the previous two years  served as adjutant of the 
Department of Mindanao and Jolo, the mission of establishing an American presence in the 
interior of the island on the north shore of Lake Lanao.  Pershing determined not to march into 
the interior unannounced, but rather to talk to and solicit the cooperation of the datus in the area.  
Over several months, from November 1901 to February 1902, Pershing consulted with, 
negotiated with, rewarded, and cajoled the datus into supporting the movement of American 
troops into the region.  On February 16, 1902, one of the more powerful Datus invited Pershing 
to visit the lake region.  Pershing completed this dangerous mission accompanied by just his 
interpreter and three scouts.  The mission opened the way for pacification of the northern lake 
area with almost no violence.
58
 Because of his success, Davis, with General Chaffee‘s support 
and approval, gave Pershing operational control of all American units in the Lake Lanao region, 
even though he was only a captain. 
Pershing could not persuade all the datus to tolerate the American presence.  Under these 
circumstances, Pershing was willing to fight.  This happened in the spring of 1903 when 
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Pershing reported to his commanders that attacks against Americans were escalating.  Pershing 
recommended, ―we should…punish some of these renegades, it will help us very much in the 
pending peace negotiations and bring openly to our support many Moros who yet cling to what 
appears to them to be the stronger side.‖59   Using the strategy of persuasion backed by force, 
Captain Pershing was able to gain American access to the interior of Mindanao and the Lake 
Lanao region, establish relations with all the important tribes and datu, and gained recognition of 
US sovereignty with a minimum of fighting.
60
 Pershing‘s success with a minimum of fighting 
brought him the first widespread recognition of his career and included messages of 
congratulation from the Secretary of War.
61
 Pershing‘s success was due to his willingness to 
work with the native leadership to achieve as much as possible.  The Moros were a warrior 
culture and they respected him because he was willing to take risk, demonstrated personal 
bravery, respected their cultural values, and fought when necessary.  Pershing also took the time 
to learn the native language and was willing to operate to the extent possible, within the same 
cultural framework of the Moros. Pershing‘s approach reflected his long service among Indians 
on the frontier.  In an unprecedented sign of respect the Moro leaders appointed Pershing an 
honorary datu.
62
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In 1903, the Philippine Commission considered all of the Philippines pacified, and 
instituted rule through Filipino and American civilian provincial governors appointed by the civil 
government.  The only significant exception was the Sulu archipelago, for which the Philippine 
Commission created a special law.  This law, among other special provisions, permitted army 
officers to hold the position of governor of the Moro Province.
63
 Pershing returned to the United 
States in July 1903, and did not serve under the new commander, Brigadier General Leonard 
Wood, who arrived in Moro Province in August 1903.  Wood was the first officer to serve as 
both the governor of Moro Province and the military commander of all forces in the military 
Department of Jolo and Mindanao.  
Leonard Wood came to the Philippines from the highly successful military governorship 
of Cuba.  He arrived in the midst of campaigning for his permanent promotion to major 
general.
64
 General Wood was the governor of Moro Province from 1903 to 1906.  Though 
initially promised command of the entire Philippine Division, his orders changed and he would 
not gain that command for three years.  The army promoted Wood to permanent major general in 
March 1904, despite his perceived lack of qualifications.  Wood was not happy with his 
assignment or with the struggle over his promotion to major general, and complained about it 
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bitterly directly to the President.
65
  Wood‘s career qualifications, and the criticism the promotion 
process highlighted, affected his strategy for dealing with the Moro issue.
66
 
General Wood approached the Moro situation much more aggressively than any of the 
previous Army commanders . All of Wood‘s predecessors in the Southern Philippines, Generals 
George Davis, Samuel S. Sumner, and William A. Kobbe, and Captain Pershing, had extensive 
frontier experience.  They all consciously or intuitively understood that they could not bend 
Moro culture  to an American model of governance.  They agreed that civil governance of the 
Moro had to be a balance of force and gradual cultural adaptation.  As General Chaffee indicated 
in 1902, ―Probably no civil process can be enforced in Moro communities for a long time 
without the presence of a military force adequate to the occasion, whatever that may be.‖  In 
1903, General Sumner commented, ―For the present at least military control seems about the 
most practical government for the Moros… it seems to be the general opinion that we should 
control them through their sultan and datos.  We can not assume complete personal supervision, 
and to remove their natural leaders and leave them without any control would add to, rather than 
decrease the already existing anarchy… by careful and just management the way may be 
gradually opened for some form of civil government at a later day.‖67  General Wood had no 
tolerance for a gradual approach, did not respect the authority of the datus, and planned to force 
the American civil process directly on the individual tribesmen. 
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Wood determined to interject the American colonial government into the internal affairs 
of the Moro by force.  He intended to establish American authority and establish his reputation 
as a fighting general.
68
  His major focus was the elimination of slavery and raiding, and breaking 
the governing influence of the datu.  He also attempted to directly tax the individual Moros.  To 
pursue this strategy Wood had to eliminate the Bates Agreement between the US government 
and the Sultan of Sulu.  Within a few months of arriving in the Philippines he convinced 
Governor Taft that the Sultan had not kept his part of the agreement and that justified its 
unilateral abrogation.  President Roosevelt supported the policy, which freed Wood to pursue his 
own governance strategy throughout the province.
69
 
For three years General Wood used the force of the American army to impose his will on 
the Moros.  He mounted numerous major expeditions against various datus on both Mindanao 
and Jolo.  Often these campaigns resulted in hundreds of American troops deploying and 
marching through the jungles without any decisive effect.  Occasionally, an outlaw datu and his 
band were cornered and a sharp fight resulted.  After each campaign Wood declared success and 
sent the US troops back to their barracks leaving the surviving Moros in the area alienated and 
hostile, and without really reducing the Moro capability or will to resist.  Wood then left his 
subordinate district governors with the responsibility of trying to govern a hostile population. 
Wood‘s tenure as governor of Moro Province culminated with the battle of Bud Dajo on 
the island of Jolo in March 1906.  In that battle, tax-resisting Moros suffered between 600 and 
800 killed.  Estimates indicated that more than two-thirds of the Moro dead were women and 
children. Wood‘s troops suffered eighteen killed and fifty-two wounded.  These were high 
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casualties for military operations after 1902.  Wood declared the fight a great military victory 
and the highlight of his military career.  In the opinion of other army officers, it was an 
unnecessary and poorly conducted battle that did nothing to advance the American cause in the 
Southern Philippines.  Critics derided Wood in Congress and his career hung in the balance.  It 
was largely through the positive testimony of his former subordinate and known friend of the 
Moro, Major Hugh Scott, that Wood escaped any adverse effects on his career.
70
  The victory at 
Bud Dajo permitted Wood to declare his policy of using force to impress American control on 
the Moro a success.  It was his last significant action as the governor of the province, and at the 
end of March 1903, Wood departed for Manila and his new assignment as commander of the 
Philippine Division.   
After Wood‘s departure major military operations against the Moro ceased and the datu 
continued in their traditional role as tribal leaders.  Wood‘s replacement as the governor of Moro 
Province was his former subordinate in the Cuban command, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss.
71
 
Bliss entered his new position with great hopes for progress in the Moro province.  However, 
after his initial optimism, Bliss realized that the complex situation had no easy or quick solution.  
Bliss understood that in the Moro he was dealing with not only a religious ideology, but also a 
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complex tribal culture.  His analysis that ―the Moros are in a state of savagery where they know a 
man but know or care nothing about a government‖ was accurate.  However, unlike Pershing and 
Bliss‘s West Point classmate, Hugh Scott, Bliss did not have the benefit of years of experience 
on the American frontier that allowed him to appreciate the Moro leaders within the context of 
their own culture.  Understanding the issues and making progress in over-coming them are two 
different things.  Major Peter Borseth, who reported directly to Bliss as a district governor, 
described Bliss‘s policy in the almost three years he was in command: 
The governor and department commander General Bliss is gradually transferring 
the onus of maintaining peace more and more upon the shoulders of the 
constabulary; and even when active hostilities are afoot in Lanao, the military 
almost invariably act in support of the constabulary (if they take the field at all), 
and the latter have consistently borne the brunt of any opposition shown by the 
outlaws.
72
  
Bliss consistently emphasized that force was the tool of last resort, but insisted that there would 
be no backsliding on the acquiescence to American rule achieved by his predecessor.  Thus, 
Bliss opposed the reduction of American army garrisons in the province while at the same time 
eschewing their employment.  The Philippine constabulary was Bliss‘s tool of choice and he 
employed it often throughout his almost three years of governance.
73
  Like many previous 
commanders, Bliss believed that American policy in the Moro province had to be low-key.  Bliss 
recognized that since the issues could not be resolved quickly, his best course was to keep the 
peace and let the relationship of the Moro to the government gradually evolve.  In his report of 
1908, Bliss stated that ―Peace has been preserved by letting him [the Moro] alone and at the 
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same time letting him see some of the evidences of the Government‘s power.‖74 When Bliss left 
the province in January 1909, with the exception of some progress in building roads and school 
enrollment, it was essentially in the same condition as when he inherited it in 1906.  Bliss did 
however, avoid large scale confrontation between the Moro and the army. 
The last and most effective military governor of the Moro was Brigadier General John 
Pershing.  Pershing was surprised when he returned to the Department of Mindanao and Jolo in 
November 1909 that he was not received as enthusiastically upon his return as when he left.  The 
esteem Moros had for Americans had eroded significantly in the six years since he left in 1903.  
Despite his unease with where he was starting, Pershing‘s more than three year assignment as the 
governor of Moro province would advance the agenda of the American government 
significantly.  Pershing determined to firmly assert American rule in the province by disarming 
the Moros.  He also had as an objective the transition of the province from military to civil rule.
75
 
The policy of disarming the Moro warriors dramatically changed the nature of 
government‘s relationship to the tribesmen.  The only thing more central to the Moro culture and 
self-identity than Islam was the Moro warrior‘s weapon.76  Pershing announced his policy to 
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disarm the Moro warriors in September 1911 and allowed three months for the turn in of all 
weapons.  His ban on weapons not only included firearms, but also all edged weapons.  
Collecting the weapons of the Moros was difficult.  By December, it was obvious that few Moro 
were willing to turn over their weapons.  Thus, confiscating weapons became a major focus of 
police and army action and largely defined the remaining two years of Pershing tenure as 
governor.   
The weapons issue gave Pershing a reason to confront datus who continued to oppose 
American governance.  The weapons issue attacked the datu system in two ways.  Those datus 
who nominally complied, even if they in fact hid many weapons from the Americans, lost 
prestige in that they publically acknowledged American authority and did not resist.  For 
example, the Sultan of Sulu submitted to the weapons ban, further reducing his diminished 
authority. The datus who actively resisted compliance opened themselves to attack by the army. 
In 1912 and 1913 Pershing led campaigns against Moros resisting the disarmament decree.
 77
   
Throughout the disarming campaign Pershing demonstrated an ability to adroitly mix 
negotiations with force to achieve acquiescence without significant casualties.  Like Bliss, he 
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also used a minimum of force and relied on native Philippine Scout army units and the Philippine 
Constabulary rather than US troops.
78
   
  The disarming of the Moro, though incomplete when Pershing left in the fall of 1913, 
dramatically changed  the nature of the relationship between the Americans and the Moro.  
Pershing engineered another dramatic change during his time as governor of Moro province.  
Quietly, over time, Pershing replaced his district governors with civilians or constabulary 
officers, and completely removed army officers from roles with the civil administration of the 
province.  Pershing also moved American army troops out of the province and replaced them 
with native Philippine Scout companies officered by Americans.  By the summer of 1913, all the 
province level officials were civilians.  Thus, when Pershing officially departed in September 
1913, his replacement as the province governor was a civilian civil servant of the Philippine 
Commission.  Pershing‘s departure ended the fifteen-year army role in governing of Philippine 
Islands. 
A Defining Experience 
Operations in the Philippines validated the importance of ideas and concepts regarding 
occupation operations learned in previous experiences:  building democracy, law and order, 
education, respect for local institutions and culture, the primacy of civil policy, and the transition 
to civil rule.  Because of US annexation of the islands and the resistance to that annexation, 
building democratic institutions in the Philippines did not follow the same model as previous 
occupation operations.  Still, there was an early emphasis on elections at the local level.  The 
priority placed on law and order created the emphasis on legal reform.  Unlike Cuba, however, 
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early significant involvement of Filipino jurists in the reform process gave the reforms 
legitimacy.  Army priority to schooling contributed to the long-term legitimacy of American 
governance while at the same time undermined the legitimacy of the Philippine insurrectionists 
in the short term.  While attempting to establish American governance, authorities worked 
patiently within the bounds of local traditions.  The relationship between the army and the Moros 
illustrated the careful balance the army sought between local customs and the needs of 
governance.   A major driver of Philippine policy was US domestic politics.  In the long term, 
the lack of significant domestic support for a US colony in the Philippines led to steady transition 
of governance from American to Filipino control ultimately culminating in a plan for Philippine 
independence in 1944.  Finally, the desire for a quick transition to civil rule strongly influenced 
the occupation.  The army relinquished executive control of the occupation to civil governor 
Howard Taft in 1901, a full year before President Roosevelt declared military operations against 
Filipino insurgents complete.  Because there was no domestic pressure to quickly quit operations 
in the Philippines, army governance continued in the islands is some form for fifteen years.  The 
characteristics of the occupation, combined with the length of time that the army influenced 
events, allowed many of the characteristics of American occupation to have a lasting influence 
on the islands and contributed to the Philippines relative political success over the course of the 
twentieth century. 
During the course of the army‘s experience in governing the Philippines, 1898 to 1913, 
five important commanders carried the title of military governor:  Elwell Otis, Arthur 
MacArthur, Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and John Pershing.  The first two governors had 
responsibility for the entire archipelago and its more than seven million residents.  They also had 
responsibility for waging an intense conventional and guerrilla war against a skilled and 
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determined enemy.  The latter three governors had the more limited responsibility of direct 
governance of the Sulu Archipelago and the island of Mindanao.  Otis operated for five months 
with almost no specific guidance from Washington.  Later, civil control and guidance gradually 
increased though the Philippine Commission was never deeply involved in the affairs of the 
Moro Province.  The governance efforts of the first two commanders, despite the challenges of 
continually fighting insurgents, were successful.  The efforts of Wood and Bliss, despite a 
smaller area, smaller population, longer tenure, and only nominal organized military resistance, 
were less influential.  Pershing, the last military governor, demonstrated an ability to patiently 
use force and negotiation to create the conditions for the transition to civil control of the Moro 
province. 
Otis and MacArthur were successful for several reasons.  First, they had the support of 
the entire US government and the US Army behind their efforts,  including the dedicated support 
of the Philippine Commission.  Though both commanders resented civilian intrusion by the 
commission on their prerogatives of command, the commission, especially once it began to 
exercise its legislative function in September 1900, ensured that there was a constant and serious 
focus on the problems of governance, regardless of the military situation.  The commission also, 
by purposely identifying itself as a civil institution not controlled by the military, was able to 
disassociate itself with military operations and establish legitimacy as a governing organization 
separate from the military.  Finally, both early military governors, Otis and MacArthur, were 
extremely talented in the areas of administration and law.  They also had frontier experience, and 
MacArthur had Reconstruction experience as well.  Additionally, MacArthur had an unusually 
strong academic interest in Asian affairs.  Their military experiences and academic interests gave 
both officers an understanding of the larger, long-term strategic interests of the United States, the 
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mission of the army, the nature of the environment, and the type of policies necessary to shape 
the Philippines into a strategic ally of the United States.
79
  The early years of military 
government set the tone for subsequent successful government by the Philippine Commission.  
The military governors established the Philippine legal system, created police forces, created the 
school system, designed and supervised local democratic government, and encouraged and 
supervised local infrastructure improvements.  They accomplished this while fighting and 
defeating a skillful and numerous native insurgency.  The quick transition to civil governance 
under Governor Taft in 1901, and the important requirement to defeat the Filipino insurgents 
prevented either of the military governors from focusing on economic issues.  The military 
governors left the task of creating an indigenous Filipino national governing apparatus to the 
American civil governor.  Still, in just three years both Otis and MacArthur, despite their 
individual shortcomings, demonstrated the strategic vision necessary for success. 
Operating on a smaller scale, Generals Wood and Bliss brought a different focus to their 
terms as military governors of the Moro Province.  Wood saw the position of military governor 
as an opportunity to make up for the lack of combat experience in his military qualifications.  
Thus, his relationship with the Moros was confrontational.  He showed none of the institution-
building drive that he demonstrated in Cuba.  Bliss, on the other hand, was not a field soldier and 
showed no inclination to be a field soldier.  To make changes or advance an agenda in the Moro 
Province required time in the field engaging in dialog with Moro leaders and the people. Despite 
a keen intellect, Bliss was content to spend most of his time in his comfortable headquarters and 
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allow his subordinates to deal with Moro issues as they arose. The net result of both Wood and 
Bliss‘s six-year tenure was no significant positive change in the Moro situation. 
John Pershing demonstrated himself to be both a highly competent combat soldier as well 
as an effective administrator.  He recognized that little progress had occurred in the Moro 
province.  He also understood that even with three years in office, his ability to effect change 
during his tenure was limited.
80
  Still, he achieved important results as military governor on his 
own initiative —the Philippine Commission did not direct disarmament.  This policy, though it 
was never completely effective and caused several large-scale violent confrontations between the 
army and various datus, was the first necessary step toward bringing the province under civil 
control.  Thus, though little else changed under Pershing‘s tenure, the disarmament policy was 
the cornerstone of future governance efforts in the province.  Disarmament of the Moros was the 
reason that Pershing was the last military governor in the Philippines and subsequent issues with 
Moro resistance were successfully resolved as police incidents. 
Colonel Bentley Mott served in the military government of the Philippines under both 
General MacArthur and Governor Taft.  Thirty years afterward he reflected on the importance of 
Philippine service to the American army officer corps: 
Our occupation of Cuba during the years following 1898, and the Philippine 
insurrection of about the same date, had a profound influence upon the 
commissioned personnel.  Service in these distant islands taught our officers 
nothing about the conduct of operations in a great war, but they had new problems 
and big responsibilities thrust upon them and as a character-forming school 
nothing could have been better for the generation of men who became the 
instructors of our army in 1917 and occupied most of the important posts in the 
oversea forces.  What service in Africa did for Joffre and Mangin and Gouraud 
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and Gallieni, service in Cuba and the Philippines did for Pershing, Funston, 
Wood, Bell, McCoy, Harbord, Bundy, Bullard, and hundreds of others.
81
 
The hundreds of others that Mott refers to included a host of junior officers who served in World 
War I, and continued to prominent positions after the war.   
The Philippines, from 1898 to 1913, was a complex military melting pot where the 
experiences of what historian Edward M. Coffman called ―The Old Army‖ of the frontier mixed 
with the young blood of Coffman‘s new generation of twentieth-century ―Regulars.‖  In the 
jungles, swamps, officer‘s mess, on the island steamers, and the polo fields of the Philippines, 
the experiences of the American frontier and Reconstruction mixed with the new experience of 
American military government in Asia, and passed to the men who would lead the American 
army through the first half of the twentieth century. Among the young officers serving their first 
army assignment in the Philippines was Lieutenant George Marshall who arrived on the island of 
Mindoro in the spring of 1902.  Marshall, assigned to the 13
th
 Infantry Regiment, spent 
considerable time among the local Philippine people in command of a small detachment of 
troops.  In that experience he saw firsthand soldiers teaching school to young Filipino children, 
chasing bandits, and interacting with local Filipino leaders.
82
 In 1903 another young army 
lieutenant arrived in the Philippines. Second Lieutenant of Engineers Douglas MacArthur spent 
his two year tour supervising the building of roads and harbor facilities vital to the economic 
growth of the islands, and worked closely with the Philippine Constabulary.
83
 Among the 
officers who served in the islands in the years after the Philippine War and before World War I, 
were every future Chief of Staff of the army from 1921 to 1945.  Every American theater 
commander in World War II had experience serving with the American forces that remained in 
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the Philippines after the governance mission was complete.  Before the next generation of 
soldiers took the reins of the army, however, the Philippine veterans had several important 
challenges to meet.  As General Pershing left the Philippines in September 1913, turmoil reigned 
across America‘s southern border with Mexico, and Europe was in the midst of unprecedented 
unrest.  
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CHAPTER 6 - Occupation and World War, 1914–1923 
 
Through the first two decades of the twentieth century, the practice of military 
government operations became central to the experience of many young army officers.  It was 
the rare career officer who did not have practical experience with some aspect of civil affairs.  
Cuba and the Philippines were the two major government operations in terms of duration and 
size of the military effort.  Less well known was the relatively quiet role the army played in 
Puerto Rico.  Also important, and a major event in American foreign policy before World War I, 
was the temporary occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico.  In many ways, the most important and 
unique operation was the American participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World 
War I.  The occupation of Vera Cruz continued to demonstrate the pattern of American military 
occupation operations as the command focused on health and sanitation, education, and law and 
order. The occupation of the Rhineland after World War I was the American army‘s first 
experience with occupation of a fully developed civilian society.  The Rhineland experience was 
also unique because it was the first experience the army had with occupation operations as part 
of a coalition of allied nations.  In the Rhineland the army adapted its traditional pattern to the 
new unique circumstances eliminating aspects of the occupation model which did not apply.  
Thus, in the Rhineland there was little emphasis on democratization and education.  The army 
governed indirectly through the existing German bureaucracy.  The command, however, 
remained focused on law and order, and sanitation and health.  Additionally, the Rhineland also 
continued to demonstrate the close linkage between American domestic political policy and 
occupation operations.   
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By 1914, the army officer corps was thoroughly inculcated to the idea of army officers 
not just serving as military governors, but also conducting the myriad of tasks associated with 
government:  writing laws and constitutions, administering justice, collecting and dispensing 
revenue, policing, managing health and sanitation, building roads and railroads, and managing 
education and economic development.  The military governor was merely one, albeit the highest, 
level of civil military responsibility  The military governor was the civil military equivalent of 
the commander and success in that position carried with it the career making influence of 
command in war.  Beginning in 1903 with the first officer to serve as Chief of Staff of the Army, 
General Samuel B. Young, each of the subsequent chiefs until 1926, had substantial experience 
as a military governor or as a key military government staff officer.  Most had multiple 
experiences.
1
 This is indicative of two attitudes toward the position of military governor in the 
American army:  first, that the position had the requisite responsibility and authority to qualify an 
officer for higher command; and second, that the army assigned only the very best officers to the 
position of military governor.  The army continued this pattern in 1914 by assigning Major 
General Frederick Funston, probably the most promising general officer in the army at the time, 
to command the American occupation of the Mexican city of Vera Cruz in 1914.
2
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Vera Cruz, 1914  
The occupation of Vera Cruz was one of the most prominent and aggressive actions that 
the American government took in regards to Mexico during the decade of the Mexican 
Revolution from 1910 to 1920.  In 1913, Victoriano Huerta and his followers murdered President 
Madero and Vice-President Suarez.  The Taft Administration, defeated in the election of 1912 by 
Democrat Woodrow Wilson, did not recognize the Huerta regime despite the urging of the 
American Ambassador, and left the problem of Mexican relations to the new President.
3
  
President Wilson established a policy of non-recognition of governments that obtained power by 
unconstitutional means, refused to recognize the Huerta regime, and demanded the protection of  
US property and citizens in Mexico  A confrontation between Mexican authorities and the US 
Navy in Tampico, Mexico, led to the apprehension of several US sailors by Mexican soldiers.  
Though the sailors were quickly released, the Congress authorized President Wilson to impose 
an arms blockade against the Mexican government in reprisal.
4
 
Initial Operations 
Almost simultaneous with the approval for action by Congress, the Americans became 
aware of a German ship carrying arms for Huerta, and bound for the Mexican port of Vera Cruz, 
the most important port controlled by the Huerta government. The Navy ordered Admiral Frank 
F. Fletcher, commander of naval forces in Mexican waters, to seize the customs house and port 
facilities of the city  to prevent off-loading the weapons.  On April 21, 1914, over 700 sailors and 
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Marines disembarked from naval ships and landed in Vera Cruz unopposed.  The Mexican 
military forces in the city chose not to resist and evacuated the city.  The American forces 
secured the immediate port facilities and then moved to secure other key locations in the city 
including the telegraph office, cable office, post office, the railroad yards, and the Mexican naval 
school.  During the first night, Admiral Charles J. Badger, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic 
Fleet, reinforced the forces in the city, bringing the total Marines and sailors ashore to 
approximately 6,000.  The force ashore was under the command of Marine Colonel F.N. Waller 
who had made his combat reputation in the brutal fighting against Philippine insurgents on the 
island of Samar.  In the first three days ashore, the Americans consolidated their position, created 
a continuous perimeter, secured the water pumping station, and cleared out armed resistance 
within the areas they controlled.  Meanwhile, the army assembled the Fifth Separate Brigade 
under Brigadier General Frederick Funston, at Galveston, Texas, for movement to Vera Cruz.
5
 
The War Department alerted General Funston and his brigade for movement to Vera 
Cruz on April 23, 1914.
6
  His orders were to ―relieve the Navy of its duties ashore incident to the 
occupation and control of the city of Vera Cruz and its environs.‖7 The purpose of Funston‘s 
operation was to put pressure on Huerta and his government to either reform or resign by cutting 
the Huerta government off from its source of imported arms and the revenues of the city‘s 
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customs house.
8
  For this purpose Funston had the over 4,000 soldiers of the army‘s Fifth 
Brigade, as well as 3,052 men of the First Marine Brigade.    The total force commanded by 
Funston was over 7,000 troops.  Funston‘s brigade disembarked at Vera Cruz on April 28, and he 
formally took command of all forces ashore on April 30.  He also took responsibility for the 
city‘s 40,000 inhabitants. His immediate supervisor was General Tasker Bliss, commander of the 
Southern Department.  In reality, he reported directly to the War Department and took his orders 
directly from the Secretary of War and the President. 
Conduct of the Occupation 
When the navy initially occupied the city, the navy command quickly became aware of a 
Mexican law that prohibited Mexican citizens from lending aid to an occupying power.  This 
prevented the navy from administering the city as planned, through the existing city officials.  In 
response, Admiral Fletcher declared martial law and established an American civil government, 
appointing American civilians residing in Vera Cruz to various positions.  General Funston 
inherited this situation from the admiral and continued to occupy the city with the American civil 
government in place.  The Wilson Administration soon decided, however, that a pure military 
government was more appropriate to the situation in Vera Cruz, and General Funston assumed 
the position of governor as well as that of military commander.  Military officers assumed 
control of all municipal government functions.  Funston noted that ―The fact that Army officers 
were available, who could speak and read Spanish and had acquired a knowledge of Spanish law 
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and administration in similar work in the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico and elsewhere, 
simplified what would otherwise have been an almost impossible situation.‖9 
With no Mexican civil officials willing to work for the Americans, Funston was free to 
establish the military government as he thought best.  His guidance to his staff was that ―The 
Government hereby established will continue the system which the people of Vera Cruz are 
accustomed to in so far as is consistent with military control.‖  General Funston proclaimed 
himself the Military Governor, and appointed an officer in charge of civil affairs.  That officer, a 
member of the Judge Advocate Corps (JAG), served as the primary advisor to the governor on 
civil affairs and as the commander‘s legal advisor.  Funston also appointed a provost marshal 
who, as in Manila under army occupation, was responsible for most municipal government 
functions.  Funston designated a variety of other civil administrators necessary to control and 
administer the city effectively including an administrator of customs (a naval officer), post 
master (American civilian of the US Postal Service), and a treasurer (an army officer).
10
 
By 1914, the army was expert at operating in former Spanish colonies and in tropic 
climates.  The army, as an institution, understood from its experience, the absolute importance of 
sanitation and this subject was of prime concern to General Funston.  By Mexican standards, 
Vera Cruz was a typical city, but by American standards, it was a filthy epidemic waiting to 
happen.  There were numerous opportunities for disease.  The city‘s market place was 
uncontrolled, dirty, and infested with flies and other insects.  The city garbage disposal system 
was virtually nonexistent and relied on vultures and wild dogs to remove waste.  No sewer 
system existed in much of the city, and what did exist was in poor repair.  Mosquitoes carrying 
malaria were common and tolerated.  Other diseases including tuberculosis, cerebral-meningitis, 
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malaria, and dysentery were also common throughout the city.  The water supply, though 
potable, was inadequate for the size of the population.
11
 
Against the city‘s challenges, the army put its very knowledgeable medical corps, its 
considerable experience in equally squalid conditions in Cuba and the Philippines, and its very 
complete sanitation regulations.  The navy brought two doctors of the US Public Health Service 
to Vera Cruz specifically to use their ―expert knowledge of public-health matters …in organizing 
and operating the health department of the city.‖ The Americans vaccinated the population, 
attacked the problems of mosquitoes and flies, repaired the sewage system, expanded the water 
supply, created a garbage collection system, and rebuilt and eliminated the unsanitary conditions 
in the public markets.
12
  By the end of the seven month American occupation, Vera Cruz was 
easily the healthiest city in Mexico and probably all of Latin America. 
Funston paid for the operation of the city government, with the exception of $40,000 
allocated by Congress for sanitation improvements, through the operation of the municipal, state, 
and federal tax laws of Mexico.  The army collected the taxes that would normally be due the 
Mexican government and applied them to the costs of operating the city.  The American presence 
reduced the city‘s overall tax income because the Americans banned bull fighting, cock fighting, 
and gambling which were important sources of Mexican government revenue.  The American 
presence also reduced the amount of imports moving through the port and thus import taxes paid 
to the revenue house.  Still, by carefully moving money between the local, state, and national 
revenue accounts, and by eliminating corruption, the military government was able to meet all 
expenses without special support from Congress.
13
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Policing and the rule of law in the occupied territory were essential to the peaceful 
occupation of the city, the coexistence of the military and civil population, and to the resumption 
of civil life under occupation. The Americans organized two police forces to enforce order in the 
city.  The first was a municipal police force, which the brigade had to recruit, equip and train 
from among the Mexican population because the original city police disbanded upon the arrival 
of the Americans.  The role of the municipal police was purely to police the civilian population. 
Theft was the primary crime that occupied police activity. Backing up the municipal police was a 
provost guard of three companies of Marines and a battalion of army infantry.   The provost 
guard also had the responsibility of policing major disturbances and all incidents that involved 
US military personnel.
14
 
Because Mexican officials would not cooperate with the occupation, Funston ordered the 
military government to establish military courts.  The intent was that the military would only 
operate criminal courts.  Army and Marine officers presided over the courts.  The army did not 
hear civil court cases, but did arbitrate civil disputes.  During the course of the occupation there 
was very little need for criminal trials, but the army adjudicated over 3,000 civil disputes and 
over 6,000 financial claims.  In all cases, army lawyers and officers conducted legal proceedings 
―under the letter and spirit of the Mexican law.‖15 
Several other issues were important for the military government to deal with.  One was an 
initial food shortage that occurred as the occupation began.  The Mexican forces surrounding the 
city turned back supplies of food meant for the city markets.  In response, the military governor 
eliminated import duties on food products.  This eased importing food and eventually resolved 
shortages.  The other issue that was unique to the Vera Cruz occupation was a large number of 
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refugees, at times more than 15,000, who entered the city to escape pursuing revolutionary 
military forces.  Over the course of the occupation, civilian ship lines transported an average of 
2,000 refugees a month from Vera Cruz, mostly to the United States.  A final issue was the city 
school system.  The military government cajoled Mexican teachers back to their jobs and 
encouraged children to go to school.  It also helped to establish a teacher‘s school in the city that 
operated during the annual school vacation.  More children attended Vera Cruz‘s public schools 
when the Americans left the city, than before US forces landed.
16
 
An aspect of the occupation that greatly eased the challenge that the army and Marine 
forces faced, was the general lack of interference by Mexican military forces.  Mexican officers 
took a cordial and appropriately courteous tone dealing with their American counter-parts.  
Under those positive conditions, officers worked out numerous small agreements to smooth the 
occupation operations and lessen the impact on the civil population.  Examples of this included 
the resumption of mail service to and from Vera Cruz through the military lines, and the 
resumption of train service between Vera Cruz and Mexico City.  During the entire seven-month 
occupation, after the initial fighting, there was only one case of conflict between the American 
and Mexican forces and neither side incurred casualties.
17
 
Resolution of the Crisis 
Mexican President Huerta lost control of the Mexican government in September 1914, 
and the Americans immediately made plans to withdraw from Vera Cruz.  However, it took more 
than two months to get the victorious Mexican revolutionaries to agree to not punish residents of 
the city who cooperated with the American army.  On November 20, 1914, the brigade at Vera 
Cruz received orders to evacuate the city.  The War Department told General Funston to ―get out 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 57–59, 48. 
17
 Ibid., 10. 
 186 
in the best practical fashion, leaving things in as good shape as possible….‖18  The occupying 
forces managed a very orderly withdrawal from the city, leaving it the best-administered 
municipality in Mexican history. All troops and Marines departed the city on November 23, 
1914.
19
   
The nature of the occupation of Vera Cruz was unusual because the mission was not part 
of a larger general war.  Though a short and limited action in terms of the number of troops and 
the length of the operation, the occupation of Vera Cruz served to make the point that 
conventional war with Mexico was a realistic possibility and that substantial military government 
operations were likely to be part of any general military action.  The occupation of Vera Cruz 
also indicated that, whatever the shortfalls of American military capability in the areas of 
conventional combat, mobilization, command and control, or logistics, the US Army and its 
leaders were extremely capable of quickly and efficiently establishing control over hostile 
civilian populations.  The Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, summed up the performance of 
the American military forces in the occupation operation: ―The character of this duty in each 
instance was similar and was of an exceedingly difficult kind, in some respects even more 
difficult than actual warfare.  It called for patience, self-control, discretion, and good judgment 
under very trying conditions, and required implicit obedience to orders —a prime military 
necessity.‖20  General Funston‘s command executed the occupation portion of the Vera Cruz 
operations with superb professional skill. 
Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1923 
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Just four years after the withdrawal of General Funston‘s occupation force from Vera 
Cruz, the US Army was committed to another important military occupation.  On November 17, 
1918, the American Third Army of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France under the 
command of General John J. Pershing began marching to its assigned occupation zone within the 
Allied occupied German Rhineland.  The American army settled into its occupation zone in 
Germany by Christmas of 1918. In the course of the four-year American occupation of the 
Rhineland the occupation command adapted to the unique conditions of post-World War I 
Germany, and showed flexibility in melding American occupation policy and traditions with the 
unique conditions in Germany and the need for inter-Allied cooperation.  Over the next four 
years, the command evolved into an important component of American foreign policy in Europe.  
The occupation also served as a practical exercise in military government for many officers who 
later served in senior leadership positions during the inter-war years and World War II, and as a 
model for future occupation policy and doctrine.   
The American participation in the post World War I occupation of Germany was much 
more complex as a strategic action than any previous occupation.  There were many reasons for 
this but the most important was that the occupation was an Allied effort and thus all policies and 
decisions were subject to inter-Allied debate and compromise.  International debate and 
compromise was in addition to the internal US domestic policy debate that accompanied all 
previous occupation experiences.  The occupation scheme divided into two distinct phases.  The 
first phase of the occupation was under the authorization of the armistice.  There was little debate 
that enforcement of the armistice required Allied occupation of German territory.  The US 
Congress almost unanimously supported this phase of the occupation.
21
  The second phase of the 
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occupation was under the terms of the peace treaty.  This phase was more problematic.  President 
Wilson agreed to US participation in a post peace treaty occupation in negotiations directly with 
French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau.  On June 28, 1919, the United States 
representatives signed the Rhineland Agreement that articulated the framework of the post-treaty 
occupation.  The Allies, however, predicated the Rhineland agreement on Article 432 of the 
peace treaty.  Since the United States never ratified the peace treaty, the Rhineland Agreement 
never went into effect for American forces.  Thus, for the duration of the post-treaty occupation, 
the legal status of the American occupation was ambiguous. Until the United States agreed to a 
separate peace with Germany in 1921, the legal justification for the US Army presence in the 
Rhineland was still the 1918 armistice agreement.  After the signing of a separate peace treaty 
with Germany there was no legal justification for the presence of the US Army on German soil.  
However, the occupation continued another fifteen months.
22
 
Another problem that complicated the American occupation was France.  France insisted 
that an occupation of the Rhineland was necessary during the armistice period to ensure that the 
Germans proceeded with the peace treaty process.  The US government agreed with this view. 
After December 1918, a debate occurred over US participation in an occupation after the signing 
of a peace treaty. The main arguments were over the rationale for the presence of Allied forces 
after signing a peace agreement.  The French argued first for the necessity of national defense 
against a renewed belligerent Germany.  The British and the United States responded with the 
offer of a trilateral defense treaty instead of an occupation.  The French argument then changed 
and justified the need for an occupation force to enforce reparations.  The United States and 
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Great Britain reluctantly acceded to that point, but the real French intent for the occupation of the 
Rhineland was to facilitate the permanent separation of the Rhineland from Germany and either 
make it an autonomous nation under French protection, or incorporate it directly into France.  As 
US General Henry T. Allen observed, ―the French authorities…were resolved to hold the 
Rhineland, regardless of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.‖23  France‘s real purpose for the 
occupation influenced the strategic issues upon which the occupation commanders focused, 
continually created friction between French forces and the Americans and British, and ultimately 
contributed to the withdrawal of the US forces from Germany. 
Little planning was done for the initial occupation of the Rhineland.  The reason for this 
was the quickness with which the armistice occurred. AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) 
established the Third Army on November 7, 1918, for the purpose of commanding U,S. 
occupation forces.  The belligerents declared the Armistice on November 11, and the formal 
organization of the Third Army took place on November 15.  On November 17, 1918, the 
advance elements of the Third Army began crossing the armistice line and began the long march 
to the occupation zone in the Rhineland.  Occupation planning fell into two categories.  First was 
operational planning that had to do with the zones of occupation and the routes of march into the 
Rhineland.  The march to the Rhine River covered as much as 250 miles over very difficult 
terrain.  It took three weeks to execute and the lead units reached the Rhine River on December 
9.  The entire army closed to the bank of the river in the American sector by December 11.  On 
December 13, elements of the army crossed the Rhine River to occupy a bridgehead zone on the 
east bank.
 24
   The second part of the planning was the conduct of the occupation itself.  The AEF 
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Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs (OCCA) as well as the Civil Affairs chief of the Third Army 
did this part of the plan.  The civil affairs officers did much of their work as the army moved 
forward into its occupation zone, and relied heavily on guidance from the Supreme Allied 
Command.   
From the start there was confusion regarding the responsibility for military government 
and civil affairs within the occupation forces.  General Pershing‘s original intent was to keep 
much of the responsibility and decision making in regards to military government at his level of 
command.  Pershing designated Brigadier General H.A. Smith as the Officer in Charge of Civil 
Affairs (OCCA) at GHQ.  General Smith assigned Colonel Irvin L. Hunt to accompany General 
Joseph T. Dickman, the Third Army commander, as his ―advisor to the Commanding General in 
civil matters.‖25  At the beginning of the occupation, it was unclear if General Pershing, General 
Joseph T. Dickman, General Smith, or Colonel Hunt would ultimately have the dominant role in 
the conduct of military government and civil affairs operations within the American occupied 
zone.  As it developed over the eight months of the Third Army‘s mission, Colonel Hunt played 
the primary role regarding interaction with the German civil officials.
26
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Colonel Hunt came to the position of OCCA for the Third US Army from wartime duty 
as the JAG officer for the II Corps and liaison duties with the Second and then the Fourth British 
armies.  He served as the OCCA from November 1918 through the deactivation of the Third 
Army in July 1919, and continued as the OCCA in the American Forces Germany (AFG) until 
his departure from Germany in April 1920.   He brought significant experience to the position.  
Hunt was an 1899 graduate of the United States Military Academy and originally commissioned 
in the Infantry.  He served as an infantry captain, construction officer, and company commander 
under Pershing‘s command on Mindanao from 1910 to 1913. He was an expert on US military 
civil affairs and military government having served in the Bureau of Insular Affairs from 1913–
1916, and was also a trained lawyer, transferring to the JAG Corps in 1916.
27
 
The occupation orders called for four Allied armies and a total of 750,000 Allied troops 
to occupy the Rhineland.  The occupying powers were France, the United States, Great Britain, 
and Belgium.  The AEF established a forward GHQ at Treves (Trier) to supervise the American 
occupation.  The occupation command, Third Army, located its headquarters in Coblenz on the 
Rhine River. The southern boundary of the American zone was with the Tenth French Army, and 
generally followed the line of the Moselle River.  The northern boundary of the command was 
with the British Second Army.  General Dickman reported directly to the commander of the 
AEF, General John J. Pershing.  Pershing in turn, reported to the commander of the occupation 
forces, the Supreme Allied Commander, French Marshall Ferdinand Foch.
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General Joseph T. Dickman had a strong background in military government.  He 
graduated from the United States Military Academy, and later earned a law degree from the 
University of Vermont.  He brought a very impressive resume to the command of the Third 
Army.  He had a long frontier career as a cavalryman serving in the 3rd Cavalry and participated 
in the Geronimo campaign.  He served in Cuba during the Spanish-American war and during the 
first occupation.  In the Philippines he distinguished himself serving as a lieutenant colonel in a 
volunteer infantry regiment on the island of Panay.  Later, he was part of Pershing‘s staff on 
Mindanao from 1909 to 1911.  Dickman was an accomplished linguist:  fluent in German, very 
good in French and Spanish, and during service in the Philippines he taught himself the Visayan 
dialect.  During World War I Dickman commanded the 3
rd
 Infantry Division and the I Corps.  
Similarly, Dickman‘s deputy commander, the Third Army chief of staff, Brigadier General 
Malin Craig, West Point class of 1898, had almost six years service in the Philippines.  Craig 
served as a lieutenant in the China Expedition, then as the aide to General Thomas H. Berry, 
while Berry was the executive to the military governor, General MacArthur, from 1900 to 1901.  
He then served as the aide to General Franklin Bell from 1902 to 1904.  In his second tour in the 
Philippines, 1906 to 1908, he served with the 1st Cavalry Regiment and as a construction 
quartermaster.
29
   Thus, the senior leadership of the American occupation army, with Dickman, 
Craig, and Hunt in charge of Civil Affairs, was very experienced in military government. 
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The area of the Rhineland that the Americans occupied was 5587 square miles, somewhat 
larger than the American state of Connecticut, and well within the capability of the occupation 
force to control.  The western boundary was the border with Luxembourg and Belgium, and the 
eastern boundary was the west bank of the Rhine except for a nineteen mile (30 kilometers) deep 
bridgehead across the river at Coblenz.  The southern boundary followed the trace of the Moselle 
River as it flowed northeast from the Luxembourg border to its confluence with the Rhine at 
Coblenz.  The only industrial area in the region was the Neuwied urban area just to the north of 
Coblenz.
30
  Though the total population of the American zone was almost 900,000, the area was 
not densely populated.  The majority of the population was Roman Catholic, and was 
concentrated in the few urban areas and the great river valleys.  The two dominant urban areas 
were Coblenz and Treves.  Coblenz was the regional capital city for the German Coblenz 
Regierungsbezirke (district), situated in the southeast corner of the sector on the Rhine.  It was 
primary an administrative center and had a population of 65,000 in the city itself and another 
69,000 in the surrounding county.  Treves was center of the Treves Regierungsbezirke, and was 
at the opposite end of the sector, in the southwest corner astride the south bank of the Moselle.  
Its population was approximately 55,000 with almost 100,000 in the surrounding county.  The 
other important population center was Neuwied with a population of 69,000.  The three 
population centers accounted for forty percent of the region‘s population.31   
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The occupying armies governed the Rhineland indirectly through the German 
government‘s appointed officials.  The armistice, and later the peace treaty, stipulated that the 
occupation forces govern through the existing indigenous government.  This arrangement was 
agreeable to all parties in the interest of order and stability.  All of the area occupied by the 
American army was part of the Rhine Province, one of the twelve provinces of the German state 
of Prussia.
32
  The American zone included parts of two of the five regierungsbezirke of the 
Rhine Province.  About half of the Coblenz and about half of the Treves Regierungsbezirke were 
under American jurisdiction.  The central German government, before November 1918, 
administered the Rhineland Province through a hierarchy of appointed German civil servants at 
the top of which was the province oberpräsident (president) and below him the 
regierungsbezirke regierunspräsidenten (district presidents).  These officials were generally 
policy makers.  The executors of policy were the landkreis (county) bürgermeistereien (mayors), 
who directly supervised the stadt and land (town and rural) subordinate bürgermeistereien.  The 
military government dealt directly with these German officials.  The German civil servants had 
little in common with the people they governed, and were not always popular.  Additionally, 
although having the German officials in place relieved much of the occupation force‘s 
administrative burden, the fact that many mid-level German officials responded to several 
different authorities, two different occupation commands as well as the provincial German 
government, created numerous potential conflicts.
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The Armistice Occupation 
The mission of the American troops as they occupied the Rhineland in 1918 was not, as 
in previous military occupations, to restore governance or to build institutions.  The primary 
mission of the occupation force was to be available if necessary to ensure the compliance of the 
German government with the armistice agreement.  This mission greatly reduced the army‘s 
responsibilities in comparison with previous occupation experiences.  Still, as the supreme 
governing authority, and in accordance with the recognized law of war, the commanders 
understood they had legal responsibilities for the population.  They also had a strong tradition of 
military governance that guided them through the mechanics of the occupation. 
The Allied commanders made clear to the German population the expectations of the 
command.  General Foch, as the Supreme Allied Commander, declared his guidance to the 
occupation armies and to the civilian population in a proclamation.  Key declarations in Foch‘s 
proclamation included: 
The Allied military authority herewith assumes command of the country.   
It demands strictest obedience from all.   
The laws and regulations in force at the moment of occupation will be continued 
inasfar as they do not affect our rights or our safety. 
Public officials will be held responsible for the conscientious and honest 
discharge of the duties with which they are entrusted.  The courts will continue to 
dispense justice. 
The inhabitants must abstain in word and deed from any act of hostility, direct or 
indirect, toward the Allied authorities.  They must obey the requisitions which 
may be made of them in conformity with law.
34
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Foch‘s proclamation was essentially an outline of the Allied authority as described in the Hague 
Convention as well as the US Army‘s published rules of land warfare.35  Both Generals Pershing 
and Dickman followed up with proclamations of their own that essentially echoed Marshal Foch.  
General Pershing‘s proclamation indicated the philosophy of the American occupation: ―All that 
lawfully and peacefully abide by the regulations laid down by the military authorities may count 
on protection for their persons, homes, property and belief.‖36  General Dickman gave specific 
guidance to his commanders in the form of a memorandum that made clear several points:  
American officers would immediately contact German officials ―when stopping in a town for the 
night or a longer period,‖ and would order, not request, compliance with the laws of war.  The 
army commander ordered commanders to direct the bürgermeister to prohibit the sale of liquors, 
except beer and light wine, produce maps of the town; inform the people to avoid assembling, 
furnish billets for troops and animals, and forbid the sale and carrying of weapons.  Commanders 
could requisition supplies from the population as needed, but were encouraged to do this through 
the local officials and were required to issue vouchers for any supplies requisitioned.  
Commanders could not requisition food.
37
  General Dickman‘s guidance, based on the laws of 
war, sufficed to govern civil-military relations for the march into the Rhineland.  Formal orders, 
called ―Anordnungen,‖ issued by General Pershing‘s headquarters on December 9, 1918, 
superseded the army commander's guidance.  The Anordnungen went into effect once units 
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arrived at their assigned occupation stations. General Pershing‘s headquarters developed the 
Anordnungen without a thorough understanding of German culture or the environment of the 
occupation.  Initially the population viewed them as unnecessarily harsh and in many cases 
nonsensical.  Over the first months of the occupation, the command recognized some of the 
problems with many of the Anordnungen and granted exceptions and made adjustments.  Colonel 
Hunt noted in his history of the occupation that  the experience of the Anordnungen 
demonstrated  that ―military regulations in an occupied territory are extremely difficult to 
enforce if they run counter to long-established customs.‖38  
The Anordnungen were the basis for law and order under the occupation forces.  On 
December 10, 1918, the AEF GHQ issued General Order (G.O.) No. 225, which established the 
procedures for enforcing the Anordnungen.    It also set up the framework of military 
government organization for the first part of the occupation.  The order invested the Commander 
in Chief‘s (Pershing) authority for civil affairs in his representative, General Smith at AEF GHQ 
forward in Treves.  Smith had the authority to modify the existing Anordnungen and issue 
additional orders relating to civil affairs for the Commander in Chief.  G.O. 225 also established 
the division commanders as the commanders primarily responsible for administration of civil 
affairs.  Corps and army commanders had civil affairs responsibility only within the areas 
controlled by the corps or army headquarters troops.  G.O 225 authorized each commander to 
issue special orders to the civil population in his area based on local circumstances.  G.O. 225 
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also authorized the establishment of military tribunals to adjudicate violations of the 
Anordnungen.  Within each jurisdiction, there were two types of tribunals:  Superior and Inferior 
Provost Courts.  Only the commanding generals could establish Superior Provost Courts.  They 
were empowered to administer punishments up to six months in prison or a fine of 5000 marks.  
The commanding officer of each garrisoned city, town, or other occupied place established 
Inferior Provost Courts.  They could administer punishments up to three months confinement or 
fines up to 1000 marks.  Army, corps, and division commanders could also appoint military 
commissions to try inhabitants for serious offenses against the military government or the laws 
of war.  These commissions did not have any limit on penalties imposed.  The review of all court 
findings rested with General Smith as the Commander in Chief‘s representative.  In March 1919, 
the Third Army commander received review authority for all courts operated by elements of his 
command.   
Critics complained about the lack of uniformity in the military court system.  The 
Anordnungen were vague enough that many German citizens had no clear idea what actions 
might be violations of the Anordnungen and what were not.  In addition, there was no 
coordination of standards between the various commands convening courts.   Thus, 
interpretations of the Anordnungen and punishments varied widely across the occupation zone. 
The establishment of permanent civil affairs officers in each kreis and appointment of a Provost 
Court to support each of them eventually solved the problem of inconsistency in the court 
system.  These officers then met weekly at either Treves or Coblenz to discuss cases and develop 
a consensus regarding interpretations of the Anordnungen.
39
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An issue that became increasingly important as the occupation progressed was the 
German police.  The Anordnungen permitted the German police to remain armed, and under the 
armistice, the German judicial law enforcement system continued to operate enforcing German 
law upon the civil population.  The military government strictly prohibited German police from 
interacting in any way with military personnel.  The German police were not a very robust or 
prestigious organization.  This was the result of neglect and German reliance on German army 
military police to support them during the war years.   American military police were the most 
important law enforcement capability in the first few months of the occupation.  As American 
troops returned to the United States, the military government placed increasing requirements on 
the German police to enforce not only German law but also occupation regulations.  The army 
also created a trained police reserve that backed up the relatively small regular German police 
force.  To improve the quality of the police the army ordered the provost marshal, who operated 
under the staff supervision of the G-1, with inspection, training, and supervision of German 
police operations.  This greatly improved the performance of the German police but created 
confusion between the provost marshal‘s officers and the civil affairs officers responsible for 
supervising all German government activity.  The solution to this situation was to confirm 
authority over police operations to the civil affairs officers, and require the military police 
officers from the G-1 staff to assist the OCCA at the kreis level. 
40
 By fall of 1919 law 
enforcement in all parts of the occupied territory except the city of Coblenz was solely the 
responsibility of the German police. 
In the area of government, the terms of the armistice called for the German civil 
administration of the Rhineland to remain in place.  The American military government fully 
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recognized that the terms of the armistice requiring supervision of the Germans greatly 
simplified the ease of military government.  Colonel Hunt‘s report summarized the American 
approach to governance: 
Supervision requires tact and judgment rather than the display of constructive 
Genius….  In Cuba and the Philippines we had striven to revise native methods, 
and with results which fully justified the amount of labor expended.  During the 
whole occupation of Germany, legislatures, executives, judges, customs officials, 
the most complicated and reputedly most effective civil organization in the world, 
were placed under the direction of American military government.
41
 
The structure and quality of the German civil administration, and the requirements of the 
armistice rendered the supervisory tasks of governance relatively easy to accomplish.   
Complementing the cooperation of the German government officials at every level was 
the overall attitude of the officials and the population in general.  All the Americans who 
participated in the occupation, particularly the march to the Rhine in November and December 
1918, commented on the unusually positive attitude of the population to the American 
occupation army.  They attributed this positive attitude to at least three factors:  relief that the 
war experience was over and a return to normalcy; the belief that the Americans, particularly 
because of President Wilson‘s fourteen pointes, were a different type of conquering army; and 
finally, the fear of bolshevism and the promise of stability that the occupying army represented.  
All three of these reasons in fact influenced the positive cooperation between the population and 
the occupying army that existed at every level from citizen to the province oberpräsident 
throughout the more than four years the army was in Germany.
42
 
As the army arrived in the occupation zone, army surgeons coordinated with the German 
civilian doctors who were the civil servants in charge of health and sanitation, the kreisartz 
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(county doctor).  In general, the Americans found the sanitary state of the territory satisfactory.  
Typhoid infected the water supply of some small communities.  The command quickly and 
effectively identified and resolved these situations.  The cause was the poor inspection 
procedures of the kreisartz, and the Americans removed the offending officials.  Though the 
Americans, in keeping with their traditions, investigated the state of health and sanitation 
thoroughly, no issues caused more than temporary and local concern.
43
 
Upon entering Germany, the Allies expected, and German officials confirmed, that the 
civilian population was on the verge of famine.  Thus, the Allies were prepared to intervene with 
food support if necessary.  Subsequent careful investigation by civil affairs officers revealed that 
the German official accounts as well as those published by the German press greatly over-stated 
the food shortage.  The Allies concluded that although German food supplies were at 
approximately half their pre-war level, and that there were acute shortages at particular times and 
places and with certain items, overall there was no food crisis.  Still, the Allies initially 
prohibited troops from eating in German restaurants, Allied supply officers purchased only fresh 
vegetables (of which there was no shortage), and the command prohibited all Allied troops and 
civilians from buying any items listed on the German ration list.   The army also sold surplus 
food supplies, mostly flour, to the Germans through the German officials.   The province 
rationed food in the winter of 1919–1920, but rations were sufficient to meet the needs of the 
population.
44
 
There was a definite difference in the tenor of the American occupation from that of the 
French.  France‘s unstated objective for the Rhineland, discussed above, influenced this different 
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tone.  The French army was openly hostile to the German population and the attitude of French 
officers and men was belligerent and superior. The French army‘s more aggressive approach to 
the occupation also reflected the French authoritarian approach to military government in their 
overseas colonies, the stress of the long and costly war just completed, and the French 
experience with German occupation in 1871.  In contrast, the US command‘s view of the 
occupation was through the prism of its relatively progressive occupation experiences in 
Philippines, Cuba, and Mexico.  Indications of inter-Allied friction based on the different 
national doctrines were quick to appear.  After the Third Army arrived in Luxembourg, on its 
march to the Rhine, the French led high command proposed breaking up the American 
occupation forces and distributing them among the other Allied armies.  This course ensured an 
American presence throughout the occupation area, but deprived the Americans of high 
command in the occupation.  Of course Pershing refused and threatened to take the issue to the 
President.  Foch and Pershing compromised and agreed to place two French divisions under 
command of the Third Army.
45
  
Before the Americans arrived at Coblenz General Dickman was alert to the different 
attitude of the French toward the German civilians as compared to that of American soldiers and 
officers.  One of the few cases of abuse of civilians during the Third Army march to the Rhine 
was a case of a French liaison officer beating a German mail carrier.  The officer was removed 
from his duties and returned to the French command. Later, the Americans removed two other 
French officers for also physically assaulting German civilians.  In addition, American military 
police were necessary on several occasions to control groups of French troops in the American 
sector.   The senior French liaison officer to the Third Army headquarters protested formally to 
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General Dickman that the Americans were entirely too lenient with the German civilians.  In 
response, Dickman formally chastised the French officers as he recalled in his memoirs: 
The French officers were told that the American Army had a larger and more 
varied experience in the military government of occupied territory than any 
European army, and that the record made in Cuba, the Philippines and China was 
creditable to that army and satisfactory to the American people. My remarks then 
continued about as follows ―The Third Army is not granting exceptional favors to 
the people of the territory it now occupies, but is only carrying out what has been 
the policy of the American government for over 100 years…. This policy has 
remained the same, whether dealing with the savages of the Great West, the 
Malays of Luzon and the Visayas, the Moro Fanatics of Sulu and Mindanao, or 
the strangely different people of North China, and will not be changed now when 
we are in a civilized country, unless orders are received to the contrary, which are 
not expected.‖46 
Dickman also had concerns about the French taking advantage of the civilian population through 
requisitions without pay, which he firmly rejected in the American zone.
47
      
In April 1919, General Foch requested that General Pershing replace General Dickman 
because of the inability of the French command to work with him.  Recognizing that the end of 
the occupation was fast approaching, General Pershing complied without prejudice to General 
Dickman, and replaced him with General Hunter Liggett.  General Dickman passed command of 
the Third Army to General Hunter Liggett on April 28, 1919.  Though Dickman gives no hint of 
it in his memoirs, General Robert Lee Bullard believed that the numerous French complaints 
about Dickman‘s supposed lenient behavior to the Germans, and his German ancestry, 
contributed to his leaving two months before the deactivation of his army.
48
  General Hunter 
Liggett graduated from West Point in 1879 and had extensive frontier and Philippine experience.  
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During the Philippine war, he was a district commander and military governor on Mindanao 
from 1899 to 1901.  During the world war, he commanded the American I Corps under the 
French during the second Marne campaign in the summer of 1918.  It was not long before 
Liggett also had a confrontation with the French army.  In June 1919, French officers tried to 
engineer a coup by Rhenish separatists.  Liggett firmly rejected French army efforts to get him to 
recognize the revolutionaries and the coup attempt failed miserably.  The change of command 
from Dickman to Liggett had almost no effect on the operations of the Third Army or the 
American occupation.
49
  
The biggest challenge to the American military government in the spring of 1919 was not 
the Germans or the French, but rather, demobilization.  The American public had little 
enthusiasm for a large overseas presence and continuance of the World War I alliance after the 
war ended.  With the war over, the priority of the American army in Europe was not the 
occupation of Germany but rather bringing the boys home.  The US Army had over two million 
men overseas during the war, most of them in Europe. Beginning on November 12, 1918, the 
primary focus of the AEF‘s energy was transporting those men home.  By the spring of 1919, the 
ten divisions of the Third Army were the last remaining US combat troops in Europe, and the 
War Department issued orders for the redeployment of the bulk of the occupation force. 
In March 1919, the 42nd division moved back the United States.  By the time the peace 
treaty was signed in June, three other divisions had followed.  This reduced the strength of the 
Third Army by over 100,000 troops.  The flow of troops to the states in itself did not have an 
operational impact on the occupation, but it did reveal the most significant flaw in the American 
organization for occupation.  As described previously, the AEF GHQ had given primary 
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responsibility for civil affairs to the division commanders.  In accordance with G.O. 225, each 
division created its own military government structure in its assigned geographic zone. This 
included its own local civil military regulations, the civil military court system, and a variety of 
relations its civil affairs officers created with local German officials.   When the first division 
moved back to the United States, the remaining units assumed its zone.  This required the 
geographic shuffling of dozens of unit boundaries and the adjustment of all of the military 
government associations constructed by the departing division.  As more divisions departed for 
the United States, the shuffling of military government responsibilities threatened to cause chaos 
in the entire military government structure. 
The OCCA at Third Army, Colonel Hunt, recognized the potential problems caused by 
departing tactical commands as early as February 1919.  The solution to this problem was to 
detach the military government organization from tactical units and organize a permanent 
military government structure based on the existing political geography.  This was exactly how 
all previous American occupations were organized:  in the former Confederate States, Cuba, the 
Philippines and Vera Cruz the army organized the senior military command structure based on 
the local geographic political boundaries.  This was even the case for the army command system 
in the United States.  Rather than change things immediately, the Third Army determined to 
transition to a permanent military government organization under the army OCCA as divisions 
departed.  Thus by the time of the signing of the peace treaty on June 30, 1919, the military 
government  capabilities of the departed 42
nd
, 89
th
, 90
th
, and 32
nd
 divisions had been reorganized 
as kreis civil affairs sections under a kreis OCCA who reported directly to the Third Army 
OCCA, Colonel Hunt.  By the end of the September 1919 all the remaining divisions in the 
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occupation zone had returned to the United States and the reorganization of military government 
was complete.
50
 
The other organizational flaw that inhibited military government in the American 
occupation zone was the position of the AEF GHQ OCCA, General Smith.  General Smith was 
General Pershing‘s representative with ultimate authority for military government.  The directors 
of local military government were the division commanders through their staff OCCA.  Corps 
and Army commanders had little command authority for military government.   Thus, the 
military government command circumvented the tactical command system and created 
significant opportunities for confusion and miscommunication.  In addition, General Smith, 
located in Treves, was 120 miles from Third Army headquarters in Coblenz, the hub of the 
American command system, and even further from many of the divisions that executed military 
government functions.  His ability to supervise the functioning of military government was 
significantly less than that of the army and corps commanders.  This flaw did not significantly 
harm the functioning of military government only because General Smith, General Dickman, and 
Colonel Hunt, as long serving regular army officers, had strong personal ties that allowed them 
to overcome the poorly designed system.  The deactivation of AEF GHQ forward headquarters at 
Treves and the AEF OCCA position on June 1, 1919 corrected this flaw in the command system.  
After that date, command authority for military government passed to the commander Third 
Army and through him to Colonel Hunt.
51
 
Post Peace Treaty Occupation 
On June 28, 1919, the Germans and the representatives of the Allies signed the peace 
treaty at Versailles.  Though the various governments still needed to ratify the treaty, Europe was 
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at peace.  On July 2, 1919, the Third Army deactivated, General Liggett departed, and General 
Henry T. Allen assumed command of the new occupation organization, American Forces 
Germany (AFG), on July 3, 1919.  Major General Allen came to the command of the AFG from 
distinguished command of the 90
th
 Division during the war and command of VIII Corps as the 
war ended.  Pershing called Allen ―exactly the right man in the right place‖ to command the 
AFG and his resume supported that assessment.  Allen graduated from West Point in 1882 and 
earned early fame as one of the first explorers of the Alaskan frontier.  Allen was unusual, even 
among the best and most successful American army officers, because he had extensive 
experience in Europe as a military attaché.  Allen served in the US embassy in St. Petersburg 
from 1890 to 1895, and as the US military representative at the Berlin embassy from 1897 to 
1898.  Allen operated with ease in both diplomatic and military circles and was completely fluent 
in Russian, German, and French.  Allen, however, was not just an embassy soldier.  In 1899, he 
went to the Philippines as the lieutenant colonel of the 49
th
 Volunteer Infantry Regiment and 
quickly earned a reputation as both an aggressive combat commander and a competent military 
governor.  In 1902, Governor William Howard Taft selected Allen to create the Philippine 
Constabulary.  Allen built the constabulary into a force of over 6,000 men and a reputation as an 
aggressive, reliable, and professional paramilitary police organization perfectly suited to the 
needs of governance in the islands.  After leaving the Philippines, Allen commanded a cavalry 
regiment with Pershing‘s forces in Mexico.  Allen‘s extensive experience in Europe, linguistic 
skills, his knowledge of civil military affairs and governance, natural intelligence, and his 
combat record made him the obvious choice to handle the army‘s role in the complex post-war 
European political situation.
52
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When Allen took command of the AFG it was still a robust force of over 100,000 men.  
However, the drawdown of forces through the summer and fall of 1919 continued.  By August, 
the Allies reduced the US sector for occupation to the eastern half of the former territory and by 
September, the size of the force was down to 11,000 men.  AFG built its headquarters staff 
around the remaining members of the Third Army headquarters.  General Malin Craig remained 
as the Chief of Staff and Colonel Hunt remained as the OCCA.  The change of command caused 
almost no disruption in the conduct of military government and the new organization of the 
military government on a geographic basis gave it increased stability and more consistency in its 
interaction with German officials.
53
 The command relationships also changed with the 
deactivation of the Third Army.   The AEF GHQ itself was preparing to return to the United 
States.  General James Harbord, Pershing‘s Chief of Staff, told General Allen that he should not 
refer issues to GHQ but solve them on his own.
54
 The AEF headquarters and Pershing sailed for 
the United States on September 1, 1919.  From that point forward, Allen reported directly to the 
War Department.  Despite the deactivation of the Third Army and the departure of the AEF, the 
leadership of the American occupation forces continued to be officers skilled and experienced in 
military governance. 
Though there was great continuity in the headquarters of AGF, that continuity did not 
extend to the occupation troops.  Over the course of the fall of 1919, the last of the veteran 
divisions sailed back to the United States.  The army recruited a special force of volunteers to 
replace the veterans.  The new recruits formed the 8
th
 Infantry Regiment, which was the core of 
the 7,500 reinforced brigade occupation force that remained in Germany.  The new men began to 
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arrive in Germany in the summer of 1919 and by the fall made up the bulk of the occupation 
forces.  In November 1919, an additional brigade, equally inexperienced, arrived in the 
American zone destined for duty in Upper Silesia during the plebiscite after ratification of the 
peace treaty.  This brigade, consisting of two infantry regiments, never deployed to Silesia, and 
remained as part of the occupation force until the end of 1921.  At the end of 1919, the 
occupation force strength was 18,828.  The AFG organized its forces into two brigades, each 
commanded by a brigadier general.  With the departure of the veteran World War I divisions, the 
quality of the force changed dramatically and training and disciplining the new soldiers of the 
AFG was the major focus of the command from the fall of 1919 on.
55
 
Unlike General Pershing, whose higher military headquarters in Europe when the war 
ended was the Supreme Allied Commander, French Marshal Foch, General Allen reported 
directly to the US War Department.  Though the Allied national leaders agreed that the Allied 
occupation of the Rhineland would continue after the peace treaty was signed to ensure French 
security and German compliance with reparations payments, they rejected a military led 
occupation under Marshal Foch.  Instead, they created a civilian agency, the Inter-Allied High 
Commission of the Rhineland, to oversee the occupation and all occupation policy.  The official 
army history of the occupation explained that the  High Commission ―was made the supreme 
representative of the Allied and Associated Powers within the occupied territories, except insofar 
as the Treaty provides others.‖  Military forces of the occupation moved into barracks and were 
restricted in their actions without the approval of the commission.  The Allies set forth the 
commission‘s responsibilities in an annex of the Versailles Peace Treaty —the Rhineland 
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Agreement.
56
  On November 19, 1919, the US Senate rejected the Versailles Peace Treaty.
57
  
Because the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, the Rhineland agreement had no impact on the 
American forces in the Rhineland.  Thus, alone among the occupying armies, the AFG remained 
in occupation status after January 1920 based on the armistice agreement of November 1918, and 
outside the authority of the Rhineland Commission.
58
  General Allen mitigated the problem of 
Allied unity by agreeing to publish the proclamations of the Inter-Allied High Commissions as 
orders of the American military governor in the American occupation zone.  In this way, the 
Allies maintained the unity of policy in the Rhineland despite there not being a formal unity of 
command.
59
 
While General Allen focused on the issues of foreign policy through the High 
Commission, the mechanics of German–American interaction within the occupied zone required 
adjustment.  In January 1920, General Allen and Mr. Pierrespont B. Noyes, the American 
civilian observer to the Allied Commission, agreed that the civil affairs officers of the AFG, who 
supervised the German civil authorities in the American zone, should be replaced by the 
American civilian staff members of the High Commission.  Thus, in the spring of 1920, the 
military civil affairs officers in the kreis gradually transferred their responsibilities to agents of 
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the American Representative to the High Commission.  In October 1920, the AFG discontinued 
the position of the OCCA at the kreis level.  The Americans maintained the continuity of the 
relationships built up by the kreis OCCA with the German authorities by demobilizing the army 
civil affairs officers in Germany and then the US Department of State hired those same 
individuals back as civilians in the same role.  In addition, General Allen assigned the new AFG 
OCCA (Colonel Hunt‘s replacement), Colonel David L. Stone, to also serve as the military 
assistant to the American Representative at the Allied High Commission.
60
 Thus, the transition 
from military government under AFG to civil administration under the High Commission was 
well coordinated and did not significantly affect the German officials who continued to conduct 
the day-to-day governance of the occupation area. 
Within the context of transition to the authority of the Inter-Allied High Commission, one 
other change occurred which effected the nature of the AFG‘s relationship with the Allies and 
the High Commission.  In June 1920 Mr. Noyes, the US Representative to the High Commission, 
was relieved of his duties and General Allen was designated as his replacement.  General Allen 
then appointed Colonel Stone as the deputy US representative.
61
  The appointment of General 
Allen, and the redesignation of Colonel Stone‘s position, consolidated all American governance 
functions, civil and military. Thus, similar to military governors in Mindanao and Cuba, General 
Allen simultaneously occupied a position as the American representative to the civil 
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 Allen Occupation, 125–126; Hunt, 361–364.  American Representation, 1920–1921, Volume II, 8–36.  
Colonel Stone replaced Colonel Hunt as the AFG OCCA.  Stone graduated from the USMA in 1898 and saw 
combat service in Cuba and the Philippines.  On his second tour of duty in the Philippines, he was wounded in 
combat against the Moro.  Because of wounds, he was transferred from the Infantry to the Quartermaster Corps.  
Stone served in World War I as the G-1 and Quartermaster of the 3
rd
 Division, and as the G-1 of 2nd Army.  After 
his service with the AFG, he served in a wide variety of command and staff position culminating with Command of 
the V Corps in 1940.  Stone retired in 1940 at the mandatory age. Cullum, Volume V, 613, and Volume VI, 855–856; 
―General David L. Stone (1876–1959),‖ The Free Encyclopedia of Washington State History, 
http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=pf_output.cfm&file_id=9100 (assessed September 2009). 
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 American Forces in Germany, American Representation In Occupied Germany, 1920–1921, Volume I 
(Coblenz, Germany:  American Forces in Germany, 1923), 257–258. 
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administration of the occupied territory, and the position of the commander of US military forces 
in the occupied territory.  As the US Representative to the High Commission, General Allen 
reported directly to the State Department.  As the commander of the AFG, he continued to report 
directly to the War Department. 
The AFG and the occupation of the Rhineland were not significant issues in the 1920 
presidential elections, although there was some public sentiment for bringing the troops home 
from Europe after the failure to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty.   The Republican candidate, 
Warren G.  Harding, made public statements advocating bringing the troops home but the main 
foreign policy issue was the League of Nations.
62
  Once Harding took office in 1921, he 
considered bringing the troops back several times.  In August 1921, representatives of Germany 
and US signed a peace treaty between the two countries, which both countries ratified and 
accepted on November 11, 1921.
63
 In November 1921, the government reduced the size of the 
force to its originally conceived size of 7,500 men.
64
  The peace treaty normalized relations 
between Germany and the United States, but also ended the armistice justifying the occupation.  
In January and February, 1922, the War Department ordered another 4,500 men home, leaving 
the strength of the occupation at 2,500 men.  Additional reductions in 1922 left Allen with a 
force of about 1,200 troops.  With the 1922 reductions, the US occupation presence was only 
slightly larger than one infantry battalion, and therefore the Allies reduced the US occupation 
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 The AFG accomplished this by deactivating the 2
nd
 Brigade as discussed previously. 
 213 
area to garrisoning the city of Coblenz. The French army assumed responsibility for the entire 
former US zone except Coblenz.
65
 
At the close of 1922, the American government had to determine if the deterrence value 
of the small AFG force was sufficient to warrant its cost financially and politically.  On the one 
hand, there was a domestic political price to pay for having the troops stationed in Europe —
particularly without a legal mandate.  Also, the mere presence of troops, and their relationship to 
the High Commission, enmeshed the US government inextricably in European politics.  On the 
other hand, the occupation force gave the US government some advantage in protecting US 
political and economic interests in Europe, and some ability to mitigate French aggression.  In 
January 1923, as the Harding Administration was debating continuing the occupation, the French 
army occupied the German Ruhr industrial region over the objections of both the American and 
British governments.  General Allen had consistently counseled that ―possibly the greatest 
restraint to complete French domination [of the Rhineland] was the independence of the 
American representative in his authority over a large section of the controlled territory.‖66  The 
French occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, demonstrated that the small US presence no 
longer had the ability to restrain the French.  Thus, the President ordered the army to withdraw 
from Germany.  By the end of the January 1923, the AFG had turned over Coblenz to the French 
army and embarked for the United States, ending a forty-nine month occupation.   
Legacy 
The occupations of Vera Cruz and the Rhineland perpetuated the experience in 
occupation operations to several new generations of American army officers.  At Vera Cruz, 
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Captain Douglas MacArthur and Lieutenants Leonard Gerow, Walton Walker, and Wade H. 
Haislip, all destined for high command in World War II, saw military government operations 
executed by an expert.
67
  MacArthur, Walker, and Haislip also participated in the Rhineland 
occupation.  Five future army chiefs of staff, John Hines, Douglas MacArthur, Malin Craig, 
George C. Marshall and J. Lawton Collins served in key staff or leadership positions during the 
Rhineland occupation. Other officers who would play an important role in the interwar and 
World War II army also saw service in the AFG including Lieutenant Colonels Jonathan 
Wainwright and John K. Herr, both of whom served as the AFG G-3 under General Allen.
68
  All 
of the key leaders who would lead the occupation operations during and after World War II were 
in the army throughout the Rhineland occupation, and could not help but be aware of how the 
postwar presence of American troops impacted the politics of the region.  As the next chapter 
describes, the Rhineland occupation became the major focus of occupation studies during the 
interwar years at both the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and at the 
Army War College.   
Both the Vera Cruz and Rhineland experiences validated the approach to occupation 
operations developed in Cuba and the Philippines.  Generals Funston, Dickman, and Allen 
specifically mentioned the value of previous occupation experience in the Philippines and Cuba 
to the conduct of their operations.  Both operations are remarkable for their relative effectiveness 
given the limited time and guidance that the 5
th
 Brigade and the Third Army had to prepare for 
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 Wainwright would achieve world fame as a Lieutenant General and the commander of US forces in the 
Philippines in 1942.  John K. Herr was a Major General and the last Chief of Cavalry in 1942. 
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their operations.  Certainly, General Funston, General Dickman and Colonel Hunt‘s previous 
military government experiences were a major part of their success despite a lack of detailed 
planning and preparation. 
Vera Cruz, in particular, demonstrated the army had the ability to directly operate the 
complex systems necessary for a large urban area to function.  The description of Funston‘s 
operations in Vera Cruz mirrors those of Wood in Havana and Otis in Manila.  All of the army‘s 
experience with administering justice, policing, finances, engineering, and sanitation and health 
regulations were required to make the Vera Cruz occupation successful.  At the end of the 
occupation, Vera Cruz was the most efficiently operated city in Mexico and possibly all of Latin 
America. 
 The Rhineland experience validated the army‘s strict reliance on the law of war for 
guidance in the conduct of the post conflict operations.  It also validated the army‘s general 
philosophy of occupying areas with a firm but benevolent hand.  Both General Allen and Colonel 
Hunt, in their histories of the occupation of the Rhineland explicitly make the connection of the 
success in the Rhineland to the legacy of the previous sixty years of American army experience 
in occupation operations by referring to the Civil War era General Orders 100 to describe the US 
Army principles applied to the occupation of Germany after World War I.  General Allen 
explained: 
There are two distinct conceptions of the purposes of an occupation:  to compel 
compliance with war decisions and inflict penalty on the population, or simply to 
compel compliance with war decisions.  The policy of the United States has been 
founded always upon the latter and our practice was clearly set forth in orders as 
early as 1863: ―As military government is carried out by military force, it is 
incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of 
 216 
justice and humanity —virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for 
the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.‖69 
The recitation of General Order 100 is a clear expression of the linkage in the minds of the US 
Army‘s leadership between the American Civil War experience, the occupation of Spanish 
possessions at the turn of the century, and the United State‘s first experience with occupation 
operations in Europe in the 1920s.  That linkage would remain firm through the interwar years 
and continue to guide the United States Army in its major military occupation operations during 
World War II.  
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 Allen gets the quotation slightly wrong but it he is definitely quoting Article 4 of General Order 100, 
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CHAPTER 7 -  Preparing, Planning, and Testing Occupation 
Operations, 1919–1945 
The World War I experience with occupation operations from 1918 to 1923 drove home 
the importance of occupation operations to the American army.  Though the American army was 
very experienced in occupation operations prior to World War I, the interwar years gave the 
army an opportunity to reflect and codify its experience.  The occupation history of the army 
became the subject of command and staff training and of doctrine.  As the United States entered 
World War II the army leaders, many with direct connections to the history of army occupation 
operations, quickly  recognized the essential requirement to conduct occupation operations. 
General Allen W. Gullion, Provost Marshal General of the Army, remarked to Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson in February 1942, ―No doubt about it.  If we‘re going to win this war, we‘re 
going to have to occupy some countries.‖1  The army recruited and trained a cadre of specialized 
civil affairs officers for the task.  Early operations reinforced the need for the army to be fully 
engaged in occupation operations and the War Department responded by adjusting its 
organization, and refining the doctrine necessary to execute occupation operations on a global 
scale in very diverse theaters.  The army tested organization, doctrine, and training in the Allied 
Military Government (AMG) operations in Italy from 1943 to 1945.  These experiences 
demonstrated consistency with the history of army occupations operations and provided valuable 
practical lessons that informed later operations in Germany and Japan. 
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 Telecon, Gullion and SW Henry L. Stimson, 5 Feb 42, in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil 
Affairs:  Soldiers Become Governors (Hereafter cited as Governors) (Washington D.C.:  Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1964), 11.  General Allen W. Gullion was the Provost Marshal General of the army from 1941 to 
1945.  Prior to serving as the PMG, Gullion served as the army JAG from 1937 to 1941.  He gained national 
recognition in 1926 as the lead prosecutor in the Brigadier General Billy Mitchell Court Martial.   
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Institutional Training and Civil-Military Missions  
The World War I leadership, who became masters of conventional warfare, started their 
careers as the young officers who thrived in the complex and unorthodox operations on the 
frontier, and in the Philippines and Cuba.  The senior leaders of the American Expeditionary 
Force (AEF), and the occupation after the war, Generals John Pershing, Robert Bullard, Henry 
Allen, Hunter Liggett, Joseph Dickman, Hanson Ely, and Preston Brown were all veterans of the 
Philippines.
2
  Their influences dominated the army in the interwar years.  The army passed their 
legacy on to the World War II generation of leaders during the interwar years through the 
professional education system, and the missions that the army performed in the years before 
World War II.  They also personally mentored many of the World War II leaders.  One of the 
legacies that they passed was that of the army‘s self-image.  Despite the focus on World War I 
style conventional operations, the army‘s self-image remained an image of a multi-functional 
tool of the nation and many of the tasks required of it in the interwar years were not strictly 
military.     
Although West Point was an important introduction to the culture of the army, its 
academic and military focus was correctly on the knowledge and skill required of junior officers.  
Other than an introduction to international law, West Point gave little formal attention to 
occupation operations.  In contrast, the army‘s premier education institutions, the General Staff 
School at Fort Leavenworth, and the War College in Washington, both devoted significant time 
to the issues of military government, occupation operations, and associated tasks.  Virtually all of 
the senior leadership of World War II were graduates of those two institutions. 
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 See Robert L. Bullard, Fighting Generals:  Illustrated Biographical Sketches of Seven Major Generals in 
World War I (Ann Arbor, MI:  J.W. Edwards, 1944), for a short but comprehensive biography of some of the lesser 
known key leaders of World War I who also reflected the military government experience. 
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At Leavenworth, the curriculum continued to teach the subject of military government 
and occupation operations in the law courses, as was the practice before World War I.  The 
amount of time the curriculum devoted to law varied considerably over the interwar years.
3
  Two 
areas of the law curriculum covered military government and occupation operations:  military 
law and international law.  Most of the instruction was in the form of lectures.  The faculty at 
Leavenworth wrote and published two outstanding texts on military government.  The faculty 
published the first text, entitled Military Government, in 1920.  This work covered the history of 
the occupation of Germany, and the history of the army‘s military government experiences in the 
Mexico.  The author of the text was General H.A. Smith, the AEF officer in charge of civil 
affairs (OCCA) in the Rhineland in 1919.
4
  In 1925, the General Service School Press at 
Leavenworth issued another more comprehensive text entitled Military Aid to the Civil Power.  
That text served as a ―practical guide for officers of the Army of the United States in 
administering the Laws of War, and in the application of correct legal principles to situations 
involving Military Government, Martial Law, and Domestic Disturbances.‖  Over a third of the 
text‘s 317 pages were devoted specifically to military government.5  During the 1930s when the 
course was two years in length, students at Leavenworth also demonstrated a continued interest 
in the subject of military government in their individual research papers under the directed topic 
―Practical Problems in Military Government.‖6 
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 Military Aid to the Civil Power (Fort Leavenworth, KS:  The General Service School Press, 1925), iii. 
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 For example two papers that focused explicitly on issues confronting military government operations 
were Major Julian Cunningham‘s 1933 paper ―Critical analysis of the methods and means adopted by the British 
forces in Mesopotamia, to control the civil population during the occupation of the region,‖  May 12, 1933, 
Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library,  
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The Army War College in Washington also addressed military government and 
occupation duties.  The War College‘s teaching philosophy was that students learned to be senior 
staff officers and senior commanders by doing.  Therefore, the College assigned students 
projects that focused on anticipated strategic level staff problems and worked on solutions in 
student committees.
7
  The problems were coordinated such that the sum of solutions together  
produced a comprehensive war plan.  The college linked the work to real potential adversaries 
designated by colors.  Although the War College academic exercises were not official plans, 
there was a close relationship between the Army General Staff and its War Plans Division and 
the work done at the college.
8
   
Between 1926 and 1940, students in the G-1 Course of the War College worked on 
aspects of war planning focused on military government of occupied areas.  The committee 
studies, though titled differently and focused on different color adversaries, followed a similar 
format.  First, the students examined facts relating to the problem of military government and 
occupation operations.  This produced a written analysis of historical military occupation 
operations.  The cases studied by the War College students included the German occupation of 
Belgium during World War I, the Allied occupation of the Rhineland after World War I, and the 
US occupations of Cuba, Vera Cruz, and Puerto Rico.  The students drew general conclusions 
regarding occupation operations from the case studies and made recommendations to the War 
Department.  The students then used the analysis of history to develop and propose a doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                                             
area during the military occupation of Germany by the armies of the allied and associated powers,‖ March 16, 1934, 
Combined Arms Library Digital Library,  
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=855&CISOBOX=1&REC
=6 (accessed 24 June 2009).   
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 The close relationship between the academic planning done at the War College and the actual war 
planning done in the General Staff War Plans Division is documented in Henry G. Gole, The Road to Rainbow:  
Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 (Annapolis, MD:  Naval Institute Press, 2003), 18–19, 142–143. 
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manual to provide guidance to the War Department and theater commanders regarding civil-
affairs operations in occupied territory.  Finally, the students prepared a plan for military 
government intended as a component of a general theater operations plan.
9
  The War College 
academic work reflected several important characteristics of the interwar army: first, the army‘s 
approach to teaching war planning was extremely comprehensive; second, the interwar army 
recognized the that the inevitable consequence of successful theater level operations was 
occupation operations;  and third, that there existed a critical requirement for detailed planning of 
occupation operations. 
Some of the most important tasks assigned to the army in the interwar years reinforced 
the educational institution‘s attention to the occupation and military government missions.  
Those tasks were not actual military government missions, but were the type of complex civil-
military tasks common in military government missions.  The army characterized the tasks as 
support to civil authorities controlling civilian populations.  Riot duty was a major concern of the 
army and eruptions of labor and racial unrest were frequent enough in the interwar years to keep 
the mission in the thoughts of army leaders and in the curriculum of the army‘s officer schools.  
The most famous of the population control missions was the dispersing of the war Bonus 
Marchers in Washington in 1932.
10
  Riot duty was the most onerous of the army‘s peacetime 
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domestic missions, but the economic depression of the 1930s caused the army to become closely 
involved with civil government and the civilian population in other ways.  One of the most 
important tasks the army performed in support of economic recovery was public works.  The 
creation of public works projects and their supervision fell to the army Corps of Engineers.
11
  
The army also organized, administered, and supervised the work of the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC).  Over the time of its existence, the CCC recruited and employed over three million 
civilians in a workforce organized along military lines and supervised by army officers and non-
commissioned officers.
12
  These diverse missions, riot control, economic infrastructure 
maintenance and construction, and labor management, were not military occupation missions, 
but they put army leaders in close contact with the concerns of the civil community and they 
reinforced the cultural notion that the army was not just a fighting force.  The diverse tasks 
encountered by the army in the interwar years made it plain that the army‘s mission was to 
perform whatever tasks were required in support of the interests of the national government. 
During the interwar years the army not only engaged with the domestic civil population 
and government, but it also engaged with populations and governments overseas.  The interwar 
army‘s overseas missions were primarily in Panama, the Philippines, and China.  The missions 
of the army units in these areas were primarily defensive.  However, peacetime operations 
required that the commanders and other leaders in these locations closely coordinate their 
operations with the American diplomats, as well as with the indigenous government and the local 
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population.  This required politically engaged and culturally aware leaders able to surmount the 
challenges of language. 
General George C. Marshall was a product of both the interwar army experience and the 
mentorship of the pre-World War generation of army leaders.  Marshall‘s career consistently 
exposed him to the experiences, doctrine, and history of army occupation operations.  In 1906, 
Marshall attended the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort Leavenworth.  He 
received extensive instruction on military government, learned French, and finished first in his 
class.
13
 Marshall left Leavenworth with a thorough theoretical knowledge of military government 
operations.  Marshall‘s operational army experience was diverse.  Marshall was frequently 
involved with tasks in operational environments closely associated with military government and 
occupation.  His experiences began in first assignment as a lieutenant in the 13
th
 Infantry in 1902 
in the Philippines. Stationed initially on the island Mindoro, he participated in many of the type 
of tasks typical of army‘s role in pacifying and governing the islands:  his soldiers taught school, 
he worked closely with clergy and other native leaders, and he spent months in remote locations 
completely out of communication with higher command.  Marshall dealt regularly with the 
challenges of confronting foreign languages, multiple foreign cultures, and tropical diseases.
14
  
Both through experience and study, Marshall had a thorough understanding of the army‘s role in 
the pacification of the islands.  During World War I Marshall made his reputation as one of the 
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top staff officers in the army.
15
  After World War I, Marshall followed General Pershing from 
France to Washington as his aide.  In 1924, the army assigned Marshall as the executive officer 
of the 15th Infantry Regiment in China.  There he learned Chinese, and commanded the regiment 
as it protected American interests and property during frequent outbreaks of civil war.
16
 In 1936, 
the army promoted him to Brigadier General and assigned him as the Chief of the Army War 
Plans Division on the army staff.  He held that position until his selection to be Chief of Staff and 
promotion to full General in September 1939.
17
  Marshall‘s rich assignment history not only put 
him in positions of great responsibility, it also placed him in the midst of diverse cultures, 
repeatedly demonstrated to him the importance of language proficiency, placed him in the midst 
of civil-military operations, and showed him how the army can have a major influence on 
political situations  short of conventional war.  
Marshall was an exceptionally gifted officer who excelled at all tasks assigned him.  
However, even an officer with brilliant qualifications needs a mentor —Marshall had two who 
became his close friends:  J. Franklin Bell and John J. Pershing.  Marshall came to General Bell‘s 
attention several times but the close relationship between the two men began in 1916 when Bell, 
serving as the Commander of the Division of the East, chose Marshall as his aide.  As his aide, 
Marshall and Bell became close and Marshall became the heir to Bell‘s vast frontier and 
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Philippine War experience.
18
  As the United States entered World War I, Bell released Marshall 
to join the 1
st
 Infantry Division staff deploying to France.  During the war, Marshall impressed 
Pershing with his self-confidence and competence and Pershing picked him as his senior aide.  In 
four years of stressful, challenging and close service, Marshall became one of Pershing‘s most 
trusted subordinates and a close friend.  Pershing occasionally joined Marshall and his wife for 
informal dinners at their quarters and came to know the family well.  In 1930, General Pershing 
was the best man at Marshall‘s second wedding.19  In subsequent years, Pershing used his 
influence on behalf of his favorite subordinate.  In 1938, Pershing helped Marshall gain a 
position on the General Staff, and in 1939, Pershing recommended Marshall as Chief of Staff of 
the Army to President Roosevelt.  On April 23, 1939, the President informed Marshall that he 
would be the new Chief of Staff.
20
   Marshall‘s close, almost familial, relationship with Pershing 
over many years put him in a superb position to glean the lessons Pershing learned on the 
frontier, among the Moros, and as head of the AEF.  
Marshall‘s personal experiences and mentors gave him a strong appreciation for the 
importance of military government and the chaos that resulted from not preparing for a post-
conflict environment.  He recalled of his experiences in the Philippines and post World War I 
Germany: 
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I had gone in myself as a second lieutenant with no instruction of any kind 
whatsoever—no schooling of any kind whatsoever —and not even an Army 
regulation.  A storm had destroyed practically all the papers, and what I could find 
in a barrel [were] rain-soaked, and I had to make up my own returns —I was the 
only officer there —and [some] of my early returns for property I had to deal with 
and supplies I had to issue —were made up almost [wholly] out of my 
imagination. But I was given no instructions at all and I was practically governor 
in effect of quite a large territory, about half an island.  
In the First World War it was not until after the actual fighting [began] that they 
started in to try to get officers that had been trained —some by [Major General 
Frederick] Funston in the [Mexican intervention —and began circulating 
[requests] to get any copies of the regulations which had been [issued] at that 
time.
21
 
Marshall‘s professional judgment was not just a product of his own experiences.22   Marshall‘s 
professional military education, his unique and challenging assignments and experiences, and his 
close contact with Generals Bell and Pershing, all connected him to the army‘s rich history of 
military government and occupation duties.  Those personal experiences influenced the emphasis 
Marshall placed on the War Department staff providing the priority, guidance, resources, and the 
support necessary for the theaters to conduct the military government mission properly.  
Doctrine  
The studies conducted at the War College discussed above were not merely filed away.  
In 1939, the G-1 (Personnel Officer) of the Army Staff proposed to the Army Staff G-3 
(Operations Officer) that, in accordance with the recommendations of the War College student 
committee, the G-1 produce a manual that covered military government.  The JAG did not 
concur, arguing that the JAG Rules of Land Warfare manual covered military government 
activities.  Ultimately, the army G-3  determined that military government required more detail 
than the legal discussion in the JAG manual and directed the G-1 to publish a new manual.  The 
                                                 
21
 Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall:  Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York:  Penguin Books, 
1993), 455. 
22
 Ibid., 61. 
 227 
result was in fact two new manuals, FM 27-5, Military Government, and a new version of FM 
27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, both prepared by the office of the JAG and published in 1940.
23
 
A strong direct link existed between the army‘s military government doctrine developed 
for World War II and the written guidance and doctrine used in all previous American 
occupation operations.  The army‘s first written guidance regarding occupying enemy territory 
and dealing with belligerent civil populations was published in General Order 100 in 1863.  In 
1914, the War Department published its first version of the Rules of Land Warfare.  That 
manual, subsequently published again in 1917 with no changes, included ―everything vital 
contained in G.O. 100  of A.G.O. of April 24, 1863,‖  and ―wherever practicable the original text 
has been used herein, because it is believed that long familiarity with this text and its 
interpretations by our officers should not be interfered with if possible to avoid doing so.‖24  The 
army revalidated the doctrine in 1934 when the army published the new Rules of Land Warfare 
manual.  The chapter on ―Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory,‖ remained 
virtually identical to the 1914 version, which included much of G.O. 100.  In 1940 and in 1944 
new versions of the manual were prepared.  The 1940 version of the manual, designated FM 27-
10, made only minor changes to the chapter on occupation, while the 1944 update only changed 
two paragraphs in the entire manual and made no changes to the occupation chapter.
25
   Thus, the 
basic legal doctrine guidance to US forces regarding occupation responsibilities and operations 
in World War II descended directly with almost no changes from the guidance derived for 
occupation operations during the American Civil War and used in all subsequent occupations.  
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The major change in occupation doctrine that occurred prior to World War II was the 
1940 publishing of FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government.  That manual was a 
much more comprehensive treatment of the subject than contained in FM 27-10, which only 
allocated thirteen pages to occupation operations.  The major difference, however, was not detail 
but rather focus.  The previous treatments of occupation operations focused on legal issues.  The 
Rules of Land Warfare manuals stipulated what commanders must, could and could not do from 
a legal point of view.  In contrast, FM 27-5 described how to conduct military government.  
Some of the important directions in the new manual included:  not tasking combatant units with 
military government responsibilities; leaving indigenous government institutions, officials, and 
laws in place; and requiring a separate civil affairs staff section in each theater staff.  The manual 
also stated the major functional responsibilities of military government as public works, fiscal 
issues, public health, education public safety, legal, public welfare, economics, and 
communications.  FM 27-5 described three phases of military government:  during active 
hostilities; before the official declaration of peace but after combat had ceased in a given area; 
and after peace was officially agreed upon but before the organization of civil government.  The 
manual also provided detailed guidance on the operation of military tribunals and on 
proclamations to the population.
26
  Much of the content in FM 27-5 came from the 
recommendations of the War College committee —recommendations based on the army history 
in occupation operations. 
In December 1943, the War Department issued a new version of FM 27-5 far superior to 
the 1940 version.  The new manual covered the same topics as the original but provided much 
more detail in the content.  The bulk of the original manual, thirty-nine of sixty-three pages, was 
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appendices covering example forms, proclamations, and ordinances.  The new manual eliminated 
these appendices and replaced them with detailed content.  The new manual covered all the same 
major topics as the old, but in greater detail.  In addition, it addressed topics not covered in the 
previous manual including joint army and navy planning and policies, likely conditions in 
occupied territories, treatment of political prisoners, operational versus territorial civil affairs 
organizations; employment of Military Police, Marines, and Shore Patrol; procurement, 
classification and training of civil affairs personnel; and planning.  One of the most important 
characteristics of the new manual was that as a joint publication of both the War Department and 
the Navy Department, it provided comprehensive guidance for military government operations 
by all the US military services.  The 1943 FM 27-5 was a solid manual, clearly written and 
practical.  It was also a practical extension of the legal guidance to military occupations 
contained in the companion doctrine in FM 27-10, and thus built upon the principles established 
over the long history of army occupation operations.
27
   
North Africa and the Civil Affairs Division 
General Marshall recognized, and army doctrine as discussed above made clear, that the 
army had an important role in occupation operations.  However, the extent of that role was not 
well defined when the war began.  Nonetheless, Marshall gave guidance to the army staff to 
prepare to participate in occupation operations and toward that end, the army staff organized 
itself to accomplish the occupation mission.  Secretary of War Henry Stimson strongly supported 
Marshall in his efforts to organize and give priority to the army‘s civil affairs capabilities.  
Stimson was a key figure not only for his support of the army military government efforts, but 
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even more important, because he championed the army‘s prime role in occupation missions to 
President Franklin Roosevelt.  Stimson was an unusual figure in the Roosevelt cabinet and in the 
history of American government.  Stimson, a Republican, became part of the Roosevelt cabinet 
in June 1940 as the President created a bipartisan organization tailored to fighting a world war.
28
  
Stimson graduated from Yale in 1888, Harvard Law School in 1890, and was a partner in the law 
firm of Root and Clark on Wall Street in 1893.  He became close friends with the senior partner, 
Elihu Root.  Stimson also developed close personal and professional ties to President Theodore 
Roosevelt who appointed him US Attorney General for the Southern District of New York in 
1906.  In 1911, President Howard Taft appointed Stimson as Secretary of War, largely based on 
Elihu Root‘s recommendation.  Stimson was Secretary of War from 1911 to 1914, supervising 
Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood.  During World War I, Stimson enlisted in the army, 
received a commission in artillery, and served in France as a staff officer.  In 1927 Stimson 
returned to public service as a special envoy for President Calvin Coolidge to Nicaragua and then 
as Governor General of the Philippines from 1927 to 1929.  President Herbert Hoover appointed 
him Secretary of State in 1930.  After leaving office in 1933, Stimson became a leading 
spokesperson for the Republican Party on foreign affairs and a strong advocate of opposition to 
Japanese aggression in China.  Over his long career Stimson developed strong personal views on 
the role of the War Department in the government of occupied territories.  He felt so strongly 
about the issue that he intimated to President Roosevelt that he was prepared to resign rather than 
consent ―to the liquidation of the great historic powers of my office.‖  Stimson‘s strong feelings 
regarding the army‘s role in military government stemmed from his own extensive experience, 
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and close associations with the army military governors of the early part of the twentieth century.  
In a letter Stimson prepared for the President in 1944, he described the history of American 
military government and the roles of men such as Elihu Root, Leonard Wood, and Frank McCoy.  
He ended the letter with the following conclusions: 
1. The authority of the military governor in each [historic] case has stemmed from 
the military power of the United States exercised by the President as Commander in 
Chief. 
2. In each case the military governor has been compelled to employ agents for the 
solution of civil administrative problems of government.  In each case these agents 
have been in the first instance composed of Army officers although many of them 
have been men of high civilian experience; for example, Tasker Bliss who conducted 
the customs of Cuba with consummate skill and success; Gorgas and Walter Reed 
who constructed its sanitary system; and many others like them. 
3. These Army officers continued until they were replaced by competent local native 
administrators. 
4. The administrators thus set up have been so successful as to constitute a bright 
page of American history, free from scandal and, in such difficult communities as 
Cuba and the Philippines, have laid the foundation of permanent good relations 
between those countries and the United States. 
In the history of the War Department, no Secretary of War brought as much personal 
experience with, or understanding of occupation operations to the War Department as 
Henry Stimson.
29
 
President Roosevelt posed a significant problem for Secretary Stimson.  Unlike Stimson, 
Roosevelt had limited experience with military government.  His natural inclination was that all 
things political should be the province of civilian leadership.  He also had a proclivity to 
personally manage details of foreign affairs.  Stimson noted in his diary that Roosevelt ―takes a 
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thoroughly Rooseveltian view of what historic good administrative procedure has required in 
such a case as we have in North Africa.  He wants to do it all himself.‖30  Both of Roosevelt‘s 
tendencies conflicted with the army‘s and Secretary Stimson‘s views of effective military 
government.  In the short term, in 1943, Stimson was able to win Roosevelt‘s support for the 
army‘s requirement to have unchallenged authority in occupied areas during hostilities.  
However, Stimson revisited military government policy several times with the President during 
the course of the war. 
Given that the Secretary of War was a firm backer of the army‘s leading role in 
occupation operations, the army required an organization to create the capability to conduct 
military government.  The Provost Marshal General of the Army took the initiative dealing with 
the military government issue as discussed below.  That effort was sufficient to organize the 
School of Military Government, but the Military Government Division within the Provost  
Marshal‘s office was at too low a level to impact War Department policy, much less national 
strategy or theater operations.  This became evident during Operation TORCH, the invasion of 
French North Africa. 
One of the important leaders that Marshall supported for promotion was Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, the commander of Operation TORCH.  Eisenhower was the field commander who 
had the greatest influence on the conduct of army occupation operations in Europe.  Because he 
did not see service overseas during World War I, Eisenhower did not have a strong wartime bond 
with the preceding generation of officers.  He was more of the generation of officers that 
matured after World War I.  By 1922, Eisenhower‘s military assignments were singularly 
unimpressive.  Two events occurred in the 1920s that created the conditions for Eisenhower to 
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distinguish himself from his peers.  The first was meeting Brigadier General Fox Conner.  
Conner graduated from West Point in 1898 and as a young officer had served in the occupation 
of Cuba.  During World War I, he was Pershing‘s Chief of Operations for the AEF, and was part 
of Pershing‘s inner circle of professional and personal confidants.  Conner met Eisenhower while 
on his way to command an infantry brigade in Panama, was impressed with him, and arranged 
for Eisenhower‘s assignment to his staff in 1922.  Eisenhower and Connor became close friends, 
and Connor took responsibility for Eisenhower‘s development as an officer.  Connor carefully 
guided Eisenhower‘s professional development, and Eisenhower later recalled that of all the 
people he would meet in his distinguished career, Connor was the ―one more or less invisible 
figure to whom I owe an incalculable debt.‖  Eisenhower‘s association with Connor connected 
him to the Pershing circle of world war veterans.  After his assignment to Panama, Connor used 
his influence to get Eisenhower a coveted selection to the Staff School at Leavenworth.
31
   His 
relationship with Fox Connor and his outstanding work at Leavenworth opened doors for 
Eisenhower.
 32
  After Leavenworth, the army assigned him to work with General Pershing on the 
American Battle Monuments Commission.  He began this work in 1926, but in 1927 he left to 
attend the War College.  After the War College, Eisenhower returned to the Battle Monuments 
Commission in France, and worked in Paris directly for General Pershing until 1929.
33
  
Returning to Washington, the army chose Eisenhower to be a military assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary of War.  He remained in this position until Army Chief of Staff General Douglas 
MacArthur picked him as an aide in 1933. 
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Eisenhower worked for MacArthur as his aide and military assistant for seven years —
four in Washington and three in the Philippines.  The assignment started out beneficial to both 
officers and greatly expanded Eisenhower‘s intellectual horizons.34  During his seven year 
association with MacArthur, Eisenhower was in the midst of national and international politics.  
He personally influenced army policy when MacArthur was Chief of Staff.  During his time in 
the Philippines, he developed a close personal friendship with President Manuel L. Quezon of 
the Philippines, and immersed himself in the strategic issues of Asia.
35
  Eisenhower, because of 
long personal contact with MacArthur, was also subject to MacArthur‘s long conversational 
monologues.  These, though somewhat self-centered, exposed Eisenhower to all of Douglas 
MacArthur‘s professional history, and undoubtedly to that of Arthur MacArthur as well.  Thus, 
when Eisenhower left the Philippines in December 1939 Eisenhower was a fundamentally 
different officer than before he began working for MacArthur.
36
    In those seven years, he 
gained insights into the issues of national defense policy, domestic and foreign politics, and the 
seventy years of the MacArthur family‘s military service beginning in the Civil War, and 
including Reconstruction, the frontier, the Philippines, Vera Cruz, and World War I.   
On November 8, 1942, Allied forces under Eisenhower‘s command landed in North 
Africa and defeated Vichy French forces under the command of French Admiral Francois 
Darlan.  The Allies left the Vichy government under Admiral Darlan in charge of civil 
administration of the territory.  They also left various Vichy racial laws in place.  Eisenhower 
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justified his accommodation with the Vichy French as military necessity.  The situation created a 
huge fervor in the Allied press and highlighted the unpreparedness of Allied forces to conduct 
military government operations.  Civil military problems plagued Eisenhower‘s command 
throughout operations in North Africa.  The problems included the question of supreme Allied 
authority in the captured territory, responsibility for feeding the civil population, responsibility 
for civil economic policy, and the role of Eisenhower‘s civil affairs staff.  As Eisenhower 
described it, ―Politics, economy, fighting —all were inextricably mixed up and confused one 
with the other.‖  Eisenhower‘s reports from North Africa prompted the War Department to 
increase the priority given to civil affairs in early 1943.
37
 
The various staff divisions of the War Department, G-1, JAG, Provost Marshal General 
(PMG), the Operations Division (OPD), as well as the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff 
all agreed on the importance of civil affairs and military government operations.  Stimson 
believed, based on his experience as the Secretary of State, that the State Department was 
completely incapable of administering occupied territory.  He felt strongly that the proper roles 
in occupied areas was that the State Department, with army support, determined policy, and the 
army, with State Department support, administered policy.
38
   However, in 1943, there was no 
concerted effort by any one department of the government to lead occupation policy, and that 
was a problem.  In North Africa the army learned that a myriad of civilian agencies all saw 
pieces of occupation operations as part of their responsibilities.  Each of the agencies wanted to 
coordinate their efforts separately with the various responsible War Department staffs, and each 
of the agencies formed its own policy in respect to occupied areas.  In addition, each agency also 
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coordinated directly with the theater commander, or in some cases, did not coordinate with the 
theater commander at all.  In either case, the other governmental agencies presented problems for 
the theater commander as well as the army staff.  These various agencies included the State 
Department, Treasury Department, Office of Economic Warfare, Office of Foreign Economic 
Coordination, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, Office of Lend-Lease 
Administration, and the North African Economic Board.  No single agency was responsible for 
coordinating the civil affairs tasks and issues that occurred in occupied territory after major 
combat operations were over.  
To solve this problem the War Department established a clearly articulated and published 
policy for occupation operations in February 1943.  It stated, ―In any military operations which 
results in occupation of substantial areas of inhabited territory, provision must be made as part of 
the military plan of attack for the welfare of the civil population over which jurisdiction is thus 
obtained.‖  After the situation stabilized, at the determination of the theater commander, the 
military would relinquish its control of the occupied territory to either the native population or 
civil agencies of the occupying forces.  Thus, the War Department firmly declared itself solely 
responsible for initial occupation operations.
39
 
The next issue the War Department confronted was establishing a single agency within 
the department to coordinate occupation tasks and issues, and to represent the War Department 
in policy.  A review by the Office of the Under-Secretary of War (OUSW) in January 1943 
confirmed that occupation responsibilities ―are scattered within the War Department, and 
delimitations of authority are not clear.‖40  The War Department addressed this problem by 
creating the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) on March 1, 1943, as part of the army General Staff.  
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On April 7, 1943, the army appointed Major General John H. Hilldring the chief of the Civil 
Affairs Division.
41
  Major General Hilldring was an infantry officer who served as the G-1 of the 
army staff before moving to head the CAD.  He was both an impressive staff officer and combat 
leader.  The army saw Hilldring as a good fit for the CAD position because as the G-1 he was 
involved in the initial writing of FM 27-5.
42
   
When Hilldring took over the CAD, General Marshall called him to his office and gave 
him guidance: 
I‘m turning over to you a sacred trust and I want you to bear that in mind every 
day and every hour you preside over this military government and civil affairs 
venture.  Our people sometimes say that soldiers are stupid.  I must admit at times 
we are.  Sometimes our people think we are extravagant with the public money, 
that we squander it, spend it recklessly.  I don‘t agree that we do.  We are in a 
business where it‘s difficult always to administer your affairs as a businessman 
can administer his affairs in a company, and good judgment sometimes requires 
us to build a tank that turns out not to be what we want, and we scrap that and 
build another one….But even though people say we are extravagant, that in itself 
isn‘t too disastrous…. 
But we have a great asset and that is that our people, our countrymen, do  not 
distrust us and do not fear us.  Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid 
of us.  They don‘t harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the 
country or the nature of this government in any way.  This is a sacred trust that I 
turn over to you today…. I don‘t want you to do anything, and I don‘t want to 
permit the enormous corps of military governors that you are in the process of 
training and that you are going to dispatch all over the world, to damage this high 
regard in which the professional soldiers in the Army are held by our people, and 
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it could happen, it could happen, Hilldring, if you don‘t understand what you are 
about.
43
 
Marshall‘s guidance reflected not only the importance he placed on the CAD and its leader, but 
also his understanding that CAD was going to be a highly visible, potentially politically 
sensitive, and strategically critical organization.
44
 
CAD was the army‘s single point of contact on issues regarding post-conflict operations, 
civil affairs, and military government.  One task of the CAD was to translate political policy into 
army directives, plans, and orders.  However, formulating national policy was still an ad-hoc 
process in 1943.  In Secretary Stimson‘s view, the President‘s Cabinet with its more than twenty 
members was not the appropriate venue for policy making.  National occupation policy was 
determined through a series of formal and informal meetings between the President, Cabinet 
officers, and assistants.  The result was confusing and sometimes contradictory policy 
statements.  The ineffectiveness of this situation became embarrassingly evident in the fall of 
1944 as German occupation policy became a priority.  To meet the requirement for policy the 
service secretaries and the Secretary of State created a formal organization for formulating post-
conflict policy: the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).
45
  The assistant 
secretaries of the State, War, and Navy departments were the members of the committee.  The 
committee formed in December 1944 —too late to have a major impact on initial German policy 
but in time to take the lead in formulating occupation policy for Japan.  The committee formed 
sub-committees of experts from the three departments to prepare policy recommendations on all 
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issues that effected occupation operations and US foreign policy.  The SWNCC staffed its 
recommendations on policy with each of the departments, and then forwarded them to the 
President for approval.  Once approved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) transformed the policy 
into directives for theater commanders.
46
  
Military Government Training  
Much of the American leadership outside of the military assumed that the task of 
occupation administration was the responsibility of American civil authorities.  This included 
President Roosevelt.  Even the army‘s own experience in World War I, and the report of Colonel 
Hunt which described it, indicated a preference for civil leadership of post-conflict operations.
47
  
One of the major findings of Colonel Hunt, based on his experience in the Rhineland, was that 
regular army officers did not have the special training or expertise required to conduct civil 
affairs operations in occupied territory.
48
  In December, 1941, the army staff looked closely at 
the military government doctrine, and the G-1 of the army, at the time responsible for military 
government occupations, raised the issue of civil affairs and military government training.  The 
army staff tasked the army PMG, General Allen W. Gullion, to be in charge of the training using 
the facilities of the Military Police School.  The staff selected the PMG to set up the course of 
instruction because the PMG had the resources, and General Gullion, in his previous position as 
the Army JAG, had supervised the writing of FM 27-5.  In late February 1942, the Provost 
Marshal General‘s Office determined that the military police schools were not sufficient to meet 
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the civil affairs training requirements and selected the University of Virginia as the site of a 
dedicated School of Military Government (SMG).  The first class reported for duty in May 
1942.
49
   
The PMG selected an army reserve JAG lawyer, Brigadier General Cornelius W. 
Wickersham, as the first commandant of the School of Military Government.
50
  The course of 
instruction at the SMG was sixteen weeks long and intended for field grade officers.  It prepared 
graduates to serve on senior level policy and planning staffs, or for leadership positions in 
military government organizations.  Each session could accommodate up to 150 students (later 
expanded to 175).  The New York Times, in a special feature on the school, described its purpose: 
Since the officers are in most cases already equipped for their specialized jobs, the 
training by the Army is largely a matter of familiarizing them with the military 
setting in which they will work and with the country to which their experience 
and skill will be applied.  Not the least of the problems is to train these essentially 
civilian experts to fit into the framework of Army organization and methods.  
Then they must translate their American technique into the environment of a 
foreign land and, to some extent into a foreign idiom. 
The school focused on two areas:  US military government doctrine and history, and the 
countries subject to likely occupation.  The curriculum included ten major subject areas:  
organization and operation of the War Department, international law and military government, 
American regulations, American experiences in military government, other nation‘s military 
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government experiences, public administration, political-military issues, geographic special 
topics (relating to Germany, Italy, or Japan), and liaison with friendly governments.  The foreign 
country expertise of the school‘s faculty was impressive.  Major Henry Rowell, Professor of 
Latin at Johns Hopkins University, was the Italian expert.  He had studied and taught in Rome.  
Professor Arnold Wolfers of Yale was the German expert.  Wolfers was a former director of the 
Hoch-schule Fur Politik in Berlin.  The Japanese expert, Professor Hugh Borton of Columbia 
University, had been a missionary in Japan and then studied at Tokyo Imperial University.  
Borton specialized in Japanese government and history.
51
  
The SMG was the top tier of a three-tier military government school system.  The system 
could produce up to 6,000 military government officers for the army field forces by the end of 
1944.  The second tier of the system and the part that trained the bulk of the company grade 
officers was the Custer–College program.  This program trained in two phases similar to the two 
major portions at the SMG.  The first phase was four weeks of basic military training, military 
government doctrine and War Department procedures.  The military government training faculty 
at the Provost Marshall Military Police School at Fort Custer, Michigan conducted this phase.  
The second phase of training focused on country specific topics and language training.  It lasted 
three months and gave students the country training they needed to operate as military 
government officers in villages, towns, and counties.  This phase, known as CATP (Civil Affairs 
Training Program) occurred at contracted civilian universities known as Civil Affairs Training 
Schools (CATS).  The army initially enrolled six civilian universities in the program and later 
expanded it to ten.  The third program that was part of the military government training system 
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was an occupation police program that trained public safety officers, police specialists, and 
military police officers and noncommissioned officers.  The Provost Marshal‘s office 
administered this program at Fort Custer as well.
52
 
Captain Robert M. Hill, a lawyer from Alabama, went through the CATP and attended 
the CATS at Yale University in the summer and fall of 1943.  His area specialty was Italy.  Hill 
reported:  
At New Haven we studied Italian culture —language, history, geography, 
demography, sociology, folklore, art, government, and politics.  We struggled 
with the language.  Our instructors were native Italian women who were residents 
of the New Haven area.  We had two oral drill periods a day and a weekly lecture 
on grammar.  This method required us to memorize whole phrases, mimic the 
instructor‘s pronunciation, and try our scraps of Italian in different situations.  We 
were expected then to be able to compose our own sentences.  For some this 
method worked, despite grammatical gender and those baffling irregular verbs. 
Hill indicated that some officers excelled in the language instruction and went on to become 
fluent, most had a working knowledge and were able to communicate, and some never got it.  
The CATP system took men who had valuable expertise and gave them the basic knowledge 
necessary to apply their skills within a military framework in a foreign land.  Hill‘s subsequent 
positive experiences as a military government officer for more than two years in occupied Italy 
validated the applicability and the effectiveness of the training he received in CATP.
53
 
The army selected a variety of different types of individuals to attend the School of 
Military Government.  Officers came from two sources, volunteers from within the already 
commissioned ranks, and volunteers recruited straight from civilian status.  Among the 
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volunteers coming from within the army there was a constant concern over quality as army field 
commanders discouraged volunteers from among their best officers.  The quality of those 
coming from civilian life was generally very high.  The civilian applicants were older and tended 
to be much more skilled and experienced than those from within the army.  The average age of 
the students going through the SMG in 1943 was forty-five years.  Older and more experienced 
officers went to staff positions while younger officers went to the field teams.  The various skills 
of the civil affairs officers included business executives (for supervisory positions), public health 
specialists, engineers, lawyers and judges, elected government officials, law enforcement 
professionals, political scientists, economists, agricultural specialists, and finance and banking 
experts.  Overall, the recruiting process for civil affairs officers (CAOs) was successful in 
attracting the high quality personnel needed for the mission.  Among the army‘s CAOs were 
several former state governors, members of Congress, city mayors and managers, university 
presidents, federal and state judges, deans of law schools, and many others prominent in civil 
professions.
54
 
Operations in Italy 
The US Army tested military government on a large scale for the first time during World 
War II in the Mediterranean Theater in 1943.  On July 9, 1943, Allied forces invaded Sicily and 
secured the island on August 17.  The Allied invasion of Sicily created a crisis within the Italian 
government and on July 24, 1943, the Italian Cabinet revolted and overthrew the Fascist dictator, 
Benito Mussolini.  On October 13, the Italian King declared war on Germany and the Allies 
recognized Italy as a co-belligerent.  The Germans continued to support a Fascist government in 
the northern part of Italy that they controlled.  Thus, Allied Military Government (AMG) 
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conducted military government operations in Italy in the midst of a highly unstable local political 
situation.
55
  After the surrender of the Italian government, the Allies set up a military government 
structure to administer operations in occupied territory.  Because of the complex political 
situation in Italy, the organization of military government was also complex.  There were 
essentially three phases of governance operating simultaneously during the Italian campaign.  
The first phase was tactical military government conducted by the CAOs of the tactical 
formations.  Initially, the highest tactical civil affairs organizations were the army level AMG 
groups commanded directly by the theater AMG headquarters in Palermo, Sicily.  The AMG 
headquarters established liaison officers at the 15
th
 Army Group headquarters.  As the Allied 
armies advanced north, the distance to Sicily became too great for effective command.  In 
October 1943, the 15
th
 Army Group established its own AMG HQ (later G-5, 15
th
 Army Group).  
The army group AMG HQ commanded all AMG organizations in the army group area of 
operations.  Below 15
th
 Army Group were AMG sections in both the Fifth US Army and the 
Eighth British Army.  In both armies, all corps and division headquarters also had AMG 
sections.  All AMG organizations were combined organizations staffed with both British and 
American officers.
56
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The military government apparatus at the theater level operated the second phase of 
governance in the Mediterranean theater.  At the theater level within Allied Forces Headquarters 
(AFHQ), a special Military Government Section (MGS) coordinated civil affairs and military 
government issues.  The MGS‘s responsibilities were planning, procuring and training personnel, 
and advising the commander in chief on civil affairs policy.  In May1944, the MGS reorganized 
as AFHQ G-5.
57
  In October 1943, there were four major theater level military government 
organizations under the MGS:  a military mission to the Italian Government in Brindisi, 
administrative AMG headquarters in Sicily, operational AMG headquarters with 15
th
 Army 
Group in Bari, and an independent AMG organization in Sardinia.  On November 10, 1943, 
AFHQ combined the four separate organizations under the Allied Control Commission (ACC).  
All elements of the ACC were combined British and US organizations and included personnel in 
equal numbers from both countries.  The ACC was technically subordinate to AFHQ, but had 
direct access to both Allied national governments and the Italian government.  AFHQ deemed 
the 15
th
 Army Group AMG redundant, reduced it to two liaison officers, and ordered the AMG 
elements of the Fifth and Eighth armies to report directly to the ACC.  The Commander in Chief 
of Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, was the President of the ACC but the organization 
operated under Deputy President, US Major General Kenyon W. Joyce and his Chief of Staff, 
US Brigadier General Maxwell D. Taylor.
58
  At the end of the summer of 1944, the ACC 
converted to a civilian organization called the Allied Commission (AC) and the AMG at 15
th
 
Army Group again reorganized as a G-5 staff section.  The AC President was a British civilian, 
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Harold Macmillan, and as its Chief Commissioner was British Lieutenant General Mason-
MacFarlane.
59
  The AC operated AMG on a regional basis centered on Italian provinces, which 
supervised communes (municipalities).  As the tactical AMG commands moved north with the 
tactical situation, AMG responsibility transferred from the 15
th
 Army Group to the ACC/AC and 
its provincial commissioners.   
The third phase of governance in the Mediterranean theater was the transfer of 
governance to indigenous authorities.  The ACC/AC gradually returned local administration to 
the Italian government as conditions permitted.  Thus, at any given time after the Fall of 1943, 
three separate and generally independent governance authorities (not counting the Fascist 
government in enemy territory) operated simultaneously in occupied Italy, geographically from 
north to south:  tactical AMG (15
th
 Army Group), theater AMG (ACC/AC), and the Italian 
government. 
Several conditions facilitated effective military government operations in Italy.  First was 
the availability of an Italian government.  The Allied governments gave Eisenhower the authority 
to determine that military necessity required that the Allies work with the Italian Badoglio 
government despite its faults and residual Fascist connections.  Having a functioning national 
government available permitted the use of the doctrine of indirect military government and a 
quick return of large portions of Italy to civil administration under the Italian government.  This 
greatly reduced the manpower requirements of AMG.  It also greatly eased the task of supplying 
and administering the civilian population.  The civil government became a vehicle through which 
the AC could dictate Allied policy and have those policies disseminated to the population and 
enforced. 
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Law and order was a concern of the AC and towards that objective they had a great 
resource in  the Italian Carabinieri.  The Carabinieri (Carabinieri Reali —CCRR) were the 
national police force of Italy.  They were a paramilitary organization with both military and 
civilian police functions.  The decision to use the CCRR was made early in the planning for the 
invasion of Sicily, Operation HUSKY.  Initially, Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPO), specially 
trained in public safety operations, closely supervised the CCRR.  The CAPOs serving in the 
theater included sixty-five veterans of the London Metropolitan Police specifically recruited to 
oversee the CCRR.  From the beginning in Sicily, the CCRR proved to be a major asset to AMG.  
The Carabinieri brought cultural awareness, language and professional police skills, and 
legitimate authority that the Italian people recognized to the AMG teams operating among the 
population.  The ability to use the CCRR under AMG supervision resulted in the quick 
establishment of law and order in occupied areas and saved the Allies untold manpower.
60
 
Another law and order priority of CAOs in occupied territory was to reestablish the 
judicial system.  CAOs quickly set-up summary courts to enforce occupation laws declared in 
posted proclamations.  They emphasized swift, fair, and open proceedings, and punishment.  
CAOs were not typically trained lawyers or judges, but all provincial level AMG teams included 
trained legal specialists.  AMG administered justice swiftly and then, if CAOs made mistakes, 
amended them upon review.  Higher headquarters automatically reviewed all CAO court 
procedures.  The AMG restored the Italian judicial system relatively quickly.  It was not 
uncommon to have civilian courts operating within three weeks of the occupation of a province.  
Many local lawyers and judges were not Fascist and their availability to serve in the judicial 
system contributed to the speed with which civil courts began to operate.  By 1944, the AMG 
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policy was to open Italian courts in all areas to the rear of the tactical army corps.
61
  Overall, the 
AMG was very effective establishing and maintaining the rule of law in Italy. 
Because Italy was a large agricultural country, planning assumed that the civilian 
population would need little food support.  Temporary food shortages proved to be politically 
embarrassing to the military government because of Allied propaganda promising a better life 
under Allied occupation, and they damaged Italian civilian morale.  The poor urban populations 
were the most affected.  In response, the Allies developed plans to provide wheat or flour to fifty 
percent of the population south of Rome and planned to provide up to seventy percent to the 
population north of Rome.  These requirements strained AMG resources.  Distribution was the 
major challenge to the AMG.  The Fifth US Army civil affairs officer reported in January 1944 
―at present there are insufficient trucks to distribute the flour ration which is laid down by 
Headquarters ACC.‖  With the road network damaged and the competing transport requirements 
of other missions and the tactical commands, AMG had a significant challenge ensuring that the 
food that was available, including military stockpiles and that produced by Italian farmers, could 
reach the populations most in need.  Efforts to distribute the food stocks were successful.  
Italians were not overfed and hunger existed at critical periods in particular locations, but overall 
the food situation was well in hand after the first year of occupation operations.
62
   
The organization of the military government apparatus in the Mediterranean theater 
caused problems for the military commanders.  The major problem was determining who had 
command authority over various AMG teams.  Part of the problem was the unclear definitions of 
administrative and operational control.   The rapidly changing location of units also contributed 
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to confusion.  All AMG elements were under the administrative control of the ACC/AC.  
Administrative control did not mean just administrative support, it also meant guidance 
regarding administering the occupied area.  The exact policies that AMG administered were the 
responsibility of the ACC/AC.  Tactical commanders had operational control of the AMG 
elements in their area of operations.  Operational control included logistics responsibility, 
determining when AMG began operations, and directing where AMG based their operations, but 
did not include policy.  Thus, some ACC/AC policies were not in tune with the particular tactical 
situation of the local commander, and some AMG teams received conflicting guidance from two 
different headquarters.  Back in Washington, the CAD staff officers took from this confusion the 
lesson that a separate territorial organization for military government was ineffective and 
distracting to the tactical command.
63
 
The fact that AMG and the ACC/AC were combined British and American organizations 
also caused some inefficiency and strain.  A reporter had the impression that ―the whole set-up 
[the AC] is unbalanced by differences of ideas between Washington and London.‖64  General 
Eisenhower‘s view was that he did ―not pay much attention to the nationality of the military 
officers serving in the Allied Forces and [made] their assignments as required by efficiency and 
economy of personnel.‖  When Eisenhower left the theater, however, British officers replaced 
senior Americans in the ACC.  This tipped the composition of the AMG leadership heavily in 
favor of the British.  Both junior and senior US leaders in Italy felt strongly that British 
personnel and policy dominated the ACC.  US Major John Boettiger reported to the War 
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Department Civil Affairs Division ―in AMG-Fifth Army there were most serious differences 
between American and British officers.‖  American civilian Henry F. Grady serving on the ACC 
staff, informed British General Mason-MacFarlane directly that ―collaboration for the peace 
shows signs of breaking down.‖  Eventually the sensitive issue became important enough for US 
Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, to tactfully request that US General Jacob L. 
Devers, the deputy theater commander, address the issue.
 65
 Command awareness of the issue 
prevented a lack of inter-Allied cooperation from becoming an operational obstacle, but the 
Americans took away from the experience the lesson that separate national occupation operations 
were preferable. 
The complex and fluid governance organization of Italy was also confusing to the Italian 
population.  As the New York Times reported, ―they [the Italian people] are bewildered by the 
bureaucratic system set up in place of the Fascist octopus.‖  Civilians were often frustrated by 
policies announced by the Italian government but not applicable to the population living in the 
areas under the control of AMG.  This circumstance was the result of the complex and 
impossible to anticipate situation caused by Italy‘s surrender and then declaration of war on 
Germany.  Nonetheless, competing government administrations within the same country created 
problems for local AMG teams and hurt the legitimacy of AMG authority.
66
  
As the war ended in Italy in 1945 all governance functions quickly reverted to either the 
AC or the Italian government —AFHQ quickly phased out tactical AMG.  Post-war AC 
activities focused on stabilizing borders and politics in northern Italy, particularly in regards to 
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the Yugoslavian forces that occupied parts of the northeast.  By December 1945, all of Italy 
except the disputed portions of the north was under control of the Italian government.  An Allied 
governance presence remained in the disputed territory until the issues were resolved in the Paris 
Peace Treaty of 1947.
67
  The AMG operations in Italy were the key element in transitioning the 
Fascist government of Mussolini into the functioning democratic republic that emerged after the 
war.  Perhaps as important, AMG in Italy was a valuable testing ground of policies and 
procedures for the difficult governance missions in Germany and Japan that followed.   
Preparing for Victory 
As soon as the United States entered World War II, before the great 1942 victories at 
Stalingrad and Midway in 1942 broke the string of Axis successes, the United States Army was 
already planning and preparing for victory and the conduct of post-conflict military government 
operations in occupied enemy territory.   This fact is indicative of two aspects of the culture of 
the American army in World War II:  the army assumed it would win the war, and anticipated 
conducting extensive occupation operations. In some respects, planning for victory began as 
soon as World War I ended more than twenty years previously.  The interwar education and staff 
training conducted at Fort Leavenworth and at the War College began giving officers formal 
exposure to the army‘s history, thinking, and doctrine regarding military government operations 
even before conclusion of the occupation of the Rhineland.  That education, combined with the 
influence and mentoring of the veterans of the Philippines, Cuba, Vera Cruz, and the Rhineland, 
facilitated the understanding among the interwar generations of officers that post-conflict 
operations were an integral and critical aspect of military planning and operations. 
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Doctrine, combined with professional military education gave the army an institutional 
understanding that detailed planning as well as execution of military government operations were 
theater command responsibilities.  Doctrine required the army staff to provide the theater 
commanders the necessary resources to conduct those operations.  One of the key requirements 
was trained personnel.  Another was strategic planning and policy.  The Civil Affairs Division 
and the various military government schools and training programs fulfilled those requirements.  
The preparation that the army did in the interwar years and the first years of World War II 
demonstrated that the institution clearly understood what Colonel Joseph Harris, a chief 
instructor at the SMG, stated in 1943: ―the success with which these [military government] tasks 
are accomplished will determine in large measure whether the war will have been fought in vain.  
It will likewise affect the length of time necessary before the world can recover from the 
disastrous destruction of the war, and will have a mighty influence on the preservation of the 
future peace of the world.‖68  
A weakness in the preparation for post-conflict operations was the national policy making 
apparatus.  The approach to civil affairs in the North African campaign indicated that regardless 
of the status of army preparations, there was no system for forming or coordinating policy at the 
national level.  In addition, President Roosevelt was inclined, based on intuition, not to trust the 
military regarding occupation operations.  The US government did not adequately address the 
policy coordination problem until late in the war with the formation of the SWNCC.  President 
Roosevelt‘s unease with military government remained an issue until his death. 
The American experience in Italy informed the army regarding the conduct of later 
occupation operations.  The military government operations in Italy demonstrated the difficulty 
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of inter-Allied coordination and cooperation.  This drove the CAD to prefer US only military 
government.  It also highlighted the problems of a military government command interfering 
with tactical commanders.  CAD‘s solution was to clearly prioritize the prerogatives of the 
tactical commander.  CAD‘s conclusions regarding operations in Italy significantly influenced 
the American approach to the occupations of Germany and Japan. 
The military government experience in Italy reflected several characteristics consistent 
with the army‘s history of occupation operations.  First, law and order was a top priority of the 
command as attested to by the rapidity with which the CCRR and Italian lawyers and judges 
were incorporated into the military government scheme.   The rapid activation of civil law 
enforcement and the cooperative attitude toward the Italian government, as well as the 
civilianization of the military government mission under the AC while the war was still in 
progress all reflect the American army‘s preference for a rapid transition to civil control.  
Unclear national strategic guidance to the theater and no national plan for economic develop 
were negative aspects of the occupation which were also consistent with the historical American 
approach. 
An important factor compensating for the lack of a policy making system at the national 
level were the senior War Department leaders who recognized the strategic importance of 
occupation operations, and the intermediate leadership who could identify, effectively plan for, 
and organize the resources necessary to conduct post conflict operations.  At the senior level, the 
broad strategic vision of leaders like Stimson, Marshall, and Eisenhower was critical to the 
success of the preparation for and execution of World War II military government.  All three had 
a direct connection to the army history of military government through the turn of the century 
generation of army military government practitioners.  In Stimson‘s case he was a participant, as 
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the Secretary of War, in the last years of army governance in the Philippines. These connections 
helped them to visualize the scope and complexity of the post-war occupation tasks.  The senior 
leadership recognized that occupation operations were the critical strategic link between combat 
operations and a successful peace.  As General Marshall stated, ―I don‘t suppose that any war in 
history has more clearly shown the truth of Clausewitz‘s old dictum than this one. The politico- 
military aspects of the war are so apparent that they do not need any enumeration. Whether it is 
in China, [the] Southwest Pacific, the Mediterranean or E.T.O., the political side is all tied in 
with the military, and the soldiers have to do most of the political work.‖69   The senior 
leadership passed its strategic understanding to its subordinates.  They empowered subordinate 
leaders like General Gullion and General Hilldring to recruit, train, and deploy the civil affairs 
specialists who provided the advice, planning, and technical expertise necessary to the success of 
theater military governors.  Other key subordinates, like Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. 
McCloy represented the vision of the army leadership to the other government agencies and 
Allies.  This eventually led to the development of SWNCC to coordinate strategic political-
military policies such as those relating to occupation operations. The senior leaders and their 
staffs were the key element that translated the army‘s history, interwar training and preparation, 
and doctrine, into resources, organizations and policy.  Those robust resources and the close 
attention of the army‘s leadership underpinned the successes of military government operations 
in post-war Germany and Japan.  
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CHAPTER 8 -  Direct Military Government: Germany, 1944–1949 
 
The American army entered German territory on September 11, 1944, when a patrol of 
the V US Corps crossed the Luxembourg-German border.  The patrol did not stay long but the 
next day US forces occupied a German village in the same area and stayed.  On October 21, 
1944 the US XIX and VII Corps, under the First US Army, seized the city of Aachen.  Aachen 
became the first major German city to come under occupation by the western Allies in World 
War II, and in Aachen the US Army began to put into effect the years of planning and 
preparation for the occupation of Germany.  The occupation of Germany was a very successful 
army operation —it helped create an economically prosperous, democratic government in place 
of the Nazis.  It also created a solid Cold War partner to counter communist influence in Europe.  
However, success did not come easy to the occupiers.  The President delayed and obfuscated on 
occupation policy, initial occupation policy was debilitating, and the requirement to coordinate 
all issues with Allies made decision making slow and often impossible.  The army achieved 
success because the basic US occupation tradition, captured in doctrine, understood by the army 
leadership, and trained in the civil affairs schools, established the conditions for success:  
democratic governance, law and order, health and welfare for the population.  Those actions 
provided the opportunity for the military government, working with a new administration in 
Washington, to formulate new political and economic policy, and transition from military to 
civilian rule.   
As the American army established its governance of Germany, it took partial 
responsibility (with the other Allied militaries) for a sophisticated urban society that numbered 
 256 
fifty-four million people in 1938.
1
  Germany in the spring of 1945, however, was not the same 
country that went to war in 1939.  The most dramatic effects were a result of the Allied 
combined bombing offensive.  The Allies waged a massive strategic air bombing campaign 
against Germany beginning in the fall of 1943.  The bombing attack significantly affected the 
German economy, and more important, the bombing had a major impact on the German people.
2
  
The strategic bombing campaign against German cities had much more than just economic 
consequences.  The attacks killed 305,000 civilians, foreigners, and members of the armed 
forces, and wounded another 780,000.  They caused massive general damage to Germany‘s 
cities.  The attacks destroyed 485,000 residential buildings and heavily damaged another 
415,000.  This accounted for forty percent of residential buildings in the fifty cities that were 
primary targets of strategic air attack.  Overall, the strategic air attack rendered 7.5 million 
German civilians homeless.
3
  Over six million Germans died in the six years of conflict 
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3
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beginning in 1939.  As the Allied ground forces moved into Germany in the spring of 1945 they 
entered a modern European state utterly destroyed and encountered a population deeply in shock. 
Germany Policy 
Formulating American policy for post-war Germany was a highly complex and 
ultimately only partly successful endeavor.  As the official army historian, Earl F. Ziemke 
observed regarding  the problem developing policy: ―the Hunt Report had been absorbed only 
into Army doctrine, not into United States strategic policy.  Elsewhere, specifically in the White 
House, other lessons were drawn from the two world wars.‖4 The army recognized the necessity 
for clear unambiguous policy and began to campaign for strategic guidance as early as 1942.  
However, President Franklin Roosevelt was not willing to focus on the details of post-war policy 
for a variety of domestic and foreign policy reasons.  Once the leadership focused on the issue, 
disagreements and a cumbersome Allied command system made it difficult to provide timely 
guidance to the theater commander. Policy toward Germany did not receive Presidential 
attention until August 1944 when, at the urging of General Eisenhower, commanding Allied 
forces in northwest Europe, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, planning coordination began 
between the War, State, Navy and Treasury Departments.  During these meetings War 
Department officials noted the influence the views of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau, had with the President, particularly in the area German policy.
5
 
The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau‘s friendship with the President dated 
from 1913, and the two men were neighbors for many years in Dutchess County, New York.  
Morgenthau was a staunch Semite, and during the August 1944 cabinet meetings on post-war 
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policy, his view that Germany deserved a harsh peace quickly became apparent.  Morgenthau‘s 
strong views regarding post-war Germany, and his access to the President, permitted him to have 
a powerful influence on national policy.
6
  The President was open to Morgenthau‘s German view 
not only because of their friendship, but also because he shared many of his friend‘s perceptions 
of the German people.  Roosevelt‘s view of the Germans greatly complicated the development of 
post-war policy for Germany.  In 1943 he stated in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
A somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany leads me 
to believe that the German philosophy cannot be changed by decree, law, or 
military order. The change in German philosophy must be evolutionary and may 
take two generations. To assume otherwise is to assume, of necessity, a period of 
quiet followed by a third world war."
7
 
Roosevelt had a predisposition to treat Germany harshly after the war because of his youthful 
experiences in Germany.  At a meeting in Quebec in September 1944, Morgenthau got both 
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to agree to a harsh peace.  The written 
agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill specifically stated, ―this program for eliminating the 
war-making industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a 
country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.‖8 Churchill claimed Morgenthau used 
Britain‘s lend-lease debt and the prospect of post-war loans as inducements to get his agreement.  
He told British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, ―When I have to choose between my people and 
the German people, I am going to choose my people.‖  The Quebec agreement occurred without 
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consultation with the State and War Departments and contravened the prevailing views in those 
departments.
9
   
Colonel Hunt‘s report on the World War I occupation of Germany strongly influenced 
the War Department‘s, and in particularly the CAD‘s, view of post-war policy.  The Hunt report 
quoted General Pershing‘s order regarding relations with the German population ―You 
[American soldiers] have come not as despoilers or oppressors, but simply as the instruments of 
a strong, free government whose purposes toward the people of Germany are beneficent.  During 
our occupation the civil population is under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the 
American Army.‖  A harsh peace violated one of the central themes of military doctrine 
expressed in FM 27-5: 
Proper treatment [of the civil population] will be of direct benefit to the 
occupying forces in preventing chaos, promoting order, and in the procurement of 
labor, services, and supplies. It will have a favorable influence upon the present 
and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its Allies. It will 
provide incentive to populations of other territories to accept, our future 
occupation.  
Such plans as may be practicable should be laid in advance for the resumption of 
production, especially in agriculture, fishing, and manufacture, but also in mining, 
forestry and the service trades.
10
 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the strongest advocate for an unemotional and just post-
war treatment of Germany.  Stimson was astonished that he was initially ―a minority of one,‖ 
with a progressive view of post-war German policy among Roosevelt‘s close advisors.  Quickly 
though, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins came to agree 
with Stimson.  In a memorandum challenging the Morgenthau view Stimson told the President ―I 
still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we 
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hope to attain by a complete military victory, that is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of 
social, economic and political stability in the world.‖  Thus, as American forces entered 
Germany in the fall of 1944, the American strategic leadership did not have an agreed upon 
vision of post-war Germany.  The different strategic visions at the national level retarded policy 
making and planning at the theater operational level.
11
 
Another issue that negatively affected planning was not the President‘s policy, but rather 
his timing. As late as October 1944, after US forces had entered Germany, Roosevelt wrote 
Secretary of State Hull: 
It is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of 
Germany, but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to 
believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment.  It 
may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence.  I 
dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.
12
 
The implication in Roosevelt‘s memorandum was that on some issues Roosevelt was content to 
wait until the war was over before determining policy.  The Presidential election in the fall of 
1944 had an influence on Roosevelt‘s willingness to commit to a definite policy on Germany.  
Though he was inclined toward Morgenthau‘s view, strong reaction from the press, Stimson and 
Hull‘s protests, and attacks by the Republican presidential candidate caused him to back off from 
Morgenthau‘s view.  He told Hull that in October 1944, ―no one wants to make Germany a 
wholly agricultural nation again.‖13  Ultimately, however, the Quebec agreement, Roosevelt‘s 
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private views, and Morgenthau‘s influence had the effect of causing the planners to place strict 
policy restrictions on German economic recovery.  
Organization of the military command and staffs also caused problems creating policy 
and planning for operations.  The military command that would defeat Germany in northwest 
Europe was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), commanded by 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Within SHAEF, the G-5 staff section was responsible for civil 
affairs.  The command was a combined Allied command whose two largest components were 
British and American.  SHAEF and General Eisenhower got their strategic policy guidance from 
the Combined (British and American) Chiefs of Staff (CCS).  The CCS got their civil affairs 
policy from the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) located in Washington, or its 
overseas extension, the CCAC(L) located in London.  Once the US leadership determined US 
policy, US strategic views were reconciled with British views in the CCAC before forwarding to 
the CCS for approval.  Once the CCS approved civil affairs policy it became Allied policy.  This 
cumbersome system required negotiation and compromise at every level.  After the CCS 
determined Allied policy, the policy went back to the national governments for approval before 
forwarding to the theater commander for execution.  This meant that often simple policy issues 
could take months of coordination before the CCS issued guidance to Eisenhower and his staff.
14
 
The combined command system, because of disagreements within the US command, 
different national visions of the post-war environment, and the slow and awkward policy 
process, gave little policy guidance to SHAEF regarding post-war Germany.  Most of SHAEF‘s 
strategic guidance came in CCS Directive 551.  CCAC in Washington drafted CCS 551, entitled 
―Directive for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender,‖ had it approved 
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by the CCS, and provided it to SHAEF in April 1944.This guidance, though useful, was 
insufficient because it did not address many of the likely contingencies tactical military 
government efforts would encounter.
15
  Also, CCS 551 provided no guidance regarding post-
surrender policy. 
American policy was of limited formal use to SHAEF because it was not approved Allied 
policy.  However, Eisenhower was also commander of the United States Army, European 
Theater of Operations (ETOUSA), and in that role it was proper for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) to provide him guidance.  Based on meetings between cabinet officers and deputies from 
State, War and Treasury, the JCS conceived a preliminary plan for the occupation of Germany.  
This preliminary plan reflected a very harsh tone and its economic provisions were particularly 
severe, reflecting the influence of Secretary Morgenthau.  The American JCS  issued the plan as 
JCS Directive 1067.  First drafts of the plan were available in the fall of 1944, but coordination 
and debate regarding the contents of the plan continued in several drafts through the winter of 
1944–45 and into the spring.16  Just prior to the Yalta conference in February 1945, the State 
Department indicated that it remained highly dissatisfied with the JCS directive, viewing it as too 
punitive in general.  Over the course of the spring of 1945 the State Department succeeded in 
getting President Roosevelt to issue new guidance on the post-war Germany.  In the new 
guidance the President was less emphatic regarding the economic dismemberment of Germany.  
The three departments, State, War, and Treasury, revised and created a new version of the 
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directive that modified the original in slight but important ways.  Eisenhower, in his US role as 
commander ETOUSA, received a draft of the plan in March 1945.  The final approved JCS 1067 
arrived in the theater in April —a month before Germany‘s formal surrender.  JCS 1067 was a 
compromise between the various department philosophies.  The stern tone of the directive 
reflected President Roosevelt‘s view of the occupation:   
It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany‘s ruthless warfare and 
the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made 
chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility 
for what they have brought upon themselves.    
Except for its economic policy, however, Morgenthau‘s harsh ideas toward Germany did not 
greatly affect the substance of the directive.  In accomplishing objectives of the occupation the 
directive advised the commander that the aim was ―not oppression,‖ while it directed him to be 
―just but firm and aloof.‖ 17     
The economic portion of the directive was harsh in tone and substance:  ―you will take no 
steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany, or (b) designed to maintain or 
strengthen the German economy.‖  Specifically, it directed the US commander to: 
take no action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a 
higher level than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations  and 
you will take appropriate measures to ensure that basic living standards of the 
German people are not higher than those existing in any one of the neighboring 
United Nations…. 18  
General Lucius D. Clay, Eisenhower‘s deputy for military government, first saw the report in 
April 1945.  Clay‘s reaction was ―we were shocked… at its failure to grasp the realities of the 
financial and economic conditions which confronted us… it had been drafted before Germany 
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surrendered and without knowledge of the conditions we should find.‖19  Mr. Robert Murphy, 
Eisenhower‘s political advisor, Brigadier General William H. Draper, the economics advisor, 
and Lewis Douglas, the financial advisor, all studied the document.  They agreed with Clay that 
JCS 1067 was fundamentally flawed.  Douglas‘s evaluation was that ―this thing was assembled 
by economic idiots!‖20  Not only was JCS 1067 flawed, it was also late.  The late issue of the 
guidance hurt the ability of the SHAEF G-5 and subordinate tactical and military government 
units to prepare detailed plans for the occupation.  President Roosevelt‘s poor health, personal 
attitudes, and disagreement at the national level caused the delay.  Morgenthau‘s influence 
affected the economic guidance.  Thus, the war ended with strategic planning guidance that was 
late and that the leadership of the occupation of Germany felt was fundamentally and seriously 
flawed.   
Operational Planning    
While national policy lurched forward subject to interdepartmental and international 
negotiation and disagreement, theater level planning attempted to make progress without 
strategic policy guidance.  Theater planning began in earnest in the summer of 1943 when the 
Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick 
E. Morgan, prepared contingency plans in the event of a sudden German military or political 
collapse.  General Morgan quickly discovered that no civil affairs or military government 
planning, staffs, or capability existed either within the British army or the deployed forces of the 
US Army in Great Britain.  Planning and developing the forces for civil affairs and military 
government became a top priority for COSSAC beginning in August 1943.  By the end of 1943, 
General Morgan‘s staff produced a contingency plan, Operation RANKIN C, in which a large 
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combined military government organization established governance of Germany in the event of 
the sudden collapse of the Nazi government.  However, at the time COSSAC published 
RANKIN C, no military government organization existed to execute it.  To execute the plan, the 
US Civil Affairs Division (CAD) began to deploy its German civil affairs specialists from the 
United States as quickly as possible.  The first personnel arrived in Great Britain in January 
1944.
21
 
In December 1943 the COSSAC staff became the SHAEF staff.  As detailed planning for 
Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of France, progressed, planning for the occupation of 
Germany remained limited to Operation RANKIN C.  SHAEF began requesting occupation 
policy guidance from the CCS and CCAC as early as April 1944, but no guidance was forth-
coming for the reasons discussed previously.  Thus, as the Allies invaded France in June 1944, 
there was no plan for occupation operations in Germany beyond RANKIN. 
Though they lacked guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the planners in the 
SHAEF G-5 (Civil Affairs) staff were not idle.  Early in the spring of 1944 the G-5 Country Unit 
for Germany began work on a Civil Affairs Handbook for Germany.  The purpose of the 
handbook was to provide guidance to civil affairs officers specifically tailored to occupation 
operations in Germany.  It included general guidance for each of the sixteen primary functions 
for which civil affairs officers were responsible.
22
  Supplementary handbooks contained even 
more detail for each civil affairs function.  Preparing the handbook was an important but routine 
                                                 
21
 Ziemke, 29–33. 
22
 The Germany Handbook lists sixteen functions for military government in Germany:  Civil 
Administration, Eradication of Nazism, Finance and Property Control, Public Safety, Legal, Public Health, Public 
Welfare, Displaced Persons and Refugees, Labour; Education and Religious Affairs, Agriculture, Food, and Food 
Distribution; Supply; Industry, Trade, Public Utilities; Rationing, and Price Control; Posts, telephone, Telegraph, 
and Radio Services; Transportation; and Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives.  Allied Expeditionary Force, 
Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender (Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force, 1944), iv. 
 266 
task.  Country Units for the other European countries where civil affairs and military government 
operations were expected prepared similar handbooks.
23
 
SHAEF was able to produce the handbooks without detailed strategic guidance because 
staff officers accurately assumed the occupation would occur in three phases.  SHAEF then 
prepared tentative plans based on the first two phases of occupation.  The first phase was the 
mobile phase.  During that phase military government teams occupied parts of Germany as the 
Allied forces captured territory (if Germany resisted) or as Allied forces moved in (if Germany 
surrendered).  Planners referred to this phase as the carpet phase, describing how a carpet of civil 
affairs teams would roll out to cover Germany.  CCS 551 provided strategic guidance for this 
phase.  The G-5 prepared a variety of versions of plans for this phase based on different possible 
variations of the future zone boundaries between the occupying armies.  In September 1944 
SHAEF approved with modification the ―1186 South Plan.‖  This plan was a version of the 
carpet plan and described the organization of each military government detachment and their 
pinpoint assignments assuming southern Germany was the US zone.  The 1186 South Plan 
described the employment of over 1,400 military government officers organized into 213 
military government detachments.  It was issued before the US zone was formally announced 
and was based on SHAEF‘s estimate of where the zone would be and the deployment of tactical 
units in the late summer of 1944.  It served as the basis for the deployment of the detachments 
within Germany as the army advanced.  In November 1944, planners modified the basic plan to 
more accurately reflect the tactical situation and the zones the planners expected to occupy after 
hostilities.
24
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The complete occupation of Germany started the second phase of occupation operations.  
It was a transitory static phase during which the occupation forces conducted essential tasks, 
such as disarming the Germany military forces.  This phase lasted until the Allies organized the 
permanent governing apparatus for Germany.  The Operation ECLIPSE plan guided this second 
phase.  The civil affairs handbooks included guidance for use during the carpet phase and the 
ECLIPSE transition phase of occupation operations.
25
 
The ECLIPSE plan was essentially a list of conditions for the transition from the rolling 
carpet mobile phase of military government to the static phase.  ECLIPSE also emphasized the 
accomplishment of critical tasks during the transition phase including enforcing the terms of 
surrender, disarming and disbanding the German military forces, arresting and bringing to justice 
war criminals, disarming and controlling the police and other paramilitary organizations, 
establishing law and order, repatriating and caring for displaced persons and prisoners of war, 
controlling public information, and establishing military government.  In March 1945 SHAEF 
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reviewed the November ECLIPSE plan and determined that an update was not necessary. 
26
 The 
ECLIPSE plan, along with the Germany Handbook, were the primary guides for occupation 
operations at the tactical level from the arrival of American forces in Germany until the German 
surrender in May 1945, and continued to be the guides to standing operating procedures for the 
occupation forces in the first year of the occupation.
 27
 
Organization 
The highest organization of military government in Northwest Europe was the SHAEF 
general staff section G-5 (Civil Affairs).  The G-5 section at SHAEF organized on February 15, 
1944.  Thirty-five officers formed the staff.  The G-5 contained six sections:  Fiscal, Legal, 
Supply, Economics, Civil Affairs Operations, and Staff Duties.  The mission of the G-5 was to 
advise the Supreme Commander on civil affairs policy, issue policy directives, and supervise 
execution of plans and policy.  In May 1945 the SHAEF G-5 reorganized in preparation for 
operations in Germany.  The G-5 established functional branches for Supply, Displaced Persons, 
Legal, Public Health, Finance, Economics, Public Relations, and Administration.
28
  The 
European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) was subordinate special staff element within the G-5, 
but located separate from the SHAEF headquarters.  Among the ECAD responsibilities was 
organization and operation of the country teams, planning, training personnel, and organization 
of a German section.  As initially organized, the G-5 and the ECAD were combined British and 
American organizations.  Country teams were teams formed of specialists on specific European 
countries to do specific planning and assist in training civil affairs and military government 
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teams.
29
 The ECAD also commanded three regiments of military government or civil affairs 
detachments.
30
  The ECAD tasked 1
st
  Civil Affairs Regiment with civil affairs duties in liberated 
Allied countries.  The 2
nd
  and 3
rd
  Regiments conducted military government in Germany under 
the carpet plan.  By May 1945, the civil affairs regiments and their assigned detachments all 
operated under control of various tactical units.  At that time the ECAD headquarters deactivated 
and its remaining special staff functions, including the country teams, organized directly under 
SHAEF G-5.
31
     
Rolling Carpet 1945 
The carpet plan called for military government units to provide civil affairs support to 
army tactical units as the tactical units executed their combat missions.  In this role, the priority 
of military government detachments was to establish control of the civil population and ensure 
their non-interference with army tactical operations.  Aspects of these operations included 
evacuation of the civil population, refugee control, disarming the civil population, and civil law 
and order in the immediate rear area of the army combat units.  Military government 
detachments attached to the tactical commands in the local area for the purposes of the carpet 
concept.  However, as the front advanced and the tactical unit moved on, the military 
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government team remained in place and continued to control the assigned geographic area and its 
civilian population.  A new military government detachment attached to the moving tactical unit 
based on the tactical unit‘s next geographic objective.  The stationary military government unit 
subsequently attached to the next tactical unit to arrive in the area.
32
  Thus, within the army‘s 
tactical commands there was a constant attachment and detachment of military government 
teams during offensive combat operations.
33
  The evaluation of the performance of the military 
government teams during the combat phase of operations was very positive.  Harold Zink, a 
member of the SHAEF G-5 staff and later critic and historian of the American military 
government efforts, concluded,  ―the accomplishments of military government during the combat 
phase were of a high order… there has been a pretty widespread verdict that military government 
performed very well.
34
 
ECLIPSE 1945 
As the Allied ground offensives rolled deep into Germany, military commanders were 
aware that the political leaders of the various allied countries had already determined at their 
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conference in Yalta in February 1945 to divide the country in occupation zones.  The US 
occupation zone was the southern portion of Germany.  The Allies designated British and 
Russian zones in northwest and eastern Germany respectively.  Belatedly, in July 1945, the 
Allies assigned the French their own occupation area along the western border encompassing 
portions of the British and American zones.  The American zone itself was 47,000 square miles 
and included a population of approximately nineteen million civilians for whom the American 
army was directly responsible.  It was mostly an agricultural and forested area.  One fourth of the 
land was arable, one fourth was mountains and forests, and one-half was swamps or pasture.  
The two most important cities in the American zone were Frankfurt and Munich.  Frankfurt was 
sixty percent destroyed while Munich was eighty percent destroyed.
35
   
Despite the ambiguity regarding the French, the withdrawal of the military government 
attachments to the US occupation zone began almost immediately after the end of hostilities on 
May 8, 1945.  It was a gradual process and not completed until July 10, 1945.  Final designation 
of national zones occurred on July 12.  Upon relief by British, French, or Soviet forces, the 
American military government teams moved to pinpoint assignments in the American zone.  The 
US zone included Land (state) Bavaria; Land Hessen, east of the Rhine River; Provinz Hessen-
Nassau, as it existed prior to 1938; the northern portions of länder (states) Baden and 
Wurttemberg, including the major population centers of Ulm, Wurtingen, Boblingen, Leonber, 
Pforzheim, and Karlshruhe; and the Bremen harbor enclave in north Germany.  On July 10, 12
th
 
US Army Group prepared to redeploy and responsibility for the US armies in Germany and for 
military government detachments passed to the new Headquarters US Forces European Theater 
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(USFET).  On July 12, the command designated Land Bavaria as the Eastern Military District 
and it placed under the control of the Third US  Army, with its headquarters in Munich.  The rest 
of the US zone, including the Bremen enclave but not Berlin, was designated the Western 
Military District and placed under the control of the Seventh US Army, headquartered in 
Heidelberg.
36
  The Americans set up the USFET headquarters in Frankfurt. 
In April 1945, the American command selected an obscure major general to be the 
commander of the occupation of Germany, Major General Lucius D. Clay.  The army selected 
Clay to serve as the Deputy Commander for military government, USFET under General 
Eisenhower who was the commander and the military governor.  Clay‘s job, as the deputy 
military governor, was to handle the day to day governance activities in Eisenhower‘s name.  
Clay was an Engineer officer and graduated from West Point in 1918.  From 1937 to 1938 Clay 
served in the Philippines, his only overseas assignment prior to World War II.  During that 
assignment he worked closely with Major Dwight Eisenhower, the aid to retired General 
Douglas MacArthur, military advisor to the Philippine government.  Eisenhower and Clay 
worked well together and the two majors established a life-long friendship.  Clay‘s first major 
assignment during World War II came in 1940  when the army selected him to supervise the 
national airfield building program whose goal was to build five hundred airports in two years.  
Once the United States entered the war, Clay served as the Chief of Material, for the Army 
Services of Supply.  In his role as Chief of Material Clay served on the important Combined 
Munitions Assignment Board which exposed him to the complex organization of the American 
economy at war.  In 1944, Clay briefly went to Europe to take charge of the port of Cherbourg.  
After straightening out the port congestion problems, Clay returned to Washington to work as the 
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Chief of War Production,  in the Office of War Mobilization under James F. Byrnes.  Byrnes 
stated he selected Clay for that important civilian position because he knew ―no army officer 
who had as clear an understanding of the view of the civilian.‖37  In the spring of 1945 President 
Roosevelt personally selected Clay for the post of deputy commander for military government in 
Germany on the recommendations of Assistant  Secretary of War John J.  McCloy and Byrnes.  
The War Department did not consult with Eisenhower,  but Eisenhower approved of the choice 
as he was well aware of Clay‘s abilities and had indicated he wanted Clay involved in post-war 
civil affairs.
38
  Clay‘s initial role was translating strategic policy into theater level organization 
and action. 
Two important theater level occupation related events occurred after the surrender of 
Germany.  One was the Potsdam meeting between the Allied leaders which contributed to 
evolving strategic policy toward Germany.  The other major strategic event was the 
implementation by the Allies of the machinery for Allied control in the form of the Allied 
Control Council in Berlin.  The implementation of the Control Council operations effectively 
began the third phase of the occupation wherein another authority gradually replaced US Army 
control under ECLIPSE. 
From July 17 to August 2, 1945, Allied national leaders met outside Berlin at Potsdam 
Germany.  One of the purposes of the meeting was to establish the way forward to peace treaties.  
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The Potsdam agreement produced by the leaders of the three allied nations, President Harry 
Truman, General Secretary  Joseph Stalin, and British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and 
later Clement Attlee,  established the principles for interim  government of Germany until the 
establishment of a more permanent government.  The Potsdam agreement established that ―for 
the time being, no central German Government shall be established.  Notwithstanding this, 
however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by state 
secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, 
foreign trade and industry.  Such departments will act under the direction of the Control 
Council.‖39  Two of the most important aspects of the Potsdam agreement were the freedom it 
gave to the national military commanders to administer their zones independently and the 
statement regarding economic issues.  On economic issues the  Potsdam leaders agreed that 
Germany would be treated as an economic unit, and ―allied controls shall be imposed upon the 
German economy, but only to the extent necessary.‖  The Potsdam economic guidance was much 
less severe and restrictive than the JCS 1067 statements on economics.  Potsdam, different from 
JCS 1067, required the occupation force to become involved in German economic development.  
Overall, General Clay‘s assessment was that the addition of the Potsdam guidance to JCS 1067 
removed the onerous economic restrictions of the latter and made the governance mission in 
Germany achievable.
40
 
On August 30, 1945 the Allied Control Council formally met for the first time in Berlin.  
The council‘s authority and mandate derived from an Allied agreement achieved and signed in 
November 1944 by the European Advisory Commission (EAC).  At its initial meeting the 
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council consisted of Marshal Georgy Zhukov of the Soviet Union, Field Marshal Bernard 
Montgomery of Britain, General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States, and General Jean 
de Lattre de Tassigny of France.  The primary purpose of the Council was ―to initiate plans and 
reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting 
Germany as a whole, on the basis of instructions received by each Commander-in-Chief from his 
Government.‖  The council‘s authority would be in effect until replaced by an unspecified 
organization designated ―by a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
41
   
Operations 
As the war ended the immediate operational tasks for military government multiplied.  In 
July the New York Times reported ―The United States Army in Europe this week has presented a 
picture of darting, seething motions, some of it in circles, as reconversion of a great war machine 
progressed.‖42 Staff work immediately increased.  Eisenhower quoted an overworked army staff 
officer who commented, ―I always thought that when the Germans finally surrendered I would 
celebrate by going on a big binge.  Now I‘m taking aspirin every day –without the fun of looking 
back on the binge!‖43  The first task was disarmament of the German military forces.  Another 
key task was reorganizing for military government in accordance with the ECLIPSE plan.  The 
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military government continued, on a larger scale, responsibility for caring for the health and 
welfare of the German civilian population as well as the millions of displaced Allied civilians 
located in Germany.  Another complex task that effected military government was the 
redeployment and demobilization of troops not needed for the occupation.  Additionally, the 
Allied occupation commands focused on developing unified strategic policy towards Germany. 
Through the months of May, June, and July the US military forces were extremely busy.  
Tactical forces and military government teams pulled back from the positions they seized in the 
last weeks of the war and reassembled within the national occupation zone agreed upon at Yalta.  
In the southwestern parts of Germany many of the military government teams were already in 
position.  These teams had to contend with the turbulence of frequently changing higher 
headquarters as tactical headquarters moved as part of the demobilization and redeployment 
process.  Though the military government detachments themselves were part of the permanent 
force remaining in Germany, the military government system had to contend with the turbulence 
of individual redeployment.  Early recruitment, and the deployment of military government 
specialists to Great Britain in early 1944 gave many team members a high number of 
demobilization points.  This caused many critical and experienced civil affairs officers to leave 
the army early in the occupation.  The loss of many of the specially recruited and trained military 
government specialists challenged effective military government at the tactical level throughout 
the first year of the occupation.
44
 
As military government teams arrived in their pinpoint assignments they immediately 
confronted the challenge of a large civil population with virtually no indigenous governance 
structure.  Throughout the last year of the war, beginning when the first parts of Germany fell to 
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the Allies in 1944, the German government practiced a policy of scorched earth as they retreated 
in front of the Allied advance.  The German government, within its ever decreasing ability in 
1945, attempted to remove everything of military or even civil value as they pulled back.  The 
Germans destroyed or disbanded most elements of civil government.  Government officials, 
including mayors, police, fire fighters, tax collectors, railroad and postal workers, and many 
other skilled government employees evacuated away from the advancing Allies.  This was 
particularly true in the large urban areas.  This created a huge challenge to military government 
teams who expected to supervise German officials in their jobs, not do the jobs themselves.
45
 
In late September 1945, General George Patton caused a major publicity embarrassment 
to the American military governor of Germany, General Eisenhower.  Patton was the commander 
of the Third Army and the military governor of the Western Military District.  In a press 
conference with US reporters, the press asked Patton about the number of former Nazis working 
for and with the military government.  Patton replied to the effect that the Germans who had 
been Nazi party members were the only Germans who possessed the many technical skills 
critical to the administration of military government.  In addition, Patton made a comparison of 
the German Nazi party membership to membership in the American Democratic and Republican 
political parties.  Patton‘s statements made instant headlines in the United States and created 
charges that the army was being ―soft‖ in its prosecution of the occupation.  The incident 
resulted in Patton‘s removal as commander of the Third Army and demonstrated that the 
Morgenthau view of occupation policy still had a powerful popular following in the United 
States.
46
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Although Patton‘s comment reflected the difficult reality of occupation administration, 
General Clay viewed Patton‘s removal as an opportunity to advance the organizational 
effectiveness of the occupation.  General Clay had made clear to General Eisenhower soon after 
his selection as deputy military governor that he considered it a necessity that the entire military 
government apparatus be under his command.  General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower‘s Chief 
of Staff, preferred that the occupation organization remain as it had been under the carpet plan, 
with military government conducted through the tactical commanders to the senior headquarters, 
USFET.  Eisenhower sided with Clay, but delayed implementation of the organizational change 
until occupation operations were established and much of the initial post-war chaos subsided.  
Clay used the occasion of Patton‘s indelicate remarks to recommend to Eisenhower that it was 
time to reorganize the force for occupation.
47
 
On October 8, 1945, the reorganization of the USFET began.  Changes occurred at the 
highest level as the US Group Control Council (USGpCC) became the Office of Military 
Government US (OMGUS) and the G-5 of the USFET became the subordinate Office of Military 
Government (US Zone).  Both were under General Clay‘s command as the deputy military 
governor.  General Clarence Lionel Adcock, the USFET G-5, became Clay‘s deputy and the 
head of OMG (US Zone) located in Frankfurt Germany in the I.G. Farben building with the rest 
of the USFET headquarters.
48
  In November Military Government commands were created from 
the Third and Seventh Army G-5 organizations to supervise  German civilian administrations set 
up in three länder organized in the American zone:  Bavaria, Wurttemberg-Baden, and Gross 
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Hessen.  These länder commands reported directly to OMG (US zone).  General Clay remained 
in Berlin where he personally supervised the staff of the OMGUS and participated in the various 
activities related to the Allied Control Council.  After the reorganization, American tactical units 
and the USFET staff had no direct role in military government except in support of and 
coordinated with OMGUS.
49
 
An important policy change occurred as the OMGUS reorganization took place.  On 
October 5, General Clay ordered military government detachments to withdraw from any direct 
role in local and municipal government.  From that point forward, military government 
detachments at the local and municipal level only advised and supervised appointed German 
officials in their tasks.  When the Germans failed to properly carry out OMGUS policies and 
directives, military government officers were to report the discrepancy to the länder 
commanders.  OMGUS directed policy to the German officials through its German 
administration set up at the Land level, and instructed German officials at the zone level through 
the Länderrat (zone Council of German leaders).
50
 
The military government closely monitored the danger of disease and famine during the 
first two years of the occupation, particularly during winter of 1945–46.  Fortunately, military 
government had the services of an exceptionally able officer in Major General Morrison C. 
Stayer, the Chief Surgeon of USFET.
51
  Stayer immediately understood that the occupation 
forces had three challenges.  The first challenge was standing up the German health services as 
quickly as possible.  The second challenge was combating disease.  The final challenge was 
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ensuring an adequate diet and preventing famine among the German population.  As early as the 
fall of 1945 Stayer was working to have German medical schools reopened in order to begin to 
meet the need for medical specialists.
52
 
The major concern regarding disease was typhus transmitted by lice.  To combat the 
spread of the disease the occupation command established control points at all major access 
points into the American zone, and a cordon sanitaire along the Rhine River to protect areas to 
the west from the disease.  The army deloused all civilians, displaced persons (DPs), and former 
prisoners of war (POWs) traveling west with DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) before 
crossing the Rhine.  Reception centers at the crossing points into the US zone inspected all 
persons and anyone suspected of having a communicable disease was isolated for observation.  
Tuberculosis was another dangerous threat to the occupation zone.  The army fought the disease 
by providing an extra food ration to those who self identified themselves and submitted to 
treatment.  Through proactive preventive measures, including a massive civilian inoculation 
program, the occupation experienced no major outbreaks of disease in the US zone.
53
 
Famine was also a major concern of the occupation command.  In 1945, the German 
official daily ration was 1150 calories per day.  This was not enough to prevent disease caused 
by malnutrition.  Military Government nutritional survey teams confirmed that 60 percent of all 
Germans were on a diet leading to starvation, and Stayer promptly raised the issue of ―disease 
and unrest‖ authorizations in JCS 1067 to General Clay.  This allowed the military government 
to begin direct food deliveries to the Germans from army and international stocks, despite 
restrictions in JCS 1067.  German authorities supervised distribution of food to the needy.  
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Prompt action by the commanded prevented starvation during the occupation's first winter.
54
  In 
the winter of 1946–47 famine was again a threat.  The previous winter the issue was food stocks, 
in the second winter the problem was inadequate transportation to move food to market.  The 
army stepped in to support German efforts to feed the population through Operation SPUD.  This 
operation was an effort to ensure that German farmers could get their potato crop to market in a 
timely manner.  Between October 1946 and January 1947 thirty-one army tactical truck 
companies and twenty percent of the trucks of forty-six army communities participated in the 
moment.  Again, army support to the new German administrations averted famine.
55
 
Conduct of the Occupation 1946–47 
Within a year of the war ending, the army, fulfilling the mandate of its doctrine and its 
history, sponsored democratic elections across the US occupation zone.  Until 1946, the 
American military government, even at the local level, operated through appointed German 
officials.  The highest form of appointed government in the US zone was the state landrat.  It 
was the equivalent of a state assembly.  The Americans set up one landrat for each of the three 
German länder (states) in the American zone.  The Americans appointed prominent Germans 
with impeccable anti-Nazi credentials to these positions.  The landrat‘s purpose was to advise 
the district commander and to disseminate military government directives to local German 
government officials who the military government detachments operating in the städten (towns) 
and landkreis (counties) appointed.   
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As the occupation entered 1946, its focus turned to transitioning greater responsibility for 
administration to the Germans.  This was essential for reducing the size and cost of the 
occupation forces, and for laying the foundation for transition from military government to civil 
authority.  However, giving greater control to the German officials also required elections to 
democratically select those officials.  General Clay determined that democracy had to start at the 
grass roots and thus scheduled gemeinde (village or small town with a population less than 
20,000 —the smallest German political organization) elections for January 1946.  Senior 
appointed German politicians and senior American officers such as General Lucian Truscott, 
new commander of Third Army and the Eastern Military District, opposed Clay.  The arguments 
against the election were that winter weather, lack of time to organize political parties, and 
inadequate voting organization and apparatus would combine to keep participation low.  Voter 
qualifications included being a German citizen, at least twenty-one years of age, one year‘s 
residence in the gemeinde, and no Nazi party membership before May 1, 1937 or membership in 
any of the major Nazi organizations or affiliates.  The elections were held as scheduled and The 
New York Times reported that ―Predictions that political apathy among the Germans would result 
in a fiasco in the first free elections held in this country in thirteen years were knocked flat today 
as voters converged on the polling place in great numbers.‖56 The final returns showed that 
eighty-six percent of eligible voters participated.  General Clay was very satisfied with the 
results.
57
 
The next step in the process was landkreis (county) elections.  These elections took place 
in April 1946 using the same processes used in January.  Turn out for the election was down 
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from January, but was still significant.  In Wuerttemberg-Baden and Bavaria the two Christian 
parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union 
(CSU), dominated.  In Grosse Hesse, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was most successful.  
The occupation held stadtkreis (large city) municipal elections in May and the results followed 
the pattern established in the gemeinde and landkreis.
58
 
Establishing state level government was critical because the numerous refugee, 
communications, transportation, and economic issues confronting the military government 
required coordination at the highest governmental level possible.  In June 1946, the process of 
forming elected länder governments began.  The occupation authorities held elections in the 
three American zone länder, Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Hesse, for länder constitutional 
assemblies.  Suffrage requirements were essentially unchanged except that the occupation 
permitted former Nazis, classified as followers or whom tribunals exonerated, to vote. The 
elections created constitutional assemblies that completed their work by the end of October 1946.  
Popular referendums approved all three land constitutions by the beginning of December 1946.
 
Basic provisions in all the state constitutions included an individual bill of rights, a constitutional 
court, and landtäge (state assemblies) —bicameral in Bavaria, unicameral in the other two states.  
General Clay approved all three constitutions against the advice of his own political experts and 
the State Department.  General Clay‘s reasoning was not that the constitutions were perfect, but 
rather that they represented the will of the people and if the United States wanted to demonstrate 
the importance of democracy to the Germans, the Germans had to have ownership of the 
institutions that governed them.
 59
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The establishment of land governments was a major step toward democracy and 
returning civil governance to the Germans.  However, it was not an efficient way to govern the 
entire US zone.  For zonal administration, the Americans established the Länderrat in October 
1945 in Stuttgart.  Initially, an appointed Council of Minister-Presidents met to consider issues 
affecting all the länder and coordinate those issues with the leadership of military government.  
A small permanent secretariat coordinated administration and policy between the länder and the 
military government.  The Länderrat met monthly and General Clay attended the meetings.  As 
the elected länder governments came into being, the elected officials of the länder replaced the 
appointed officials in the Länderrat. General Clay always made informal remarks at the monthly 
meeting and heard the views of the minister-presidents, and then the group adjourned for 
informal discussions over coffee.  An open press conference occurred after each meeting.  
General Clay‘s intent was not only to accomplish the business of zonal governance but also to set 
an example of the role of the press in democracy.  The Länderrat was the primary interface 
between General Clay and representatives of the German people.  The Länderrat remained the 
highest expression of German governance until the formation of the West German government in 
1949.
60
 
The military government believed that the key to the success of democracy in post-war 
Germany was eliminating Nazis from participation in the democratic process.  This was 
necessary, as General Clay indicated, to permit a new generation of leaders to emerge.  Clay also 
recognized that running the complex civil government system of a modern nation required that 
the government employ skilled individuals:  ―All too often it seems that the only men with the 
qualifications … are the career civil servants... a great proportion of whom were more than 
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nominal participants (by our definition) in the activities of the Nazi Party.‖61  Despite this 
dilemma, the American occupation vigorously pursued the identification, and if warranted the 
punishment of former Nazis.  Nazi affiliations were determined through several means.  The 
Americans required all Germans in the US zone to fill out a questionnaire focused on an 
individual‘s past political affiliations and activity, known as the frägeboden.  Intentionally 
submitting false data was a crime.  Nazi party records and interviews with other Germans were 
also sources used to identify Nazi party members. Over the course of the occupation the US 
Army processed thirteen million frägeboden.  Approximately one quarter indicated some 
affiliation with the Nazi party.  Military tribunals evaluated the individuals affiliated with the 
Nazi party to determine the degree of guilt.  Individuals were subject to one of five 
classifications:  major offender, offender, lesser offender, follower, or non-offenders.
62
  As 
tensions increased with the Soviets, the emphasis on the program decreased.  On Christmas Eve 
1946, the US authorities granted blanket amnesty to 800,000 Germans identified as followers.  
Though often rocked by scandal, the German administered tribunals continued to steadily 
evaluate all former Nazis through 1949.  The tribunals found approximately two million Nazis 
chargeable and tried some 930,000.  Of these, tribunals found more than 1,500 who were major 
offenders, and 21,000 to be offenders.  Another 580,000 were determined to be lesser offenders 
or followers.
63
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A mission that was separate but related to denazificaton was establishing and enforcing 
law and order.  Upon occupation of an area or town, the military government teams posted 
proclamations announcing the fundamental expectations of military government.  Military courts 
tried violators of occupation proclamations.  Local military government officials tried minor 
offenses and punished offenders with fines.  Local officials referred more serious offenses to 
military tribunals or courts martial.  Within four months of the end of the war, by the end of 
August 1945, German courts reopened for crimes involving Germans violating German law and 
committing offenses against other Germans.  Military tribunals continued to hear cases of 
violations of occupation directives and cases involving Germans and Americans or other 
foreigners. 
Control of the DPs living in Germany was another issue related to law and order and a 
major concern of the command.  When the war ended, the American command estimated that 
there were approximately 2.3 million DPs in the American zone.  This number did not include 
Allied prisoners of war or German refugees.  The command created special military government 
detachments to care for DPs.  Even before the war ended, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officials worked closely with military government 
officers as well as the tactical commands coordinating policy and programs for DPs.  From 
January 1946 to July 1947, UNRRA ran the DP camps in the US zone.  In 1947, the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) took over from UNRRA and increased international responsibility 
for the camps and DPs.  Populations in the DP camps increased in 1946 and 1947 as civilians 
fled Eastern Europe.  In 1948, the U.S government passed the Displaced Persons Act, which 
permitted 205,000 DPs to immigrate to the United States.  The new state of Israel also began 
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accepting DPs in 1948 and approximately 100,000 emigrated from the US occupation zone.  By 
1950, the DP population in DP centers in the US zone was down to approximately 100,000.
64
  
Displaced persons posed several problems for the military government.  First was the 
general requirement to care for them.  The occupation forces opened large camps to house DPs 
and used army and UN food sources to maintain them.  Army engineers assured the camps were 
serviceable and as comfortable as possible. The army also provided food and medical care.  
Another responsibility of the military government was to document the DP population; toward 
this end, the military government officers worked with Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) officers 
and with Allied liaison officers.  Initially military government officers supervised the DP camps 
and organized the camp populations to make them self-administering as much as possible.  Once 
documented, the primary goal of the military government was to repatriate the DPs as quickly as 
possible to their original countries. Between VE Day and October 1945, the US zone repatriated 
more than 2.3 million DPs. However, many DPs, particularly those from Eastern Europe, were 
not willing to return to their native country.  In October 1945, the US zone retained 474,000 DPs, 
of whom half were nonrepatriable.  Most of the remaining DPs were from eastern European 
countries under Soviet control.  Military government was responsible for these individuals while 
assisting in arranging immigrations.  Military government officers also organized the DPs as a 
temporary source of labor.  They were particularly useful repairing critical infrastructure 
damaged in the war and serving under US supervision, as equipment guards.  A segment of the 
DP population was also a source of organized crime.  The US Constabulary had responsibility 
for law and order in DP facilities.
65
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Initially, US policy dictated that military government would not establish German police 
organizations.  This policy changed on July 10, 1945, when  the establishment of German police 
became one of the highest priorities for the military government public safety officers.  The 
military government developed a systematic plan for reconstituting the German police.  First, all 
Nazi police organizations, of which there were dozens, were abolished.  The occupation 
authorities established decentralized police organizations of two types.  Urban areas established 
municipal police.  Policing of all other areas was the responsibility of rural police who eventually 
came under the control of the land governments.  Later, the Americans also established a border 
police to control the borders of the US zone.  Numerous problems beset the establishment of the 
new police forces but the biggest was keeping Nazis out of the force.  In some cases, such as the 
major police forces in Frankfurt, Munich, and Wiesbaden, former anti-Nazi police presidents 
were located who were more than capable of reestablishing a new reformed force with little 
supervision.  In most cases however, it was a slow process of establish police schools, training 
programs, and carefully vetting recruits.  By the end of December 1945, almost 25,000 police 
were trained and operating in rural and municipal police forces throughout the US zone.  Though 
organized relatively quickly, German police suffered from transportation and communications 
shortages, as well as a lack of weapons.  In September 1945 the army authorized weapons for the 
police, but it was not until the summer of 1946 that the army provided most police forces 
revolvers and carbines.  Also by the summer of 1946, public safety officers had released 
impounded German vehicles for police use, and in Bavaria, the Third Army made over 300 army 
jeeps available to the German police.  With improved telephone systems and the beginnings of 
police radio nets, by the end of the summer of 1946 the German police were completely 
functional.  By that time, also, they were operating in close coordination with American Military 
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Police, and U.S Constabulary units.  Such cooperation was essential because the German police 
lacked jurisdiction over Displaced Person camps and occupation personnel.
66
 
As indicated above, the German police capability disintegrated in the chaotic last weeks 
of the war.  The Allies disbanded any semblance of police cohesion that survived the war 
because it represented the Nazi regime.  Thus, in the first year of the occupation the task of 
policing fell squarely on the occupation tactical forces and military police.  The problem with 
using tactical units for police tasks was training.  In addition, the tactical and military police units 
were in a constant state of turmoil as they deployed out of the theater, deactivated, and adjusted 
to the massive individual redeployment of high point soldiers.  The problems with the tactical 
units, the lack of German police, and indications that crime was on the upswing as the effects of 
food shortages increased, caused General Eisenhower to request permission from the War 
Department to organize a permanent American military police force for Germany, the US 
Constabulary. 
With the War Department‘s authorization, General Eisenhower ordered Major General 
Ernest N. Harmon to organize a constabulary force for Germany.  Harmon, known as one of the 
top combat leaders in the army, was determined to create an elite, specially trained, and highly 
visible combat police force.  By January 1946, Harmon had organized a constabulary training 
school and fielded the first of thirty 800 man constabulary squadrons organized into ten 
regiments (three squadrons each) in three brigades (three regiments each and  one assigned to 
Austria).  A brigadier general commanded each of the three brigades, each located with the 
military government commands of the three German länder.  The headquarters of the 
constabulary officially activated on July 1, 1946.  At its high point, the Constabulary strength 
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was almost 35,000 troops.  Fortunately, a major increase in crime did not occur and as the 
German police force effectiveness improved through 1946 and 1947, the constabulary squadrons 
quickly decreased their direct involvement in local law enforcement.  Their primary tasks 
became border control, transportation supervision, and back-up support to local German police 
forces.  By the end of 1947, designated constabulary squadrons discarded their police role and 
became part of the tactical army occupation force.  The army deactivated most of the 
constabulary squadrons by 1950.  The last two constabulary squadrons deactivated in 1952.
67
  
Policy Change 
As the US military government proceeded with the process of establishing control over 
its zone of Germany, it became increasingly obvious that the tone of JCS 1067 was not 
compatible with the cooperation required between the Germans and the American occupation in 
order to successfully establish democratic institutions.  Also, US policy makers were 
increasingly aware of the harsh nature of the Soviet occupation and the aggressiveness of Soviet 
policy in Eastern Europe.  The first major break from the tone of JCS 1067, and a clear 
expressive of how important Europe and Germany were within US foreign policy, took place in 
September 1946 in a speech in Stuttgart by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.  The 
important elements of Byrnes speech were its endorsement of the economic unity of the British 
and American zones, and its proclamation that ―German people throughout Germany…should 
now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs.‖   As General Clay 
observed, ―the German people were promised the opportunity and assistance to rejoin the family 
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of nations.‖68  The speech set a new tone of German-American cooperation that continued 
through the remainder of the occupation.   
Despite and improved tone in US-German policy, the need for Allied cooperation 
continued to limit US efforts to pass responsibility to the Germans.  The process of breaking 
away from the post-war construct of the Allied Control Council began with the efforts to 
reestablish the German economy to make Germany self-sustaining and thus reduce the burden of 
the occupation on the American taxpayer.  By the summer of 1946, General Clay recognized that 
without economic unification of the national zones, Germany would remain a drain on the US 
budget.  None of the zones was economically self-sufficient.  In his report on conditions in the 
summer of 1946, General Joseph T. McNarney, who replaced Eisenhower as the USFET 
commander in December 1945, stated that the German economy was almost stagnant because 
there was no common economic policy.  On August 9, 1946, General Clay and Lieutenant 
General Brian Robertson, Deputy Military Governor of the British zone, agreed upon the broad 
principles of economic unity between the two zones.  These principles included the creation of 
German run executive agencies responsible for agriculture, finance, trade and commerce, 
industry, transportation, and communications.  Britain and the United States invited France and 
the Soviet Union to join the zonal union in accordance with the provisions of the Potsdam 
agreement, but they declined.  On September 13, 1946, German, British, and American officials 
signed the agreement to fuse the economies of the two zones. An executive committee made up 
of the German economic ministers of the three US länder and three representatives of the British 
zone supervised the economic fusion.  The occupation authorities tasked them with 
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implementing economic policy declared by the Allied Control Council, as well as coordinating 
and supervising economic policy among the länder in the US and British zones.  By March 1947, 
the transportation and communications executive had taken full responsibility for telephone and 
postal service between and within the two zones.  In May, German rail authorities assumed 
control of all railways.  A popularly elected German Economic Advisory Council was set up in 
May 1947 to give German Land government more direct say in economic policy.  The British 
and Americans ensured German officials kept the Allied Control Commission completely aware 
of the activities toward economic fusion and restated the invitations for French and Soviet 
participation frequently.  This was to avoid charges that the British and Americans were 
instigating a political union and thereby establishing a western German state.
69
 
End of the Army Occupation 1948–49 
The Achilles heel of four-power control over Germany was the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.  Through 1945, the US leadership, particularly the army 
leadership in Germany, was unaware that their vision of a free democratic Germany was 
incompatible with the future Germany envisioned by the Soviets.  Initially it appeared that the 
Soviets were reasonably cooperative within the Allied Control Council.
70
  The Allies first 
detected Soviet reluctance in the political arena.  The concept of rule by the four powers called 
for the Allied Control Council to jointly make policy decisions.  Initially, the intent was for each 
individual Allied commander to then execute those policies within the national occupation zones.  
The Allies intended this situation to be a temporary measure.  One of the most important political 
tasks of the Control Council was to organize national German institutions under the control of 
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the council.  The intent was for these institutions, run by appointed reliable and loyal Germans, 
to execute and supervise Control Council policy at the national level.  The goal was that national 
German institutions would be the first step toward rebuilding a democratic, nonthreatening 
German government.  The French and Soviets balked at setting up German national institutions.  
Though the Soviet forces ostensibly promoted democracy, they severely restricted the ability of 
German political parties to form and operate in their zone.  They intimidated, arrested, and 
harassed any German who peacefully protested Soviet policy or the activities of the Soviet 
sponsored German Communist Party.    Soviet harassment was not limited to Germans.  
Beginning in 1946 a pattern of harassing American and Allied military and civilian personnel 
began.  Most often this harassment occurred in Berlin or when traveling to Berlin.  Harassment 
also occurred along the US zone boundary with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of 
Germany.  Occasionally, such harassment became violent as in the summer of 1946 when Soviet 
troops attacked a US Constabulary patrol along the zonal border.  In an exchange of fire, one 
Soviet soldier died.
71
 
By November 1947, economic integration of the British and US zones was proceeding 
well.  However, political cooperation  with the Russians continued to deteriorate.  When the 
Allied Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in November without any agreement on 
further achievement of the Potsdam objectives or even agreeing to meet again, Generals Clay 
and Robertson agreed the time had come for the last step in bizonal economic integration.  With 
the approval of the British Foreign Minister, and US Secretary of State George Marshall, the two 
military governors proclaimed further Bizonia integration in February 1948.  The reorganization 
added a framework for German governance by expanding the Economic Advisory Council to 
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104 members.  It also established the equivalent of an upper house in the form of a Länderrat 
composed of two representatives from each of the eight German länder that comprised the 
British and American zones.  The occupation authorities gave the Länderrat authority to initiate 
legislation and to veto Economic Council legislation.  The military governors established a high 
court in March 1948 to interpret and enforce legislation across both zones.  Though not intended 
as a two state government, and completely subject to military government control, the new 
bizonal administration provided valuable administrative and governance experience to the 
Germans. 
72
  
The center of the US and Soviet competition in Germany was Berlin.  Beginning in 
January 1948, as bizonal integration increased, the Soviet forces stepped up harassing and 
impeding travel and supplies into the city of Berlin from the western zones.  Harassment of 
western Allies increased steadily through the first months of 1948.  Propaganda against the 
western Allies also reached unprecedented levels in the Soviet controlled press.  On March 20, 
1948, the Soviets abruptly adjourned the Allied Control Council meeting without setting a date 
for its next meeting.
73
  On June 22, 1948, the Soviet command in Berlin closed the highway and 
railway between Helmstedt and the British sector of Berlin, effectively cutting off all land and 
sea transportation into western Berlin.  To sustain the city and its population of 2.2 million 
civilians the Allies responded by airlifting the two necessities of survival in Berlin:  food and 
coal.  On June 28, 1948, the military governors of the western zones formally initiated an airlift 
to supply the city.  The city required 7,250 tons of cargo a day to sustain it.  During the summer 
months the requirement was only 4,500 tons.  Initially, it was difficult meeting the requirements 
of the city, but by January 1949 the airlift achieved ninety-six percent of its food goal and one 
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hundred and thirteen percent of its coal objective. This rate of supply was sufficient to maintain 
the city indefinitely.  Through the spring of 1949, the airlift increased its effectiveness achieving 
a record tonnage of 12,849 tons on April 16, 1949.  On that day, an aircraft landed at one of the 
three Allied airfields in Berlin every 63 seconds. Faced with the success of the aerial resupply 
through the winter of 1948–49, the Soviets raised the blockade of the city on May 12, 1949.74 
The importance of the blockade cannot be understated.  It demonstrated that combined 
Allied control of Germany and integration of the western and Soviet national zones was highly 
unlikely in the near future.  This realization brought increased unity to the western Allies as well 
as the western population of Germany.  The blockade helped eliminate whatever opposition 
remained to the integration of the western zones.  During the blockade, France joined its zone to 
the economic integration that already existed between the zones of the United States and Great 
Britain.  Most important, the blockade reinforced the Allies commitment to politically 
empowering the Germans of the western zones.  In the American zone, German political control 
progressed according to a systemically executed plan.
 75
  The first phase of the plan was local 
governance.  The second phase was the economic unification of the British and US zones.  This 
occurred due to economic necessity. The third phase was the complete political unification of the 
western zones.  The major rationale behind the last phase was the security threat of communism 
in general and the Soviet Union in particular. 
The success of the bizonal economic fusion and the failure of the minister‘s conference in 
November 1947 influenced France to integrate its zone with other two western Allies.  In April 
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and May 1948, Allied delegations met in London with the objective of agreeing upon guidelines 
to provide to the German constitutional assembly.  The conference produced a report which 
included three important annexes:  instructions for the minister-presidents of the German länder, 
a guide for the military governments to use to measure success of the constitutional assembly, 
and principles to use developing an Occupation Statute defining the continued occupation of 
Germany after the establishment of a West German government. On September 1, 1948 the 
delegates elected by the länder arrived in Bonn and formed a Parliamentary Council to create a 
constitution which the Germans preferred to call the ―Basic Law.‖76  The negotiations to form 
the German Basic Law were long and difficult.  The central issue of disagreement was over the 
extent and power of a future German central government.  The Germans made the first draft of 
the Basic Law available to Allies in January 1949.  The Allies made adjustments to decrease the 
power of the central government and increase the independence of the states.  Despite the Allies‘ 
recommendations, the Germans returned a second draft that made few changes.  On April 25, 
1949, the military governors met again with representatives of the German Parliamentary 
Council.  At this meeting, General Clay obtained agreement on the extent of federal government 
power.  This agreement was the necessary breakthrough that resulted in the Parliamentary 
Council agreeing on the Basic Law on May 8.  On May 12, 1949, the Allies accepted the Basic 
Law.
77
  On the same day, the blockade of Berlin ended. 
Success in Germany 
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Many problems challenged the American occupation of Germany but ultimately the 
occupation was an important part of creating an economically strong and democratic West 
Germany.  Overall the occupation was successful, but success came despite cumbersome 
coordination with Allies, lack of clear strategic guidance, dysfunctional economic policy, and a 
poorly managed transition from combat to occupation operations in the summer of 1945.  The 
American army overcame these challenges because of the initiative and planning of the G-5 
staffs and the military government detachments, the solid doctrine,  robust resources devoted to 
the occupation mission, and the leadership of Eisenhower and Clay.  Throughout the occupation 
the traditional tasks of democratization, law and order, and health and sanitation guided 
operations.  The success in the traditional American occupation tasks of occupation stabilized the 
American zone and permitted the command the time to adjust political and economic policy to 
correct the initial misguidance of JCS 1067, and to confront Soviet intransigence regarding the 
Eastern German zone,   
The Americans naively believed that they could effectively govern Germany jointly with 
three Allies.  Prior experience with France in World War I, and the difficulty the American 
government and military had dealing with the various French factions during World War II, 
should have warned the American senior leadership that making France an equal partner in the 
occupation would raise many problems while enhancing the operation very little.  The Soviets 
represented a similar problem except Soviet war efforts made their involvement in post-war 
Germany impossible to avoid.  Additionally,  President Roosevelt had made a deliberate decision 
that personal diplomacy between himself and Marshal Stalin could alleviate Soviet security 
concerns.  Even the British, with whom the United States had generally good relations and who 
shared similar post-war strategic objectives, could occasionally be difficult partners.  Thus, the 
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Allies could not avoid the slow, cautious and often indecisive decision-making coming from the 
various Allied command and policy organizations.  In the face of the inherent difficulties of the 
situation, what is surprising, and a testament to the diplomacy and leadership of General Clay, is 
that Americans were able to keep the western portion of the alliance intact, nurse the American 
zone to recovery, ultimately lead the unification of the western zones, and not start a war with 
the Soviet Union over Berlin.   
No one in the US government could change President Roosevelt‘s assessment of his 
influence with Soviet Union.  Similarly, army training and doctrine could only have a limited 
impact on the national leadership‘s policy toward Germany.  Thus, the President‘s reluctance to 
give early definitive guidance regarding post-war Germany policy, and the tendency on the part 
of the President and some of his advisors to favor a harsh peace, contrary to army doctrine, was 
difficult for the army and its leaders to influence.  Further, in the American tradition, the army 
leadership had little role influencing national political policy.  The lack of detail and the lateness 
of operational planning are all largely attributable to problems among the civilian political 
leadership at the strategic level. 
To his credit, General Clay recognized early the necessity, in accord with military 
government doctrine, for a clear direct military government chain of command.  He also 
understood that the tactical commanders, with years of combat behind them, were unlikely to be 
attuned to the political nuances of military government and give it priority.  Eisenhower agreed 
with Clay, yet it was a full six months into the occupation, and then only spurred by the Patton 
incident,  before Clay was given direct control of military government and the tactical 
commanders removed from the chain of command.  Because of this, issues such as the 
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redeployment of tactical units to the Pacific and demobilization were much more disruptive than 
they should have been. 
The army chain of command, beginning with General John H. Hilldring, the chief of the 
Civil Affairs Division at the War Department, to the men of the civil affairs detachments, was 
thoroughly schooled in the army civil affairs doctrine contained in FM 2-37.  They all clearly 
understood that the mission of military government was to ―assist military operations, to further 
national policies, and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law.‖  
They also understood that doctrine stated that, ―International law requires and military necessity 
dictates just and reasonable treatment of inhabitants of occupied territory to minimize their 
belligerency and obtain their cooperation….Proper treatment…will have a favorable influence 
upon the present and future attitude of the population toward the United States and its Allies.‖78  
The doctrine pervaded virtually all aspects of military government and prevailed in 
circumstances where policy was absent or ambiguous.  Because of the clear and well-understood 
doctrine, the harsh tone that dominated the strategic guidance did not translate into harsh practice 
at the tactical level.  Military government doctrine, ingrained in the army‘s approach to 
occupation operations, kept the occupation from failing in its first year.  This allowed enough 
time for President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes to reorient the strategic political policy 
in 1946. 
One reason the doctrine was so effective was the very deliberate training and high quality 
of military government personnel as described in the previous chapter.  Extensive training in the 
United States continued once the military government teams arrived in Britain and continued on 
the continent until the time they deployed to their assignments.  The army recruited most of the 
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military government personnel in important positions specifically because of the expertise they 
acquired as civilians.  General Eisenhower‘s evaluation was that ―the military government group 
of Americans did a remarkable job –one that reflected their sincerity and intelligence as well as 
the soundness of their special training.‖79 At the theater level, General Clay and the other senior 
commanders had immediate access to some of the top experts in literally dozens of critical skill 
areas.  At the tactical level, a thorough knowledge of the way things were suppose to be allowed 
military government officers to act in the absence of detailed guidance and to adjust to 
unforeseen circumstances. The expertise and training embodied in the military government 
personnel, facilitated success despite poor or insufficient guidance.   
Poor decisions, lack of planning, bad assumptions, and unexpected circumstances were 
all part of the military government experience in Germany.  Another factor that enabled the 
American military government effort to prevail despite adversity was resources.  Beginning in 
1944 the American army in the European theater had available thousands of civil affairs officers 
and enlisted men.  When the manpower requirements proved insufficient in the last months of 
the war, the theater authorized the conversion and retraining of tactical units to support the 
military government mission.  The individual teams were also well equipped and completely 
mobile.  Each team was authorized vehicles and radios.  Military government teams were also 
not on their own.  Army engineers and logistics units in particular, often worked in direct support 
of the military government.  The theater created ten regiments of the US Constabulary 
specifically to support the law and order aspects of military government.  Finally, when the 
Soviet leadership directly challenged the military government mission during the blockade of the 
Berlin, the entire resources of the United States Air Force supported the Military Governor in 
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order to execute US policy in Berlin.  Throughout the war the army staff placed significant 
emphasis on the resources needed to execute the military government mission.  Though on 
several occasions the estimates of personal requirements were inaccurate, there was always a 
priority to provide the resources necessary to get the governance mission accomplished.    
One aspect of the occupation of Germany that helped its success was the lack of pressure 
to finish operations quickly.  Although the American occupation leadership was well aware that 
the length of the occupation equated to costs to the US government, there was no significant 
pressure to end the occupation quickly.  American leaders moved events along as fast as they 
could without jeopardizing the mission.  The manner in which the occupation command dealt 
with the Soviets was indicative of the ability of the command to be patient regarding occupation 
policy.  General Clay worked sincerely with his Soviet counterparts for two and half years before 
concluding that there was no hope for effective Control Council governance of a united 
Germany.  The reason Clay worked so hard to find common ground with the Soviets and kept at 
it so long was that he understood that a break with the Russians guaranteed a divided Germany.  
It was only when Clay concluded that his choice was between a divided Germany and a 
Germany under Soviet domination, that he began to change the focus of military government to 
developing the self-sufficiency of the US zone in 1947.  The American government‘s investment 
in time in Germany permitted the military government to empower and organize a new 
generation of German politicians, protect the young democratic institutions from external and 
internal subversion, and supervise the rebuilding of Germany‘s economic capability. 
Probably the factor that most influenced the success of the occupation in Germany was 
leadership.  The army leadership in Washington, Generals Marshall and Hilldring and Secretary 
Stimson, worked to ensure policy toward Germany remained consistent with army doctrine.  In 
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the European theater, General Eisenhower and the men of the SHAEF G-5 staff were proactively 
seeking guidance and creating theater policy for subordinate commands.  General Clay provided 
the most critical leadership. General Lucius Clay‘s ability to deal directly with tactical 
commanders, Allies, Germans, and Washington proved to be superb.  Clay demonstrated himself 
to be a leader capable of accomplishing a critical national mission despite the fact that within his 
army experience he had never commanded more troops than an engineer company.  Clay did not 
inspire Germans with his charisma; rather, he impressed them with his competence.
80
  In 1948, 
as the Berlin crisis developed, Time magazine said ―No other American at this moment has the 
authority and responsibility for so many on-the-spot decisions that can determine whether or not 
the US this year finds itself in World War III. A man less sure of himself than Clay would break 
under such conditions. But Clay eats well, likes to take walks in his flower garden, and is mildly 
contemptuous of insomniacs ("If they'd work harder they could sleep all right").‖  Eisenhower 
considered Clay ―forceful and thorough and tactful… you would assume I am one of Clay‘s 
admirers –which I am.‖81  Historian Harold Zink concluded,  ―had the United States not had an 
officer like General Clay in Germany during 1945 and 1946, when there was little or no direction 
coming out of Washington, a heavy price might have been paid.‖82 Most important, Clay 
understood that the occupation operation was not just a mopping up operation after the war.  He 
realized that it was the key to ensuring that the sacrifices made during the combat phase of the 
war translated into strategic victory.  General Clay lived the experience of how a mismanaged 
peace after World War I contributed to the start of World War II, and was determined not to let 
that history repeat itself. 
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Of the occupations conducted in the history of the American army, the circumstances of 
the occupation of Germany were some of the most difficult.  Germany‘s economy was destroyed, 
millions had been killed, large portions of the population were homeless and refugees, and no 
political leadership existed anywhere.  Even more challenging was the lack of cogent strategic 
guidance and a Soviet ally determined to thwart US occupation objectives.  Despite these 
conditions, four years after the occupation began, a functioning democratic government was in 
place in the former western occupation zones.  A decade later, in 1955, the western zone 
achieved sovereignty and a place in the United Nations as the Federal Republic of Germany.  By 
1960, West Germany was thriving and much of the world viewed its recovery as an economic 
miracle.  These outcomes were no accident.  Army occupation doctrine, the civil affairs training 
program and expert personnel, the resources provided to support the occupation, and most 
importantly, leadership, were important factors that created the success in Germany under 
American army occupation. 
 304 
 
CHAPTER 9 - Indirect Military Government:  Japan, 1945–1952 
 
The occupation of Japan, conducted primarily by the military forces of the United States, 
bore little resemblance to the occupation policies and operations conducted simultaneously by 
US military forces in Germany.  The differences between the two occupations were primarily 
because of the unique military and political circumstances in the two theaters of war.    The 
occupation of Japan was an even greater success than Germany.  The occupation of Japan 
benefited from much more effective planning and strategic guidance than any previous 
occupation operation.  It was easier because the Japanese government bureaucracy was available 
to assist the occupation forces after surrender.  The presence of the Japanese government did not 
divert the occupation forces from following a pattern of activities in accordance with the history 
of US Army occupation: the occupation forces quickly worked to establish democratic 
government, they reformed the health services and avoided disease and famine, they  reformed 
the school system, and they instituted individual liberties.  Similar to Germany, the immediate 
actions of the army ensured enough stability to provide the time for more complete policy to 
develop in response to the Cold War and other post-war events.  Finally, the success in Japan 
could not be separated from the influence of the personality and leadership of General Douglas 
MacArthur, the military governor.  His vision, explicitly informed by the army‘s history of 
occupation operations was the key force shaping the general nature of the occupation and the 
relationship between the army and the Japanese.     
Japan, August 1945 
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Japan‘s surrender in many ways was similar to that of Germany in 1918.  Like Germany 
in 1918, much of the Japanese military capability was intact, the homeland uncompromised, the 
government was completely functional, and the surrender negotiated.  However, some things 
were different.  Though Americans did not invade the homeland, there was no doubt in the 
Allied or Japanese mind that invasion was inevitable and Japan was defeated.  Further, though 
some Japanese die-hards believed otherwise, Japanese senior military and government officials 
understood that they could not withstand an Allied invasion.  The only difference of opinion was 
over whether a strategy of bloody defense of the homeland might cause the Allies to offer better 
surrender terms than were offered in July 1945.  Another difference between post World War I 
Germany and Japan in the late summer of 1945 was the affects of Allied air attack.  Unlike the 
German economy in 1918, which the Allies disrupted, but did not destroy, with a very effective 
sea blockade, the Americans virtually destroyed the Japanese economy by air attacks in 1945.  
Moreover, the American attacks, killing hundreds of thousands of civilians and destroying 
millions of homes, caused physiological effects on the civilian population. The American air 
attacks culminated in the two atomic attacks on August 6 and 9, which together killed 
approximately 200,000 people and destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The 
Japanese also knew that the atomic attacks were just a prelude to the invasion of the home island 
of Kyushu in November.  That knowledge, the loss of Okinawa, and the atomic attacks 
convinced the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War and Emperor Hirohito to agree to 
surrender in accordance with the Potsdam terms.   Another difference was that the Japanese in 
1945 dealt with an alliance completely dominated by the policy of a single adversary, the United 
States, rather than a coalition of equal Allies as existed in World War I. A final and most 
important difference between Japan in 1945 and Germany in 1918 was that subsequent to the 
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surrender, Allied forces completely occupied Japan under conditions of unconditional surrender.  
Thus, unlike Germany in 1918, after the war ended the occupying power completely controlled 
Japan‘s future. 
The war devastated Japan.  Most of Japan‘s population of 72 million resided on the four 
large home islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido.   Japan had a large urban 
population with 23 percent of the population living in the many large cities.  The largest urban 
areas were Tokyo, population 2.8 million, Osaka, population of 1.1 million, and Kyoto, 
population 870,000.  Japan had seven additional urban areas with populations over 200,000.
1
  
Japan was a very class-conscious society not long removed from feudalism.  A small aristocratic 
elite ruled Japan, and though legally the only class distinctions that existed were between the 
nobility and commoners, many other social and economic distinctions existed in Japanese 
society.
2
 Approximately seventy percent of the population was tenet farmers.  The balance of the 
population was industrial workers.  Roughly, one-quarter of the urban population fled or 
evacuated from the cities because of the American air attacks.  This mass migration from the 
cities included as many 8.5 million people.  Tokyo‘s population reflected the scale of the exodus: 
in 1940, Tokyo‘s population was 6.7 million; after the US air attacks of 1945, more than half the 
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population fled the city.  The evacuees helped spread discouragement and disaffection for the 
war throughout the islands.
3
   
Allied air attacks destroyed much of the Japanese economy by the end of the war.  
However, air attack was not the only weapon used against the economy.  Japan was also subject 
to a very effective American submarine campaign against the Japanese merchant fleet.  The US 
strategic bombing survey concluded after the war that ―by August 1945, even without direct air 
attack on her cities and industries, the over-all level of Japanese war production would have 
declined below the peak levels of 1944 by 40 to 50 percent solely as a result of the interdiction of 
overseas imports [by submarine attack].‖  Still, the results of the unrelenting air attacks, 
particularly the firebomb attacks, were devastating.  ―In the aggregate some 40 percent of the 
built-up area of the 66 cities attacked was destroyed. Approximately 30 percent of the entire 
urban population of Japan lost their homes and many of their possessions.‖  In addition, the 
bombing survey reported: 
physical productive capacity [was reduced] by roughly the following percentages 
of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83 percent; aircraft engine plants, 75 
percent; air-frame plants, 60 percent; electronics and communication equipment 
plants, 70 percent; army ordnance plants, 30 percent; naval ordnance plants, 28 
percent; merchant and naval shipyards, 15 percent; light metals, 35 percent; ingot 
steel, 15 percent; chemicals, 10 percent.   
The survey concluded that overall, ―the physical destruction resulting from the air attack on 
Japan approximates that suffered by Germany.‖4  The attacks not only affected the economic 
capability of the country but also the psychology of the people.  In the last nine months of the 
war, Japanese civilian casualties from air attack were approximately 806,000.  Approximately 
330,000 of these were fatalities.  By the time of surrender sixty-four percent of the population 
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stated they had reached a point where they felt they personally could no longer continue to 
support the war effort.  These feelings manifested themselves in loss of faith in both the military 
and civilian leadership.
5
  The civilian population was psychologically ready for the war to end in 
August 1945. 
When the war ended, Japan still retained significant military capability.  The army and 
navy together contained 6.9 million men.  About 3.5 million men occupied the home island 
defenses, and the Japanese command dedicated 950,000 men to defend Kyushu, the first 
American objective.  Another 3.4 million men were part of the Japanese armies fighting in 
China, or scattered throughout Asia and the Pacific in various Japanese garrisons.  Unlike the 
Japanese army, little was left of the Japanese navy in the summer of 1945.  The US Navy 
destroyed most of the Japanese navy through four years of war. However, the Japanese air 
forces, both army and navy, though thoroughly outclassed by the aviation might of the United 
States and its Allies, still retained over 12,000 aircraft and over 18,000 pilots.  The Japanese high 
command carefully hoarded these resources to defend the homeland and they represented a 
significant capability to do damage to an invading force, particularly through kamikaze suicide 
tactics.  Thus, though beaten and surrendering, Japan had a significant military capability when it 
surrendered.  The occupation force had to account for that capability until the task of disarming 
and dispersing the Japanese military was complete.
6
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Japan had a unique government.  It operated under the Meiji constitution, which 
essentially organized the country as a democratic constitutional monarchy patterned loosely after 
the nineteenth-century Prussian model.  However, the constitution was vague on several key 
points, particularly the power distribution between the Emperor and the Diet.  The conservative 
interpretation of the constitution was that the supreme power resided in the Emperor.  The liberal 
interpretation was that ultimate power was invested in the Diet though its ability to make laws.  
Thus, at the top of the political hierarchy was the Emperor, who potentially welded great power.  
Also included in the government were a prime minister and cabinet.  The Emperor appointed the 
prime minister who then recommended cabinet ministers to the emperor for appointment.  The 
prime minister was one of the key advisors to the Emperor.  Other key advisors were the Privy 
Council, a permanent group of distinguished statesmen appointed by the Emperor; the Board of 
Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals; and Imperial Headquarters, consisting of the chiefs of the 
army and navy general staffs.  The most influential advisory group to the Emperor in 1945 was 
the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War.  The council, created as an advisory group in 
early 1945, consisted of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Ministers of the Army and 
Navy, and the Chiefs of the Army General Staff and Navy General Staff. These six critical 
figures advised the Emperor on war policy.  In August of 1945, they were deadlocked three to 
three regarding whether to accept the Potsdam conditions for surrender.  It was the only the 
intervention of the Emperor Hirohito that broke the tie and permitted Japan to agree to surrender 
after the atomic attacks of August.  As described above, the design of the government placed the 
Emperor at the center of decision-making and in reality, Emperor Hirohito was in fact the central 
decision maker in Japan.
7
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Plans and Policy 
The Allies outlined general post-war considerations for Japan at the Cairo conference in 
December 1943.  The three Allies involved in the Pacific war, China, Great Britain, and the 
United States determined the general conditions for the surrender of Japan: 
Japan shall be stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized or 
occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and 
the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.  Japan will also be 
expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.  The 
aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, 
are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. 
With these objects in view the three Allies… will continue to persevere in serious 
and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of 
Japan.
8
 
With the Cairo declaration, the planners of the occupation operations understood two facets of 
the occupation.  First, the declaration defined Japan‘s boundaries as the four main home islands, 
and second, it stipulated that the occupation occur under the conditions of unconditional 
surrender. 
A key assumption regarding the planning for the occupation of Japan was that it would 
follow the invasion of the home islands led by General Douglas MacArthur.  The American plan 
to seize Japan, Operation DOWNFALL, consisted of two phases.  Phase one was the occupation 
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of the island of southern Kyushu; codenamed Operation OLYMPIC.  The army planned 
OLYMPIC to occur on November 1, 1945.  The second phase was the invasion of the main 
island, Honshu, codenamed Operation CORONET.  The projected date for CORONET was 
March 1, 1946.
9
  Operation DOWNFALL was the highest planning priority.  In July, the army 
assigned Brigadier General William E. Crist to MacArthur‘s headquarters from his duty as the 
chief of military government operations on the island of Okinawa.  Crist took charge of building 
the military government organization and planning occupation operations for DOWNFALL.  
Crist understood he had about six months to get his plans and organization prepared. However, 
the fast changing situation in August that resulted in peace, made all Crist‘s plans efforts 
irrelevant.
10
 
General Crist had barely formed the military government section of MacArthur‘s 
headquarters when the army began preparing to move to Japan.  Fortunately, initial planning for 
a short-notice occupation predated the formation of the military government section.  In response 
to the JCS directive to begin planning in case of a sudden collapse of the Japanese government, 
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MacArthur‘s planners developed the Operation BLACKLIST plan.11 The purpose of Operation 
BLACKLIST was to guide American forces in the event that the Japanese government 
surrendered either before or during the conduct of Operation OLYMPIC.  The relatively simple 
plan called for the complete occupation of the four home islands of Japan, and Korea in a 
systematic phased manner by US forces:  XXIV Corps to occupy Korea; Sixth Army to occupy 
Kyushu, Shikoku, and southern Honshu; and Eighth Army to occupy northern Honshu, including 
Tokyo, and Hokkaido.  The plan called for the initial phase one forces to be in country and 
occupy their assigned areas, four key lodgment areas, within thirty days of the order to execute 
the occupation.  Troops allocated to phase one were primarily from the Operation OLYMPIC 
troop list and the plan assigned an army or Marine corps to each of the four phase one objectives.  
Phase two and three of BLACKLIST anticipated adding additional corps and expanding the 
occupation throughout the four islands. The tasks of the initial corps occupations were to destroy 
any military opposition to imposition of the surrender, disarm and demobilize the Japanese 
armed forces, control communications routes, institute military government and ensure the 
maintenance of law and order, and recover Allied prisoners of war.  Of these tasks, disarmament 
and control of communications were the two primary missions.
12
  The command disseminated 
BLACKLIST to subordinate units on August 8, 1945, seven days prior to the announcement of 
the surrender agreement by the Japanese government.  Thus, when the Japanese surrendered, 
MacArthur had completely reasonable and workable plan for physically occupying Japan on 
hand.  It became the basis for the occupation of Japan and the initial activities of the occupation 
army forces. Though BLACKLIST provided guidance for the military operations necessary to 
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physically occupy Japan, its policy guidance was sparse.  Washington provided the policy 
guidance for governance of Japan.  
Organization and Command and Control  
General Douglas MacArthur was the commander of the occupation of the Japan and 
designated the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) by President Harry Truman.  In 
addition, he was the commander of US Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC).
13
  MacArthur had wide-
ranging powers to implement the occupation, but he received considerable guidance from 
Washington.  The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) determined US national 
policy regarding Japan.  Ensuring Allied input to policy was the responsibility of the Far Eastern 
Commission (FEC), made up of the eleven countries that were at war with Japan.  The 
Commission met in Washington and thus its input was mostly through the SWNCC.  The 
American member of the Commission was Major General Frank McCoy whose long experience 
with diplomatic missions, military government, and occupation operations began as a military 
aide to General Leonard Wood in Cuba.
14
 The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) represented the 
Allies directly to the SCAP.  It consisted of four members, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the British Commonwealth, and China.  However, the ACJ had no formal authority over the 
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1989). 
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SCAP and its actions were strictly advisory and therefore ineffective.  SCAP headquarters 
received orders through directives from the JCS, then created specific implementing instructions, 
and supervised execution.
15
 
Two general headquarters (GHQ) had responsibilities for occupation policy and 
execution:  GHQ SCAP and GHQ AFPAC.  MacArthur commanded both, they were collocated 
in Tokyo, and many of the staff sections were simultaneously part of both organizations.  The 
major difference between the two headquarters was that the Allies confined SCAP activities and 
authority to Japan, though they included all services as well as Allied forces;  AFPAC had 
authority of all US Army resources in the Pacific.  The AFPAC staff was responsible for the 
supervision of Japanese compliance with SCAP occupation directives through the subordinate 
military government apparatus assigned to occupation units.  It also had responsibility for 
counter-intelligence, censorship, public safety, military police, and provost marshal operations.
16
  
Under General MacArthur, in his role as commander of AFPAC, the army formed a 
Military Government Section to plan and conduct the military government of Japan as part of the 
overall invasion plan.  The organization formed in Manila and deployed to Tokyo in September.  
However, it never received guidance as to its role and mission in the occupation from MacArthur 
or his Chief of Staff.
17
  As the circumstances of the occupation became evident through August 
and September, it was obvious that the elaborate organization necessary for direct military 
government by the army was not going to be necessary.  On September 26, 1945, AFPAC 
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disbanded the military government section. GHQ dispersed the military government personnel 
among the subordinate command military government sections or absorbed them into the new 
SCAP non-military staff sections.  The SCAP staff was officially established on October 2, 1945 
and aside from appropriate military sections such as G1, G2, G3, and G4 (working as both the 
SCAP and AFPAC staff), SCAP was set up to mirror the functions of the Japanese civil 
government.
18
  The SCAP non-military staff consisted of fourteen functional staff sections the 
most important of which were the Economic and Scientific Section, the Civil Intelligence 
Section, the Government Section, Public Health and Welfare Section, and the Civil Information 
and Education Section.
19
 
The SCAP staff communicated with the Japanese government through written 
memorandum known as SCAPINs (short for SCAP index).  The Japanese government organized 
a special ministry level organization called the Liaison and Coordination Office whose only 
function was to facilitate communication between SCAP and the Japanese government.  This 
office worked directly for the Japanese Prime Minister.  The command transmitted SCAPINs to 
the liaison office, which then transmitted the memorandum to the proper Japanese ministry or 
agency.  The SCAPINs had the force of law to the Japanese government, which often translated 
them directly into Imperial Decrees or laws for execution by the Japanese people and 
government.
20
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Below the level of SCAP and AFPAC were the two occupying armies:  the Eighth US 
Army commanded by Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger and the Sixth US Army 
commanded by General Walter Krueger.
21
 In accordance with the BLACKLIST plan, Eighth 
Army occupied the northern part of the main island of Honshu, as well as the sparsely populated 
northern island of Hokkaido.  The Eighth Army included eight combat divisions and several 
separate regimental combat teams, organized into three corps, totaling over 230,000 troops.  The 
Sixth US Army began landing on September 25.  It also consisted of eight combat divisions in 
three corps (including the V Marine Amphibious Corps) totaling approximately 250,000 troops.  
The Sixth Army had responsibility for the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and southern Honshu.  
These troop strengths reflected the high-water mark of the occupation at the end of October 
1945.  The major responsibility of the occupying armies was ensuring compliance with the 
disarmament directives of the surrender documents.  The armies also had the responsibility for 
the ensuring compliance by the Japanese government with SCAPINs.  This was primarily the 
responsibility of the military government sections of the armies and their subordinate commands. 
By early 1946, the Eighth Army supervised an extensive military government system in 
Japan. At the time of the surrender, the army possessed thousands of military government 
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specialists trained specifically for Japan.  A minority were already in Asia, the army deployed 
the remaining personnel to the theater as quickly as possible in the late summer and fall of 
1945.
22
   At Eighth Army, headquarters military government was initially a staff officer within 
the G1 staff but subsequently reorganized as a special military government staff section reporting 
directly to the army commander.  The head of the military government organization in Eighth 
Army was Colonel Rex W. Beasley, who was not a military government trained officer but 
served as the commander of the 81
st
 Infantry Division artillery during the Pacific campaign.  The 
Eighth Army controlled two military government staff sections working in I and IX Corps 
headquarters.  Below Eighth Army and the two corps, eight regional military government 
districts controlled forty-six teams allocated one to each Japanese prefecture.  The task of this 
military government infrastructure was to observe and inspect compliance with SCAP directives.  
They were to report any violations of policy.  The command permitted them to make suggestions 
to local officials but specifically prohibited them from exercising any authority.  Unlike 
Germany, ―team commanders were in no sense military governors.‖ 23      
One of the additional tasks of the occupying units was demobilization of American units.  
This began almost as soon as the commands arrived in Japan.  Demobilization accelerated as the 
occupation progressed and the competence and reliability of the Japanese government and police 
forces became obvious.  The Sixth Army officially relinquished its occupation responsibilities to 
Eighth Army on December 31, 1945.  By the end of 1945, several divisions had returned to the 
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United States.  Equally significant, most of the units remaining in Japan were grossly under 
strength.  An example of this was the 42
nd
 General Hospital in Tokyo.  Though authorized 594 
personnel, the actual strength of the unit at the beginning of 1946 was 301 personnel, or fifty-one 
percent.  By the end of January 1946, even though the Eighth Army had absorbed the bulk of 
remaining Sixth Army‘s units, the total troop strength of the occupation force was 194,061—less 
than half of what it had been just three months previously.
24
 
While the military government apparatus at the SCAP level appeared to be functioning 
smoothly and was well on its way to making a lasting impression on the Japanese government 
and people, it was not the same for the military government organizations in the occupation 
armies.  The command ordered them not to get involved directly with policy formulation or 
execution.  The Japanese soon realized that because they lacked authority, military government 
teams could not deliver consequences for non-compliance with SCAP directives.  The only way 
to correct non-compliance at the local level was for the military government teams at the local 
level to report through the many layers of command to SCAP.  Then, GHQ SCAP protested 
directly to the Japanese civil government at the national level.  This was an extremely time 
consuming and frustrating process for the teams and affected their morale and effectiveness.
25
  
Another major problem with the early military government apparatus at army level and below 
was that it had no connection to the SCAP non-military staff sections, either formally or 
informally.  Information from the SCAP staff sections passed through the SCAP Chief of Staff, 
to the AFPAC staff, then to 8
th
 Army, then through the tactical chains of command at several 
levels, and then from the tactical commanders to the military government staff officers.  This 
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ineffective command system further eroded the prestige and effectiveness of the local military 
government teams.
26
  The lack of any direct connection and the complicated traditional tactical 
linkage between SCAP staff and the military government apparatus was such that SCAP 
operated without much consideration of the military government operation.
27
  Often, the official 
chain of command did not even inform the military government elements of new SCAP 
directives to the Japanese government.  That these problem did not become a major issue during 
the occupation, except among the military government officers who felt misused and 
disrespected, is a testament to the general degree of conscientious cooperation on the part of the 
Japanese and  to the extent that the objectives of SCAP and the Japanese government coincided.   
Ultimately, the military government organization withered away from disuse.  By 1948, little 
significant military government activity occurred except at the SCAP level, and the occupation 
army‘s primary focus was garrison duty and training.  28 
The key figure in the occupation of Japan was US Army General Douglas MacArthur 
whose education, career, mentors and family relationships uniquely prepared him for assuming 
responsibility for military government and occupation duties after World War II.  MacArthur had 
a direct connection to the army‘s earliest large-scale occupation experience through his father‘s 
career and his parent‘s courtship in occupied Louisiana during Reconstruction.  Immediately 
after graduation from West Point in 1903, the army assigned him as an engineer officer in the 
Philippines working on infrastructure projects.  He also developed texts on engineering and 
reconnaissance for the Philippine Constabulary.  Soon after his tour in the Philippines, he joined 
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his father, Major General Arthur MacArthur, as an aide for the period that the general served as 
an observer of the Russo-Japanese war.  In that position, he traveled extensively in Japan, China, 
and Europe.  While traveling with his father, he attended an audience with the Japanese Emperor.  
Returning to the United States, MacArthur served as an aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, 
participated in the Panama Canal construction, and was army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood‘s 
representative with Brigadier General Frederick Funston during the occupation of Vera Cruz.
29
  
During World War I, he spent the entire war with the 42
nd
 Infantry Division, ending the war as 
the division commander during  the occupation of the Rhineland.  MacArthur became the 
youngest Chief of Staff of the army in 1932, and remained in that position until his retirement in 
1935.  Upon retirement from the army, he became the special military advisor to the President of 
the Philippine Commonwealth.  He held that position until called back to active service in 1941 
as a Lieutenant General and commander of army forces in the Far East.
30
  MacArthur was the 
beneficiary of a strong system of mentors, particularly during the crucial early part of his career.  
The most important of these was his father, Arthur MacArthur.  Douglas MacArthur was very 
close to his father, who was his role model.  He was very aware of his father‘s history as military 
governor in the Philippines, and hoped to emulate him as much as possible.  In 1945, Douglas 
MacArthur was perhaps the most experienced officer in the United States Army; he had personal 
experience with military government; and had a direct link through his mentors, Arthur 
MacArthur, Funston, and Wood, to virtually every American military government experience 
since the American Civil War.  Though he did not speak Japanese, he had lived for years in Asia 
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and traveled extensively throughout the region.  He was immensely qualified for the role of 
SCAP in post-war Japan. 
Conduct of the Occupation 
Douglas MacArthur‘s personal history and philosophies had a large impact on the 
occupation of Japan.  Equally, important was the guidance he received from the SWNCC 
through the JCS.  The JCS provided their initial guidance to MacArthur on August 29, 1945 in a 
―Statement on United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan.‖  Part II of the initial 
guidance stated, ―In view of the present character of the Japanese society and the desire of the 
United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its forces and resources, the 
Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese government machinery and 
agencies, including the Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States 
objectives.‖31 The decision to govern Japan through the Japanese government was the defining 
policy of the entire occupation as described by the SCAP official history:  
On August 30, GHQ, AFPAC issued an amendment to Operations Instructions 
No. 4, which materially altered the missions assigned to the Army commanders 
who soon would be arriving on the Nippon homeland.  Instead of actually 
instituting ―military government,‖ Army commanders were to supervise the 
execution the policies relative to government functions which GHQ AFPAC, was 
to issue directly to the Japanese Government; likewise the functions of the Armies 
with respect to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces 
were changed from ―operational control and direction to ―supervision of the 
execution‖ of orders transmitted to the Japanese by GHQ AFPAC.   
The army called this ―passive‖ military government, in contrast to ―active‖ military government 
practiced in Germany.
32
  This policy guidance from Washington was based on the Japanese 
surrender and fundamentally changed the approach to military government in Japan —making it 
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radically different from what was happening simultaneously in Germany.  It also rendered much 
of the military government organization in AFPAC less critical, as discussed above. 
More formal and specific guidance came in JCS Directive 1380/15 published on 
November 15, 1945.  This very clear and complete document more definitively stated US policy 
but did not fundamentally alter the initial policy guidance.  It also strongly recommended some 
courses of action to pursue.  It became a checklist of the tasks  SCAP had to accomplish in 
Japan.  However, the document did not dictate to SCAP how to achieve goals.  It gave SCAP 
objectives, and almost unlimited powers.  It only required that MacArthur report his actions to 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The initial guidance issued in August, and the formal JCS Directive 
issued to MacArthur in November, gave the SCAP a very clear mission statement: 
The ultimate objective of the United Nations with respect to Japan is to foster 
conditions which will give the greatest possible assurance that Japan will not 
again become a menace to the peace and security of the world and will permit her 
eventual admission as a responsible and peaceful member of the family of 
nations…. The United States desires that the Japanese Government conform as 
closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government, but it is not the 
responsibility of the occupation forces to impose on Japan any form of 
government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.
33
 
Within his clear mission statement and the specific guidance of JCS Directive 1380/15, 
MacArthur had free rein to achieve the objectives of the United States government the best way 
that he knew how. 
The major mission of the occupation armies was the disarmament of the Japanese 
military forces.  Again, MacArthur‘s guidance was unequivocal:  ―Disarmament and 
demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out 
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promptly and with determination.‖34 The Japanese military in Japan had over two million men 
under arms.  In addition, ―ninety-seven percent of Japan's stocks of guns, shells, explosives, and 
other military supplies were thoroughly protected in dispersed or underground storage depots.‖  
As indicated earlier, the Japanese military chain of command executed the disarmament 
supervised by the American occupation units.  Between August 15 and November 1, 1945, the 
Japanese War Ministry demobilized approximately 2.3 million active troops in the home islands.  
This was 97 percent of the entire force.  The ministries also had responsibility for demobilizing 
the millions of troops returning from foreign assignments.  As the scale of demobilization 
decreased over time, the ministries became bureaus in June 1946, and were eventually abolished 
in October 1947.  The Japanese government transferred lingering responsibilities for 
demobilization and disarmament to existing civilian ministries.
35
   
The initial guidance to SCAP, issued in August 1945 and reiterated in JCS 1380/15, was 
somewhat vague on the specifics of post-war Japanese government: 
To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible 
government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the 
objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government 
should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government 
but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any 
form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.
36
 
This guidance did not specifically address the Emperor in post-war Japan issue, nor did it make a 
judgment regarding the status of the Japanese Meiji constitution.  It implied, however, that those 
two related tasks were the responsibility of SCAP.  SCAP tasked the mission of supervising 
democratic government in Japan to the Government Section (GS) of the SCAP staff, headed by 
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Brigadier General Courtney Whitney.  Whitney was an army air corps reserve pilot, World War I 
veteran, and civilian lawyer.  
37
  Unlike all of the previous American experience with 
occupations, the Japanese government remained functioning through the US occupation of 
Japan.  Thus, the military governor‘s task was not to build a capacity to govern, but rather to 
adjust the prevailing organization and policies of government to ensure alignment with US post-
surrender policy.  The Japanese surrender documents invested the authority to adjust the 
Japanese government in General MacArthur as SCAP.  SCAP made his adjustments to Japanese 
government by working with and through the Japanese government.  Still, though this 
arrangement was unique in American occupation history, many of the characteristics of the 
American occupation experience were evident in the process.  Continuity with previous 
occupation experiences appeared in the decision to write a new Japanese constitution, and to 
establish basic individual freedoms.   
In the first year of the occupation the Japanese government focused its greatest energy on 
saving the position of the Emperor in the post-war government.  The United States made no 
promises regarding retention of the Emperor in the surrender terms.
38
  Given this situation, it was 
the unpublicized objective of successive Japanese governments after the surrender to protect the 
place of the Emperor within Japanese politics.  In general, the Americans and General 
MacArthur supported this position because American Japanese experts recognized the central 
role that the Emperor occupied in Japanese history, culture, and politics.  More practically, 
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American policy makers recognized that the cooperation of the Emperor made occupation 
operations significantly easier from the standpoints of policy, cooperation, and cost.  War Plans 
Division in Washington recognized this fact as early as May 45 and it was a position strongly 
advocated by Secretary of War Henry Stimson.
39
 Thus, American policy was to use the Emperor 
to facilitate occupation policy. 
Though both the Japanese moderate politicians and SCAP wanted to protect the Emperor, 
their visions of the future role of the Emperor in Japanese government was fundamentally 
different.  The Americans believed that Japanese militarism that had led to World War II was a 
function of flaws in the Meiji constitution.
40
  Thus, the Americans understood that the only way 
to fundamentally change Japanese politics and to democratize Japan was to change the 
constitution.  This was a point of conflict with Japanese officials because the Meiji constitution 
was also the source of the Emperor‘s political power.  MacArthur assigned the task of 
supervising the revision of the Japanese constitution to the Government Section.
41
  MacArthur 
directed Prime Minister Kijuro Shidehara to democratize the constitution on October 11, 1945.  
At the end of January 1946, the Japanese returned their recommended draft ideas for a new 
constitution to the SCAP staff.  The Japanese recommendations were a disappointment to the 
staff and to MacArthur.  The Japanese revision did not substantially altered the core of the Meiji 
constitution.  MacArthur and his staff concluded that the Japanese were not capable of creating a 
significantly new political document.  MacArthur and General Whitney determined that the GS, 
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working in complete secrecy, should rewrite the document.  In six days, under the direction of 
Harvard trained lawyer Colonel Charles L. Cades, the GS created a new document.  The staff 
presented that document, which became the basis of the future ―Peace constitution,‖ to 
MacArthur and he approved it on February 12.  On February 13, the GS gave the draft to the 
Japanese government for their consideration.  Occupation officials directed the Japanese officials 
to propose the document to the Diet as if it was their own product.  The Japanese took the GS 
draft, translated it, and subtly altered it.  The changes made by the Japanese were not 
fundamental but made the document more authentically Japanese.
42
  On March 5, the Emperor 
endorsed the new constitution.  The Japanese newspapers published an outline of the proposed 
constitution on March 6. The Japanese Diet debated the new document April to August, and 
approved the document on November 3, 1946.  It went into effect six months later and it became 
the basis of all Japanese law.   The new constitution articulated a position for the Emperor that 
was a clear break from the political role he played during the war, yet retained his person and 
image as a unifying national symbol.
43
 
The new constitution created the legal tools to make Japan a true functioning democracy. 
Among many traditional democratic and liberal concepts, the constitution established absolute 
equality under the law regardless of sex, race, social status or family origin; it abolished the 
Japanese nobility, guaranteed universal adult suffrage, freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, 
speech and the press; equality of the sexes in regards to all aspects of marriage; and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest, search, and the right to counsel.  It also established the Diet as ―the highest 
organ of the state power,‖ and organized it with two houses.  The constitution vested all 
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executive power in the Prime minister and the Cabinet.  The constitution also established an 
independent judiciary with a supreme court as the court of last resort with power to determine the 
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.  The most controversial aspect of 
the constitution was Article 9, known as the peace clause.  The article stated in part ―the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation,‖ and ―land, sea, and air 
forces… will never be maintained.‖ 44  Many observers thought this last clause was unrealistic.  
Others believed that it still preserved the right to self-defense.  Article 9 was controversial and 
has remained the subject of debate since 1946.  It has, however, not been revoked or amended.  
Two reasons motivated MacArthur to move quickly in creating a new Japanese 
constitution.  One was that the Far Eastern Council scheduled its first meeting in late February 
1946 and MacArthur did not want the Council, in which the Soviet Union had a veto authority, 
in any way involved in the constitution writing process.  The second reason was that MacArthur 
had scheduled national elections for a new Diet in April 1946.  He wanted prospective legislators 
to campaign on the proposed new constitution.  In effect, MacArthur wanted the first post-war 
election to be an unofficial plebiscite on the constitution.  The Japanese government held its first 
post-war national elections on April 10, 1946 —twenty-six million Japanese voted at over 
21,000 polling places in the first elections.  The military government teams of Eighth Army 
mobilized to carefully observe for any disturbance or discrepancies in the carefully planned 
voting procedures.  Military government officers also closely watched Japanese procedures for 
securing the completed ballots. SCAP concluded that, 
The arrangements by the Japanese officials for handling voters in the polling 
places were worked out in great detail and remarkably efficient. The Japanese 
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people were orderly at the polls; there were no recorded instances of misconduct 
or disorder. Women, voting for the first time, appeared to have no difficulty with 
the voting procedure. 
Candidates who ran in favor of the new constitution won overwhelmingly.  Radical parties such 
as the Japanese Communist party got only a small portion of the vote.  Women candidates, 
running for public office for the first time in Japanese history, won 38 of 466 seats in the Diet. 
Over thirteen million women voted in the election —approximately sixty-six percent of those 
eligible.  Overall, new candidates won 375 seats, and the new diet represented thirty-three 
different political parties, indicating that the election resulted in a significant change in the 
individuals making up Japan‘s government.45  Less than a year after the end of the war the 
Japanese had democratically endorsed a new constitution and elected a new government. 
To facilitate true democratic opportunities, including elections and the new constitution, 
SCAP took action to ensure the rights of individual Japanese.  MacArthur did this early in the 
occupation and it facilitated the first elections and the constitutional debate.  On October 4, 1945, 
SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese government that became essentially the Japanese bill of 
rights.  Many of the provisions of the directive later appeared in the Japanese constitution, but 
importantly, the actions that MacArthur directed went into law almost immediately.  The 
directive ordered the Japanese government to abrogate all laws that ―establish or maintain 
restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the 
unrestricted discussion of the Emperor,‖ or ―by their terms…operate unequally in favor of or 
against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.‖  It also abolished all 
secret police organizations and ordered the release of all political prisoners.  As of result of this 
decree the government removed over 5,000 police officials, the Japanese communist party 
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emerged in public, and the cabinet of Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni resigned in mass.  
MacArthur followed up this directive by ordering the new Prime Minister, Kijuro Shidehara, to 
immediately implement five additional reforms:  the enfranchisement of women, the 
encouragement of labor unions, the reform of education, the elimination of secret inquisition, and 
the promotion of wider distribution of ownership of the means of production and trade.
46
  These 
reforms were in accordance with pre-surrender planning and began the process of economic and 
cultural reform discussed below. 
The military government also used purges to forward the democratic process in Japan.  
Purges occurred in several waves as the occupation authorities identified different categories of 
individuals who posed a threat to occupation policies or the stability of Japanese government.  
The first purge occurred soon after the surrender with the goal of eliminating the worst of the 
conservative and military factions who supported the war from key public positions.  The second 
purge aimed at eliminating centralized control of business activity.  A final significant purge 
occurred in 1947 and 1948 as the occupation identified an increasing threat of Soviet backed 
communist activity.  This last purge eliminated communists and affiliated persons from key 
public positions, especially in organized labor.
47
  These purges facilitated the SCAP working 
through the Japanese government, eliminated opposition to SCAP policies, and intimidated 
potential opposition to SCAP policies and directives.  With the exception of the purge of the 
communists, the purges were one of the most unpopular and covertly resisted SCAP policies. 
The US occupation authorities met little resistance implementing health and sanitation 
reform.  In accordance with their history, the Americans made securing the occupation forces 
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and the indigenous population against the outbreak of disease, and preventing famine a top 
priority.  Disease and malnutrition were the responsibility of the Public Health and Welfare 
Section of the SCAP staff under brigadier General Crawford Sams.
48
  The Japanese police ran 
the Japanese health department and when US authorities abolished the national police, they also 
abolished much of the national health organization.  Sams used the power of the SCAP to build a 
completely new national medical system.  He organized a national health ministry, prefecture 
and local health organizations, and a national medical school and nursing school system.  He 
took control, literally, of all Japanese medical professionals in the country, and placed them 
within the new organizations he constructed.  He modeled the Japanese medical system on the 
major medical reforms that took place in the United States in the early twentieth century.  While 
reorganizing the entire medical system, Sams simultaneously dealt with a host of diseases 
threatening the population. He organized over 360,000 Japanese into sanitation teams across 
Japan.  The teams decontaminated individuals and locations, supervised sanitation regulations, 
assisted with insect control, and provided education.  Sams instituted mandatory national 
immunization projects that had immediate effects on the spread of disease. In the first three 
years, the revamped health system saved of over five million Japanese lives.  Opposition to the 
US medical efforts was not significant but what there was came from within the Japan doctor 
associations who resisted the professionalization efforts of the Americans.  After a meeting with 
the Emperor‘s uncle, Sams gained the royal family‘s support for his efforts and that eliminated 
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all significant resistance.  The US medical efforts increased life expectancy significantly, 
reduced the mortality rates, controlled epidemics, and essentially and most importantly, provided 
the Japanese government and society a modern professional medical system that could sustain 
the policies implemented under General Sams into the future.
49
 
In 1945, a combination of typhoons and flooding destroyed one third of Japan‘s rice crop.  
In addition, the end of the war cut off the normal imports of rice from the Empire.  These 
conditions, combined with the reduction of food rations during the war placed ten million 
Japanese on the brink of starvation.  The Allied command did not anticipate this condition and 
although occupation plans had no requirements to support occupation troops with Japanese 
rations, there also were no plans to supplement the Japanese food supply.  SCAP initially fed the 
population with Japanese military reserve rations.  At the same time, SCAP requested emergency 
relief from Washington.  It was not until January 1946 that Allied emergency food supplies 
began to reach Japan.  The relief was not too soon as deaths were occurring due to malnutrition.  
One estimate attributed over a thousand deaths in Tokyo during the first three months of the 
occupation to malnutrition.  American food supplies arrived at irregular intervals from 1946 on, 
but issues related to diet and famine remained a concern in Japan until 1949.   
One of the major breakthroughs of Sams' section was in the area of nutrition.  The Health 
and Welfare section set up national diet surveys to monitor nutrition.  The section discovered a 
national protein shortage among children.  The Americans set up a specific program to attack 
nutrition deficiencies through the school system.  Sams arranged a demonstration of his program 
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in the Tokyo school system for Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.  The demonstration program 
showed such a dramatic change in the health of children that the Japanese government 
immediately and enthusiastically implemented a national school lunch program.
50
 
JCS economic guidance precluded the SCAP from taking ―any responsibility for the 
economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy.‖  The guidance 
did not preclude the Japanese from improving their economic condition, but it made clear that it 
was a Japanese not occupation force responsibility.  The American occupation‘s concern with 
economics in Japan was primarily as economics related to security, and health and welfare. 
Security aspects of economics had to do with reactionary elements within the labor movement, 
dismantling the arms industry, reparations, and unemployment that could lead to unrest.  Health 
and welfare concerns had to do with improving the agricultural capacity of the country to lessen 
the threat of famine and disease.
51
   
The occupation directive specifically required SCAP to break up the large industrial and 
banking magnates that controlled much of the Japanese economy:  ―You will require plans for 
dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentrations of 
private business control.‖  The Allies believed that these organizations, known as the zaibatsu, 
had a strong influence, for business reasons, on Japan‘s expansionist war policy.  American 
economic experts on the SCAP staff also saw them as undemocratic monopolies.  Therefore, the 
SCAP Scientific and Economic Section developed a plan to break up several dozen of the largest 
zaibatsu into component companies that had no formal or informal relationships.  This program 
was unpopular with most segments of Japanese society because it threatened jobs, retirement 
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pensions, and the rapid economic recovery.  Breaking up the zaibatsu occurred at a slow but 
steady pace beginning in 1946, but ended uncompleted in 1948.  A change in US policy toward 
Japan contained in National Security Council Paper (NCS) 13/2 (see below) caused the end of 
the anti-zaibatsu program.  In 1948, the occupation economic priority changed to building up 
Japanese industrial capability.
52
  
In the years immediately after the surrender in 1945, the Japanese economy made little 
progress toward recovery.  In 1949, the Secretary of Defense appointed American economics 
expert, Joseph Dodge as a special advisor to the SCAP for economic issues.  Dodge was 
specifically appointed to address the Japanese economy issue and soon announced the ―Dodge 
Line‖ policy for economic recovery.  This policy firmly established Japanese industrial recovery 
as a top US priority.  Dodge‘s policies imposed severe fiscal limitations on the Japanese 
government and were hugely unpopular.  By 1950, the new economic policies had curbed 
Japanese inflation and balanced the government budget, but at the cost of dramatic budget cuts in 
education, welfare, and public works programs.  The Dodge plan‘s results were ambiguous at 
best: unemployment steadily rose, and observers of the Japanese economy sensed a coming 
economic depression.  Japan averted an economic disaster only because of the beginning of the 
Korean War in the summer of 1950.  The war created a market for Japanese goods, and cash 
flow for Japanese industry beginning in 1951.  In total, the war brought in 2.3 billion dollars into 
the Japanese economy between 1951 and 1953.  The US military spent an additional 1.75 billion 
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dollars in the three years after the war ended.  These vast expenditures were the impetus required 
to begin Japan‘s economic recovery.53 
A great occupation success was agriculture reform.  Non-owners worked over half of the 
land under cultivation in Japan in 1945.  Roughly seventy percent of all farmers were involved in 
some sort of tenancy.  Despite the almost feudal organization of agriculture, land reform was not 
one of the tasks assigned to SCAP by the JCS guidance.  The origins of the land reform idea 
were the writings of prewar Japanese university intellectuals.  SCAP saw land reform as a 
solution to two problems: food shortages and radicalization of the large rural peasant population 
by subversive groups.  MacArthur was personally in favor of the idea because it was a concept 
that his father had advocated but not been able to implement during the Philippine War. In 
October 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to develop legislation for land reform.  In 
January 1946, SCAP rejected the legislation as too conservative and developed its own land 
reform plan.  The land reform legislation developed by SCAP, with input from the ACJ, became 
law in October 1946.  Implementation of the land reform was largely complete by 1948, and by 
1949, it had reallocated two million hectares of arable land.  The reform reduced the number of 
landless tenant farmers to seven percent, fifty-seven percent of rural families were farm owners, 
thirty-five percent were part owners part tenant farmers, and independent farmers cultivated 
ninety percent of all cropland. 
54
 The joint staff guidance to SCAP specifically addressed labor 
reform: ―Require the Japanese to remove, as rapidly as practicable, wartime controls over labor 
and reinstate protective labor legislation. Require the removal of all legal hindrances to the 
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formation of organizations of employees along democratic lines.‖55  Steps toward increasing 
organized labor in Japan began soon after the occupation forces arrived.  Within a short time 
organized labor surged.   By 1947, 25,000 different unions had a combined membership over 
five million.  By 1950, there were seven million union members. With the large growth in 
organized labor came the danger of increased communist influence in the country.  General 
MacArthur was not overly concerned with communist influence, but both Japanese government 
officials and the SCAP G2 counter-intelligence section were.  The Japanese and the G2 both 
monitored the increasing influence of communist in the labor movement.  MacArthur remained 
uninterested in communist labor efforts until January 1947 when a group of labor organizations 
threatened a national general strike.  MacArthur encouraged the Japanese government to deal 
with the unions and avoid a strike.  Radical labor leaders considered the strike a major 
demonstration of their national political power and were determined that it go forward despite 
the government offering pay increases up to forty percent.  On the eve of strike, SCAP got 
directly involved and MacArthur prohibited the strike, and notified the unions that he would use 
the power of the occupation forces to break any effort to strike.  The unions backed down, the 
workers received their pay increases, and communist influence in labor organization diminished 
greatly.   Attempts by the Japanese communists to influence the labor movement through 
Japanese army veterans converted to communism in Soviet prisoner of war camps also proved 
unsuccessful and created a backlash against communism among the Japanese population.  
Because of the problems with radicals, communists in particular, SCAP permitted the Japanese 
government to exert more control over labor organizations.  MacArthur later, however, admitted 
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that the reorganization of Japanese labor, to make it a progressive and positive aspect of society 
and the Japanese economy, ―was only partially successful.‖56 
The occupation authorities understood that to fundamentally change Japan they had to 
accomplish more than changing the mechanics of the political apparatus.  The Japanese could 
easily undermine such changes once the occupation period was over.  One way to do this was to 
fundamentally change the economy.  Land reform was a success toward this end  —effecting the 
largest portion of the population.  However, the other economic reforms, organizing labor and 
decartelization, were only partly successful.  Success of the occupation therefore, hinged on the 
occupation‘s ability to directly effect the attitudes and outlook of the population.  The SCAP 
addressed policy in three major areas in its efforts to erase the militarization of Japanese society 
and substitute liberal democratic values.  These areas were education, religion, and the media. 
Japanese education reform was an example of how occupation policies did not change 
Japan directly, but instead indirectly empowered Japanese reformers to make changes that 
otherwise would have been difficult or impossible to achieve.  Reforming education was the 
primary mission of the Civil Information and Education (CI&E) Section. The earliest reforms in 
education came in the fall of 1945 as the SCAP staff, in accordance with occupation policy, 
ordered the Japanese Education Ministry to implement policies to remove militaristic and 
nationalistic instruction and text from schools, screen teachers to remove ultra conservative 
militarists, and end military training.  In 1946, SCAP began to research progressive policies 
necessary to improve the Japanese education system and make it more supportive of democratic 
ideals.  The recommended education reforms included simplifying written Japanese;  shortening 
the school week to five days; adding electives; integrating core subjects such as social studies, 
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science and math; discouraging rote memorization;  decentralizing school control from the 
national government to local elected school boards; introducing the concept of home rooms; 
formation of student councils;  and adding sports and school extra-curricular clubs. The new 
national constitution included three education clauses:  separating religion from state education; 
guaranteed academic freedom; and established the right to universal, compulsory, and free public 
education.  Screening committees and policies screened over 700,000 individual teachers to 
remove those with militarist backgrounds, but by 1948 the committees removed only 3,000.  
However, the threat of screening induced many to resign, and the process eliminated 
approximately twenty-five percent of Japan‘s professional educators.57  Overall, using mostly the 
ideas of liberal Japanese reformers, SCAP transformed the Japanese education system into a 
bulwark for democratic ideas. 
As indicated above, the new Japanese constitution eliminated religion from the public 
education system.  The new constitution also eliminated any state support for the Shinto religion, 
which the Meiji constitution proclaimed as the official state religion.  However, before the 
approval of the constitution SCAP issued SCAPIN 448, the subject of which was ―Abolition of 
Governmental Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto.‖  The directive 
prohibited state sponsorship or financial aid to shrines and any participation in any Shinto 
practices by government officials acting in their official capacity.  It also directed the Japanese 
government give all religions the same legal status.  SCAPIN 448 became the basis for 
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constitution Articles 20 and 89, guaranteeing freedom of religion and prohibiting public funding 
of religion.
58
 SCAP‘s efforts effectively made Japan a secular state. 
The occupation used the media as a third technique to eliminate militarism from Japanese 
culture and implant in its place a respect for democracy.  Control of information during the 
occupation took two forms.  One form was censorship designed to limit the distribution of 
information.  The other form was a pro-occupation and pro-democracy propaganda campaign 
designed to market democratic ideals and incite Japanese public approval of occupation policies.  
The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) of the G2 Counter-Intelligence Section was 
responsible for civil censorship and used two different tactics, precensorship and monitoring.  
The occupation normally punished violation of censorship guidelines by the suspension of 
publication or broadcast privileges. At the beginning of the occupation most censorship took the 
form of monitoring.  CCD discovered as early as September 1945 that this was not effective.  
Japanese media outlets were asserting anti-occupation news that was factually suspect.  
Controversial news items included alleging that Japan did not surrender unconditionally, 
challenging the facts of Japanese atrocities, and  highlighting the indiscipline of Allied 
occupation troops.  To stop what the occupation authorities considered misleading news, 
censorship restrictions gradually increased through the fall of 1945.  By 1946, strict pre-
censorship was in place on most large media outlets.  Censorship of Japanese media began to 
phase out in 1947 and SCAP mostly eliminated precensorship of materials by the end of that 
year.
 59
  William Coughlin, a SCAP critic who focused on SCAP‘s relationship with the Japanese 
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media and overall press policy, concluded, ―the SCAP censorship of the press for nearly three 
years was an unfortunate but necessary evil.‖ 60 
CCD told the Japanese press what they could not do.  SCAP tasked the mission to 
influence the public‘s attitudes to the CI&E Section.  The CI&E Section told the Japanese media 
what it should publish.  The section‘s main mission, the reform of Japanese education, partly 
addressed this issue.  However, the command influenced the larger adult population using the 
tools of mass media.  The CI&E fed news stories to the Japanese press, broadcast its own radio 
shows, and imported US media such as newspapers, books and movies toward meeting this 
objective.  Though its initial efforts were clumsy, over time the CI&E section developed several 
effective techniques to connect to the Japanese population, including some very popular radio 
shows.  The CI&E also opened American information centers that included large libraries 
throughout Japan.  By 1949 seventeen such centers were open, included one located with each 
major Japanese university.
61
      
End of the Occupation 
In late February and March 1948 George Kennan, a senior State Department official and 
its most influential strategist, made an assessment visit to Japan.  By 1948, much had changed 
since the SWNCC and the JCS provided initial policy guidance to SCAP after the surrender of 
Japan.  Relations with the Soviet Union had steadily deteriorated and the two nations and their 
Allies were on the verge of the Cold War.  Most important, China was falling apart and it was 
apparent that the nationalist government was not going to be a strong ally for stability in Asia, if 
it survived.  As Kennan reflected later, Japan was the key to American national security issues in 
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Asia:  ―if at any time in the postwar period the Soviet leaders had been confronted with a choice 
between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the 
latter.‖  Thus, in Kennan‘s mind, Japan was the Cold War prize in Asia and the objective of US 
policy had to be to keep it in the American camp.  Kennan also believed that Japan was 
politically ready for sovereignty.  What concerned Kennan was that at the end of 1947, a 
sovereign Japan had no obvious defensive capability relative to potentially aggressive 
communist states in North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.
62
 
Soon after his return to Washington, Kennan wrote National Security Council paper 13/2, 
which outlined a plan for the incorporation of Japan into US national security strategy.   In 
particular, NSC 13/2 outlined the necessity of transforming Japan to resist internal communist 
threats without US support.  Kennan‘s view was that the new goal of the occupation should be to 
―achievement of maximum stability of Japanese society, in order that Japan may best be able to 
stand on her own feet when the protecting hand is withdrawn..‖  Kennan‘s paper provided new 
guidance for the occupation forces in Japan:  relax SCAP involvement in Japanese internal 
affairs, mandate no further reform legislation, reduce occupation costs, stop reparations, the 
priority of SCAP should be economic recovery, gradually cease political purges of militarists, 
develop a centralized Japanese police capability, focus long term US infrastructure development 
on Okinawa, and delay a final peace treaty until the Japanese government demonstrated 
sustainable stability.  The President, the State Department, and the Department of the Army all 
approved of Kennan‘s paper with only minor changes.  SCAP policies beginning in late 1948 
and throughout 1949, showed the influence of Kennan‘s proposals. 63   
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Kennan‘s visit and his policy writings, in conjunction with the SCAP‘s own assessment 
of the status of the occupation in the light of the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union, 
mark a distinct shift in occupation priorities.  The Japanese refer to this shift as the ―reverse 
course‖ period.  However, it was not a reverse of occupation policies, but rather a shift in 
priorities.  Kennan‘s view was that General MacArthur was ―largely in agreement‖ with the shift 
in US priorities in Asia and occupation policies. In the economic sphere, the priority shifted from 
decentralizing and democratizing the Japanese economy, to economic development.  Politically, 
the emphasis changed from eliminating conservative tendencies to encouraging pro-American 
policies.  SCAP control of Japan gradually loosened as the command achieved initial occupation 
objectives, military resources declined, and Japanese governance and administration steadily 
improved.  A purge continued in Japan, but from 1949 on the emphasis of the command was on 
eliminating communists in public positions.  In the spring of 1950, the process of developing a 
peace treaty with Japan began.  Events culminated in the summer of 1950 with the communist 
invasion of South Korea.  That event absorbed the bulk of SCAP resources and attention.  By the 
early fall of 1950 SCAP was completely focused on the Korean War and SCAP‘s main concern 
with Japan was leveraging Japanese resources to aid the war effort in Korea.  Japan became the 
main American base for waging the Korean War.  It was the center of US air and naval 
operations against Korea and it was the strategic logistics base for ground operations.  Because 
of the Korean War, Japan‘s economy finally began to improve.  The Korean War added more 
urgency to creating a national Japanese Police reserve force –the precursor of Japan‘s national 
defense military forces.  Finally, the Korea war set the conditions for the San Francisco peace 
treaty between the United Nations and Japan.
64
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On September 8, 1951, the United States and 49 other UN members and Japan signed the 
San Francisco peace treaty ending the US occupation of Japan.  The treaty came into force on 
April 28, 1952.  The treaty was a non-punitive treaty.  Concurrent with the signing of the peace 
treaty the United States and Japan signed a treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the 
two countries.  This treaty insured Japan‘s external security despite Article IX of the Japanese 
constitution.  The non-punitive spirit and letter of the treaty was in no small measure attributable 
to the strong mutual respect developed between the two nations through the shared occupation 
experience. 
Success in Japan 
Overall, the occupation of Japan succeeded.  The Allies achieved virtually all of their 
initial occupation goals.  The Japanese constitution fundamentally and permanently altered the 
nature of Japanese government.  It successfully created a democratic and demilitarized state.  
The Japanese people were satisfied with occupation policies and results.  As early as May 1946 
American intelligence sources were confirming ―Japan's cities are in ruins and its people are 
threatened with starvation, yet the Japanese outwardly welcome their conquerors with smiles and 
sincere offers of assistance.‖65 The acceptance of the constitution, democratic government, and 
cultural reforms, particularly in the area of education, demonstrated the acquiescence of the 
Japanese people to occupation goals and policies.  Finally, most historians, both Japanese and 
American, agree that the positive accomplishments of the occupation out-weigh the unavoidable 
mistakes, misguided policies, and conservative actions that occurred.  Japanese occupation 
historian Eiji Takemae, while warning that conservative forces continue to chip away at 
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progressive ideals established in the occupation period, concluded, ―Japanese can take pride in 
the peaceful, prosperous and democratic society they have constructed since then from the ashes 
of the Old Order.‖66 The most prominent American historian of the period, John W. Dower, 
critiqued ―the binational bureaucratic cult, the old-style corporatism that survived the passage 
from war to peace, the mystique of nonaccountability symbolized by the sovereign, [and] the 
stunted aspects of the new imperial democracy,‖ but conceded ―MacArthur was quite accurate 
when he spoke of a society that had undergone significant change.  Postwar Japan was a vastly 
freer and more egalitarian nation than imperial Japan had been.  Its people had become chary of 
militarism and war to a degree matched by few other societies in our world.‖67 Adequate 
resources, solid but flexible planning, sufficient time to achieve its objectives, and decisive and 
enlightened leadership made the occupation a success. 
The amount of planning and resources devoted to occupation operations during and after 
the war were significant.  The thousands of Japanese specialists trained by the army‘s Civil 
Affairs Division and deployed into theater were exactly what the mission required.  Additionally, 
the army and the state department augmented the military government specialists with American 
civilian employees, and hired thousands of Japanese once the occupation forces arrived in Japan.  
As important, though there was a definite shortage of Japanese expertise in the United States 
overall, the government identified the very best experts on all aspects of Japanese society and 
arranged for them to contribute to the occupation effort.   
The level that planning occurred was also important.  Though President Roosevelt was 
not intimately involved in occupation planning for Japan, the Cabinet consulted with President 
Truman regularly and he approved the occupation policy.   Secretaries of State and War were 
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closely involved in policymaking and the interdepartmental staffs and working groups, 
particularly the SWNCC, were key to ensuring a unified governmental approach to the issue.  
The US government did not neglect Japan occupation policy at the strategic level.  Different 
from the army‘s history, clear strategic guidance and an abundance of tactical resources 
permitted the occupation to succeed even though the speed of surrender precluded detailed 
tactical planning. 
The occupation of Japan lasted six years.  General MacArthur from his earliest comments 
on occupation policy understood that the occupation could not run too long.  However, there was 
also an understanding within SCAP and the American government that the post-war policies in 
Japan had to be successful in order to justify the sacrifices made during the war.  Therefore, there 
was no rush to reach a peace treaty, and no significant political pressure to end the occupation 
before it did.  Awareness of the importance of time was implicit in George Kennan‘s observation 
that a demonstration of ―sustainable stability‖ was necessary before signing a peace treaty.  
Sufficient time allowed the SCAP to implement policy, supervise and evaluate policy, and make 
adjustments.  Many SCAP policies, such as censorship and education reform, may have made 
lasting negative impressions or may not have lasted beyond the occupation as policy.  However,  
with time to observe compliance with policies, phase out unnecessary restrictions, and reinforce 
effective ideas, most SCAP reforms were eventually embraced by the Japanese population. 
General MacArthur‘s leadership was an important aspect of the success of the 
occupation.  In many ways, he personified the American occupation authority as Time magazine 
described him in 1948: ―brilliant soldier and administrator, great showman, benevolent dictator, 
steadfast egoist.‖68  In many ways he resembled two of his mentors, Arthur MacArthur and 
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Leonard Wood.  MacArthur was a controversial figure; nonetheless, his decisions and his 
personality were directly responsible for a large part of the success of the occupation.  Former 
military government officers, who were highly critical of their role in Japan, still concluded that 
credit for ―the unexpected success of the entire operation …belongs to General MacArthur.‖69  
MacArthur‘s decision to disregard much of the military government apparatus upon arrival in 
Japan and to run the occupation through a special non-military staff was unorthodox but 
effective.  Many considered his decision to release political prisoners, particularly communists, 
dangerous and it did cause some problems with organized labor, but it undoubtedly established 
his legitimate sincere interest in true reform.  SCAP‘s ability to balance the need for censorship 
and control of information with the requirements for freedom of expression and press met the 
needs of Japan in both the short and long term.  MacArthur‘s decision to push hard for a 
dramatic new constitution, including Article 9, the peace clause, and the elimination of the 
Emperor‘s political power, unequivocally demonstrated that the new democratic Japan would 
have no significant political ties to militaristic Imperial Japan.  MacArthur‘s personality and his 
personal history also undoubtedly contributed to his effectiveness.  MacArthur‘s flexibility in 
responding to George Kennan‘s new priorities in 1948 demonstrated a willingness to adopt new 
ideas when they represented well thought-out solutions to identified problems.  Though he was 
no linguist, his long history of living in Asia, combined with his unusually long service in high 
command (in 1945 he had been a general officer for twenty-seven years) gave MacArthur an 
unusual instinctive understanding of the role of symbolism.  He often struck just the right cord in 
critical situations.  Japanese historian Kawai Kazuo‘s   description of the impact of MacArthur‘s  
decision to fly into Atsugi airfield on August 30, 1945 and then to travel essentially unarmed into 
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Yokohama, illustrates the role that MacArthur‘s unique personality often played during the 
occupation: 
It was an exhibition of cool personal courage; it was even more a gesture of trust 
in the good faith of the Japanese. It was a masterpiece of psychology, which 
completely disarmed Japanese apprehensions.  From that moment, whatever 
danger there might have been of a fanatic attack on the Americans vanished in a 
wave of Japanese admiration and gratitude.
70
 
Throughout the course of the occupation, MacArthur demonstrated just the right empathy with 
Japanese values, but at the same time never compromised his mission or his supreme authority.  
MacArthur‘s unique leadership was an important element in the SCAP‘s overall mission success. 
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CHAPTER 10 - The American Way of Occupation 
 
In the eighty-seven years, between 1865 and 1952, the US Army engaged in occupation 
and military government operations at least seven times covering a span of forty-one years —
forty-seven percent of the period.  Before World War II, the army conducted occupation and 
military government operations for twenty-eight of the seventy-six years, 1865 to 1941 —thirty-
seven percent of the period.  These calculations do not include the fourteen years, 1877 to 1890, 
when active operations on the western frontier continued.  No other mission, including combat 
operations, was as consistently required of the US Army as occupation and military government.  
Beginning in 1865, American army occupation operations demonstrated a continuity of actions 
and approach.  Each occupation operation built upon the experiences of preceding operations.  
During the period, the important mission of military government became a part of the army‘s 
institutional culture.  The army‘s culture came to understand that successful occupation 
operations were essential to strategic victory.   The post-World War II occupations of Japan and 
Germany were a success partly due to the institutional culture that anticipated the mission, 
planned and allocated resources for it, and focused the army‘s leadership on it both during the 
war and for several years afterward.  The occupations of Germany and Japan embodied the 
American approach to occupations that had evolved over the years.  However, there were several 
aspects of occupation operations that were unsuccessful.   
Institutional Culture 
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Army doctrine was a consistent contributor to the success of military occupation 
operations and provided an important direct connection between early experiences and World 
War II.
1
  However, there was another factor that directly linked the World War II generation of 
leaders with the history of the army‘s occupation experiences: institutional culture.  The US 
Army that entered World War II had a distinct culture, most dramatically represented by the 
regular army officer corps.  The institutional culture was a product of personal experiences 
passed from generation to generation through formal officer education and a vast interpersonal 
network of mentors, friends and family.  Culture is a complex concept.  British anthropologist 
Edward B. Tylor proposed one of the first and simplest definitions of culture in his 1871 book 
Primitive Culture, ―a complex whole including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capability or habit acquired by human beings as members of society.‖2  A more 
specific and comprehensive definition used by the GLOBE research study of the relationships 
between culture, leadership and organizations is ―shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and 
interpretations and meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of 
members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations.‖3  Many factors influence 
culture; one of the most important is kinship relations among the organization‘s members.  
Another factor is the particular nature of the organization.
4
  The history, education, structure, and 
missions of the army defined it as an organization.  The living conditions, social and political 
atmosphere, and attitudes and priorities of the organization‘s members and leaders affected the 
kinship relationships within the organization.  Leaders, in particular, set the tone, imposed their 
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own values and assumptions, and acted as role models.
5
 In the case of the culture of the regular 
army officer corps, which led the army in World War II, kinship relations and the nature of the 
organization reinforced each other to produce an institutional culture that understood and 
accepted the importance of post-conflict operations to strategic military success. 
Social anthropologists struggle to define the term kinship and its relationship to culture.  
All generally agree that there is a biological component to kinship relations, but relationships 
related to environment also fall within the scope of the term kinship.  The small core of regular 
army officers on active service in 1922 was less than 12,000 and as the United States approached 
World War II, active officers still numbered less than 15,000.
6
  This small group was a tightly 
knit cadre of professionals with very strong personal ties to each other and to the organization.  
Most had social and professional connections that were as strong as family relations, including 
many who were direct family relatives. This group of career professionals, more than any other, 
defined the army‘s institutional culture.  
West Point was central to the sense of community among army officers.  Military 
sociologist Morris Janowitz in his classic study of the military profession, The Professional 
Soldier, noted, ―[T]he academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession.  
They are the source of the pervasive…sense of fraternity which prevails among military men.‖7 
Except for the period of mobilization for World War I when the army expanded greatly, the 
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majority of officers entering the army between 1900 and 1939 were graduates of West Point.
8
  
Between 1900 and 1939, West Point contributed an average of 181 officers per year to the Army.  
The highest number of commissioning occurred in 1939 when West Point commissioned 456 
cadets as second lieutenants, and the lowest number was in 1921, when the academy 
commissioned only seventeen.  From 1898 to 1940, two-thirds of all general officers of the 
regular army graduated from West Point.
9
  Assimilation into the army culture began at West 
Point.  The academy experience tied the cadet closely to his classmates; he also came to know 
well the other classes attending the academy at the same time.  In four-years at the academy the 
cadet was likely to share the experience with over 1200 other cadets.
10
  The bonds formed at 
West Point represented the type of strong kinship relationships that the army fostered and which 
occurred outside the traditional family.  Faculty members were also an important influence on 
the cadets as well. 
Actual family kinship relations were also an important contributor to the strength of army 
culture.  Janowitz noted that families in the pre-World War II military were ―deeply involved in 
the transmission of military tradition.‖11 Of the graduating West Point cadets between 1900 and 
1939, twenty-six percent were direct descendants (sons, grandsons, or both) of graduates.
12
 
Numerous other cadets married into army families.  Janowitz observed that ―a proper marriage 
by a young officer to the daughter of a high-ranking officer was a relevant step in building a 
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career, and service wives worked hard to screen potential candidates.‖13  Lieutenant (later 
brigadier general) Harry Chamberlin (USMA 10) is an example of how marriage connected 
officers.  Chamberlin married Sally Garlington, daughter of General Ernst Garlington (USMA 
76), niece of General J. Franklin Bell (USMA 76), and sister of then Lieutenant Creswell 
Garlington (USMA 10). Sally Garlington was the personal secretary for family friend General 
George C. Marshall throughout World War II.
14
 Though Chamberlin did not come from a 
military family, marriage integrated him into one of the most distinguished families in the army.  
Kinship relations were an especially powerful vehicle for perpetuating attitudes regarding the 
army and its mission to subsequent generations of officer.  The transmission of attitudes occurred 
through direct interpersonal interaction.  Army officers, in the 1920s and 1930s, like all previous 
generations of professional army officers, spent most of their professional and personal lives 
together in very close and often isolated communities.  They spent months and sometimes years 
together in remote parts of the world, on field exercises, or on missions.  The isolation and forced 
interaction of the army officer began for cadets at West Point and continued throughout the 
career of the regular officer.  In those isolated settings, interaction including the sharing of life 
stories was unavoidable.  A great body of anecdotal evidence indicates that this was the case.  
General Hamilton Howze (USMA 30) described how his father‘s (Robert Lee Howze, USMA 
88) house at Fort Bliss after World War I was frequently visited by old comrades including 
General John Pershing (USMA 86) and Colonel Billy Mitchell.  The senior Howze and 
Pershing‘s relationship included shared service at West Point, the Ghost Dance War, the Spanish 
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American War, the Philippine War, and World War I.
15
  George Marshall‘s house at Fort 
Benning in the 1930s was the location of late Friday night gin games and informal study groups 
that regularly included future army leaders Joseph Stillwell, Omar Bradley, Courtney Hodges, 
and J. Lawton Collins.
16
  Shared service created additional kinship ties similar to family 
relations.  
The major source of ideas about occupation operations was the experiences of the army‘s 
leaders, their friends and mentors, and their families.  In the seventy-six years prior to 1941 
every generation of American regular army officers engaged in major military government 
occupation operations, or closely associated tasks.  They passed these experiences on to 
subsequent generations of army officers who took ownership of them.
17
  World War II leader, 
General Lucien Truscott, recalled how as a young officer his commanders were a constant source 
on the army‘s history.  Truscott remembered one, Colonel George H. Morgan, winner of the 
Medal of Honor in action against the Apache in 1882, who ―was always entertaining us with 
tales of the frontier and the ―Old Army.‖  Another, Colonel Arthur Poillon, had served in a 
variety of military attaché positions and ―shared his knowledge of both the early history of the 
regiment and of the area with all on many pleasant expeditions and picnics.‖ 18  It was the rare 
regular officer in 1940 who was not aware of the army‘s history, including the occupations and 
large-scale civil-military operations that were part of the army‘s history.  All of the senior leaders 
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of the World War II occupations, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Clay, Marshall, and thousands of 
others were immersed in the army‘s institutional culture through their personal kinship relations 
and their professional experiences.    Through them and the complex web of interpersonal 
relations that linked them, the army‘s institutional culture influenced the army‘s understanding 
of, and therefore its success executing occupation operations. 
The American Way of Occupation 
American army occupation operations through World War II share some general 
characteristics that comprise a unique American approach to such operations: an American way 
of conducting occupation operations, an American way of occupation.  Such characteristics 
include the primacy of installing democratic government, transitioning government to civil 
control as quickly as possible, an understanding of the limits of imposing foreign ideas on native 
populations, a reliance on the civilian leadership for strategic policy, and an emphasis on public 
education, the rule of law, and the health and welfare of the civilian population.  These 
characteristics typified American occupation from the Confederacy to Japan. 
The American army made establishing democratic government its top priority when 
conducting occupation operations.  The army employed a set pattern:  create the rules of 
suffrage, organize local elections and elect constitutional assemblies, guide the writing of a 
constitution, and supervise electing a democratic government according to the approved 
constitution.  The army followed this pattern beginning in the former Confederate States and 
remained consistent with it through the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II.  
The only major exceptions were the occupations of the Vera Cruz, the Rhineland and Italy.  In 
those cases indigenous government systems predated the occupation and did not have to  be 
constructed.   
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Interestingly, in addition to following a consistent political formation pattern, the army 
also consistently manipulated the suffrage laws in order to influence to the greatest extent 
possible the post-occupation government.  In the former Confederate states the suffrage laws 
built into the state constitutions ensured Freedmen‘s rights and state Republican Party 
governments.  In post-World War II Germany, and to a lesser extent in Japan, the exclusion of 
former Nazis and militarists from voting was an effective means of destroying the political 
power of the wartime regimes.  In Japan, enfranchising women also changed the nature of the 
indigenous political system.  However, using suffrage as a means to control future policy was not 
always successful.  In Cuba, for example, post-occupation Cuban politicians and policy were 
frequently at odds with those of the United States. 
The American army‘s occupation approach featured an emphasis on turning the occupied 
territory over to civil authorities as quickly as possible.  General Marshall told General Hilldring 
when he took over the Civil Affairs Division ―Your mission is to start planning from the day you 
go into business, how you‗re going to get out it as fast as possible.‖19 Demilitarizing occupation 
operations was because of military necessity but rather the unique civil-military environment in 
which the US Army traditionally operated.  Part of that was the American population‘s insistence 
on dramatically reducing army forces immediately after the cessation of hostilities.  This 
occurred in all wars and greatly influenced post-conflict operations.  In all the occupations prior 
to World War II, army governance operated under severe manpower constraints.  This was 
particularly evident after the Civil War and in the Philippines where geography and indigenous 
opposition made the need for manpower acute.  In Cuba and the Rhineland, opposition was 
nonexistent and governed area was small so manpower was not a major problem.  After World 
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War II, the occupation forces also quickly demobilized.  However, demobilization only occurred 
after the occupation command assured itself that there was no armed resistance.  In addition, 
though occupation forces after World War II demobilized, very robust civil affairs capability 
remained to facilitate the transition to civil rule. 
Demobilization was one reason that American occupation commanders were anxious to 
end military governance as quickly as possible.  Another reason was the general American 
distaste for military rule.  Generals Ulysses Grant, and Lucius Clay were both uncomfortable 
with the military role in governance and wanted to end it as quickly as possible.  Clay pursued a 
rigorous program of civilianizing the military government in Germany.
20
  Even Douglas 
MacArthur, who was very comfortable in his role as SCAP, understood that if not withdrawn in a 
timely manner, occupation forces could become a strategic liability.
21
  In all American military 
government missions, except the Philippines, not only did the army quickly and dramatically 
reduce military forces after hostilities, they also pursued a very aggressive timeline for creating 
constitutions, holding elections, and turning over governance to civilian authority.  In all cases, 
except the Philippines, the army quickly and efficiently set up a civil authority representing the 
native population.
22
  The process used was virtually identical in all cases and considered 
legitimate by the bulk of the population.  
Also laudable was the American sensitivity to local culture, language, religion, and 
politics.  The tolerance of the army leadership is attributable to two factors.  First was the army‘s 
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frontier experience.  The close relationship between army officers and the Native Americans 
accustomed generations of army officers to non-Christian peoples and culture.  Duty on the 
Mexican border, as well as the minorities in the army‘s own ranks, introduced most army 
officers to the Catholic religion and Hispanic and African-American culture before many of their 
peers in the American social elite.  These associations tended to make army officers more 
tolerant of the people and institutions they encountered in the Philippines, Cuba, Italy, Germany 
and Japan. 
The army‘s sensitivity to native culture and tradition was reflected in the occupation 
institutions the army created.  In the American South, the state governments did not differ 
substantially in form from their pre-war (and Presidential Reconstruction) predecessors.  In Cuba 
and the Philippines, which had no previous history of government, the government systems were 
largely patterned on the US model.  However, in Germany, Italy and Japan, parliamentary 
systems, completely different from the US model, were permitted to function because that was 
the national tradition.  Sensitivity to local traditions led to a high priority for relations with the 
Catholic Church in the Philippines and Italy, and influenced the legal systems created in Cuba 
and the Philippines, and recreated in Germany, Italy, and Japan.  In all cases, the army permitted 
the retention of the bulk of the legal traditions of the occupied country.  The army‘s endorsement 
of the Japanese Emperor demonstrated the considerable degree that the American military 
ignored wartime attitudes and prejudices in the interest of occupation success.   
The army‘s emphasis on linguistic ability also contributed to its ability to adapt to the 
environment of the occupied nation.  Language ability was highly valued on the American 
frontier.  Command of Spanish proved invaluable to operations on the Mexican border, 
particularly against the Apache, as well as in Cuba and the Philippines.  Generals Bliss, Pershing, 
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Scott, and Allen were all outstanding linguists.  Scott was the one of the foremost authorities on 
Native American sign language.  General Pershing, though not fluent, had a working knowledge 
of Tagolog, Spanish, French, and Japanese.  Generals Bliss and Allen were both fluent in French 
and Spanish, while Bliss was competent in German and Allen was fluent in that language as well 
as Russian.  Before World War I and after, language was a mandatory component of the army 
education system, particularly the staff college at Fort Leavenworth.  Until World War I, the 
language for operations within the army was Spanish, while the languages for professional 
education and development were German and French.  Acquiring language skills fostered 
cultural understanding and often produced cultural empathy.  Thus, a byproduct of the army‘s 
emphasis on linguistic skills was an officer corps that was both culturally aware and largely 
empathetic with the situations of native populations.   
One historian of the German occupation noted that none of the key American general 
officers could speak German.  However, it would be wrong to conclude from that fact that 
language proficiency was not an important aspect of the occupation‘s success.  The army in fact 
continued to recognize the importance of language ability during World War II.  General 
Marshall himself was competent in Spanish and French and had a working knowledge of 
Chinese.  Language was perhaps the most emphasized component in the World War II military 
government school system and was highly prized in the army‘s Civil Affairs Division.  Thus, 
though senior commanders such Lucius Clay and Douglas MacArthur, may not have had a 
personal knowledge of German or Japanese, many of the officers who dealt daily with the 
Germans and Japanese did. 
During the occupation, army officers were aware of US domestic politics and 
communicated with the civilian leadership.  They always recognized the principle of civilian 
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primacy over operations, but they did not hesitate to consider domestic political issues or consult 
with civilian leaders when forging policy.  The nature of occupation operations thrust military 
governors into the midst of American foreign policy.  Once he was satisfied that he understood 
President Johnson‘s Reconstruction program, General Grant was very vocal criticizing it.  He 
used several devices, including general officer assignments, to mitigate what he perceived as the 
damage the President was inflicting on the recent military victory.  However, Grant never 
directly challenged the President‘s authority.  He ultimately registered his disagreement by 
running against Johnson for President in 1868.  Several decades later, General Arthur MacArthur 
curtailed his military operations in the Philippines to support President McKinley‘s 1900 
reelection bid.  The military governors also monitored the attitudes and polices of the Congress.  
General Leonard Wood was not shy about advocating tariff exemptions for Cuban sugar to 
Congress.  General Clay was equally ardent arguing for Germany‘s inclusion in the Marshall 
plan. 
Military governors thus attempted to influence policy but tdid not challenge civilian 
primacy.  Sometimes the civilian leadership had to define what conduct of the military 
government was acceptable.  This was the case when Secretary of War Root constrained General 
Leonard Wood‘s lobbying to Congress on Cuba‘s behalf.  Nevertheless, in the history of 
American military government, there were no cases of army officers operating in open defiance 
of the national civilian authorities or policy. 
Education was one facet of occupation in which the army consistently demonstrated a 
strong and unique interest.  This began with  the occupation of the South, where the Union army, 
through the Freedmen Bureau,  established publicly supported schools for the children of former 
slaves, ultimately leading to public education throughout the region.  In all subsequent 
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occupations, the American command gave education significant priority.  The army‘s support of 
the Carlisle Indian School demonstrates the army‘s commitment to education during its 
operations in the American West.  In the Philippines and Cuba, not only did the command 
quickly reestablish and improve the school systems, but the occupation authorities put great 
emphasis on teacher training, education and pay.  The army sent Cuban teachers to the United 
States for training, and urged recruitment of large numbers of American teachers for the 
Philippines.  Education policy garnered much attention in the occupations of Germany and Japan 
as well where officials examined the indigenous education systems to ensure liberal curricula 
and eliminate militaristic teachers.  The army saw education as a fundamental requirement for 
stable democratic government.  Thus, for the army education reform reinforced the number one 
occupation priority, democratization. 
Another army occupation priority was reestablishing a sound legal system.  Sociologist 
Richard Brown in his study of early twentieth century senior army officers made the point that 
respect for law and order was a cornerstone of the social beliefs of the army leadership before 
World War II.  Further, he identified General Order 100, and the Rules of Land Warfare manuals 
that followed, as a critical component of that belief system.
23
   Many of the army‘s military 
governors, Generals Halleck, Otis, Arthur MacArthur, Pershing and Dickman among them, had 
strong academic backgrounds in law.  Beginning in Cuba and the Philippines, the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) corps was always a key component in army governance.  Colonel I.L. 
Hunt, who established the army‘s occupation system in the Rhineland was a JAG officer, as was 
General Enoch Crowder, a key advisor to Arthur MacArthur in the Philippines and to Charles E. 
MaGoon (himself a lawyer) in Cuba.  Until 1940, the JAG office was the proponent of army 
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military government doctrine and army lawyers taught the subject in the army school system.  It 
was also no coincidence that the three Secretaries of War who had the greatest influence on US 
military government overseas, Elihu Root, Howard Taft, and Henry Stimson, were noted 
lawyers.  The result of the American emphasis on the importance of law in occupation operations  
was legitimacy in the eyes of the native population, the international community, and the 
American public. 
Related to the reestablishing the rule of law in post-conflict operations was forming 
indigenous police forces.  The one notable failure of the American army to do this was during 
Reconstruction and it was likely a contributing factor to the general lawlessness of much of the 
South and in the slow response of federal forces to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan.  The importance 
of indigenous police had its precedent on the American frontier, where Native American scouts 
notably assisted army regular forces defusing confrontations between settlers and Indian tribes.  
The Philippine Constabulary and the Cuban Rural Guard were important to  the rule of law, 
legitimization, and political stabilization in those occupations.  The Carabinieri in Italy and the 
rehabilitated German and Japanese police forces were also important aspects of controlling crime 
and preventing anarchy in post World War II Europe and Japan.  In many cases, the army 
employed civilian police experts to help create the new force and instill the vital ethics of 
service, professionalism, and political neutrality. 
In all occupation operations after Reconstruction, the US Army demonstrated a strong 
concern for the health and welfare of the civilian population.  This characteristic emerged after 
the Spanish-American War.  The army medical corps led the medical efforts in Cuba and the 
Philippines.  Army doctors instituted modern vaccination programs, researched local diseases, 
established local health care professional standards, and designed sanitation regulations wherever 
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the army went.  In Germany, the army supervised the rebuilding of the shattered medical 
institutions.  In Japan, General Sams oversaw the rebuilding and modernization of the entire 
health care system.  The success of army health care programs reflected in dramatically 
improved civilian mortality statistics in all areas where the American army located.  Despite 
unprecedented destruction from unrestricted strategic bombing and atomic attack, army doctors 
prevented widespread famine and pestilence in all the post-World War II occupations.  Army 
medical programs saved lives and resources, and legitimized the occupation force in the eyes of 
the civilian population.  Medical programs were a major contributor to occupation success.  
Challenges Not Met 
Though the history of American postwar occupations is one of increasing success, the US 
Army systemically failed to anticipate or correctly address several facets of the operations.  
Foremost among these failures was the inability of the national leadership to anticipate post-
conflict occupation, develop suitable policy, and provide the army clear guidance.  Additionally, 
the United States consistently failed to understand the relationship between economics and 
political stability.  The army also consistently failed to manage the transition from combat to 
post-combat operations posture. These failures threatened to undermine strategic success and at 
the least increased the duration of the occupation. 
One of the most consistent themes throughout the history of American military 
occupation operations was the lack of clear political guidance.  After the Civil War President 
Johnson‘s guidance to the army was clear but it did not match what the army leadership and the 
Congress thought were the strategic objectives of the war.  This disunity was fatal to the mission.  
In Cuba and the Philippines, the army‘s problem was the almost total lack of guidance from the 
President.  In the case of Cuba, fortunately, the Congress had made clear before the Spanish-
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American War that the strategic objective was Cuban independence.  In the case of the 
Philippines, neither the President nor Congress had a clear idea what the national policy was or 
should be.  Even after the United States annexed the Philippines, the American national 
leadership hinted to the Filipinos that the annexation was not permanent.  Policy in the Rhineland 
was equally obscure.  No plan existed to occupy the Rhineland as late as two weeks before the 
war ended.  After the American army initially occupied the Rhineland, the United States did not 
agree to a permanent occupation until just before signing the Versailles Peace Treaty.  Finally, 
the failure of the US government to ratify the treaty placed the US Army in midst of an Allied 
occupation disconnected politically from the other occupying armies. 
The American record of engaging in occupation operations without either long-term or 
short-term national strategic guidance continued in World War II.  Henry Stimson, the 
experienced Secretary of War, understood this history but given President Roosevelt‘s personal 
style of governance, he was almost powerless to stop it.  Thus, General Eisenhower, the theater 
commander, made the major decisions regarding occupation policy in North Africa and Italy.  He 
made the two crucial decisions to work with the Vichy government in North Africa, and to 
cooperate with the Italian government after it surrendered.  In the case of Germany, Roosevelt‘s 
style again prevented timely, coherent, systematic planning, resulting in late dissemination of 
policy and flawed economic guidance in the final strategic directive, JCS 1067.  The US 
government had a better organized process for the planning of the occupation of Japan.  This was 
despite the fact that the surrender of Japan came months before the Americans anticipated it.  
Policy for the occupation of Japan, as outlined in JCS 1380, was clear and comprehensive and 
complemented the occupation plan, Operation BLACKLIST.  This was because President 
Truman did not interfere significantly with the process and the new inter-departmental planning 
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organization, the SWNCC, provided the needed strategic perspective, expertise and 
interdepartmental coordinating capability.  The occupation of Japan also required little detailed 
coordination among the Allied powers, being mainly an American operation.  Still, JCS 1380 
contained flawed economic guidance for the commander. 
A major shortcoming in the history of the American occupation operations was the 
continual failure of the senior leadership to recognize the indispensability of progressive 
economic development to occupation success.  The Achilles heel of every major US Army 
occupation was the failure to remedy the economic weakness of the occupied area.  There was no 
meaningful economic revitalization plan for the occupied Confederate states.  Congress stymied 
Cuban economic revitalization despite the best efforts of General Wood and Secretary Root.  In 
the Philippines, the Americans made little effort to support the Philippine economy.  Economic 
comprehension was completely absent in the World War II approach to occupation operations.  
During the war in Italy, and in both JCS 1067 and 1380 after the war, government policy 
specifically prohibited the army from engaging in the rehabilitation of the Italian, German, and 
Japanese economy.  In Germany, this occurred despite widespread understanding among 
economists and business executives within the US government of the interdependence of the 
European national economies, both friendly and enemy.  In Germany, the steps taken by General 
Clay toward zonal economic integration and revitalization of the Ruhr industrial area occurred 
despite JCS 1067.  The Marshall plan happened only after the war was over and US officials, 
struggling to stabilize Europe politically and economically, demonstrated to the Congress that 
massive economic support to Europe, including Germany, was critical to political stability.  
However, the United States did not decide to implement the Marshall Plan until fully two years 
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after the war ended, and the plan did not begin to have an impact until 1949, fully four years 
after the war ended, and after the military occupation of Germany was essentially over. 
Economic policy toward Japan, like initial policy toward Germany, precluded occupation 
support to the Japanese economy.  Unlike Germany, there were no strong links between the 
Japanese economy and that of major American Allies in the region, so no Marshall plan rescued 
it.  By 1948, however, US occupation officials recognized the close relationship between 
Japanese political stability and economic stability and prosperity.  The growing Soviet threat in 
Asia and the fall of China also caused a reevaluation of Japan as a potential allied partner.  
Ultimately, however, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 rescued the Japanese 
economy.  The Korean War fully engaged the American military in Asia and Japan became the 
strategic logistics base for US forces fighting in Korea.  This resulted in the United States 
spending billions of dollars in Japan for goods and services necessary to support the war.  
American spending for the Korean War provided the necessary capital to revitalize Japanese 
industry.  This occurred despite the occupation plan rather than because of it.  Ironically, during 
World War II the US military and government demonstrated a laudable strategic understanding 
of the relationship between national industrial capacity and warfighting, but only belatedly 
realized that that same strategic link existed between post-conflict success and economic policy. 
One of the American army‘s historical lessons about occupation was the need to organize 
the occupation forces along local political boundaries.  Colonel Hunt made this recommendation 
explicitly after World War I.  In Cuba, the army organized its forces based on the Cuban 
provincial organization from the beginning of the occupation.  In the Philippines, the complexity 
of the guerrilla war made the transition from operational organization to territorial organization 
more difficult.  In the Rhineland, the army was slow to adapt its occupation organization to 
 365 
German political organization. Despite Hunt‘s advice, the army mismanaged the transition from 
tactical organization to territorial organization during and after World War II in both Germany 
and Italy.  In Germany, tactical commands governed the occupation for too long after the end of 
hostilities.  This not only violated the necessity of aligning the military command with the 
political organization of the country, but it also placed tactical headquarters, untrained and 
unfocused on occupation operations, in charge of military government.  This directly 
contradicted the doctrinal guidance in FM 27-5. 
Conclusions   
Over its history from the American Civil War to World War II, the US Army engaged in 
several large-scale military government and occupation operations.  Over that period the army 
learned from its experiences and developed an unofficial, yet systematic approach to occupation 
operations.  That systematic approach focused on developing democratic institutions, quickly 
transferring control to civil authorities, respecting local cultural traditions, enforcing law and 
order, and facilitating education the health and welfare of the population.  The army captured this 
approach to occupation operations in doctrine but also informally through an institutional culture 
that passed the experiences of occupation operations from generation to generation.  The leaders 
of occupation operations in World War II were in most cases only two generations removed from 
the army experience in Reconstruction, and in cases such as Douglas MacArthur, only one.  
Thus, in World War II, the army adequately planned and robustly supported occupation 
operations.  This mitigated the effects of defective policy and uncooperative Allies, ensuring 
relative stability and buying time for policy corrections. To a significant extent, these actions by 
the army contributed to the success of the occupation of Germany and Japan after 1945. 
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 In planning and executing occupation operations during and after World War II, US 
forces made many mistakes, and in many cases failed to recognize and correct systemic mistakes 
made in similar operations in the army‘s history.  However, particularly in the World War II era, 
the understanding of the strategic importance of occupation operations pervaded all levels of the 
American army.  By World War II, the American army had inculcated the strategic importance 
of occupation operations in the army‘s culture.  Doctrine reinforced the intuitive cultural 
acceptance of the mission.  In the World War II era, the army recognized the need for occupation 
operations early.  There was no debate within the army about the importance of the occupation 
operations and the requirement for large-scale dedication of assets to them.  This understanding, 
however, was not evident in just World War II.  General Grant and his perceptions of the 
Reconstruction set the precedent for future generations of army leaders sensing the 
Clausewitzian relationship between strategic political policy, war, and post-conflict occupation 
success.  That sensing ensured that army leaders such as Grant, Arthur MacArthur, Wood, Bell, 
Pershing, Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Clay, and Marshall personally engaged the 
occupation mission and made certain their staffs allocated the resources necessary to make those 
missions successful.  
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